Many OT security programmes buy firewalls and "62443 certified" products before anyone has decided which parts of the plant need which level of protection, and that decision is exactly what IEC 62443-3-2 exists to make. Part 3-2 sets out how an asset owner, usually with its system integrator, defines the system under consideration, partitions it into zones and conduits, assesses cyber risk for each, and records a target security level (SL-T) and requirements in a cybersecurity requirements specification (CRS). This guide walks through the seven zone and conduit requirements (ZCR 1 to ZCR 7) in practical detail, with worked examples, the evidence an assessor will expect, how identity enters the assessment, and how the results feed procurement and design. It is for OT security leads, process safety and risk engineers, integrators and consultants. The series as a whole is explained in the IEC 62443 Guide; segmentation design is in the OT Network Segmentation, Purdue Model and IEC 62443 Zones and Conduits Guide.
Key takeaways
- 3-2 is a process, not a risk formula. It does not prescribe one risk method: the asset owner sets the method, aligned with its corporate risk approach, and the risk matrices in the standard are informative.
- Two passes, by design. A quick initial assessment on worst-case consequence decides where a detailed, threat and vulnerability based assessment is needed, so effort goes where risk is.
- Some partitioning is mandatory. Business and control assets shall be separated, and safety related assets shall be separated; temporarily connected devices, wireless devices and devices connected via external networks should be.
- The output is the CRS. Zone and conduit drawings, SL-T per zone and conduit, threat environment, countermeasures and requirements become the specification that integrators design to and suppliers are measured against.
- The asset owner signs it. ZCR 7 requires asset owner approval of the results, including residual risk. An integrator can do the work, but cannot accept the risk.
What it is and who it applies to
IEC 62443-3-2 Edition 1.0, "Security risk assessment for system design", was published on 24 June 2020 (ISA publishes it as ANSI/ISA-62443-3-2-2020). IEC lists a stability date of 2027. Its abstract describes four outcomes: define a system under consideration (SUC) for an industrial automation and control system (IACS), partition it into zones and conduits, assess risk for each zone and conduit, and set an SL-T for each, then document the security requirements.
| Role | Responsibility under 3-2 |
|---|---|
| Asset owner | Accountable. Sets the risk method and tolerable risk, provides policies and prior hazard analyses, approves results and residual risk (ZCR 7) |
| System integrator or integration service provider | Often performs the partitioning and assessment, produces the CRS, then designs to it under 62443-3-3 |
| Process safety and operations | Supplies consequence data (HAZOP, LOPA, SIL studies) and validates impact ratings |
| Product suppliers | Not directly in scope; they answer SL-T with component capability (SL-C) under 62443-4-2 |
It applies to new projects (greenfield design) and to existing systems (brownfield), where the assessment is usually what reveals the gap between achieved and target security levels. Part 3-2 sits between the asset owner programme in 62443-2-1 (ANSI/ISA-62443-2-1-2024) and the system requirements in 62443-3-3.
Structure and key requirements
| Requirement | What you do | Main output |
|---|---|---|
| ZCR 1 Identify the SUC | Define the system boundary and all access points; gather architecture diagrams, inventory, data flows, policies, regulations, tolerable risk guidelines, prior hazard analyses and criticality assessments | SUC description and boundary |
| ZCR 2 Initial cybersecurity risk assessment | Assess worst-case unmitigated consequence if the SUC or its parts are compromised, assuming likelihood is high | Initial risk evaluation; diagrams updated with external services and support |
| ZCR 3 Partition into zones and conduits | Group assets by risk and criticality, function, location, required access and responsible organisation; apply the separation rules | Initial or revised zone and conduit diagram |
| ZCR 4 Compare initial risk with tolerable risk | Decide for each zone and conduit whether a detailed assessment is needed | List of zones and conduits for detailed assessment |
| ZCR 5 Detailed cybersecurity risk assessment | Identify threats and vulnerabilities, estimate consequence and likelihood, determine unmitigated risk and SL-T, evaluate existing countermeasures, determine residual risk and add countermeasures until it is tolerable | SL-T, residual risk and countermeasure list per zone and conduit |
| ZCR 6 Document requirements, assumptions and constraints | Write the cybersecurity requirements specification | CRS |
| ZCR 7 Asset owner approval | Review and approve results by accountable management | Signed approval and residual risk acceptance |
Partitioning rules (ZCR 3)
- Shall separate business and control system assets: enterprise IT and the IACS never share a zone.
- Shall separate safety related assets: the safety instrumented system and its engineering station form their own zone or zones.
- Should separate temporarily connected devices: laptops, USB tools and vendor kits connect through a defined zone or conduit, not directly into a control zone.
- Should separate wireless devices: wireless sensors and access points form their own zone with a conduit to wired zones.
