Join our Newsletter — 33% off our NHI Course
Authentication, Authorisation & Trust

NOT_DELEGATED

← Back to Glossary
By NHI Mgmt Group Updated November 18, 2026 Domain: Authentication, Authorisation & Trust

NOT_DELEGATED is an account flag that prevents Kerberos delegated credentials from being used for that principal. It marks a user or service account as non-delegable, so a service cannot impersonate that identity to other services through constrained or unconstrained delegation.

What the NOT_DELEGATED flag changes in Kerberos

NOT_DELEGATED is not just a descriptive label. It changes how Kerberos can be used for that account by blocking delegated credentials, which means downstream services cannot act as that principal through delegation. That makes the account materially different from one that can be forwarded or impersonated by a service.

In practice, this flag is used to reduce the blast radius of delegation in environments where a compromised middle-tier service could otherwise obtain access as the protected account. It is especially important for privileged users and sensitive service accounts, where delegation is often the difference between limited compromise and broad lateral movement.

How NOT_DELEGATED interacts with other Kerberos protections

Kerberos delegation controls are layered, not interchangeable. NOT_DELEGATED prevents a principal from being used via delegation, while constrained delegation and resource-based constrained delegation determine which services may obtain delegated access under approved conditions. A principal can still authenticate normally; the flag specifically restricts delegated use of that identity.

This is why the setting is often discussed alongside protected users, accounts marked as sensitive and cannot be delegated, and service-account design. Those controls all narrow where identity forwarding is allowed, but they do so in different ways and at different layers of policy.

For a practical overview of how delegation shows up in Active Directory, How to find unconstrained delegation in Active Directory is a useful companion because it shows the delegation patterns that this flag is meant to constrain.

Why the flag matters for account trust and impersonation risk

The security value of NOT_DELEGATED is that it breaks a common trust chain: a service may authenticate a user, but it cannot carry that identity onward to another service on the user’s behalf. That matters because delegated credentials are powerful, and once they are available to a service, the service boundary becomes a high-value target.

Used correctly, the flag helps preserve separation between the account that authenticates and the services that process requests. Used inconsistently, it can create false confidence if administrators assume all sensitive accounts are automatically protected when only some delegation paths are blocked.

At the control level, Kerberos delegation and privileged-account handling should be reviewed together so that accounts with real business or administrative authority are not silently exposed to delegation-based impersonation.

Operational effects on application design and service accounts

NOT_DELEGATED can affect how line-of-business applications, middle tiers and service accounts are designed. Any service that expects to act as a user across multiple hops may fail if the target principal is marked non-delegable, so teams need to distinguish legitimate application flow from unnecessary privilege propagation.

That makes the flag a governance control as much as a technical one: it forces explicit decisions about which identities may be forwarded, which ones must never be forwarded, and where an application should use its own service identity instead of borrowing the caller’s authority.

Risk and Threat Considerations

Delegation abuse is dangerous because it turns one authenticated session into broader impersonation potential. If a service or intermediary is compromised and delegation is allowed, an attacker can often move from initial access to access as the delegated principal, which is why non-delegable accounts are a meaningful containment control.

Failure mechanism: When the principal is not marked non-delegable, a service that receives its credentials or delegated ticket can reuse that trust relationship to reach additional services as the original identity, enabling lateral movement and privilege escalation.

Impact: Abuse of delegated Kerberos access can expose sensitive data, administrative functions, and trusted service paths, and it can make post-compromise containment much harder because the attacker appears to be using an allowed identity path.

Standards & Framework Alignment

This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.

NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5, NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) and CIS Controls v8 set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.

FrameworkControl / ReferenceRelevance
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5IA-9 — Service Identification and AuthenticationKerberos delegation control affects service-to-service identity handling.
AC-6 — Least PrivilegeNon-delegable accounts reduce the authority exposed through impersonation.
IA-5 — Authenticator ManagementDelegated Kerberos credentials are identity-bearing material that require lifecycle control.
Recommendation — Apply IA-9 to restrict service impersonation paths and verify delegated authentication rules. Use AC-6 to limit which identities can be forwarded or acted on by services. Manage Kerberos credential handling so delegation cannot extend beyond intended trust boundaries.
NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207)Zero Trust ArchitectureThe flag supports explicit trust reduction and limits implicit downstream reuse of identity.
Recommendation — Enforce explicit trust decisions so a service cannot reuse identity authority beyond its intended scope.
CIS Controls v8CIS-6 — Access Control ManagementDelegation settings are access-control decisions that govern impersonation risk.
Recommendation — Review and restrict delegation-related access paths to reduce impersonation exposure.

Practitioner Guidance

Governance implication: Treat NOT_DELEGATED as part of account classification, not as an isolated checkbox. The most important judgement is which users and service identities must never be replayed through middle-tier delegation because their access is too sensitive to forward.

What to watch for: Review delegation settings whenever you introduce new applications, service accounts, or trust relationships, especially where a service handles privileged users or high-value back-end resources. In environments with legacy Kerberos flows, the safest design is usually the one that makes delegation explicit rather than assumed.

Free weekly newsletter

Subscribe to the NHI & AI Identity Journal

The latest on NHI and Agentic AI security – articles, research, breaches, news and events every week.

Bonus 33% off our NHI Course when you subscribe.

NHIMG Editorial Note
Reviewed and updated by the NHIMG editorial team on November 18, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group — the #1 independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org