CVE-2014-100005 is a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in D-Link DIR-600 Router. CISA added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue on 16 May 2024, which means attackers have used it in real attacks. D-Link DIR-600 routers contain a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability that allows an attacker to change router configurations by hijacking an existing administrator session.
What the vulnerability is and why CSRF matters on a router
A cross-site request forgery in a router is dangerous because the browser can be tricked into sending authenticated requests to the device on behalf of a logged-in administrator. In practice, that means the attacker does not need to know the admin password if an active session can be abused.
On network appliances, this class of flaw can be especially damaging because configuration changes often affect the whole home or small office environment, not just one endpoint. If an attacker can change DNS, firewall, remote management, or forwarding settings, they can redirect traffic, expose internal services, or prepare the device for later compromise.
How exposure is typically checked
Exposure assessment starts with confirming whether the organisation or household actually uses the affected router model, then checking whether the device is reachable from the internet or accessible to untrusted users on the local network. Vendor advisories and the CISA KEV catalogue are the authoritative sources for patch and prioritisation details.
A practical review should also look for signs that the router is still managed through a web interface with an active administrative session model, because that is the condition CSRF relies on. The broader lesson is the same one covered in the Vulnerability Management Guide: inventory the asset first, then prioritise remediation based on exploitability and exposure.
Why the attack path is effective
CSRF works by abusing trust in the victim’s existing authenticated browser session. If the router accepts state-changing requests without strong anti-CSRF protections, an attacker can induce an administrator’s browser to submit a request that the device treats as legitimate.
For router administration, the consequence is not just nuisance configuration drift. Attackers can use a forged request to alter security settings, persist access, or weaken the network boundary. The attack pattern is closely related to the broader web attack family described in the Web Application Attacks Guide, where request forgery is one of the canonical ways authenticated state can be abused.
Remediation and post-exploitation checks
The first remediation step is to apply the vendor’s fix or mitigation guidance for the exact router firmware branch, then verify that administrative access no longer accepts unauthenticated cross-origin state changes. Where patching is delayed, reduce exposure by limiting who can reach the management interface and by avoiding routine use of long-lived administrator sessions.
After remediation, review the device for unauthorised configuration changes, because CSRF is often used to modify settings quietly rather than to crash the device. If the router was exploited, rotate any credentials, shared secrets, or management access material that may have been exposed through the administrative session or any linked management workflow. For teams that manage many devices, prioritised vulnerability remediation is the right operational lens, not isolated one-off patching.
Risk and Threat Considerations
This vulnerability is material because router compromise can create network-wide exposure, not just local browser abuse. Once configuration settings are changed, the attacker may be able to persist, redirect traffic, or weaken other security controls that depend on the router’s trust boundary.
Failure mechanism: The attacker leverages an authenticated administrator session in the browser and submits a forged state-changing request that the router accepts without adequate anti-CSRF protection.
Impact: Router settings can be altered silently, which can lead to traffic redirection, exposure of internal services, loss of network trust, and follow-on compromise of connected systems.
Standards & Framework Alignment
This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5, OWASP ASVS and CIS Controls v8 set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.
| Framework | Control / Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 | IA-2 — Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) | Admin session abuse makes strong user authentication central to router management |
| IA-5 — Authenticator Management | CSRF impact grows when admin sessions and authenticators are long-lived or poorly managed | |
| AC-7 — Unsuccessful Logon Attempts | Router admin interfaces need protective controls against repeated unauthorized access attempts | |
| Recommendation — Require strong administrator authentication before allowing configuration changes. Shorten authenticator lifetime and rotate credentials after suspected misuse. Limit repeated admin login attempts and alert on abnormal authentication activity. | ||
| OWASP ASVS | V8 — Authorization | CSRF is a state-changing authorization weakness in web management interfaces |
| V16 — Security Logging and Error Handling | Post-exploitation review depends on logging of administrative configuration changes | |
| Recommendation — Verify that sensitive actions require explicit, integrity-protected authorization checks. Log and review all privileged configuration changes on the management interface. | ||
| CIS Controls v8 | CIS-5 — Account Management | Router admin access depends on controlling who can hold and use privileged accounts |
| Recommendation — Restrict and review privileged administrator accounts for network devices. | ||
Practitioner Guidance
Why practitioners should care: Treat this as a device trust problem, not only an application bug. If the router management plane can be driven by a forged browser request, the integrity of the entire local network configuration is at risk.
What to watch for: Unexplained DNS changes, new port forwards, modified firewall rules, or remote-management settings are all strong indicators that the device configuration may have been altered through abuse of the admin session.
Practitioner takeaway: For internet-exposed or business-critical routers, configuration integrity and session hardening deserve the same operational attention as patching.
Related resources from NHI Mgmt Group
- CVE-2023-2533 (PaperCut NG/MF Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF))
- CVE-2008-4128 (Cisco IOS Cross-Site Request Forgery)
- Why do unauthenticated local AI agents create a bigger risk than a normal cross-site request forgery issue?
- What is the difference between cross-site scripting and cross-site request forgery in JavaScript applications?
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Reviewed and updated by the NHIMG editorial team on October 17, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group — the #1 independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org