A pending authentication token is a temporary token returned when a risk system requires the user to complete a challenge before authentication can finish. It preserves the in progress state so the application can verify the user and resume the original authentication attempt safely.
Expanded Definition
A pending authentication token is not a final proof of identity. It is a short-lived, stateful placeholder that lets an authentication flow pause while a user completes a risk-based challenge, such as step-up verification, device confirmation, or out-of-band approval, then resume without forcing a full restart.
In NHI and IAM design, the token matters because it preserves continuity across trust decisions. That makes it different from ordinary session tokens, bearer tokens, or refresh tokens, which typically imply completed authentication or delegated access. A pending token should carry only enough context to correlate the in-progress attempt, and no broader privilege than the unfinished flow requires. Standards do not define this term uniformly, so usage in the industry is still evolving. The closest control expectations come from secure authentication session handling in NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Security and Privacy Controls and strong identity assurance patterns in ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Information Security Management.
The most common misapplication is treating the pending token as an authenticated session, which occurs when engineering teams attach application privileges before the challenge is completed.
Examples and Use Cases
Implementing pending authentication tokens rigorously often introduces additional state management and timeout complexity, requiring organisations to weigh smoother user recovery against tighter fraud controls and stricter token expiry handling.
- A workforce login is interrupted by a risk engine that requests MFA, and the app stores a pending token so the user can complete verification without re-entering credentials.
- An SSO broker issues a pending token after device posture checks fail, then resumes the original transaction only if the device is remediated.
- An AI admin console pauses a privileged action until a human approver approves the step-up challenge, with the pending token preserving the original request context.
- A SaaS platform uses a pending token during passwordless login while waiting for a push approval, then exchanges it for a final session only after verification.
- Incident investigations into token exposure, including the Salesloft OAuth token breach, show why in-progress authentication state must be tightly bounded and short-lived.
Pending tokens also fit mature authentication systems that rely on stepwise evaluation, such as the guidance in NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Security and Privacy Controls, where session control, verification, and error handling must be intentionally separated.
Why It Matters in NHI Security
Pending authentication tokens sit at a sensitive boundary between identity verification and access issuance. If they are replayable, long-lived, or over-scoped, they can become a foothold for account takeover, privilege escalation, or broken challenge flows. In NHI environments, that risk is amplified because machine-driven workflows often exchange tokens at speed, across APIs, agents, and orchestration layers where hidden state can be hard to audit.
NHIMG research shows how often identity material is mishandled in the wild: 44% of NHI tokens are exposed in the wild across collaboration tools, tickets, and code commits, and 91% of former employee tokens remain active after offboarding, according to The 2025 State of NHIs and Secrets in Cybersecurity. That makes lifecycle boundaries and revocation discipline essential, especially when a pending token is mistaken for a usable credential. The broader secrets exposure problem is reinforced by the State of Secrets Sprawl 2026, where leaked credentials remain exploitable long after initial discovery.
Organisations typically encounter pending-token weakness only after a failed challenge is bypassed or a resumed login is hijacked, at which point the token’s lifecycle and trust boundaries become operationally unavoidable to address.
Standards & Framework Alignment
This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.
OWASP Agentic AI Top 10 and OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 address the attack and risk surface, while NIST SP 800-63, NIST CSF 2.0 and NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.
| Framework | Control / Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| NIST SP 800-63 | AAL2 | Pending tokens preserve an in-progress identity proofing and authentication transaction. |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.AA | Authentication assurance and access enforcement depend on properly handling unfinished login states. |
| NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) | ID | Zero trust requires continuous verification before access is issued, including interim challenge states. |
| OWASP Agentic AI Top 10 | A01 | Agentic flows can misuse partial auth state if token progression is not tightly controlled. |
| OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 | NHI-02 | Token handling and lifecycle controls are central to NHI secret and credential safety. |
Limit scope, duration, and observability of pending tokens and revoke them promptly after completion or failure.
Related resources from NHI Mgmt Group
- What breaks when CLI authentication relies on local token files in headless environments?
- How should security teams govern token-based authentication in cloud environments?
- Why do token-based authentication systems still create breach risk?
- What is the difference between token enrichment and authentication?
Deepen Your Knowledge
Reviewed and updated by the NHIMG editorial team on August 24, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group — the #1 independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org
