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IEC 62443-3-3 and 4-2 Security Levels Guide: Systems and Components

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 27 October 2026 12 min read
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Industrial asset owners specify "SL 2" or "SL 3" in tenders, product suppliers certify components at a capability level, and the two often do not line up because system and component requirements live in different parts of IEC 62443. Part 3-3 sets system security requirements by security level for a whole control system or zone; Part 4-2 sets the technical requirements a single component must meet to claim a capability level. This guide explains the seven foundational requirements, the four security levels, the difference between target, capability and achieved levels, how 3-3 and 4-2 connect, and what they demand of machine identities such as device certificates and service accounts. It is for OT security architects, system integrators, product security teams and procurement. The standards are paid documents; this page relies on ISA, ISA Global Cybersecurity Alliance and ISASecure public material checked on 27 October 2026, and does not reproduce requirement text.

Key takeaways

  • Two parts, two audiences. ISAGCA describes Part 3-3 as system-level requirements aimed mainly at control system suppliers, integrators and asset owners, and Part 4-2 as component-level requirements aimed at component suppliers.
  • Same seven foundational requirements. Both parts are organised around FR 1 Identification and Authentication Control through FR 7 Resource Availability; FR 1 and FR 2 together are often called access control.
  • Security levels describe the attacker you resist. SL 1 covers casual or coincidental violation; SL 2 to SL 4 cover intentional violation with increasing means, resources, IACS-specific skills and motivation.
  • Target, capability, achieved. SL-T comes from the Part 3-2 risk assessment, SL-C is what a product or system can provide natively, and SL-A is what is actually in place in operation. Tenders that only say "SL 2" without saying which one cause disputes.
  • Machine identity is FR 1 work. Devices and software processes must be identified and authenticated, not only human users, so device certificates, service accounts and controller credentials are central evidence.

What it is and who it applies to

IEC 62443 is a series of standards for the security of industrial automation and control systems (IACS), developed with the ISA99 committee. ISA lists Part 3-3 as "System security requirements and security levels" (ISA-62443-3-3-2013) and Part 4-2 as "Technical security requirements for IACS components" (ANSI/ISA-62443-4-2-2018, reprinted with an editorial corrigendum in August 2019). IEC recognised the series as a horizontal standard in 2021, which means other sector standards are expected to build on it. For the whole series, see the IEC 62443 Guide.

Role (ISAGCA definition)Main part usedWhat they do with security levels
Asset owner: accountable for and operates the IACS3-2, 3-3, 2-1Sets SL-T per zone and conduit; verifies SL-A
Integration service provider: designs, installs, commissions3-3, 2-4Builds a solution whose SL-C, plus countermeasures, meets SL-T
Product supplier: makes hardware or software products4-1, 4-2 (components); 3-3 (systems)Declares and certifies SL-C
Maintenance service provider2-4Keeps SL-A from degrading in operation

Structure and key requirements

The seven foundational requirements

FRNameTypical concerns
FR 1Identification and Authentication Control (IAC)Human, software process and device identities; authenticators; PKI
FR 2Use Control (UC)Authorisation enforcement, least privilege, auditable events
FR 3System Integrity (SI)Communication integrity, malicious code protection, software integrity
FR 4Data Confidentiality (DC)Information at rest and in transit, cryptography
FR 5Restricted Data Flow (RDF)Network segmentation, zone boundary protection
FR 6Timely Response to Events (TRE)Audit log accessibility, continuous monitoring
FR 7Resource Availability (RA)Denial-of-service protection, backup, recovery

In Part 3-3 the requirements are system requirements (SRs) with requirement enhancements (REs) that apply at higher security levels. Part 4-2 uses component requirements (CRs) with the same FR structure, plus requirements specific to component types. ISAGCA notes that security levels determine which requirement enhancements apply in each part.

Security levels

LevelProtection against (ISAGCA wording, paraphrased)Practical reading
SL 1Casual or coincidental violationMistakes and accidental misuse
SL 2Intentional violation with simple means, low resources, generic skills, low motivationOpportunistic attackers using common tools
SL 3Intentional violation with sophisticated means, moderate resources, IACS-specific skills, moderate motivationSkilled attackers who understand industrial systems
SL 4Intentional violation with sophisticated means, extended resources, IACS-specific skills, high motivationWell-resourced, determined adversaries

Security levels are assigned per foundational requirement, so a zone can need SL 3 for FR 5 (data flow) but SL 2 for FR 4 (confidentiality). A level is often written as a vector across the seven FRs rather than a single number.

