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Threats, Abuse & Incident Response

WebDAV Relay Attack

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By NHI Mgmt Group Updated November 16, 2026 Domain: Threats, Abuse & Incident Response

A WebDAV relay attack is a technique that forwards a victim’s WebDAV authentication to another service to impersonate the victim. It works by relaying NTLM or similar credentials through a WebDAV endpoint, so the attacker gains authorised access without knowing the password. Defences include disabling unnecessary WebDAV exposure, enforcing SMB and HTTP signing where possible, and limiting NTLM use.

What WebDAV Relay Attacks Exploit

WebDAV relay attacks are dangerous because they turn authentication into a forwarding channel, not a proof of possession. The attacker does not need the victim’s password if they can coerce or capture a WebDAV authentication exchange and relay it to a different service that accepts the same credentials.

That makes the technique less about breaking cryptography and more about abusing trust between protocols. The practical security question is whether the destination service will accept the relayed authentication without enough binding to the original endpoint, channel, or session context.

Why WebDAV Makes Relay Feasible

WebDAV is an extension to HTTP for remote authoring and file access, so it often sits in the same trust zone as web and file-sharing infrastructure. When it is exposed unnecessarily, it can become a convenient entry point for coerced authentication, especially where NTLM is still accepted and channel protections are weak.

The danger is compounded when organisations assume that “authentication happened” means “the right service was reached.” Relay attacks exploit that gap: the victim authenticated, but not necessarily to the intended target. NTLM Relay Guide explains the defensive controls that break this pattern, including signing and channel binding.

Exposure, Detection, and Identity Impact

To understand exposure, organisations need to inventory where WebDAV is enabled, where NTLM is still accepted, and which internal services will honour relayed authentication. Internet-facing endpoints, exposed intranet shares, and legacy services are the places most likely to matter first. Physical Layer and Wireless Jamming Guide is a broader reference for relay-style abuse across protocols and trust boundaries.

Detection is usually indirect. Suspicious authentication paths, unusual logon sources, unexpected use of NTLM where Kerberos or stronger mechanisms were expected, and access that appears valid but arrives from the wrong network path can all indicate relay activity. If exploitation succeeds, the identity impact can be immediate: the attacker may gain a usable session, a service context, or access to resources that should only have been available to the victim.

Remediation and Compensating Controls

The most effective reductions are architectural rather than purely reactive. Disable WebDAV where it is not required, reduce or eliminate NTLM dependence, and enforce SMB and HTTP signing or equivalent channel protections wherever supported. These measures make the relay path harder to complete because the attacker can no longer reuse the victim’s authentication as-is.

When patching or protocol replacement is not immediately possible, compensate by tightening exposure, segmenting access to the most sensitive services, and monitoring for authentication anomalies. NTLM Relay Guide is also useful here because it focuses on the control set that directly blocks relay abuse rather than only describing the attack path.

Risk and Threat Considerations

WebDAV relay attacks are risky because they let an adversary convert a legitimate authentication event into unauthorised access elsewhere. The underlying weakness is trust reuse, where a service accepts forwarded credentials without sufficient endpoint or channel binding.

Failure mechanism: A victim is induced to authenticate to a WebDAV endpoint, and the attacker relays that authentication to another service that accepts the same mechanism, creating access without password knowledge.

Impact: Successful relay can lead to impersonation, lateral movement, and access to files, administrative functions, or service contexts that were never meant to be reachable from the original session.

Standards & Framework Alignment

This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.

NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 and CIS Controls v8 set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.

FrameworkControl / ReferenceRelevance
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5IA-5 — Authenticator ManagementWebDAV relay abuse depends on weak credential lifecycle and reusable authentication material.
IA-9 — Service Identification and AuthenticationRelayed authentication targets services that accept machine-to-machine or service logons.
SC-8 — Transmission Confidentiality and IntegrityRelay attacks exploit insufficient integrity protection on authentication exchanges in transit.
Recommendation — Reduce relay exposure by managing authenticators to limit NTLM reuse and rotate exposed credentials promptly. Require strong service authentication and reject unauthenticated or weakly bound service logons. Protect authentication traffic in transit so credentials cannot be forwarded or reused by an intermediary.
CIS Controls v8CIS-6 — Access Control ManagementRelay defense requires reducing exposed access paths and constraining who can authenticate where.
CIS-8 — Audit Log ManagementDetection depends on logging anomalous authentication paths and unexpected NTLM use.
Recommendation — Remove unnecessary WebDAV exposure and restrict access paths that can accept relayed authentication. Centralize and review authentication logs to spot relayed logons and abnormal source-target pairs.

Practitioner Guidance

Why practitioners should care: WebDAV relay is a protocol-trust problem, so the right response is to treat WebDAV exposure and NTLM acceptance as an access-path design issue, not just a web-service configuration detail. Review where authentication can be coerced, where it can be relayed, and which services would still accept it if the source endpoint were not the intended one.

What to watch for: Unnecessary WebDAV availability, legacy NTLM acceptance, and inconsistent signing or channel-binding support are the conditions that most often keep relay paths viable. The practical goal is to remove the forwarding opportunity, then verify that the remaining authentication paths are bound tightly enough to resist reuse.

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Reviewed and updated by the NHIMG editorial team on November 16, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group — the #1 independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org