The HHS Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) Cybersecurity Performance Goals are a voluntary set of 20 practices, split into 10 Essential and 10 Enhanced goals, that tell hospitals, clinics, payers and their suppliers which security outcomes to fund first. They are short, they map to controls most security teams already know, and they sit underneath the wider regulatory debate about the HIPAA Security Rule. This guide explains each goal in plain terms, shows how the two tiers fit together, and gives a sequenced plan for adopting them with the identity and asset work that most goals depend on.
The goals are published by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services on the HHS Cyber Gateway HPH CPGs page, which describes them as a voluntary subset of cybersecurity practices. Each goal on that page links to sub-practices in the Health Industry Cybersecurity Practices (HICP) publication, to sample NIST SP 800-53 controls, and to the matching CISA Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goal. For the cross-sector goals themselves, see our CISA Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) Guide; for the binding rule, see the HIPAA Security Rule Guide.
This page is guidance, not legal advice. Status as of 18 Nov 2026: the HPH CPGs remain voluntary; the HIPAA Security Rule changes proposed in January 2025 had not been confirmed as a final rule in the sources reviewed for this page. Check the HHS and Federal Register pages before relying on any status statement.
Key takeaways
- There are 20 HPH CPGs: 10 Essential goals that set a minimum floor and 10 Enhanced goals that build a more mature programme.
- The goals are voluntary. They are not a HIPAA compliance standard, but they line up closely with the safeguards HHS proposed in its January 2025 Security Rule notice of proposed rulemaking.
- Four of the 10 Essential goals are identity goals: multifactor authentication, revoking departing workforce credentials, unique credentials and separate privileged accounts.
- Asset inventory is an Enhanced goal, yet almost every Essential goal assumes you know what you own. Start inventory work early even if you report it later.
- Each goal maps to a CISA cross-sector CPG ID and to NIST SP 800-53 controls, so you can reuse existing evidence instead of building a separate framework.
- Supplier goals (vendor requirements, third-party vulnerability disclosure and incident reporting) matter more in healthcare than in most sectors because clinical systems are vendor-run.
HHS HPH CPGs at a glance
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Publisher | U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), with the 405(d) programme and HICP as the supporting practice library |
| Status | Voluntary goals; HHS describes them as a voluntary subset of cybersecurity practices |
| Structure | 10 Essential goals and 10 Enhanced goals |
| Mappings on the HHS page | HICP practices, sample NIST SP 800-53 controls and CISA cross-sector CPG IDs for every goal |
| Link to regulation | The January 2025 HIPAA Security Rule NPRM lists the CPGs among existing HHS guidance and says such guidance alone has not been sufficiently instructive for regulated entities |
| Primary audience | Hospitals, health systems, clinics, payers, public health bodies and their technology suppliers |
Scope: who the goals are for
The CPGs are written for the whole Healthcare and Public Health sector, not only HIPAA covered entities. In practice that means four groups will use them.
- Hospitals and health systems, which run the largest mix of IT, clinical applications and connected medical devices and therefore touch every goal.
- Smaller providers such as clinics, dental and GP-style practices, where the Essential goals are a realistic first target. Our Cyber Security for Dental and GP Practices Guide covers that setting.
- Health plans and public health agencies, which hold large data sets and depend on remote access and third parties.
- Suppliers of electronic health records, medical devices, managed services and billing platforms. Several goals put obligations on the buyer to require things of these suppliers, so suppliers increasingly see the goals in contracts and questionnaires.
Because the goals are voluntary, there is no formal applicability test. The useful scoping question is which of your environments handle electronic protected health information or support clinical care, because those are where the proposed HIPAA changes and the goals overlap.
The 10 Essential goals
The Essential goals are the floor. They target the techniques behind most healthcare incidents: exploited internet-facing flaws, phishing, stolen credentials and slow recovery. The descriptions below paraphrase the HHS page; the mapping column shows the CISA cross-sector CPG ID HHS lists for each goal.
| Essential goal | What it asks for | CISA CPG ID |
|---|---|---|
| Mitigate Known Vulnerabilities | Reduce the chance that attackers exploit known flaws in internet-facing systems | 1.E, 2.W |
| Email Security | Reduce risk from spoofing, phishing and email fraud | 2.M |
| Multifactor Authentication | Add a second login factor where safe and feasible, starting with internet-accessible assets | 2.H |
| Basic Cybersecurity Training | Help the workforce learn and practise more secure behaviour | 2.I |
| Strong Encryption | Encrypt sensitive data and IT and OT traffic in motion | 2.K |
| Revoke Credentials for Departing Workforce Members | Remove access promptly for former employees, contractors, affiliates and volunteers | 2.D |
| Basic Incident Planning and Preparedness | Be able to respond to, restore from and recover from significant incidents safely | 5.A |
| Unique Credentials | Use unique internal credentials to spot anomalies and limit lateral movement, especially between IT and OT | 2.C |
| Separate User and Privileged Accounts | Use separate administrative accounts so a compromised user account does not expose privileged access | 2.E |
| Vendor/Supplier Cybersecurity Requirements | Identify, assess and mitigate risk from third-party products and services | 1.I |
What good looks like for each Essential goal
- Known vulnerabilities: an external attack surface list, a patch window for internet-facing systems, and the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog used as the top priority signal. Remote access gateways and file transfer tools come first.
