Most incident response failures are discovered during the incident: the logs were never collected, the retainer number is out of date, nobody can reach the cloud console, and the playbook assumes a tool that was retired last year. This checklist lets [Organisation] verify, before anything goes wrong, that the things a response depends on actually exist and work. It is organised by response phase, from scope and triggers through to post-incident review, and every item asks for evidence rather than a yes or no. It is for security leaders, incident managers and internal auditors running a readiness assessment, typically once a year and after major changes. It complements the Incident Response Maturity Model, which measures how capable the function is; this checklist tests whether it is ready today.
How to use this template
- Replace text in square brackets, such as [Organisation], [Incident manager] and [SOC], with your own names and roles.
- For each item, record a status (see the rating scale), the evidence you inspected, the owner and the date checked. "We have a plan" is not evidence; "plan v3.2 approved 14 March, contact list tested 2 April" is.
- Test items that can be tested: dial the retainer hotline, log in with the break-glass account, restore a backup, run the log query. A document review alone will overstate readiness.
- Assess at least annually, and again after a merger, a major platform migration, a change of SOC or retainer provider, or a significant incident.
- Track every "Not ready" item as a remediation action with an owner and date, and report the summary to [Security steering committee].
| Status | Meaning | Evidence expected |
|---|---|---|
| Ready | In place and tested within the last 12 months | Test record, screenshot, ticket or exercise report |
| Partly ready | In place but untested, out of date or covering only part of the estate | Document with known gaps listed |
| Not ready | Missing, or tested and failed | Remediation action raised |
| Not applicable | Does not apply to [Organisation] | Reason recorded and approved |
1. Scope and triggers
- Plan and policy: an approved incident response policy and plan exist, name an accountable executive, and were reviewed within the last 12 months. See the Incident Response Plan Template.
- Definitions: the plan defines what counts as an event, an incident and a major incident, with examples relevant to [Organisation], including identity, cloud, SaaS and AI agent scenarios.
- Severity scale: a severity matrix ties impact (data, service, safety, legal) to response level, escalation and who can declare a major incident.
- Scope coverage: the plan covers on-premises, cloud, SaaS, OT (if any), third parties and managed service providers, and non-human identities such as service accounts and API keys.
- Playbooks: scenario playbooks exist for the most likely incidents (ransomware, business email compromise, leaked credentials, cloud account compromise, edge device exploitation, insider data theft) and each was reviewed against current tools in the last 12 months.
- Asset context: responders can find the owner, criticality and dependencies of a system within minutes, from the CMDB or asset inventory.
2. Roles and contacts
The NCSC's guidance on incident response processes recommends key contacts for the response team or provider, IT, senior management, legal, PR, HR and the insurer, with at least two contact methods and two or more people per role.
- Named roles: incident manager, technical lead, communications lead, legal counsel, executive decision maker and scribe, each with a deputy.
- Contact list: current, held offline as well as online, with mobile numbers and personal email as fallback, and tested by a call-out in the last six months. See the Incident Response Contact and Call Tree Template.
- Retainer: the incident response retainer is active, the hotline number and contract reference are in the plan, the onboarding paperwork (scoping, legal terms, data access) is pre-agreed, and the provider has been engaged in an exercise. See the Incident Response Retainer Buyer's Guide.
- Cyber insurance: the policy number, insurer hotline and notification conditions are recorded, and the plan states whether the insurer must approve the choice of response firm or counsel.
- Third parties: contacts and escalation routes for the MSP, MSSP, cloud providers, key SaaS vendors and identity provider are recorded, including how to open a priority security case.
- Authorities: contacts for the national CSIRT or cyber agency, law enforcement and the data protection regulator are recorded.
- Out-of-band communication: a channel that does not depend on the corporate identity provider or email (for example a separate messaging tenant or a bridge line that is always available) is set up and tested.
3. Detection and triage
- Log sources: the logs the playbooks rely on are collected centrally: identity provider sign-in and audit logs, endpoint detection, email, cloud control plane audit trails, SaaS audit logs, VPN and firewall logs, DNS and proxy. Check for each one that data from 90 days ago can actually be queried.
- Retention: retention meets the longer of legal requirements and your typical detection gap, and logs are protected from deletion by an administrator of the source system. See the Log Management and Retention Guide.
- Time: all sources use a synchronised time source and logs record time zone, so events can be put into one timeline.
- Coverage gaps: a list of systems without logging or EDR exists and is accepted by the risk owner.
- Triage procedure: the SOC or on-call analyst has a documented triage and declaration process, with criteria for waking the incident manager out of hours.
- Reporting route: staff know how to report a suspected incident, and the route works out of hours.
- Forensic readiness: responders have approved tools and storage for evidence (disk and memory capture, cloud snapshots, log exports) and a chain of custody form. See the Forensic Readiness Guide.
4. Containment
- Responder access: named responders hold, or can obtain within an agreed time, the privileges needed to contain: disabling accounts, revoking sessions and tokens, isolating endpoints, changing firewall rules, suspending cloud keys. Test it: ask a responder to isolate a test host and revoke a test user's sessions.
