Cyber insurance applications ask short yes or no questions about identity controls, and the honest answer is rarely a clean yes. "Do you enforce MFA for all remote access?" hides service accounts, legacy VPN profiles, contractor portals and break-glass accounts; "Do you use privileged access management?" hides the administrators who never touch the vault. An inaccurate answer can affect whether a claim is paid, and the identity team is usually the only function that can answer precisely. This guide goes question by question through the identity controls insurers typically ask about, explains what each question really tests, lists the evidence to keep, and shows how to close gaps before renewal. It is written for identity and security teams supporting the risk or finance function at application and renewal time. For the wider insurance picture, see the Cyber Insurance Guide.
Key takeaways
- Identity questions dominate the application: multi-factor authentication for email, remote access and privileged accounts, privileged access management, and offboarding are the identity controls insurers most commonly ask about, alongside EDR, backups and patching.
- Answer with scope, not slogans: state coverage by population and access path, and list exceptions; "MFA on all remote access except two legacy VPN profiles, retiring in Q2" is a defensible answer, an unqualified "yes" may not be.
- Misrepresentation is the real risk: the UK NCSC warns that misrepresenting controls could affect your ability to claim; the security team must own the identity answers and their evidence.
- Non-human identities are the usual gap: service accounts, API keys and shared administrator accounts are where "all" quietly becomes "most".
- Insurer minimums are not a baseline: the NCSC advises against treating an insurer's minimum requirements as enough; build to a security standard and let the questionnaire be a by-product.
How insurers use identity questions
Underwriters use applications and supplemental questionnaires (often a ransomware supplement) to filter risks, set terms and price. Identity controls feature heavily because so many ransomware and business email compromise losses start with a stolen credential or an unprotected remote access path. The UK NCSC's cyber insurance guidance notes that insurers may ask about technical, procedural and human controls, that policies are usually reassessed every 12 months, that you must keep security details accurate and tell insurers when circumstances change, and that misrepresenting controls could affect your ability to claim.
Question sets differ by insurer, market and size of organisation, and change from year to year, so treat the list below as the themes to prepare for, not any insurer's exact wording. Read your own application carefully: the exact words ("all", "enforced", "privileged", "remote") define what you are attesting to.
The identity questions, and what they really test
| Question theme | What it really tests | Hidden scope to check | Evidence to keep |
|---|---|---|---|
| MFA for email and cloud productivity suite | Whether a stolen password alone can open a mailbox | Legacy authentication protocols (IMAP, POP, SMTP AUTH) still enabled; app passwords; mailbox service accounts | Identity provider policy export; report of sign-ins without MFA; legacy authentication disabled setting |
| MFA for all remote access | Whether any external entry point accepts a password alone | VPN profiles, VDI, Citrix and RDP gateways, remote support tools, vendor portals, SSH bastions | Inventory of external entry points with authentication method for each; scan of exposed services |
| MFA for privileged and administrative access | Whether admin credentials can be used without a second factor | Domain admins on internal networks, cloud global administrators, hypervisor and backup consoles, local admin | Privileged group membership with MFA status; console authentication settings |
| MFA for third parties and contractors | Whether partner access is weaker than staff access | Vendor-managed accounts, shared support logins, guest accounts | Third-party account list with sponsor, expiry and method |
| Type of MFA | Resistance to phishing and push fatigue | SMS and voice fallback, push without number matching | Method registration report; authentication strength policies |
| Privileged access management tool | Whether admin credentials are vaulted, rotated and monitored | Admins who bypass the vault; standing domain admin rights | Vault coverage report; count of standing privileged accounts |
| Separate privileged accounts | Whether admins browse and read email with admin rights | Dual-use accounts, admin rights on daily accounts | List of admin accounts and their owners; policy |
| Local administrator rights | Ease of lateral movement | Users with local admin; shared local admin passwords | Local admin group report; local password management deployment |
| Service accounts | Whether high-privilege non-human accounts are controlled | Service accounts in Domain Admins; non-expiring passwords; interactive logon allowed | Service account inventory with owner, privilege, password age, logon restrictions |
| Offboarding | Whether leavers lose access promptly | SaaS outside SSO; tokens and API keys created by the leaver | Leaver latency report; sample of recent leavers checked across systems |
| Backup access | Whether attackers who gain admin can delete backups | Backup console using domain credentials; no MFA on backup admin | Backup identity design; MFA on backup console; separate credentials |
Answering MFA questions precisely
MFA questions cause most of the difficulty because coverage is rarely total. Work through them in this order.
