When a regulator, insurer or court reviews a security incident months later, the question is rarely only what happened: it is what you knew, when you knew it, and why you decided what you did. Most response teams reconstruct that story afterwards from chat threads and memory, which is slow and easy to challenge. This template gives incident managers and scribes a ready-to-use running log and decision record, organised by response phase, with fields for timestamps, evidence and rationale. It complements, and does not replace, your incident response plan. It is for incident commanders, scribes, legal and privacy teams and anyone who must later defend the response.
How to use this template
- Open it at declaration: start a new copy the moment an event is declared an incident, using the incident reference from your ticketing system. See the Incident Response Plan Template for the declaration criteria that trigger it.
- Appoint one scribe: a named person (not the incident commander) owns the log. Others submit entries to the scribe or add them directly in a controlled channel.
- Record in UTC: every entry carries a UTC timestamp to the minute, the author and the source. Local time goes in brackets only where regulators or staff need it.
- Facts, decisions and assumptions are different entries: tag each line as F (fact observed), D (decision), A (assumption), T (task) or C (communication). This lets reviewers separate what was known from what was believed.
- Never edit, only append: correct an error with a new entry that references the earlier one. Store the log where edits are versioned or write-once, and restrict access to the response team and counsel.
- Replace bracketed text: [Organisation], [Incident commander] and similar placeholders are yours to fill. Ask counsel whether the log should be created under legal privilege in your jurisdiction, and mark it accordingly.
Entry format (use for every line)
| Field | What to record | Example |
|---|---|---|
| ID | Sequential number, never reused | 047 |
| Time (UTC) | When it happened or was decided, and when logged if different | 2026-03-14 09:42 (logged 09:50) |
| Type | F, D, A, T or C | D |
| Entry | One plain sentence | Disable VPN accounts for finance OU pending reset |
| Rationale | For D entries: options considered and why this one | Isolation of subnet rejected: payroll run due 14:00 |
| Authority | Who decided, under which delegated authority | [Incident commander], IR plan section 4.2 |
| Evidence reference | Ticket, evidence item or file hash that supports it | EV-012, SIEM query saved as Q-031 |
| Owner and due | For T entries: who and by when | [IAM lead], 10:30 UTC |
| Status | Open, done, superseded (with ID) | Superseded by 052 |
1. Scope and triggers
Complete this header once, then update it with appended entries as scope changes.
- Incident reference and title: [INC-YYYY-NNN], [short neutral title, no blame or speculation].
- Trigger: what was detected, by whom or which control, and the first observed time (UTC).
- Declared at and by: time of declaration and the person with authority to declare.
- Initial severity: [level] with the criteria met. Record every later change of severity as a D entry. See the Incident Severity Classification Matrix Template.
- Systems, data and identities in scope: list assets, data categories (personal, payment, health, regulated) and accounts, including service accounts, API keys and tokens that may be affected.
- Awareness time: the time [Organisation] became aware of a personal data breach or a significant incident, decided and recorded as a D entry. Many notification clocks start here, so the rationale matters.
- Regulatory clocks started: one line per obligation that may apply, with the deadline calculated in UTC (see section 7).
2. Roles and contacts
NCSC guidance recommends one central point of coordination, named decision makers with deputies, and at least two contact methods for each key contact. Record who held each role and when it changed hands.
| Role | Name | Deputy | From (UTC) | To (UTC) | Contact methods |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Incident commander | [Name] | [Name] | [Phone, out-of-band chat] | ||
| Scribe (log owner) | [Name] | [Name] | |||
| Technical lead | [Name] | [Name] | |||
| Legal counsel | [Name] | [Name] | |||
| Data protection officer | [Name] | [Name] | |||
| Communications lead | [Name] | [Name] | |||
| Executive decision maker | [Name] | [Name] | |||
| External parties (IR retainer, insurer, law enforcement) | [Firm, case ref] |
Record handovers as C entries that summarise open decisions and tasks at the handover point. See the Incident Response Contact and Call Tree Template and the Incident Commander Role Guide.
3. Detection and triage
Log what was known at triage, not what was learnt later. The aim is to show reasonable judgement on the information available at each point.
- [Time] F: first alert or report, with source (EDR alert ID, SIEM rule name, user report ticket).
- [Time] F: validation steps taken and results, with saved query or evidence reference.
- [Time] A: working hypothesis (for example "credential theft via phishing, single mailbox") and what would disprove it.
- [Time] D: declare or not declare, with severity and rationale.
- [Time] D: evidence preservation decision: what is collected first (memory, disk, cloud audit logs) and what is accepted as lost. Link each item to the chain of custody record. See the Chain of Custody Form Template.
- [Time] D: whether to engage the IR retainer, insurer and counsel, and when they were contacted.
4. Containment
Containment decisions are the ones most often challenged later, because they trade evidence, business continuity and attacker awareness against each other. Every containment action gets a D entry with options considered.
| Decision prompt | Record |
|---|---|
| Options considered | For example: isolate host, block indicator, disable account, revoke tokens, rotate keys, take service offline |
| Chosen action and scope | Exactly which hosts, accounts, keys or tenants |
| Why now, why not later | Evidence of active harm versus value of continued observation |
| Business impact accepted | Service affected, owner who accepted it, expected duration |
| Evidence impact | What volatile data was captured before the action |
| Verification | How you confirmed it worked (failed sign-ins, blocked connections) with evidence reference |
| Rollback condition | What would cause you to reverse it |
Where the incident involves machine credentials, log each revoked or rotated secret by its identifier, never its value. See the Incident Scoping and Containment Strategy Guide.
