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Plaso Guide: Building, Filtering and Using Super Timelines

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 8 November 2026 11 min read
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A single compromised host can hold millions of timestamps across the file system, registry, event logs and browser data, and responders who cannot merge them into one ordered view miss the sequence that explains the intrusion. Plaso, the Python engine behind the log2timeline tool, extracts those events into a storage file that can then be filtered, tagged and exported. This guide explains the Plaso toolset (log2timeline, psort, pinfo, psteal and image_export), how to choose between full super timelines and targeted collection, how to filter and tag output so analysts find signal quickly, and how to run it defensibly. It goes deeper than the Open Source DFIR Tools Landscape Guide and is written for DFIR analysts and incident responders. Options and parser names were checked against the project repository and documentation (release 20261025) on 27 October 2026.

This is an independent guide from NHI Mgmt Group, based on the Plaso project's public documentation as of November 2026. It is not sponsored or reviewed by the Plaso project. Product features change, so confirm settings against the Plaso project's current documentation.

Key takeaways

  • Plaso is a pipeline, not one command. log2timeline extracts events into a .plaso storage file; psort filters, analyses and outputs it; pinfo describes it; psteal runs both with defaults.
  • Targeted beats exhaustive under time pressure. Forensic Artifacts definitions (--artifact-filters) or YAML filter files (--file-filter) cut processing from hours to minutes for triage.
  • Tagging turns a timeline into findings. The bundled tag_windows.txt labels events such as new services (7045), failed logons (4625) and cleared logs (104, 1102), so analysts start from known-bad patterns.
  • Everything is UTC by default. psort writes UTC unless --output-time-zone is set; agree the case time zone before analysts compare notes.
  • Some analysis plugins send data out. The virustotal and chrome_extension plugins contact external services; disable them for sensitive cases or isolated workstations.

What the tool does

Plaso (Plaso Langar Að Safna Öllu, "super timeline all the things") is an open source engine, licensed Apache-2.0, that collects timestamped events from individual files, directories, mount points or storage media images and aggregates them for timeline analysis. It replaced the original Perl log2timeline. Releases are date-versioned (for example 20261025) and the project recommends using a packaged release no older than six months rather than the development branch.

The command-line tools

ToolPurposeTypical use
log2timelineExtracts events from a source into a Plaso storage file, with metadata about the collectionlog2timeline.py --storage-file case.plaso image.E01
psortPost-processes storage files: filter, sort, deduplicate, run analysis plugins and write outputpsort.py -o dynamic -w case.csv case.plaso
pinfoReports what a storage file contains: sources, parsers used, event counts, warningsValidate a run before analysis; --sections sources
pstealRuns log2timeline and psort in one go with a limited subset of optionsQuick look at a small image: psteal.py --source image.raw -o dynamic -w out.csv
image_exportExports file content from an image by extension, path filter, signature or date rangePull executables or registry hives for other tools

Sources and parsers

log2timeline scans the source first. If it finds several partitions, an encrypted volume (BitLocker credentials such as a recovery password can be supplied) or Volume Shadow Copies, it prompts; --partitions, --vss_stores and --unattended make runs non-interactive. Parsers are grouped into presets (for example win7, winxp, linux, macos, webhist) selectable with --parsers, and --info lists everything available in your build. Parsers relevant to most intrusion cases include:

PlatformParsers (as named in Plaso)Evidence
Windowswinevtx, winreg, mft, usnjrnl, prefetch, lnk, winjob, recycle_bin, setupapi, esedbEvent logs, registry keys, file system metadata, execution and file-open traces
Linuxsyslog, systemd_journal, utmp, selinux, bash_history, zsh_extended_history, Docker container and layer parsersLogons, commands, services, container activity
macOSunified_logging, fseventsd, plist plugins (login items, background items), macostccPersistence, file events, privacy permission grants
Cloud and networkaws_cloudtrail_log, azure_activity_log, gcp_log, apache_access, aws_elb_access, ivanti_vc0Control-plane actions and edge device logs alongside host evidence
Other toolsbodyfile, jsonlImport output from other tools (for example a Volatility 3 timeliner bodyfile)

Defender use cases

Full super timeline or targeted timeline?

