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Delegated permissions

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By NHI Mgmt Group Updated November 1, 2026 Domain: Agentic AI & Autonomous Identity

Delegated permissions are access rights granted through another identity, application, or administrative relationship rather than directly to the end user. They matter because revoking the visible account does not always remove the underlying authority, which can preserve access after offboarding.

What delegated permissions are in practice

Delegated permissions are powerful because they let one identity act with authority that originates elsewhere, often through an app, consent grant, or administrative relationship. The practical concern is not just who can log in, but whose access is being borrowed, extended, or inherited, and whether that authority remains after the visible account is removed.

That distinction matters in everyday governance. A user can appear offboarded while consented access, app grants, or delegated rights still exist, so the effective access path survives the account lifecycle. In other words, delegated permissions turn access review into a relationship problem, not just an account problem.

How delegated permissions differ from direct access

Direct access is granted to an account explicitly. Delegated access is mediated through another trusted identity or application, so the resulting access may be narrower than full administrative rights but still broad enough to read data, call APIs, or perform actions on the user’s behalf. The security outcome depends on how the delegation was created, what scope was approved, and whether that approval can be changed independently of the account itself.

This is why delegated permissions are often discussed alongside consent and OAuth scope design. A permission can be technically valid and still be operationally risky if the scope is too broad, the consent path is unclear, or users and administrators cannot easily see which downstream authorities were created.

Why delegated permissions are security-sensitive

Delegated permissions are sensitive because they can outlive the event that created them. If an attacker or careless administrator secures consent once, the resulting access may persist until the grant, app relationship, or token path is explicitly removed. That creates a durable access channel that is easy to miss during routine account cleanup.

They also increase the blast radius of a compromised app or over-privileged integration. When a trusted application is allowed to act for a user, compromise of that application or its configuration can expose mail, files, directories, or other protected resources without needing to steal the user’s password directly.

Where delegated permissions create review and remediation work

Delegated permissions should be reviewed as part of application governance, consent management, and access recertification. The useful question is not only “is this user active?” but “what app or administrative relationship can still exercise authority in the user’s name?” That is where hidden persistence often appears, especially in large Microsoft 365 or Entra ID environments.

NHIMG’s Entra ID Applications and Consent Guide is a practical reference for understanding consent grants, delegated permissions, and how to remove risky app access paths without breaking legitimate business use.

How practitioners should interpret delegated permissions

Delegated permissions are best treated as an authorization relationship with its own lifecycle, not as a one-time checkbox on the user account. That means ownership, review cadence, and revocation paths need to be clear for the app, the grant, and the administrative relationship that made the access possible.

For design and review work, OAuth Scope Design Guide helps practitioners think about scope granularity and least privilege, while How to find high-privilege Microsoft Graph application permissions shows how delegated and app permissions can be audited for excessive authority.

Risk and Threat Considerations

Delegated permissions create a common failure mode where access remains effective after the visible account is disabled, deleted, or forgotten. That persistence is attractive to attackers and dangerous for defenders because it turns consented app access and administrative delegation into a quiet continuation path.

Failure mechanism: A grant, scope, or delegated relationship remains active after offboarding, so the hidden authority survives even when the named user no longer appears active.

Impact: Attackers or unwanted integrations can retain access to data, APIs, and administrative functions, which can delay containment and complicate post-incident cleanup.

Standards & Framework Alignment

This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.

OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 and OWASP API Security Top 10 address the attack and risk surface, while NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 and NIST SP 800-63 set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.

FrameworkControl / ReferenceRelevance
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5IA-5 — Authenticator ManagementDelegated permissions depend on controlling the lifecycle of access credentials and grants.
AC-2 — Account ManagementDelegated access must be governed through account and relationship lifecycle management.
AC-6 — Least PrivilegeDelegated permissions should be limited to the minimum authority needed for the task.
Recommendation — Review and revoke delegated grants and associated credentials when authority should end. Track delegated access relationships as part of account lifecycle and offboarding. Constrain delegated grants to the least privilege required for the approved use case.
OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10NHI-05 — Overprivileged NHIDelegated app authority can become excessive when scopes or grants are broader than needed.
NHI-01 — Improper OffboardingDelegated permissions can survive account offboarding if grants are not explicitly removed.
NHI-10 — Human Use of NHIDelegated permissions often arise when human users interact with app or service authority on their behalf.
Recommendation — Audit delegated app scopes and remove excessive permissions before they are abused. Revoke delegation grants as part of offboarding, not only the user account. Separate human and delegated application authority so user actions do not inherit hidden app power.
NIST SP 800-63Digital Identity GuidelinesDelegated access hinges on trustworthy identity assurance and consented access relationships.
Recommendation — Use identity assurance and consent controls that clearly distinguish user authority from delegated app authority.
OWASP API Security Top 10API5 — Broken Function Level AuthorizationDelegated permissions can expose function-level API actions if scope checks are weak.
Recommendation — Enforce function-level authorization checks on every delegated API action.

Practitioner Guidance

Governance implication: Treat delegated permissions as governed access objects with an owner, review date, and explicit removal path. If a team cannot explain why the delegation exists and what it enables, the grant is already too opaque to be safe.

Practitioner takeaway: For offboarding and access review, remove the delegation itself, not just the account that used it.

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Reviewed and updated by the NHIMG editorial team on November 1, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group — the #1 independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org