- Should separate devices connected via external networks: remote access, cloud connectors and third-party links terminate in their own zone, usually in the industrial DMZ.
Security level targets
The SL-T describes the attacker the zone must resist. As summarised by the ISA Global Cybersecurity Alliance: SL 1 against casual or coincidental violation; SL 2 against intentional violation using simple means, low resources, generic skills and low motivation; SL 3 against sophisticated means, moderate resources, IACS-specific skills and moderate motivation; SL 4 against sophisticated means, extended resources, IACS-specific skills and high motivation. In practice the SL-T is often set per foundational requirement (FR 1 to FR 7) as a vector rather than as a single number, so a zone can need SL 3 for identification and authentication (FR 1) but SL 2 for data confidentiality (FR 4).
Worked example: a water treatment plant
| Zone or conduit | Worst-case consequence (ZCR 2) | Detailed assessment? | Indicative SL-T |
|---|---|---|---|
| Z1 Enterprise IT | Business disruption | Out of SUC | Not applicable |
| Z2 Industrial DMZ (historian replica, patch server, remote access broker) | Loss of view of process; path into control | Yes | SL 2, FR 1 and FR 5 at SL 3 |
| Z3 Supervisory (SCADA servers, HMIs, engineering workstation) | Unsafe dosing commands; loss of control | Yes | SL 3 |
| Z4 Control (PLCs and remote I/O for dosing and filtration) | Physical harm through chemical overdose | Yes | SL 3; compensating countermeasures where PLCs only reach SL-C 1 |
| Z5 Safety (independent overdose trip system) | Loss of last line of defence | Yes | SL 3, with no routable conduit to Z2 |
| Z6 Wireless tank level sensors | False level readings | Yes | SL 2 |
| C1 Conduit Z2 to Z3 | Lateral movement from DMZ | Yes | SL 3 at the enforcing firewall |
The example is illustrative: your SL-T depends on your tolerable risk criteria and threat environment, not on sector averages.
Identity and NHI requirements
Identity enters 3-2 in three places, and missing any of them distorts the result.
- ZCR 1 inputs: list every account and credential that reaches the SUC: vendor remote access accounts, shared operator logins, service accounts for historians and OPC servers, and keys or certificates on gateways and cloud connectors. Each one is an access point at the SUC boundary. See the OT and ICS Identity and Access Guide.
- ZCR 3 partitioning: group assets by "required access" and "responsible organisation" as well as function. A zone whose devices are maintained by a vendor under remote access has a different risk profile from one maintained only on site.
- ZCR 5 vulnerabilities: default and shared credentials, accounts trusted across zones (for example an OT domain trusting the corporate domain) and unmanaged service accounts are vulnerabilities to score. They often raise the FR 1 and FR 2 elements of the SL-T above the others.
- ZCR 6 CRS: state identity requirements per zone: individual accounts for engineering actions, MFA on conduits from external networks, owned and inventoried service accounts, and rules for break-glass accounts. See the Identity for OT Environments Guide and the OT Remote Access Guide.
The Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack shows why: a legacy VPN account without MFA was an unrecorded access point, and the business could not prove which zones it reached, so it shut down the pipeline.
Implementation steps
- Agree method and tolerable risk (weeks 1 to 2): align consequence categories (health and safety, environment, production, regulatory, reputation) with the corporate risk matrix and the process safety team's existing scales. Record who can accept which level of residual risk.
- Collect inputs (weeks 2 to 4): architecture drawings, asset inventory, data flows, HAZOP and LOPA results, and the identity and remote access list above. Passive monitoring data is the fastest way to validate flows; see the OT Network Security Monitoring Guide.
- Run ZCR 1 to 4 in a workshop: with operations, process safety, OT engineering and the integrator. Draft zones on consequence, then test them against the separation rules.
- Run ZCR 5 for zones above tolerable risk: use a threat catalogue such as ATT&CK for ICS and the vulnerabilities found on site. Score unmitigated risk, set SL-T, credit existing countermeasures only if they are verified, and add countermeasures until residual risk is tolerable. For a complementary, consequence-first view, Idaho National Laboratory's Consequence-driven Cyber-informed Engineering (CCE) assumes a skilled adversary will get in and focuses on engineering out the worst outcomes.
- Write the CRS (ZCR 6): it can be a section of existing design documentation rather than a standalone document, but it must be under change control.
- Obtain approval (ZCR 7) from the accountable manager, with explicit residual risk acceptance and review dates.
- Use the results: issue SL-T per zone in tenders, design conduits to it, and compare achieved security level (SL-A) during commissioning tests.
- Repeat on change: new conduits, new remote access, process changes and significant incidents trigger a reassessment of the affected zones. If a design change cannot meet SL-T, return to ZCR 5 and record compensating countermeasures rather than lowering the target.
