An agent user is the child identity associated with an agent identity, created after the blueprint is authenticated and authorised. It is not a person, but it can still hold access and generate activity, so offboarding and attestations must cover it explicitly.
What the term means in practice
An agent user is best understood as a subordinate, executable identity created for an agent after the agent blueprint has been authenticated and authorised. The important security point is that it can act, persist, and produce audit-relevant activity on its own, so it must be governed as a real access-bearing identity rather than treated as a mere configuration detail.
This matters because the “child” relationship changes ownership and control. The blueprint is the design-time artefact, but the agent user is the runtime actor, which means lifecycle decisions, permission review, and offboarding have to follow the agent user itself, not just the parent agent concept.
Why agent users are security-relevant
Once created, an agent user can inherit access paths, API permissions, or workflow authority that may be broader than the initiating human expected. That creates a classic governance gap: the entity that actually performs actions may outlive the approval context that created it, especially when teams focus on the agent project and forget the active identity attached to it.
That gap is why controls such as inventory, ownership, and periodic review are not optional. NHIMG’s Salesforce Agent Inventory is a practical example of why running users, permission sets, and attached access must be visible together, while Citizen-Built AI Agents vs IT-Built Agents shows how ownership and handover decisions affect whether an agent user is still valid.
How agent users differ from the agent blueprint
The blueprint defines intent, policy, and structure. The agent user is the identity that executes that intent in the environment. That distinction is easy to miss, but it is security-critical because the runtime identity may have credentials, tokens, or permissions that need separate governance and separate revocation.
In mature designs, the blueprint can change without automatically changing the runtime identity, and the runtime identity can survive changes to the human sponsor, the original workflow, or the product team. That is why an agent user should be treated as a governed identity object with its own lifecycle, not as a by-product of the agent definition.
Lifecycle, visibility, and control expectations
The core operational issue is that agent users can become orphaned, overprivileged, or forgotten if teams only track the parent agent. Effective governance requires the ability to identify who approved the agent, what it can access, when it was last used, and what should happen when the blueprint is retired or reassigned.
That lifecycle view is reflected in Agentic AI Identity Guide, which explains delegation, registration, authentication, and retirement, and in AI Agent Authorisation Guide, which frames least privilege and per-action decisions as the right control model for an agent that can act independently.
Risk and Threat Considerations
Agent users create risk when the runtime identity outlives its business need, accumulates excess privilege, or is shared across multiple workflows. If that identity is not explicitly offboarded or re-attested, an attacker or careless operator may be able to reuse it, abuse it, or let it continue acting with stale access.
Failure mechanism: The parent agent remains visible while the child identity quietly retains permissions, tokens, or session access after the intended approval, ownership, or use case has ended.
Impact: That can lead to orphaned access, unauthorized actions, poor auditability, and a harder incident response path because the system activity is attached to an identity that no longer has a clear business owner.
Standards & Framework Alignment
This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.
OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 addresses the attack and risk surface, while NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 sets the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.
| Framework | Control / Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 | IA-5 — Authenticator Management | Agent users rely on credentials and tokens that must be managed across their lifecycle. |
| AC-2 — Account Management | An agent user is a distinct account that needs creation, review, and removal controls. | |
| IA-9 — Service Identification and Authentication | Agent users are non-person entities that authenticate to services and act independently. | |
| Recommendation — Manage agent-user authenticators with rotation, revocation, and expiry rules. Track, review, and disable agent-user accounts when they are no longer needed. Use service-style authentication controls for agent users and bound their trust relationships. | ||
| OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 | NHI-01 — Improper Offboarding | Agent users can remain active after the blueprint or owner is no longer valid. |
| NHI-05 — Overprivileged NHI | The child identity may accumulate more access than the agent actually needs. | |
| NHI-07 — Long-Lived Secrets | Agent users commonly depend on credentials or tokens that can outlast their intended use. | |
| Recommendation — Retire agent users explicitly when the agent or its owner is decommissioned. Reduce agent-user privilege to the smallest task-bound access set. Rotate and expire agent-user secrets on a defined schedule and after role changes. | ||
Practitioner Guidance
What to watch for: Treat the agent user as the object that needs inventory, review, and retirement. The most common mistake is to govern the agent blueprint while leaving the child identity unchecked, which creates a false sense of control.
Governance implication: Ownership should be explicit, and offboarding should target the agent user directly, with attestations covering whether the identity still needs its permissions, credentials, and execution scope.
Related resources from NHI Mgmt Group
- What is the difference between user permissions and agent permissions?
- When should organisations require user interaction instead of autonomous agent action?
- What is the difference between user consent and agent consent?
- How should security teams design agent workflows to avoid unnecessary user prompts?
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Reviewed and updated by the NHIMG editorial team on November 18, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group — the #1 independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org