ApproachHowChoose it whenTrade-off
Full super timelineDefault parsers over the whole imageScoping is unclear, the case may go to litigation, or you need to prove absence of activityHours of processing and millions of events; analysts drown without filters
Artifact-targeted--artifact-filters with Forensic Artifacts definition names (or a file of names)Fast triage of known high-value artefacts across many hostsMisses evidence outside the chosen artefacts
Filter-file targeted--file-filter with a YAML include/exclude file such as the bundled filter_windows.yamlYou want precise control of paths, for example MFT, UsnJrnl, hives, LNK, jump lists, event logs and prefetchFilters apply at source level only, not inside archives; artifact and file filters cannot be combined
Single file or log setPoint log2timeline at a file or directoryExported logs (EVTX, CloudTrail) collected by other meansNo file system context

A common pattern is to collect triage packages with a tool such as KAPE or Velociraptor, run targeted Plaso processing on each, and keep full images for the hosts that matter. See the KAPE and Triage Collection Guide and the Velociraptor Guide.

Filtering and analysis with psort

  • Time slices: --slice "2026-03-04T10:15:00" returns events five minutes either side of a pivot time; --slice_size widens the window. Since 20200613 the value must be ISO 8601.
  • Event filters: expressions such as parser is 'winevtx' and event_identifier is 4624, with operators including contains (case-insensitive substring), regexp, iregexp, comparison operators and not. --slicer adds context events around each match.
  • Date filters: restrict output to the incident window to reduce volume; set --output-time-zone only when every reader understands the offset.
  • Duplicates: psort removes duplicate events by default; -a keeps them, which matters when duplicates come from different Volume Shadow Copies.
  • Tagging: --analysis tagging --tagging-file tag_windows.txt applies labels such as application_execution, login_failed, service_new, task_schedule, autorun, file_download, firewall_change and eventlog_cleared; Linux and macOS rule files ship too. Then filter on tag contains 'service_new'.
  • Hash lookups: log2timeline hashes files by default; the bloom and nsrlsvr plugins label known files, which helps exclude operating system noise.

Questions a tagged timeline answers

QuestionPlaso evidenceRelated ATT&CK technique
When did the attacker install persistence?service_new (System 7045), task_schedule, autorun tags, registry key last-written timesT1543.003 Windows Service, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1547.001 Registry Run Keys
Which account logged on, and from where?Security 4624 and 4625 records, RDP and SMB events, Linux login tagsT1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares
What ran first on patient zero?Prefetch, Amcache, LNK and jump lists ordered against browser downloadsT1204.002 Malicious File
Were logs tampered with?eventlog_cleared tag (104, 1102), gaps in event record sequencesT1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs, T1070 Indicator Removal
Were files timestomped?Differences between $MFT attribute times and $UsnJrnl recordsT1070 Indicator Removal

For the analytical method (pivots, gaps, clock skew and reporting), see the Forensic Timeline Analysis Guide and the Windows Forensic Artefacts Guide.

Output choices

psort no longer writes to stdout (since 1.5.0); use -w. Output modules include dynamic (default, configurable with --fields and --additional_fields), l2tcsv (legacy 17-field CSV), json, json_line, tln, l2ttln, xlsx, and, with optional dependencies, opensearch and opensearch_ts for Timesketch. Runtime fields such as sha256_hash, file_entropy and yara_match help pivot to malware analysis. Timesketch, Google's open source collaborative timeline tool, is the usual front end when several analysts share a case.

Deployment and safe use

  1. Install a packaged release: the project recommends the Docker image (log2timeline/plaso) or distribution packages. For isolated forensic networks, docker save the image, move it on verified media and docker load it.
  2. Mount evidence read-only: pass evidence into the container with a read-only bind mount and write the storage file to a separate case volume.
  3. Hash first: hash images before processing and record the Plaso version, command line and parser preset in case notes. --logfile captures the run log, and pinfo output belongs in the case file.
  4. Size the host: each worker can use more than a gigabyte of memory on large images; set --workers and --worker_memory_limit to match the analysis host, and use --temporary_directory on fast local storage.
  5. Control outbound calls: do not run the virustotal or chrome_extension analysis plugins on sensitive cases unless policy allows sending hashes or extension IDs to external services.
  6. Protect output: timelines contain usernames, file paths, URLs, email subjects and sometimes command lines with secrets; store and share them like the image. See the Evidence Handling and Chain of Custody Guide.
  7. Test before you need it: process a known-good image of your standard build each quarter, compare event counts with the previous release and note parser warnings.

