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HMI and SCADA Server Hardening Guide: Accounts, Remote Access and Allowlisting

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 27 October 2026 13 min read
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The human-machine interface (HMI) is where operators see and change a physical process, and in many plants it runs on an old Windows build with a shared login, auto-logon, remote desktop or VNC exposed and no application control. SCADA servers, HMI clients, historians and alarm servers form the supervisory layer that attackers reach first when they want to manipulate or stop a process. This guide gives a hardening baseline for those Windows-based systems and for embedded panel HMIs: accounts and shared logins, remote access, application control, removable media, logging, backups and patching, within the constraints of vendor support and 24x7 operation. It is written for OT engineers, control system integrators and security teams, and goes deeper on the supervisory layer than the broader OT Security Guide.

Key takeaways

  • Exposure and default passwords are the first fix. In the CyberAv3ngers campaign CISA describes in AA23-335A, IRGC-affiliated actors compromised at least 75 Unitronics PLC and HMI devices that had default or no passwords and were reachable on TCP port 20256, and left a defacement on HMI screens.
  • Shared operator logins are an identity problem with a safety constraint. Replace them with named or role accounts where the HMI supports it, and where it cannot, compensate with physical control, session logging and a fast, safe login model for operators.
  • Remote viewing tools are remote control tools. VNC, RDP and vendor remote support agents on HMIs must sit behind brokered remote access with phishing-resistant MFA, never on a routable address.
  • Application control fits HMIs well. A fixed-function workstation running a known set of binaries is the ideal case for App Control for Business or AppLocker, deployed in audit mode first.
  • Recovery is part of hardening. Tested offline backups of HMI projects, SCADA configurations and controller logic, plus the ability to run manually, decide how long a compromise lasts.

What sits in the supervisory layer and why it is targeted

SystemRoleTypical weaknesses
SCADA or DCS serverPolls controllers, holds tag database and alarm logic, serves HMI clientsService accounts with domain admin rights, unpatched OS pinned to a vendor-qualified build, broad inbound access
HMI client or operator stationDisplays process graphics and sends operator commandsShared or auto-logon account, local admin for operators, VNC for remote viewing, USB ports open
Embedded panel HMITouch panel on the machine, often with a built-in web or remote access serverDefault password, remote access feature enabled, rarely updated firmware
HistorianStores process data; often replicated to the business networkDual-homed or reachable from IT, database credentials embedded in reporting tools
Alarm, reporting and OPC serversIntegration with other systems and the business layerLegacy DCOM-based OPC with broad permissions, shared service accounts

MITRE ATT&CK for ICS models the attacker path through this layer: initial access via T0883 Internet Accessible Device, T0822 External Remote Services or T0866 Exploitation of Remote Services; use of T0859 Valid Accounts; operating the process through T0823 Graphical User Interface; and impact via T0831 Manipulation of Control. The engineering workstation that holds project files is the other high-value target; see the Engineering Workstation Security Guide.

Accounts, shared logins and privileged access

Shared operator logins exist because operators must reach the HMI instantly at shift change or during an upset. Hardening must preserve that, so the goal is accountable access, not slower access.

OptionWhen it fitsTrade-off
Named operator accounts in the HMI application, with a shared, locked-down Windows sessionHMI software with its own user and role model (most modern SCADA packages)Good accountability for commands; Windows session still shared, so lock down the desktop shell
Named Windows accounts with fast user switching or badge loginSites with a reliable OT domain and badge infrastructureBest accountability; needs testing so login never blocks an alarm response
Shared role account (for example one per control room) with compensating controlsLegacy HMIs that cannot do betterNo individual accountability; rely on physical access control, CCTV, shift logs and HMI audit trails
  • Remove local admin from operator sessions: operators run the HMI; they do not need to install software or change system settings.
  • Manage local administrator passwords: where HMIs are domain-joined to an OT domain, Windows LAPS rotates and backs up the local administrator password to Windows Server AD (or Microsoft Entra ID), and is supported on Windows 11, Windows 10 with the April 2023 update or later, and Windows Server 2019 and later. Microsoft notes that legacy LAPS emulation mode stores passwords in clear text in AD, so use native Windows LAPS.
  • Separate engineering and operations rights: changing a graphic, tag or alarm limit is an engineering action requiring an engineering account, not the operator login.
  • Disable auto-logon where possible: where the vendor requires it for unattended restart, restrict that account to launching the HMI shell only.
  • Tame service accounts: SCADA services, historian collectors and OPC servers often run as one powerful domain account. Give each service its own least-privilege account, deny interactive logon, and record owners. See the Service Account Security Guide.