- Email security: sender authentication records enforced on your domains, external sender tagging, and a reporting button the clinical workforce actually uses.
- MFA: every remote access path, webmail, cloud admin console and vendor support portal. Prefer phishing-resistant methods for administrators, following CISA: Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA.
- Training: short, role-based sessions; clinicians need different scenarios from finance staff.
- Encryption: TLS for interfaces between clinical systems, encrypted backups and encrypted laptops. Older device protocols may need compensating network controls instead.
- Revoke departing credentials: a joiner, mover, leaver feed from HR and from the medical staff office, because affiliated physicians and agency staff are often outside the HR system.
- Incident planning: a written plan that includes clinical downtime, tested at least through a tabletop exercise.
- Unique credentials: no shared logins on workstations, devices or interfaces, and no reused default passwords.
- Separate privileged accounts: administrators use a second account for admin work, with no email or browsing from that account.
- Supplier requirements: security clauses in new contracts covering access, patching, notification and support for MFA.
The 10 Enhanced goals
The Enhanced goals move an organisation from preventing common attacks to finding and containing the ones that get through. They need more staff time and tooling, so most organisations phase them over two to three budget cycles.
| Enhanced goal | What it asks for | CISA CPG ID |
|---|---|---|
| Asset Inventory | Identify known, unknown (shadow) and unmanaged assets so vulnerabilities can be handled faster | 1.A |
| Third Party Vulnerability Disclosure | Discover and respond promptly to vulnerabilities in vendor-provided assets | 1.H |
| Third Party Incident Reporting | Discover and respond promptly to incidents at vendors and service providers | 1.G |
| Cybersecurity Testing | Find weaknesses through penetration testing and attack simulation and share findings responsibly | 4.B |
| Cybersecurity Mitigation | Act quickly on prioritised vulnerabilities found through testing | 1.F |
| Detect and Respond to Relevant Threats and TTPs | Detect relevant threats on endpoints and at network entry and exit points | 3.A |
| Network Segmentation | Separate mission-critical assets into segments to limit lateral movement | 2.F |
| Centralized Log Collection | Collect security log telemetry centrally for visibility and faster response | 2.T |
| Centralized Incident Planning and Preparedness | Maintain, drill and update incident response plans for relevant threat scenarios | 2.S |
| Configuration Management | Define secure settings for devices and systems and keep them aligned to baselines | 2.O |
Three Enhanced goals deserve early attention in a hospital. Asset inventory feeds vulnerability work, segmentation and incident scoping; network segmentation protects medical devices that cannot be patched; and centralised logging is what lets an incident team decide quickly whether a clinical system is safe to keep running. Our Medical Device Security Guide covers the device side of segmentation.
How the goals relate to HIPAA and the proposed Security Rule update
The CPGs do not create legal duties. The HIPAA Security Rule does, and HHS published a notice of proposed rulemaking to update it in the Federal Register on 6 January 2025, with comments due on or before 7 March 2025. The preamble names the Department's CPGs alongside other HHS guidance, and concludes that such resources had not been sufficiently instructive for regulated entities to improve Security Rule compliance. That is the policy link: HHS used the goals as a reference point and then proposed making several related practices mandatory.
The proposal would, among other things, require regulated entities to inventory their technology assets, map the movement of ePHI through their information systems, and expressly encrypt ePHI with limited exceptions. It also adds a definition of multifactor authentication and standards for vulnerability management and compliance audit. Those topics overlap with the Asset Inventory, Strong Encryption, Multifactor Authentication, Mitigate Known Vulnerabilities and Cybersecurity Testing goals. Our HHS HIPAA Security Rule Update (2025 NPRM) Guide covers the proposed obligations in detail; this page does not repeat them.
The practical message for security teams is simple. Work done to meet the CPGs is not wasted whatever happens to the final rule, because the same evidence (an asset register, MFA coverage, encryption status, scan results) serves a HIPAA risk analysis today. Our HIPAA Security Risk Assessment Template can carry that evidence.
Enforcement and penalties
There is no penalty for not meeting the HPH CPGs, and HHS does not certify organisations against them. Enforcement exposure comes from elsewhere:
- HIPAA Security Rule enforcement by the HHS Office for Civil Rights, where an organisation's safeguards and risk analysis are judged against the rule in force. Showing that you adopted recognised practices helps explain your decisions, but it is not a safe harbour on its own.
- Contracts and payers. Customers, insurers and health plans may write CPG-style requirements into agreements, which then become binding between the parties.
- State rules. Some states set their own hospital cyber requirements; check the healthcare rules map for your state.
Treat the CPGs as a planning baseline that will make any future audit or investigation easier to answer, not as a compliance badge.
What it means for security and identity teams
Identity is the largest single theme in the Essential tier. Four goals are directly about accounts, and Email Security and Vendor Requirements depend heavily on them too. Healthcare identity has some specific problems that the goals expose.