SL-T, SL-C and SL-A

  • SL-T (target): the desired level for a zone or conduit, from the Part 3-2 risk assessment, documented in the cybersecurity requirements specification. See the IEC 62443-3-2 OT Risk Assessment Guide.
  • SL-C (capability): what a system (3-3) or component (4-2) provides natively when properly integrated and configured, without extra countermeasures.
  • SL-A (achieved): what is actually in place after commissioning and in operation. ISAGCA notes that Part 2-2 combines SL-A with operational and maintenance policies into a security programme rating.

The design rule: SL-C of the chosen system and components, plus compensating countermeasures, should meet SL-T; SL-A must then be verified and maintained. Component SL-C under 4-2 is one input to system SL-C under 3-3, not a substitute for it.

Component types in Part 4-2

Part 4-2 recognises four component types: software application, embedded device, host device and network device. Some requirements are specific to a type, and ISASecure certificates name the type, for example a capability SL 2 certificate for embedded and network devices.

Identity and NHI requirements

OT environments are dominated by non-human identities: controllers, HMIs, engineering workstations' service processes, historians, OPC UA clients and remote access gateways. FR 1 explicitly extends identification and authentication beyond human users to software processes and devices, which is where most OT identity gaps lie.

Area under FR 1 and FR 2What higher SLs typically demandNHI implementation
Software process and device identification and authenticationUnique identification and authentication of devices and processesPer-device certificates rather than shared keys; unique accounts per application
Authenticator managementControlled initial authenticators, change of defaults, protection of stored authenticatorsRemove vendor default credentials; vault service account passwords; rotate
Public key infrastructure and certificatesCertificate validation, revocation checkingOperate an OT PKI with defined lifetimes and revocation that works offline
Account managementLifecycle of accounts including disabling and removalInventory service accounts on HMIs and historians; remove on decommission
Authorisation enforcement and least privilegeRole-based use control for all users including processesScope integration accounts to required tags and functions only
Auditable events (FR 2) and audit log accessibility (FR 6)Records of security events with source identityLog which device or process identity made each change

Legacy controllers frequently cannot support per-device certificates, which lowers the component SL-C for FR 1. The 3-3 answer is a compensating countermeasure at the zone or conduit, such as an authenticating gateway, documented against the SL-T. See the Manufacturing Identity and OT Access Guide and the NHI Authentication Guide.

Editions and current status

DocumentEdition and date (IEC webstore)Notes
IEC 62443-3-3:2013Edition 1.0, 7 August 2013; corrigendum April 2014; stability date 2027Technical system requirements tied to the seven FRs in Part 1-1; defines capability security levels for control systems
IEC 62443-4-2:2019Edition 1.0, 27 February 2019; corrigendum August 2022; stability date 2027Component requirements mapped to the seven FRs; defines capability levels for components, not target or achieved levels
ANSI/ISA-62443-4-2-2018ISA edition; reprinted with editorial corrigendum August 2019ISA counterpart of 4-2

The IEC stability date of 2027 for both parts means IEC expects to review them around then, and revised editions may follow. The point in the 4-2 abstract matters for procurement: a component standard can only define capability. Target and achieved levels are properties of the asset owner's zones and operations, governed by Parts 3-2, 3-3 and 2-1. If you quote these parts in contracts, cite the edition and year, and agree in advance how a new edition published during the contract will be handled.

Implementation steps

  1. Partition and assess: define zones and conduits and run the Part 3-2 risk assessment to set SL-T per FR. See the OT Network Segmentation, Purdue Model and IEC 62443 Zones and Conduits Guide.
  2. Write the requirement specification: express SL-T as an FR vector per zone and conduit in the cybersecurity requirements specification, and state in tenders whether you are asking for SL-C of products or SL-A of a delivered solution.
  3. Select products against 4-2: ask suppliers for SL-C by FR and component type, ideally with certification evidence; record gaps.
  4. Design the system against 3-3: the integrator shows how system SL-C plus countermeasures meets SL-T, FR by FR.
  5. Test before commissioning: verify requirements in a factory and site acceptance test, including identity tests: default credentials removed, certificates valid, accounts unique.
  6. Commission and measure SL-A: document achieved levels and accepted residual risks.
  7. Operate and maintain: patching, account reviews and certificate renewals keep SL-A from drifting. If a change lowers SL-A (for example a vendor remote access tool with a shared account), roll back or add a countermeasure through change control.