Remote access: VNC, RDP and vendor support

CISA, FBI, EPA and DOE list "Secure remote access to OT networks" among their primary OT mitigations: if remote access is essential, use a private connection and a VPN with a strong password and phishing-resistant MFA, apply least privilege and disable dormant accounts. AA23-335A adds VPNs or gateways for remote access and MFA for OT access.

  • No direct exposure: VNC, RDP, HMI web servers and panel remote access features must not be reachable from the internet or the corporate network. Find them with an external exposure check and internal scans.
  • Broker every session: route remote access through a jump host or remote access gateway in the OT DMZ that enforces MFA, records sessions and grants time-limited access. See the OT Remote Access Guide.
  • VNC specifics: classic VNC authentication uses a single shared password and many builds do not encrypt the session. If VNC is unavoidable for view-only monitoring, bind it to the local host or management interface, tunnel it, set view-only where the product supports it, and use a unique password per station.
  • RDP specifics: require Network Level Authentication, restrict to the jump host, and do not leave RDP open on HMIs for convenience. See the Remote Desktop (RDP) Security Guide.
  • Vendor agents: remove permanently installed remote support tools; enable vendor access per session through the broker.

Application control, malware protection and removable media

Microsoft describes App Control for Business as changing Windows from running all code unless antivirus predicts it is bad, to running code only if policy says so, covering applications, kernel code, scripts, MSI installers and PowerShell in Constrained Language Mode. Microsoft also states application control is not a replacement for antivirus. An HMI or SCADA server is close to the ideal case because its software set changes rarely.

  1. Agree with the vendor. Confirm that application control and the chosen antivirus are qualified for your SCADA version; many vendors publish exclusion lists and supported products.
  2. Baseline a clean, known-good system. Build the policy from a freshly installed and verified station, using publisher rules for signed vendor software and hash rules for unsigned components.
  3. Deploy in audit mode. Run through full operating cycles, including shift changes, reports, alarm floods and vendor maintenance tasks, and review would-be blocks.
  4. Enforce on a pilot station. Choose a non-critical or redundant HMI first, with operations present and a documented rollback (revert to audit policy and restart).
  5. Roll out by area, keeping change control tight: every SCADA patch or project change may need a policy update.
  • Removable media: block USB storage by default and allow only scanned, registered media through a kiosk or transfer station. T0847 Replication Through Removable Media is a documented ICS initial access technique. See the Removable Media and USB Control Guide.
  • Browsers and email: remove them or block internet access entirely from operator stations.
  • Desktop lockdown: use a restricted shell or kiosk configuration so operators cannot reach the file system or command line from the HMI session.

Network placement, services and patching

  • Zone the supervisory layer: HMIs and SCADA servers belong in their own zone, with conduits to controllers below and to the OT DMZ above. Historians that feed the business should replicate to a DMZ instance, not be reachable from IT. CISA's primary mitigations call for an IT/OT DMZ for passing control data. See the OT Network Segmentation, Purdue Model and IEC 62443 Zones and Conduits Guide.
  • Host firewall: enable Windows Defender Firewall with inbound rules only for the SCADA protocols and clients that need them.
  • Remove unused roles and services: web servers, file sharing, print spooler and legacy protocols that the SCADA package does not use.
  • Change default ports and names only as defence in depth: AA23-335A recommends changing default ports and device names, but this slows only opportunistic scanning; it does not replace authentication.
  • Patching: follow vendor-qualified patch lists, test on a staging station or redundant server, and patch redundant pairs one side at a time. Where an OS is out of support and cannot be upgraded, record it, isolate it further and plan replacement. See the ICS Advisory Triage and OT Vulnerability Management Guide.
  • Embedded panel HMIs: set passwords on every access level, disable built-in remote access and web servers not in use, and update firmware through the vendor's tool; AA23-335A required the Unitronics engineering software and firmware to be upgraded as an immediate step.

Small versus large sites: a small utility or plant with two or three HMIs and an integrator should start with exposure removal, password changes, a single brokered remote access path and offline project backups; application control can follow at the next HMI refresh. A large operator with an OT domain should standardise hardened golden images per HMI type, deploy Windows LAPS and application control through central policy, and run a quarterly review of service accounts and remote access grants.

