When an incident is declared, responders often lose the first hours hunting for a clean laptop, a write blocker, a working phone number for the legal team or an admin account that still works after the identity provider has gone down. A jump kit fixes that: a portable, pre-staged set of hardware, trusted software, credentials, contacts and paperwork that is ready to leave the building at any moment. This guide covers what goes into the physical kit, the software and trusted media, the offline credentials and contact pack, cloud and remote variants, how to build and test the kit, and how to measure whether it is ready. It is for incident response leads, DFIR practitioners and security managers building or refreshing a response capability. Logging, retention and evidence requirements are covered in the Forensic Readiness Guide; this page is about the kit you carry and the access you hold.
Key takeaways
- Ready at all times, never borrowed: NIST's long-standing guidance describes the jump kit as a portable case kept ready to go, and warns teams not to borrow items from it, because its whole purpose is a faster response.
- Two devices per responder: a dedicated investigation laptop that is wiped and rebuilt after every incident, and a separate standard device for email, reports and calls, so contamination never crosses over.
- Trusted tools on read-only media: RFC 3227 advises a prepared toolset per operating system on read-only media, with statically linked binaries, because the tools on a compromised host cannot be trusted.
- The offline pack matters as much as hardware: printed contacts with two routes per person, sealed break-glass credentials, network diagrams and the plan itself must survive the loss of email, chat and the identity provider.
- A kit that is not tested is a box of flat batteries: inspect it quarterly, take it on every exercise, and track kit readiness and time to first collection as metrics.
What a jump kit is and why it still matters
NIST SP 800-61 Revision 2 described the jump kit as a portable case holding the materials an investigator may need, typically a loaded laptop with packet capture and forensic tools, backup devices, blank media and basic networking equipment. Revision 2 was withdrawn on 3 April 2025 and replaced by SP 800-61 Revision 3, which reorganises incident response around the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 rather than listing equipment. The equipment lists in Revision 2 remain the most widely used public baseline, and nothing in Revision 3 makes the idea obsolete: Revision 3 places preparation inside Govern, Identify and Protect, and the kit is a concrete output of that preparation.
The kit has changed shape. A decade ago it was mostly hard drives and cables. Today most first collection happens remotely through EDR live response, cloud snapshots and SaaS audit exports, so the kit must also hold the access to do those things when normal access paths are compromised. A modern kit has four layers:
- Physical: hardware for on-site acquisition, isolation and documentation.
- Software: trusted, verified tools and clean images, held offline.
- Access: pre-provisioned responder identities and sealed emergency credentials that do not depend on the production directory.
- Information: contacts, diagrams, baselines, playbooks and forms, available on paper or offline.
Physical kit: hardware checklist
The table below builds on the Revision 2 lists for analysis hardware and evidence handling, with notes on what to check. Size it for your estate: an organisation with no on-premises servers needs less disk hardware and more cloud access.
| Item | Purpose | Readiness check |
|---|---|---|
| Investigation laptop (one per responder) | Packet capture, triage, analysis; may run non-standard software | Rebuilt from a known-good image after each use; full disk encryption; patched monthly while stored |
| Standard work device or phone | Email, reports, calls; never connected to suspect systems | Enrolled in device management; charged |
| Hardware write blockers (SATA, NVMe, USB as your estate needs) | Read-only access to seized media | Model has a NIST CFTT test report or internal validation; firmware recorded |
| Evidence drives, wiped and labelled | Destination for disk and memory images | Capacity above your largest endpoint disk and server RAM; forensic wipe recorded |
| Trusted tool media (read-only USB or optical, per OS) | Run collection tools without trusting the host | Hashes recorded and verified at each inspection |
| Network tap or managed switch with port mirroring, cables, USB network adapters | Capture traffic, isolate a segment, connect to air-gapped kit | Tested with the investigation laptop |
| Signal-blocking (Faraday) bags | Isolate seized phones and tablets from networks before examination | Bag tested with a live phone |
| Portable printer and paper | Print logs or screens from non-networked systems (a Revision 2 item) | Driver works offline from the laptop |
| Camera, notebooks with numbered pages, audio recorder | Photograph scenes and screens, record actions | Camera clock set to UTC |
| Evidence bags, tags, tamper-evident tape, chain of custody forms | Package and track exhibits | Stock counted; forms are the current version |
| Power: adapters, multi-way strip, power bank, regional plugs | Keep kit and live systems powered | Charged; travel adapters for each country you operate in |
| Screwdrivers and small tools, antistatic bags | Remove drives safely | Bits match current hardware |
For mobile devices, follow the preservation steps in NIST SP 800-101 Rev. 1 and agree in advance who may seize a staff phone, since personal devices raise employment and privacy questions. For memory acquisition procedures, see the Memory Forensics Guide.