- Inventory every entry point: list every way into the environment from the internet: identity provider sign-in, VPN concentrators, VDI and Citrix gateways, remote desktop gateways, remote support tools, SSH bastions, vendor portals, webmail and any application with its own login. Confirm against an external attack surface scan, not just documentation.
- Record the method per entry point: which MFA method is enforced, whether there is a fallback, and which accounts are excluded.
- List exclusions by name: break-glass accounts, service accounts, kiosk or shared device accounts, accounts using legacy protocols. Each needs a reason, an owner and a compensating control. See the Break-Glass Account Guide.
- Check legacy authentication: protocols that do not support modern authentication bypass MFA policies entirely. Blocking them is often the single biggest change that turns a qualified answer into a clean one.
- State the method honestly: if SMS or voice is allowed, say so. Phishing-resistant methods (FIDO2 security keys, passkeys, certificate-based authentication) are the strongest answer. NIST SP 800-63B-4 requires verifiers at AAL2 to offer at least one phishing-resistant option, and CISA lists phishing-resistant MFA as Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goal 2.H. See the Phishing-Resistant MFA Guide.
The Change Healthcare intrusion is the case underwriters cite most often: attackers used a stolen login on a remote access portal that had no multi-factor check, and ransomware followed. See the Change Healthcare breach analysis.
Privileged access and service account questions
Insurers ask about privileged access because ransomware operators need administrative rights to deploy widely and destroy backups. Prepare four numbers before the application arrives: the count of standing privileged accounts in the directory and cloud tenants, the share of those vaulted or protected by just-in-time elevation, the count of service accounts with privileged group membership, and the count of endpoints where users hold local administrator rights.
- Vault coverage is not PAM coverage: a vault that holds some passwords while administrators sign in with their own permanently privileged accounts does not meet the intent of a PAM question. See the Privileged Access Management Guide.
- Service accounts in admin groups: service accounts in Domain Admins or equivalent cloud roles, with non-expiring passwords and interactive logon allowed, are a classic route to domain compromise. Move them to managed service accounts or workload identities, remove interactive logon, and rotate. See the Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA) Guide.
- Service accounts and MFA: service accounts cannot usually perform MFA, so an "MFA for all accounts" attestation is rarely literally true. State the compensating controls instead: network restrictions, no interactive sign-in, credential vaulting and rotation, and monitoring. Microsoft notes, for example, that its user-scoped Conditional Access policies do not apply to service principals, which need workload identity policies.
- Local administrator passwords: unique, rotated local administrator passwords on every endpoint (for example through Windows LAPS) limit lateral movement and are a common question.
- Backup administration: the backup console should use separate credentials from the production directory, with MFA, so a domain compromise does not reach backups. See the Backup Identity Isolation Guide.
Where identity fits: non-human identities and secrets
Questionnaires are increasingly asking about secrets in code, API keys and third-party integrations, and some ask about AI tools with access to company data. Even where they do not, non-human identities are where an attestation is most likely to be wrong. Before answering, run three checks: secret scanning across source repositories and CI/CD logs, a review of OAuth applications and integrations with broad tenant permissions, and a list of API keys and tokens with no owner or no expiry. Record the results with the evidence pack. The Snowflake breach showed how password-only accounts with no network restrictions, and credentials that were never rotated, led to data theft from many customers at once. See the NHI Ownership Guide.
Building the evidence pack
Keep a standing identity evidence pack, refreshed before each renewal and after major changes, so answers can be shown to be true at the time they were given.
| Evidence item | Source | Refresh |
|---|---|---|
| External entry point inventory with authentication method | Network team, attack surface scan | Quarterly and before renewal |
| MFA and conditional access policy exports, with exclusion lists | Identity provider | Before renewal and on change |
| Sign-ins without MFA report (30 days) | Identity provider sign-in logs | Monthly |
| MFA method registration report by population | Identity provider | Quarterly |
| Privileged group membership and vault coverage | Directory, cloud tenants, PAM tool | Monthly |
| Service account inventory with owner, privilege and rotation date | Directory, IGA or NHI tooling | Quarterly |
| Local admin password management deployment report | Endpoint management | Quarterly |
| Leaver latency report and sample test | IGA, HR, sample of SaaS | Quarterly |
| Backup console authentication design and last restore test | Backup team | Twice a year |
| Signed answer sheet with owner per answer and date | Risk or finance, security | Each application |
The live Cyber Insurance Guide makes the same point for the wider application: where the honest answer is "most", do not round it up to "all". Keep the evidence pack for the life of the policy and beyond, since claims are judged against what was stated at the time.
Closing gaps before renewal
- Twelve weeks out: obtain the current application and any supplements from the broker; assign an owner to every identity question.
- Ten weeks: run the inventories and reports in the evidence table and list each gap against the question it affects.