- Break-glass accounts: emergency administrator accounts for the identity provider and cloud platforms exist, are excluded from controls an attacker could abuse, are monitored, and were last tested within six months. See the Break-Glass Account Guide.
- Non-human identities: responders can find and disable service accounts, API keys, OAuth grants and automation tokens associated with a compromised system, and know who owns them. See the Identity Incident Response Playbook.
- Pre-approved actions: the plan lists containment actions the incident manager may take without further approval (for example isolating a single host) and those needing executive approval (for example disconnecting the internet edge or shutting down a production service).
- Third-party containment: contracts allow you to require the MSP or SaaS provider to suspend access or preserve logs on request.
5. Eradication
- Rebuild capability: gold images, infrastructure-as-code and configuration baselines exist so compromised systems can be rebuilt rather than cleaned.
- Credential reset at scale: a tested procedure exists for mass password reset, Kerberos KRBTGT rotation (where Active Directory is used), session revocation across SaaS, and rotation of secrets in vaults and pipelines.
- Persistence checks: playbooks list the persistence locations to check for each platform, such as new OAuth applications, mailbox rules, scheduled tasks, cloud IAM users and keys, and edge device configurations.
- Emergency patching: an emergency change route exists to patch or mitigate the exploited vulnerability within hours. See the Emergency Out-of-Band Patching Playbook.
6. Recovery
- Backups: backups of critical systems are immutable or offline, protected by separate credentials, and a restore of a critical system was tested in the last 12 months with the time recorded. See the Backup Security and Immutable Backup Guide.
- Recovery order: the order in which services are restored is agreed with the business, starting with identity, network and core infrastructure.
- Recovery objectives: recovery time and recovery point objectives for critical services are documented and consistent with tested restore times.
- Clean environment: a method exists to restore into a known-clean environment and validate restored systems before reconnecting them.
- Business continuity link: the incident plan links to business continuity plans so manual workarounds start while systems are restored.
7. Communication and notification
- Regulatory clocks: the notification obligations that apply to [Organisation] are listed with their deadlines and the trigger for each clock (for example, under the GDPR, notification of a personal data breach to the supervisory authority within 72 hours of becoming aware of it, where required). Confirm current requirements with legal counsel. See the Data Breach Notification Checklist.
- Decision owner: the person who decides whether a notification is required, and who approves its content, is named.
- Templates: pre-drafted holding statements exist for staff, customers, regulators, media and partners, reviewed by legal.
- Contractual notifications: customer and partner contracts with incident notification clauses are listed with their deadlines.
- Decision record: a log template captures decisions, their rationale and who made them, under legal privilege where appropriate. See the Incident Log and Decision Record Template.
8. Post-incident review
- Review process: the plan requires a blameless post-incident review within an agreed period after major incidents, with actions tracked to closure.
- Exercises: at least one tabletop exercise with executives and one technical exercise ran in the last 12 months, with findings tracked. See the Tabletop Exercise Guide.
- Detection improvement: lessons learned feed new detection rules, playbook updates and control changes, and the link is recorded.
- Metrics: mean time to detect, contain and recover, and the share of readiness items rated Ready, are reported to [Security steering committee].
- Plan maintenance: the plan, playbooks and contacts are updated after every major incident and exercise.
Implementation guidance
- Prepare (week 1): agree scope and assessors, collect the current plan, playbooks, contact lists, retainer and insurance documents, and the log source inventory.
- Assess by document review (weeks 2 to 3): rate every item from evidence, interviewing owners where documents are missing.
- Test (weeks 3 to 4): run live tests for the items that matter most: the retainer hotline, out-of-band channel, break-glass logins, a responder containment action, a 90-day log query and a backup restore. Schedule tests with owners so they do not trigger a real response.
- Report: summarise by section with counts of Ready, Partly ready and Not ready, and highlight the five gaps that would most delay a real response.
- Remediate and re-test: assign owners and dates, and re-test closed items rather than accepting a status change.
Small organisations can complete this in a few days, often with the retainer or MSP; the critical items are contacts, out-of-band communication, break-glass access, backups and logs. Large organisations should run it per business unit or region and consolidate, because readiness often varies sharply between units.
| Checklist section | NIST CSF 2.0 | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Scope and triggers | ID.IM-04, DE.AE-08 | IR-1, IR-8 |
| 2. Roles and contacts | GV.RR-02, RS.MA-01 | IR-8 |
| 3. Detection and triage | DE.CM-01, RS.MA-02 | IR-4, AU-6 |
| 4 and 5. Containment and eradication | RS.MI-01, RS.MI-02 | IR-4 |
| 6. Recovery | RC.RP-01, PR.DS-11 | CP-9, CP-10 |
| 7. Communication and notification | RS.CO-02, RS.CO-03, RC.CO-03 | IR-6 |
| 8. Post-incident review | ID.IM-02, ID.IM-04 | IR-2, IR-3 |
Standards and references
- NIST: SP 800-61 Rev. 3 Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations for Cybersecurity Risk Management
- NCSC: Cyber incident response processes
- NCSC: Incident management collection
- NIST: Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5
- NIST: SP 800-86 Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Incident Response Maturity Model · Incident Response Guide · Incident Response Plan Template · NIST SP 800-61 Incident Response Guide