Software and trusted media
RFC 3227 (BCP 55) sets the principle: keep a prepared toolset on read-only media for each operating system you manage, use statically linked programs that do not depend on libraries on the suspect system, and be ready to explain the tools' authenticity and reliability. It lists the categories: a process examiner, system state tools for interfaces, connections and ARP, bit-level copy tools, checksum and signing tools, core image tools and scripts to automate collection. It also warns that kernel-level rootkits can make even trusted tools show an incomplete picture, which is why memory capture matters.
| Category | What to hold | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Triage collectors | Approved collection packages for Windows, macOS and Linux | Pre-approved by legal and IT change so they can run without debate |
| Memory acquisition | Tool per OS and architecture, tested against current builds | New OS releases break drivers: retest after each major update |
| Disk imaging and hashing | Imaging software, SHA-256 hashing, image verification | Prefer tools with CFTT disk imaging test results or documented internal validation |
| Network analysis | Packet capture and protocol analysers | A Revision 2 baseline item; include capture filters you have tested |
| Analysis | Forensic suite, timeline and log tools, offline threat intelligence | Open source options are reviewed in the Open Source DFIR Tools Landscape Guide |
| Recovery | Clean OS and application images, golden configurations | Revision 2 lists clean images under mitigation; store offline and hash them |
| Reference data | Hashes of critical files, port lists, OS and product documentation | All Revision 2 analysis resources; keep an offline copy |
- Licensing: commercial forensic tools often use dongles or online activation. Confirm the licence works offline and on the jump laptop, and record renewal dates in the kit log.
- Integrity: publish a manifest of every file on the trusted media with its hash, store the manifest separately, and verify before use. A tampered toolkit would undermine every exhibit it produced.
- Updates: rebuild the media on a schedule (quarterly is common) rather than patching it in place, and keep the previous version until the new one is verified.
Credentials, access and the offline information pack
Responders increasingly need to act in a tenant they no longer trust. In the MGM Resorts breach, a help desk call reportedly led to identity provider admin access, and the ALPHV group claimed that MGM shut down its Okta sync servers while containing the attack (a claim MGM did not confirm). If your responders sign in through the same identity provider, a kit without independent access is useless on day one.
- Responder identities: pre-provisioned, monitored IR accounts with phishing-resistant MFA, separate from production admin accounts, with the roles needed to isolate hosts, snapshot volumes and export audit logs. Alert on every sign-in.
- Sealed break-glass credentials: emergency accounts for the identity provider, cloud root or organisation admin, and key SaaS tenants, with hardware security keys or sealed secrets stored in a safe, opened under two-person control. See the Break-Glass Account Guide.
- Service accounts and machine credentials: an offline list of the high-value non-human identities (CI/CD service principals, backup service accounts, API keys for the EDR and SIEM) with their owners and how to rotate or disable each, because these are often what attackers abuse and what responders must revoke first.
- Encryption keys: recovery keys for the jump laptops and evidence drives, held separately from the kit.