Detection and hardening value

Timelines show what your telemetry missed. After each case, compare the Plaso sequence with what the SIEM and EDR alerted on and close the gaps.

Timeline findingImprovementFramework reference
Service installed (7045) with no alertDetection on new services with unusual paths; see the Sigma Rules GuideNIST SP 800-53 SI-4
Security log cleared (1102)Forward logs off-host so clearing does not destroy them; alert on 1102 and 104NIST SP 800-53 AU-9; see the Windows Event Forwarding Guide
Activity before log retention startsExtend retention for high-value logsNIST SP 800-53 AU-11
Execution visible only in prefetch or AmcacheEnable process creation logging (4688 with command line, or Sysmon); see the Sysmon GuideNIST CSF 2.0 DE.AE-03
Root cause reconstructedFeed into lessons learned and control changesNIST CSF 2.0 RS.AN-03

Where identity fits

Timelines are often the only record of when a service account or local administrator was first used from an unexpected host. Filter on logon events for each privileged and non-human account in scope and compare against its expected source systems. See the Service Account Security Guide.

Measuring the capability

  • Time to first timeline: hours from evidence receipt to a tagged, filtered timeline for a triage package (target under two hours).
  • Parser warning rate: warnings per run from pinfo, tracked across releases to catch silent parsing failures.
  • Telemetry gap count: events of attacker activity found only in the timeline, not in SIEM or EDR, per case.
  • Release currency: age of the deployed Plaso release against the six-month recommendation.

Common failure patterns

  • Full timelines for every host: processing every image exhaustively stalls the investigation; triage with filters and go deep where the evidence points.
  • Time zone confusion: analysts mix UTC output with local-time notes from logs or interviews and misorder events; state UTC in every report.
  • Interactive prompts in automation: pipelines hang on a partition or VSS prompt; use --partitions, --vss_stores and --unattended.
  • Dropping duplicates blindly: deduplication hides the fact that an artefact existed in an older shadow copy; keep -a output for VSS work.
  • Ignoring pinfo: a run that silently skipped an encrypted volume or failed a parser looks like an empty period of activity.

Alternatives

OptionChoose it whenTrade-off
Plaso plus TimesketchMulti-artefact timelines shared by several analystsRuns with an OpenSearch back end
Single-artefact parsers (for example Eric Zimmerman's MFTECmd and related tools)Fast, precise parsing of one artefact type with CSV outputYou merge and normalise timelines yourself
Hayabusa or ChainsawFast Sigma-based triage of Windows event logs onlyFocused on Windows event logs; see the Hayabusa and Chainsaw Guide
The Sleuth Kit mactime and bodyfilesFile system timelines onlyFocused on file system metadata
Commercial forensic suitesTeams needing GUI workflows, vendor support and court-tested reportingLicence cost; confirm capabilities with the vendor

Small teams can run psteal or targeted log2timeline in Docker on a workstation; larger teams typically automate processing of triage packages straight into Timesketch so analysts start from a tagged timeline.

Practitioner checklist

  • Deploy a pinned Plaso release (Docker or package) on the forensic workstation and record its version per case.
  • Maintain a tested filter file and an artifact list for your standard Windows and Linux builds.
  • Run log2timeline with --unattended and explicit partition and VSS choices in automated pipelines.
  • Check every storage file with pinfo before analysis and file the output with the case.
  • Run the tagging analysis plugin and start review from tagged events.
  • Agree and state the time zone (UTC by default) in all timeline output and reports.
  • Disable outbound analysis plugins for sensitive cases.
  • Compare each case timeline against SIEM and EDR alerts and raise detection gaps.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Open Source DFIR Tools Landscape Guide · Forensic Timeline Analysis Guide · Digital Forensics (DFIR) Guide · Volatility 3 Guide · Hayabusa and Chainsaw Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 8 November 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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