Choosing a target level

  • SL 1: rarely sufficient for anything internet-reachable or safety-relevant; suitable for low-consequence zones with strong boundary protection.
  • SL 2: a common baseline for general production zones.
  • SL 3: for zones whose compromise could cause safety, environmental or major economic harm, or that face sector-targeted threat actors.
  • SL 4: uncommon, expensive, and often reached through architecture (isolation, unidirectional gateways) rather than component features.

Smaller operators should resist specifying SL 3 everywhere; a well-justified SL 2 vector with SL 3 for critical FRs on critical zones is cheaper and more defensible. Large operators should standardise FR vectors per zone type so procurement is repeatable.

Evidence and assessment

Scheme (per ISAGCA and ISASecure)CertifiesAgainst
ISASecure SDLASupplier's secure development lifecyclePart 4-1
ISASecure CSAComponent capability at SL 1 to 4, by component typePart 4-2 (and 4-1 process)
ISASecure SSAControl system capabilityPart 3-3
IECEE conformity assessmentProducts, systems and service providersIncluding 2-4, 3-3:2013, 4-1:2018 and 4-2:2019

ISASecure describes CSA as four elements: a development lifecycle process assessment (SDLPA-C), a review of development artefacts (SDA-C), a functional security assessment of capabilities (FSA-C) and vulnerability identification testing (VIT-C). FSA-C is where higher levels add requirements. A certificate states SL-C only; it does not show your SL-A. For asset owners, the most useful evidence at handover is a requirement-by-requirement compliance matrix from the integrator, showing for each SR and FR whether it is met natively, met by a named countermeasure, or accepted as residual risk, with the test record that proves it. See the ISA/IEC 62443 Certification Guide.

Metrics

  • Zones with documented SL-T vectors as a percentage of all zones.
  • Components in critical zones with certified or verified SL-C meeting SL-T.
  • Devices and service accounts still using vendor default or shared credentials.
  • Device certificates expiring within 30 days without a renewal ticket.
  • Open SL-A gaps with accepted residual risk past review date.

Mapping to other frameworks

IEC 62443 FRNIST CSF 2.0NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5
FR 1 IACPR.AA-01, PR.AA-03IA-2, IA-3, IA-5
FR 2 UCPR.AA-05AC-3, AC-6, AU-2
FR 3 SIPR.PS-02SI-3, SI-7
FR 4 DCPR.DS-01, PR.DS-02SC-8, SC-28
FR 5 RDFPR.IR-01SC-7
FR 6 TREDE.CM-01, PR.PS-04AU-6, SI-4
FR 7 RAPR.IR-04, PR.DS-11CP-9, SC-5

This is an indicative NHI Mgmt Group mapping, not an official crosswalk. NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 (September 2023) is NIST's main OT security guidance; CSRC shows an initial public draft of Revision 4 with comments due 30 November 2026, so check for changes before relying on it. See the NIST SP 800-82 OT Security Guide.

Common pitfalls

  • "SL 2" without qualifiers: tenders that do not say SL-T, SL-C or SL-A, or which FRs, invite suppliers to claim compliance on the easiest reading.
  • Treating a 4-2 certificate as system compliance: certified components can be integrated insecurely; 3-3 and SL-A still need to be shown.
  • Human-only FR 1 evidence: operator logins are strong while controllers, historians and integration services share one account or a default password.
  • Unmanaged certificates: device certificates issued at commissioning with long lifetimes and no renewal or revocation process.
  • SL-A drift: remote vendor access, temporary accounts and emergency changes erode achieved levels after commissioning.
  • Uniform SL 3: over-specifying everywhere drives cost and exceptions instead of focusing on critical zones.

Practitioner checklist

  • Set SL-T as an FR vector per zone and conduit from the Part 3-2 assessment.
  • Write tenders that distinguish SL-C of products from SL-A of delivered solutions.
  • Request 4-2 SL-C evidence by component type and FR, preferably certified.
  • Require integrators to show 3-3 compliance FR by FR, with countermeasures for gaps.
  • Remove default credentials and give every device and software process a unique identity.
  • Run an OT PKI with defined certificate lifetimes, renewal and revocation.
  • Verify SL-A at commissioning and after significant change.
  • Review service accounts and remote access accounts in OT at least quarterly.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: IEC 62443 Guide · IEC 62443-4-1 and 4-2 Secure Product Development Guide · IEC 62443-3-2 OT Risk Assessment Guide · Manufacturing Identity and OT Access Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 27 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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