The information pack should be printed and also held on an encrypted offline device. NIST's Revision 2 list and the NCSC incident management guidance agree on the core contents:
| Document | Content | Source of the practice |
|---|---|---|
| Contact sheet | Team, IT, executives, legal, communications, HR, insurer, IR retainer, law enforcement, regulators; at least two ways to reach each, deputies, out-of-hours escalation | NCSC; NIST Rev. 2 adds primary and backup contacts and a way to verify identity |
| Out-of-band channel details | Standing conference bridge, alternative messaging, phone tree | NCSC; see the Out-of-Band Communications for Incident Response Guide |
| Network diagrams and critical asset list | Segments, crown-jewel systems, data flows | NIST Rev. 2 |
| Baselines | Expected network, system and application activity | NIST Rev. 2 |
| Plan, playbooks and checklists | IR plan, playbooks for the three to five most likely incident types, short checklists | NCSC |
| Forms | Incident log, chain of custody, decision log, post-incident review | NCSC; NIST Rev. 2; see the Chain of Custody Form Template |
| Legal and notification sheet | Regulator deadlines, insurer notification terms, retainer activation steps | Your legal team |
Identity verification on the contact sheet is not a formality. Attackers who are inside email and chat can impersonate responders; agree verification phrases or call-back numbers in advance and record them in the sealed part of the pack.
Cloud, remote and virtual kit variants
Not every incident needs someone on a train with a case. Decide which form of kit each scenario needs.
| Variant | Best for | What it holds | Trade-offs |
|---|---|---|---|
| Physical case | Sites with servers, OT, branch offices, seized devices, insider cases | Hardware above plus offline pack | Needs storage, inspection and transport; one case per region for large estates |
| Cloud forensic account | IaaS incidents | Isolated account or subscription, snapshot and share roles, analysis instances, evidence storage with object lock | Must be outside the blast radius of the production tenant and tested end to end |
| Remote collection | Distributed endpoints and home workers | EDR live response packages, pre-approved scripts, upload destination | Depends on the EDR console and its admin accounts being trustworthy |
| Ship-out kit | Remote staff or sites without responders | Pre-labelled return box, evidence drive, written instructions, collection USB | Chain of custody relies on courier records; RFC 3227 suggests recording shipping numbers |
- Small organisations: one investigation laptop, a write blocker, two evidence drives, trusted media, the printed pack and a retainer who brings the rest. Spend effort on access and contacts first, because that is where small teams stall. See the Small Business Incident Response Guide.
- Large or multinational organisations: a kit per region, a named kit custodian per kit, a cloud forensic account per major provider, and travel considerations such as carrying encrypted devices and evidence across borders, which legal should review in advance.
- Retainer-led response: agree with the provider what they bring and what you must supply (access, accounts, data transfer method). See the Incident Response Retainer Buyer's Guide.
Building, storing and testing the kit
- Start from scenarios: list the three to five incidents you are most likely to face (ransomware, cloud account takeover, business email compromise, insider data theft) and note what each needs on the first day.
- Write the manifest: every item, serial number, firmware or software version, hash for media, expiry or renewal date, and storage location. Keep it with the kit and in the offline pack.
- Build and validate: image the investigation laptops, build the trusted media, test write blockers and imaging against a lab drive and compare hashes, and provision the responder and break-glass accounts.
- Seal and store: keep the kit in a secure, access-controlled location, with tamper-evident seals on the case and on credential envelopes. Revision 2 also calls for secure storage for evidence; keep that separate from the kit.
- Inspect quarterly: charge batteries, patch and re-hash the laptops, rebuild media, check consumable stock, test responder accounts and update contacts. Log the inspection.
- Exercise with it: take the kit to tabletop and technical exercises and actually use it: acquire a lab image, snapshot a test cloud volume, open a break-glass envelope and confirm alerts fire. See the Cyber Incident Exercises Beyond Tabletop Guide.
- Reset after use: after each incident, wipe and rebuild investigation laptops (Revision 2 requires this before reuse), restock, rotate any opened break-glass credential, and review what was missing.