- Shared and generic accounts on nursing workstations, imaging consoles and lab systems conflict with the Unique Credentials goal. Fast user switching and badge tap login can keep clinical workflow quick without sharing.
- Affiliated and temporary workforce such as locum doctors, students and agency nurses often sit outside the HR feed, so the Revoke Credentials goal needs a second authoritative source.
- Vendor remote access to devices and clinical applications is a common entry point. Put it behind MFA, time-bound approval and session recording.
- Non-human identities such as interface engine accounts, HL7 and FHIR integration credentials, service accounts on EHR servers and API keys for cloud services fall under Unique Credentials, Separate Privileged Accounts and Configuration Management. They are rarely owned, rarely rotated and often highly privileged. Our Machine Identity in Healthcare guide covers inventory and rotation.
For the broader healthcare identity picture, including clinical single sign-on and break glass access, see the Healthcare Identity Security Guide.
Compliance steps: a sequenced adoption plan
- Baseline. Score each of the 20 goals as not started, partial or met, with one line of evidence each. Keep it short; this is for prioritising, not auditing.
- Start the inventory. Even a rough asset and account inventory makes the Essential goals measurable. Include medical devices, interfaces and service accounts.
- Close the internet-facing gaps first. MFA on all remote access and webmail, patching of known exploited vulnerabilities on internet-facing systems, and email authentication. These three remove the most common initial access routes.
- Fix the account model. Separate admin accounts, remove shared logins where you can, and connect leaver processes for every workforce source.
- Write and test the incident plan with clinical leaders, including downtime procedures. See the Healthcare Incident Response Guide.
- Update supplier contracts at renewal: MFA support, patch timelines, vulnerability disclosure and incident notification.
- Move to the Enhanced tier in this order for most hospitals: segmentation of clinical and device networks, central logging, configuration baselines, then testing and mitigation cycles.
- Map evidence once. Use the NIST SP 800-53 references HHS gives for each goal (for example IA-2 for MFA, CM-8 for inventory and RA-5 for vulnerability scanning) so the same evidence supports CPG reporting, a HIPAA risk analysis and any NIST CSF 2.0 profile.
- Report to the board on goal coverage and the top residual risks, not on tool counts. Our Healthcare Board Cyber Briefing gives a format.
Measuring progress
Each goal needs one or two measures that a board and a regulator would both understand. Suggested measures from NHI Mgmt Group, not set by HHS:
| Goal | Suggested measure |
|---|---|
| Multifactor Authentication | Percentage of internet-accessible logins, including vendor access, protected by MFA |
| Mitigate Known Vulnerabilities | Median days to remediate known exploited vulnerabilities on internet-facing assets |
| Revoke Credentials | Percentage of leavers whose access was removed within your target window, across all workforce sources |
| Separate Privileged Accounts | Number of administrators using a daily account for admin work |
| Asset Inventory | Share of network-observed devices matched to an owner and a record |
| Network Segmentation | Share of medical devices on segmented networks with defined allowed flows |
| Centralized Log Collection | Share of critical systems sending security logs to the central platform |
Common failure patterns
- Treating the goals as a checklist to tick rather than a priority order, so effort goes to easy goals while remote access stays without MFA.
- MFA with exceptions that swallow the rule, such as vendor accounts, legacy VPN profiles or service desk resets that bypass the second factor.
- Leaver processes tied only to HR, leaving affiliated clinicians, students and contractors active for months.
- Service accounts ignored under Unique Credentials and Separate Privileged Accounts because they do not belong to a person.
- Incident plans with no clinical input, which fail the first time a ward needs to decide whether to keep a system online.
- Supplier clauses added only to new contracts while the largest clinical vendors stay on old terms for years.
- Inventory postponed because it is an Enhanced goal, which leaves every other measure unreliable.
Practitioner checklist
- Score all 20 HPH CPGs with one line of evidence each.
- Confirm MFA on every remote access path, webmail, cloud console and vendor portal.
- Track known exploited vulnerabilities on internet-facing systems against a fixed remediation window.
- Connect leaver feeds from HR, the medical staff office, agencies and education partners.
- Create separate admin accounts and remove email and browsing from them.
- List service accounts and integration credentials with an owner and a rotation date.
- Start an asset inventory that includes medical devices and interfaces.
- Test the incident plan with clinical leaders, including downtime.
- Add security requirements, vulnerability disclosure and incident notification to supplier contracts at renewal.
- Map evidence to the NIST SP 800-53 references for reuse in the HIPAA risk analysis.
Standards and references
- HHS Cyber Gateway: HPH Cybersecurity Performance Goals
- Federal Register: HIPAA Security Rule To Strengthen the Cybersecurity of Electronic Protected Health Information (NPRM, 6 January 2025)
- ASPR TRACIE: Healthcare and Public Health Sector-Specific Cybersecurity Performance Goals
- NIST: The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0
- CISA: Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog
- CISA: Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA
- CISA: #StopRansomware Guide
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: HHS HIPAA Security Rule Update (2025 NPRM) Guide · CISA Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) Guide · HIPAA Security Rule Guide · Healthcare Identity Security Guide