- Eight weeks: fix quick wins: block legacy authentication, enforce MFA on any remaining external entry point, remove service accounts from privileged groups where possible, enable MFA on backup consoles. Deploy changes in report-only or audit mode first, then enforce for a pilot group, then everyone, with a rollback (revert to the previous policy) ready.
- Four weeks: document residual exceptions with compensating controls and a remediation date.
- Submission: security signs off the identity answers; qualified answers are explained in the free-text fields rather than forced into yes or no.
- Mid-term: tell the insurer, through the broker, of material changes, as the NCSC guidance advises, and keep the evidence pack current.
Decision guidance
- Yes, no or qualified: answer yes only when coverage is complete for the population and path in the question and you hold evidence. Where coverage is near complete with documented exceptions, answer with the qualification. Where a control is planned, say so with the date; underwriters often prefer a credible plan to an unsupported yes.
- Small organisations: focus on the few controls that answer most questions: MFA on email and every remote access path, separate admin accounts with MFA, unique local admin passwords, and backups with separate credentials. In the UK, Cyber Essentials covers user access control and some insurers offer discounts for certification; organisations with turnover under £20 million that certify their whole organisation are entitled to cyber liability insurance arranged through IASME. See the Cyber Essentials Guide.
- Large organisations: answers span many tenants, subsidiaries and acquisitions. Scope each answer explicitly ("all entities except the subsidiary acquired in March, integration due Q3") and keep per-entity evidence.
Detection and measurement
Insurers ask whether controls exist; claims depend on whether they worked. Monitor sign-ins that bypass MFA, new members of privileged groups, service account interactive logons, use of break-glass accounts, and authentication to external entry points not in the inventory. Relevant MITRE ATT&CK techniques include T1078 Valid Accounts, T1133 External Remote Services and T1621 Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation.
- MFA coverage by entry point: share of external entry points enforcing MFA, target 100%.
- Sign-ins without MFA: count per month, with each one explained.
- Phishing-resistant share: privileged users and all users, reported separately.
- Standing privileged accounts: count, trending down as just-in-time access grows.
- Privileged service accounts: count in admin groups, trending to zero.
- Attestation accuracy: identity answers that needed correction after evidence review.
Framework mapping
| Insurance theme | CISA CPG | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | NIST CSF 2.0 | CIS Controls v8.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MFA (email, remote, privileged) | 2.H | IA-2, IA-2(1), AC-17 | PR.AA-03 | 6 |
| Separate privileged accounts, PAM | 2.E | AC-6, AC-2 | PR.AA-05 | 5, 6 |
| Unique and default credentials, local admin | 2.A, 2.C | IA-5 | PR.AA-01 | 4, 5 |
| Offboarding | 2.D | PS-4, AC-2(3) | PR.AA-01 | 5, 6 |
| Failed login detection | 2.G | AC-7, SI-4 | DE.CM-03 | 8 |
Common failure patterns
- "All" that means "most": attesting to MFA on all remote access when an old VPN profile, a vendor portal or a remote support tool still accepts a password alone.
- Legacy protocols left on: MFA enforced in the identity provider while IMAP, POP or SMTP AUTH remain enabled for some mailboxes, giving attackers a password-only path.
- Service accounts ignored: privileged service accounts with old passwords not mentioned in the PAM answer.
- Copy-forward answers: last year's application resubmitted without checking whether anything changed, including acquisitions.
- Help desk bypass: strong MFA undone by a help desk that resets methods on a phone call. See the Account Recovery and Help Desk Security Guide.
- Answers owned by finance alone: the application completed without the identity team, so technical qualifiers are lost.
Practitioner checklist
- Obtain the application early and assign an owner to every identity question.
- Inventory every external entry point and record the MFA method and exclusions for each.
- Block legacy authentication protocols and confirm with a sign-ins-without-MFA report.
- Count standing privileged accounts, vault coverage and privileged service accounts.
- Deploy unique local administrator passwords and separate admin accounts.
- Protect backup consoles with separate credentials and MFA.
- Scan for exposed secrets and review broad OAuth integrations before answering.
- Keep a dated identity evidence pack and a signed answer sheet.
- Qualify answers honestly and notify the insurer of material changes mid-term.
Standards and references
- NCSC: Cyber insurance guidance
- NCSC: Cyber Essentials overview
- CISA: Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals
- NIST: SP 800-63B-4 Authentication and Authenticator Management
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5
- Microsoft Learn: Configure and enable risk policies
- MITRE ATT&CK: External Remote Services
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Cyber Insurance Guide · Insurance Sector Identity Security Guide · MFA Guide · Privileged Access Management Guide · CISA Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) Guide