A network relay is a device, service or software component that forwards traffic between two network points. It sits in the path of packets or connections and can preserve, translate or proxy communication depending on its design. Relays are used in routing, tunnelling, access control and traffic inspection.
What a network relay does
A network relay forwards traffic between two endpoints, so it acts as an intermediary rather than a final destination. In practice, that can mean simple packet forwarding, connection forwarding, protocol translation, or proxying, depending on the design and the control plane around it.
The key security point is that relays sit on the communication path. That gives them visibility into traffic, but it also means their configuration, trust boundaries, and reachability directly shape what can be observed, altered, or blocked.
Where relays are used
Relays show up anywhere communication needs to cross a boundary or be mediated. Common examples include routing between subnets, tunnelling through restricted paths, access control gateways, reverse proxies, and inspection points that need to see traffic before it reaches a protected service.
Because they are intermediary components, relays often combine transport handling with policy enforcement. That can make them useful for segmentation, but it also makes them sensitive infrastructure: if the relay is too permissive, it can become a bypass path; if it is too narrow, it can become a bottleneck.
How relays change traffic handling
Relays are not all the same. Some preserve the original communication semantics and simply pass traffic onward, while others terminate one connection and initiate another, rewrite headers, translate protocols, or apply filtering and inspection. The more a relay transforms traffic, the more it becomes part of the security control surface, not just the network path.
That distinction matters operationally. A relay that only forwards packets may mainly affect availability and reachability, while a proxy-style relay can also affect authentication flows, session handling, logging, and content inspection. In other words, the relay’s behaviour determines whether it is a passive path component or an active control point.
Security implications of relay design
Relays are attractive because they concentrate access, but that concentration also creates risk. A compromised or misconfigured relay can expose internal services, weaken segmentation, enable traffic interception, or provide a pivot point into otherwise separated networks. For that reason, relay hardening and trust review are as important as routing correctness.
Relays also create visibility trade-offs. They can improve monitoring and policy enforcement, but they may hide the original endpoint relationship, complicate attribution, or obscure the real source of a connection if logging and header preservation are weak.
When relays are used for tunnelling or proxying, it is worth understanding the relay pattern as part of the broader network-relay and covert-routing problem space described in Operational Relay Box Networks Guide. That matters because the same forwarding property that helps legitimate connectivity can also be used to mask the origin, scale, or persistence of traffic.
Risk and Threat Considerations
Network relays become risky when they are treated as harmless plumbing rather than as security-relevant infrastructure. An exposed or overtrusted relay can enable interception, policy bypass, lateral movement, or traffic redirection, especially when the relay is reachable from untrusted networks or sits between sensitive segments.
Failure mechanism: Attackers abuse the relay’s forwarding role to move traffic through a trusted path, conceal origin, or reach services that should not be directly accessible. Weak authentication, permissive allowlists, or poor logging make that abuse harder to detect.
Impact: The result can be data exposure, unauthorized access, degraded segmentation, or a pivot point for deeper compromise. In more complex environments, a relay compromise can also undermine confidence in traffic inspection and monitoring because the relay itself becomes part of the attack surface.
Standards & Framework Alignment
This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.
MITRE ATT&CK addresses the attack and risk surface, while NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5, NIST CSF 2.0 and CIS Controls v8 set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.
| Framework | Control / Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 | SC-7 — Boundary Protection | Relays create and enforce network boundaries that need controlled traffic filtering and segmentation. |
| AC-4 — Information Flow Enforcement | Relays often enforce whether communication may cross a trust boundary or reach a protected service. | |
| Recommendation — Constrain relay paths with boundary controls and only permit the traffic flows the relay is meant to carry. Enforce information-flow policy at the relay so only approved destinations, ports, and protocols pass through. | ||
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.AA-05 — Network Access is Controlled | A relay can be the control point that limits which network paths and connection attempts are allowed. |
| Recommendation — Use the relay to restrict network access to approved paths and deny unexpected routing or proxying behaviour. | ||
| CIS Controls v8 | CIS-12 — Network Infrastructure Management | Relays are network infrastructure that require secure administration, review, and change control. |
| Recommendation — Manage relay configuration changes, access, and baselines under strict infrastructure control. | ||
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1090 — Proxy | Relays can function as proxy layers that forward traffic and obscure the original source of a connection. |
| Recommendation — Model suspicious relay behaviour as proxy activity and hunt for unexpected forwarding or tunnelling paths. | ||
Practitioner Guidance
What to watch for: Treat relays as controlled security boundaries, not generic infrastructure. Review what the relay is allowed to forward, whether it preserves or rewrites identity and source information, and whether its logs are sufficient to reconstruct who connected to what and when.
Governance implication: Ownership should be explicit because relays often sit between teams, tools, and trust zones. If a relay mediates privileged or sensitive flows, its configuration changes should be reviewed with the same discipline you would apply to other access-bearing choke points.
Related resources from NHI Mgmt Group
- Who is accountable when a router becomes part of a global botnet or relay network?
- What is the difference between using a remote desktop tool's public relay model and connecting through a private network path?
- What are the signs that a covert relay network is expanding through targeted micro-intrusion campaigns?
- What happens when managed devices use privacy relay features without a matching network policy?
Deepen Your Knowledge
Free weekly newsletter
Subscribe to the NHI & AI Identity Journal
The latest on NHI and Agentic AI security – articles, research, breaches, news and events every week.
Bonus 33% off our NHI Course when you subscribe.
Reviewed and updated by the NHIMG editorial team on November 2, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group — the #1 independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org