Rollback and fallbacks: keep the previous verified version of the trusted media until a new build passes testing, and keep at least one spare evidence drive and laptop so a failed item does not stop collection.
Measuring readiness
- Kit readiness rate: percentage of manifest items present, charged and within version or expiry at the last inspection. Target 100%.
- Inspection on time: quarterly inspections completed in the scheduled window.
- Time to first collection: minutes from declaration to the first verified memory or triage capture in exercises and real incidents.
- Contact accuracy: percentage of contacts reached first time in a call-tree test.
- Break-glass test success: emergency accounts that worked, and raised alerts, when tested.
- Post-incident gaps: number of "missing from the kit" findings per incident review, which should fall over time.
Framework mapping
| Framework | Reference | Kit relevance |
|---|---|---|
| NIST CSF 2.0 | ID.IM-04 | Incident response plans established and maintained; the kit implements the plan |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | RS.AN-06, RS.AN-07 | Recording investigation actions, collecting incident data with integrity and provenance: forms, hashing, write blockers |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | RS.CO-02, RS.MA-01 | Notifying stakeholders and coordinating with third parties: contact and retainer sheets |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | IR-4, IR-7, IR-8 | Incident handling, incident response assistance, incident response plan |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | IR-2, IR-3 | Training and testing, which should use the kit |
| CIS Controls v8.1 | 17.2, 17.7 | Maintain contact information for reporting incidents; conduct routine incident response exercises |
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | A.5.24, A.5.26, A.5.28 | Incident management planning and preparation; response to incidents; collection of evidence |
Common failure patterns
- The kit was borrowed: the spare laptop became someone's daily machine and the write blocker went to a project. Revision 2 warned against exactly this; give the kit a custodian and a seal.
- Everything depends on single sign-on: responder accounts, the EDR console, the password vault and the contact list all sit behind the identity provider the attacker controls. Keep sealed, independent access and a printed pack.
- Tools that no longer run: memory acquisition drivers fail on the latest OS build, licences expired, or dongles need online activation. Retest after major OS releases and record licence dates.
- Undersized evidence storage: drives smaller than server memory or disks, discovered at 2 a.m. Size against your largest systems.
- Stale contacts: leavers on the call sheet, no deputies, no out-of-hours numbers, and no way to verify who is calling. Review contacts monthly and test the call tree.
- Contaminated analysis laptop: one device used for both investigation and email, or not rebuilt between incidents, which mixes cases and risks spreading malware.
Practitioner checklist
- Name a kit custodian and seal the kit; no borrowing.
- Issue each responder a dedicated investigation laptop and a separate standard device.
- Build read-only trusted media per OS with a hashed manifest stored separately.
- Validate write blockers and imaging tools against a lab drive and keep the results.
- Size evidence drives above your largest disk and memory footprint.
- Provision monitored responder accounts and sealed break-glass credentials independent of production SSO.
- Print the contact sheet with two routes per person, deputies and verification arrangements.
- Stand up and test a cloud forensic account for each major cloud provider you use.
- Inspect quarterly, use the kit in every exercise, and rebuild it after every incident.
- Track kit readiness, time to first collection and post-incident gaps.
Standards and references
- NIST: SP 800-61 Rev. 3, Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations for Cybersecurity Risk Management
- NIST: SP 800-61 Rev. 2, Computer Security Incident Handling Guide (withdrawn, historical)
- IETF: RFC 3227, Guidelines for Evidence Collection and Archiving
- NIST: SP 800-86, Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response
- NIST: SP 800-101 Rev. 1, Guidelines on Mobile Device Forensics
- NIST: Computer Forensics Tool Testing Program
- NCSC: Cyber incident response processes
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Incident Response Guide · Forensic Readiness Guide · Evidence Handling and Chain of Custody Guide · Open Source DFIR Tools Landscape Guide · Incident Response Plan Template