VirtualHere is software for sharing USB devices over a network so they can be used on a remote computer or virtual machine as if locally connected. It is commonly used for dongles, smart cards and other USB peripherals, and the forwarded device effectively becomes part of the remote session’s trusted hardware path.
What VirtualHere Does in a Remote-Access Chain
VirtualHere extends a local USB device across the network so a remote computer or virtual machine can use it as though it were physically attached. That makes the remote endpoint depend on a trusted device path that would normally stay local.
In practice, this matters because USB redirection is not just a convenience feature. It changes where device trust is established, where input and authentication events are handled, and where the organisation must assume the device could be observed, copied, or interrupted.
Why USB Redirection Changes the Trust Boundary
USB forwarding moves a peripheral from the user's desk into a remote session boundary. A dongle, smart card, security token, or similar device may still function normally, but the remote host now relies on the redirection layer to preserve device identity, availability, and integrity.
That shift can be benign when the environment is tightly controlled, yet it also means the session inherits the security properties of the network path and the host that brokers the device. If that path is weak, the “local” device experience can hide a much broader exposure.
For a general control lens, NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Security and Privacy Controls helps frame the access-control, authentication, audit, and configuration duties that surround a trusted device path, while NIST SP 800-207 Zero Trust Architecture is useful for thinking about why remote device access should never be assumed trustworthy by default.
Common Security and Operational Failure Modes
USB-over-network tools can fail in ways that are easy to miss. A device may be left connected longer than intended, a credential-bearing peripheral may be reused across systems, or the forwarding software may become a hidden dependency for login, signing, or application access.
Another practical issue is that a shared USB channel can blur ownership. If multiple users, sessions, or virtual machines can reach the same device, organisations can lose clear separation between the hardware, the session, and the identity that is supposed to be using it.
OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 is relevant where the forwarded device is part of a broader machine-to-machine or service access pattern, especially when long-lived secrets, overprivilege, or poor offboarding make the remote path harder to govern.
When VirtualHere Becomes a Governance Problem
VirtualHere is not only a transport utility, it can become part of access governance when the forwarded device is used for authentication, signing, licensing, or regulated workflows. At that point, the tool is effectively extending a trusted hardware dependency into a remote trust zone.
That creates decisions about who may attach which devices, how those devices are inventoried, whether the remote host is trusted enough to consume them, and what should happen when the device, client, or session is lost, cloned, or redirected unexpectedly.
For organisations using network-delivered device trust, Zero Trust thinking is the right baseline: treat the forwarded USB path as a privileged dependency, and verify session context rather than assuming the attached peripheral is inherently safe.
Risk and Threat Considerations
USB redirection can expose high-value peripherals to interception, misuse, or persistence because the device becomes part of the remote session's trust chain. If that chain is compromised, an attacker may be able to exploit the redirected device for authentication, signing, or privileged access.
Failure mechanism: The redirection layer becomes a single point of trust for a device that the organisation may treat as physically present, even though the actual session, network, and host are separate attack surfaces.
Impact: Compromise can affect login material, session integrity, approval workflows, and the confidentiality or availability of the device itself, especially when the peripheral is a dongle or smart card used for sensitive access.
Standards & Framework Alignment
This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.
OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 addresses the attack and risk surface, while NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 and NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.
| Framework | Control / Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 | IA-5 — Authenticator Management | USB-forwarded dongles and smart cards often carry authenticators or keys that need lifecycle control. |
| IA-9 — Service Identification and Authentication | Device redirection can extend machine-to-machine trust across hosts and sessions. | |
| AC-6 — Least Privilege | Only narrowly scoped sessions should reach privileged USB devices used for access or signing. | |
| Recommendation — Manage and rotate forwarded device authenticators so remote sessions cannot reuse stale credentials. Require strong authentication for any redirected device path that carries service or workload trust. Limit forwarded-device access to the smallest set of users, hosts, and sessions. | ||
| NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) | SP 800-207 — Zero Trust Architecture | Remote USB access is a trust-boundary problem that benefits from verify-every-session thinking. |
| Recommendation — Treat the forwarded USB channel as untrusted until the session and host are explicitly verified. | ||
| OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 | NHI-02 — Secret Leakage | USB devices used for auth or licensing can expose embedded secrets if mishandled in remote paths. |
| NHI-05 — Overprivileged NHI | Forwarded device access often persists beyond the minimum needed and can exceed intended privilege. | |
| Recommendation — Prevent secret-bearing peripherals from being exposed through unmanaged remote forwarding paths. Scope device forwarding so only necessary systems and users can exercise the peripheral's authority. | ||
Practitioner Guidance
Why practitioners should care: Treat USB forwarding as an access-control decision, not just a connectivity feature. If the device participates in authentication, signing, or privileged workflows, the brokered path deserves the same review discipline as any other trusted access channel.
What to watch for: Pay close attention to which peripherals are allowed, which remote hosts can consume them, and whether the operational dependence on the forwarding layer is visible in asset, access, and incident-response processes.
Practitioner takeaway: The safest deployment pattern is the one where the organisation can explain, audit, and revoke the forwarded device path without guessing which session or host currently “owns” it.
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Reviewed and updated by the NHIMG editorial team on October 29, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group — the #1 independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org