Logging, detection and measurement

Collect Windows Security logs (logon success and failure, account and group changes, new services and process creation where enabled), application control audit and block events, HMI and SCADA application audit trails (operator commands, setpoint and alarm changes, project downloads), and network flows to and from the supervisory zone. Forward them to a collector in the OT DMZ so that a compromised HMI cannot erase its own history. Passive OT network monitoring adds visibility into controller writes and new connections. See the OT Network Security Monitoring Guide.

  • Alert on: remote sessions not originating from the jump host, logons outside shift patterns, new local accounts, application control blocks, controller program downloads outside change windows, and HMI screens or projects changing unexpectedly (a defacement is the visible version of this).
MetricTarget
HMI, SCADA and panel interfaces reachable from internet or ITZero
Stations with default or shared vendor passwordsZero
Remote sessions through the broker with MFA, as a share of all remote sessions100 percent
Stations with application control enforcedRising; all new builds enforced
Stations sending logs to the collector100 percent
Successful restore tests of HMI projects and SCADA configuration in the last 12 monthsAt least one per system

Backup, recovery and manual operations

  • Back up what you cannot rebuild: HMI projects, SCADA tag databases, alarm configurations, historian configuration, controller logic and the licences and keys needed to reinstall.
  • Keep copies offline and versioned: AA23-335A recommends tested backups of PLC logic and spare hardware; the same applies to the supervisory layer.
  • Use golden images: a verified, hardened image per HMI type lets you rebuild a compromised station in hours.
  • Practise manual operation: CISA's primary mitigations include practising and maintaining the ability to operate OT systems manually, so losing the HMIs does not mean losing the process. See the Backup Security and Immutable Backup Guide.

Framework mapping

Control areaNIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5ATT&CK for ICS mitigation
Accounts, shared logins, local adminAC-2, AC-6, IA-5M0918 User Account Management; M0926 Privileged Account Management
Remote access with MFAAC-17, IA-2M0932 Multi-factor Authentication
Application control and antimalwareCM-7, SI-3M0938 Execution Prevention; M0949 Antivirus/Antimalware
Removable mediaMP-7M0942 Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Segmentation and host firewallSC-7M0930 Network Segmentation; M0937 Filter Network Traffic
Logging and monitoringAU-2, AU-6, SI-4n/a
Inventory, patching, backupCM-8, SI-2, CP-9M0953 Data Backup

NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security (final, September 2023), is the main US government reference for applying these controls in OT; NIST's publication page notes an initial public draft of Revision 4 with comments due 30 November 2026, so check for updates. For the IEC 62443 view, see the IEC 62443 Guide.

Common failure patterns

  • Internet-reachable HMIs and panels with default passwords: the pattern behind the Unitronics defacements in AA23-335A. See the CyberAv3ngers Threat Actor Profile Guide.
  • VNC left on for convenience: installed by an integrator for remote viewing, with one password across the site and no encryption.
  • Operators as local administrators: so any malware or USB autorun runs with full rights on the station that controls the process.
  • One domain account for every SCADA service: compromise of one server's service account gives control of the whole supervisory layer.
  • Dual-homed historians: a historian with one interface in IT and one in OT bypasses the DMZ entirely.
  • Backups never restored: project backups that turn out to be outdated or missing licences when a station must be rebuilt.

Practitioner checklist

  • Confirm no HMI, SCADA server, historian or panel interface is reachable from the internet or the corporate network.
  • Replace every default password, including embedded panel access levels and vendor accounts.
  • Move operators to named application accounts or role accounts with compensating controls, and remove local admin rights.
  • Deploy native Windows LAPS for local administrator passwords on domain-joined stations.
  • Route all VNC, RDP and vendor sessions through a broker with phishing-resistant MFA and session recording.
  • Roll out application control in audit mode, then enforce station by station with vendor agreement.
  • Block USB storage except through a scanning transfer station.
  • Give each SCADA service its own least-privilege account with interactive logon denied.
  • Forward Windows, application control and HMI audit logs to an OT DMZ collector.
  • Keep offline, versioned backups and golden images, and test restores and manual operation yearly.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: OT Security Guide · Engineering Workstation Security Guide · Moxa and Industrial Networking Device Hardening Guide · Water and Wastewater Cybersecurity Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 27 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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