5. Eradication
- Root cause statement: current best understanding, tagged F or A, revised by appended entries as analysis matures.
- Persistence removed: each mechanism found (scheduled task, OAuth grant, new federation trust, added credential on an application) with removal time and verifier.
- Credentials reset: scope of resets for people, service accounts, API keys and certificates, and the decision on whether a full reset was needed.
- Vulnerabilities fixed: CVE or configuration, patch or mitigation, and time applied.
- Decision to declare eradication complete: D entry with the evidence relied on, such as a clean hunt across the estate over a defined period.
6. Recovery
- Restoration order: D entry listing the order services return and who approved it.
- Integrity checks: how restored systems and backups were verified as clean, with evidence references.
- Heightened monitoring: what extra detection was enabled and for how long.
- Return to normal operations: time, approver and residual risks accepted, each risk with a named owner.
7. Communication and notification
Log every external and significant internal communication as a C entry: time sent, audience, channel, approver and the stored copy. Log every decision not to notify as a D entry with its reasoning; the ICO states that you should document your reasoning when you decide a breach does not need reporting, and that all personal data breaches must be recorded whether or not they are reported.
| Obligation (if applicable) | Clock | Starts from | Log entries needed |
|---|---|---|---|
| UK GDPR / EU GDPR supervisory authority | Without undue delay, not later than 72 hours | Becoming aware of a personal data breach | Awareness time, risk assessment, reasons for any delay, phased reports |
| GDPR data subjects | Without undue delay where high risk | Assessment of high risk | Risk decision and rationale, copy of notice |
| NIS2 CSIRT or competent authority | Early warning 24 hours, notification 72 hours, final report one month after notification | Becoming aware of a significant incident | Significance decision, each submission and reference |
| US SEC Form 8-K Item 1.05 | Generally four business days | Determination that the incident is material | Materiality deliberation and decision time |
| Contracts, insurer, sector regulator | [As per contract or rule] | [Trigger] | [Clause reference, submission copy] |
Check each obligation against current official text and your counsel's advice; this table is a prompt, not a complete list. See the Cyber Incident Reporting Requirements Map and the Incident Communication Plan Template.
8. Post-incident review
At closure the scribe produces a clean chronology from the log, and the review uses it as the single source of truth.
- Closure entry: time, approver and conditions met.
- Decision audit: for each D entry, was the information available adequate, and what would have changed the decision.
- Gaps: information that was hard or impossible to obtain (NCSC highlights logs missing or overwritten) and how it will be collected next time.
- Actions: improvement actions with owners and dates, transferred to the risk register or plan of action.
- Retention: retention period and location for the log and evidence, agreed with counsel. See the Post-Incident Review and Root Cause Analysis Template.
Implementation guidance
- Choose the tool before you need it: a ticketing system with append-only comments, a dedicated incident platform, or a controlled shared document with version history. It must work when email, chat or identity provider are compromised, so keep an offline or out-of-band fallback. See the Out-of-Band Communications for Incident Response Guide.
- Train two or more scribes: run the template in every tabletop exercise so scribing becomes routine.
- Agree privilege and retention with counsel: decide in advance who can see the log, whether it is prepared at counsel's direction, and how long it is kept.
- Integrate time sources: confirm systems use NTP so log timestamps and evidence timestamps can be reconciled.
- Test and review: after each exercise or real incident, check that every D entry had rationale and authority, and refine the fields.
Measures that show it is working
- Percentage of decision entries with rationale and authority recorded (target 100 per cent).
- Median gap between event time and log time for decisions (target under 15 minutes).
- Number of regulator or auditor follow-up questions that could not be answered from the log.
- Time to produce a clean chronology after closure (target under two working days).
Framework mapping
| Framework | Reference | How this template supports it |
|---|---|---|
| NIST CSF 2.0 | RS.AN-06 | Actions performed during an investigation are recorded, with integrity and provenance preserved |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | RS.MA-02, RS.CO-02 | Triage decisions and stakeholder notifications are logged |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | ID.IM-03 | Improvements identified from the response itself |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 | Incident handling, monitoring (tracking and documenting incidents) and reporting |
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A | 5.25, 5.26, 5.27, 5.28 | Assessment and decision on events, response, learning, collection of evidence |
| CIS Controls v8.1 | Control 17 | Incident response management, including post-incident reviews |
Standards and references
- NCSC: Your cyber incident response processes
- NIST: SP 800-61 Rev. 3, Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations for Cybersecurity Risk Management
- NIST: Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5
- ICO: Personal data breaches, a guide
- EUR-Lex: Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2)
- SEC: Cybersecurity risk management, strategy, governance and incident disclosure rules
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Incident Response Guide · Incident Response Plan Template · Evidence Handling and Chain of Custody Guide · Tabletop Exercise After Action Report Template