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Cyber Security

Split Tunnelling

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By NHI Mgmt Group Updated October 31, 2026 Domain: Cyber Security

Split tunnelling is a VPN configuration where only selected traffic goes through the corporate tunnel while other traffic uses the user’s local internet connection. That can improve performance, but it also removes consistent monitoring and policy control, which increases exposure to interception, unapproved access, and weaker enforcement of security controls.

What Split Tunnelling Does

Split tunnelling changes the trust boundary of a VPN session. Some traffic is protected and routed through the corporate tunnel, while other traffic exits directly to the internet. That design can reduce latency and bandwidth use, but it also means the VPN no longer sees or governs every request from the device.

The core distinction is not just where packets travel, but which traffic is inside the organisation’s security controls and which traffic is outside them. Once that boundary is split, the user can be simultaneously connected to internal resources and external services with different policy, inspection, and routing paths.

Why Organisations Use It

Split tunnelling is usually adopted to improve performance, reduce congestion on VPN concentrators, or avoid sending low-risk or high-volume traffic through the corporate network. It is common where organisations want access to internal applications without forcing every internet-bound request through the same path.

That convenience can be legitimate, especially for bandwidth-heavy collaboration tools or SaaS services that do not need backhauling. But the operational benefit is only real when the organisation has explicitly decided which traffic may bypass the tunnel and what controls must still apply to that traffic.

How Split Tunnelling Changes Security Control

From a security perspective, split tunnelling weakens the assumption that the VPN is the single monitored path for remote users. Traffic that bypasses the tunnel may avoid corporate DNS, web filtering, logging, threat detection, and content inspection, depending on how the environment is built.

It also introduces routing and policy complexity. Access decisions can become inconsistent when some destinations are reached through corporate controls and others are not, which makes troubleshooting harder and increases the chance of unintended exposure, especially on unmanaged or partially managed devices.

For a practical set of risks, see VPN split tunnelling, which covers leak paths, pivot risk, and safer routing choices, and VPN Security Guide, which places split tunnelling in the wider context of VPN hardening and replacement options.

Where Split Tunnelling Fits in Modern Access Design

Split tunnelling is best understood as one access-design choice among several, not as a default security pattern. Organisations that need stronger control often prefer architectures that keep inspection and policy enforcement closer to the application or session rather than relying on a broad network tunnel.

That is why split tunnelling is often discussed alongside zero trust and VPN replacement strategies. The key question is whether the organisation wants all remote traffic to inherit the same monitoring and policy model, or whether it is comfortable accepting different control levels for different traffic classes.

Risk and Threat Considerations

Split tunnelling creates a clear exposure window because the device is simultaneously inside the corporate trust domain and connected directly to the public internet. That dual path can reduce the visibility of malicious traffic, create local network exposure, and increase the chance that attackers or malware can reach the endpoint outside normal corporate inspection.

Failure mechanism: Traffic that bypasses the tunnel may evade central logging, DNS control, web filtering, and egress inspection, while an attacker or malicious process can exploit the less monitored path to intercept traffic, stage phishing, or pivot from the endpoint toward internal resources.

Impact: The result can be weaker detection, inconsistent policy enforcement, greater chance of credential capture or session abuse, and a larger blast radius if the device is compromised while still authenticated to corporate systems.

Standards & Framework Alignment

This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.

NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5, NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) and CIS Controls v8 set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.

FrameworkControl / ReferenceRelevance
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5SC-7 — Boundary ProtectionSplit tunnelling changes network boundary enforcement and inspection points.
Recommendation — Enforce SC-7 to control which traffic may bypass the corporate tunnel and which inspection points remain active.
NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207)N/A — Zero Trust ArchitectureSplit tunnelling contrasts with continuous verification and per-session access control.
Recommendation — Apply zero trust design to reduce reliance on broad tunnel trust and move policy enforcement closer to the resource.
CIS Controls v8CIS-12 — Network Infrastructure ManagementSplit tunnelling depends on secure network routing, control points, and boundary configuration.
Recommendation — Use CIS-12 to govern routing, remote-access pathways, and network control consistency across the VPN estate.

Practitioner Guidance

Why practitioners should care: Split tunnelling is not just a performance setting, it is a governance choice about where security enforcement lives. If the organisation cannot state which traffic is allowed to bypass the tunnel and which controls still apply, the design is already too implicit.

Common misunderstanding: Many teams treat split tunnelling as harmless because the “important” traffic still goes through the VPN. In practice, the traffic that bypasses the tunnel is often the traffic most likely to carry malware, phishing, or data leakage risk, and it can still affect the same endpoint session.

Practitioner takeaway: Use split tunnelling only when the bypassed traffic path is intentionally designed, monitored, and documented, otherwise the simpler and safer assumption is full-tunnel enforcement for remote access.

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Reviewed and updated by the NHIMG editorial team on October 31, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group — the #1 independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org