Small versus large operators: a small utility can run the whole method in two workshops for one site, with a single CRS. A multi-site operator should define standard zone templates and SL-T ranges centrally, then run site-specific detailed assessments only where a site deviates from the template.
Evidence and assessment
Assessors, auditors and regulators typically look for:
- Method: the documented risk methodology, consequence scales and tolerable risk statement approved by the asset owner.
- SUC definition: boundary, access points and the list of external services and support.
- Zone and conduit drawings: each conduit with its endpoints, protocols, direction, owner and enforcing device.
- Risk records: initial and detailed assessments with threats, vulnerabilities, consequence, likelihood, existing and added countermeasures, residual risk and SL-T per zone and conduit.
- CRS: SUC description, drawings, zone and conduit characteristics, operating environment and threat environment assumptions, policies and regulatory requirements, and countermeasures.
- Approval and review: signed approval, residual risk owners and reassessment triggers.
Measures that show the assessment is alive: percentage of sites with an approved CRS less than [24] months old; percentage of conduits with a named owner and enforcing device; number of zones where SL-A is below SL-T, with a dated remediation plan; percentage of OT changes that triggered a documented reassessment decision; and count of accepted residual risks past their review date.
Mapping to other frameworks
| 62443-3-2 element | NIST CSF 2.0 | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | Other |
|---|---|---|---|
| Risk method and tolerable risk (before ZCR 1) | GV.RM-02; GV.RM-06 | RA-2 Security Categorization | ISO/IEC 27005 risk process |
| ZCR 1 SUC and data flows | ID.AM-03 | PL-8 Security and Privacy Architectures | NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 architecture |
| ZCR 2 and ZCR 5 risk assessments | ID.RA-03; ID.RA-04; ID.RA-05 | RA-3 Risk Assessment | NIST SP 800-30 |
| ZCR 3 zones and conduits | PR.IR-01 | SC-7 Boundary Protection; AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement | ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A 8.22 Segregation of networks |
| ZCR 5 countermeasure selection | ID.RA-06 | RA-3; CA-2 Control Assessments | 62443-3-3 system requirements by SL |
| Identity inputs and requirements | PR.AA-01 | AC-2 Account Management; IA-2; IA-3 | 62443-3-3 FR 1 and FR 2 |
Teams already using NIST SP 800-30 can run it inside ZCR 5, since 3-2 does not mandate a method; see the NIST SP 800-30 Risk Assessment Guide. The SL-T from 3-2 is what suppliers answer with SL-C under 4-2: see the IEC 62443-4-1 and 4-2 Secure Product Development Guide.
Common pitfalls
- Zones copied from VLANs: drawing zones around the existing network rather than around consequence hides high-risk assets inside low-risk zones.
- One SL-T for the whole site: a single number loses the difference between a safety zone and a lab network, and between FRs.
- Skipping ZCR 2: going straight to a detailed assessment of everything wastes effort; using only the initial assessment leaves SL-T guessed rather than derived.
- Crediting unverified countermeasures: a firewall rule set that nobody has reviewed in years is not a countermeasure in ZCR 5.
- Missing access points: vendor VPNs, cloud connectors and maintenance laptops left out of ZCR 1 because they are "temporary".
- No reassessment trigger: an approved CRS that is never revisited after new remote access or a plant extension.
Practitioner checklist
- Document the risk method, consequence scales and tolerable risk, and have the asset owner approve them.
- Define the SUC boundary and every access point, including vendor, cloud and service account paths.
- Run the initial assessment on worst-case consequence with process safety in the room.
- Apply the separation rules: business from control, safety from everything, and temporary, wireless and external connections in their own zones.
- Run detailed assessments only where initial risk exceeds tolerable risk.
- Set SL-T per zone and conduit, per FR where it differs, and record compensating countermeasures.
- Write the CRS under change control and include identity requirements per zone.
- Obtain signed asset owner approval with named residual risk owners and review dates.
- Use SL-T in tenders and compare SL-A at commissioning.
- Define the change events that trigger reassessment and track them.
Standards and references
- IEC: IEC 62443-3-2 Security risk assessment for system design
- ISA: ISA/IEC 62443 Series of Standards
- ISA Global Cybersecurity Alliance: Quick Start Guide to the ISA/IEC 62443 Standards
- Idaho National Laboratory: Consequence-driven Cyber-informed Engineering (CCE)
- NIST: SP 800-82 Rev. 3, Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5
- NIST: Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: IEC 62443 Guide · OT Network Segmentation, Purdue Model and IEC 62443 Zones and Conduits Guide · NIST SP 800-30 Risk Assessment Guide · OT Security Guide