A device identity is only as strong as the place its private key lives, and on most IoT fleets that key is a file in flash that can be copied to a thousand clones. Hardware roots of trust fix this by generating or deriving the identity key inside silicon that does not let it out, and by tying it to what the device actually booted. The two main approaches are the Trusted Platform Module (TPM 2.0), a dedicated security chip or firmware component, and the Trusted Computing Group's Device Identifier Composition Engine (DICE), a minimal hardware design for constrained microcontrollers. This guide explains how each works, how manufacturer and operator identities (IEEE 802.1AR IDevID and LDevID) fit on top, how attestation proves firmware state, and how to choose and deploy them. It is for device makers, IoT platform engineers and security architects. For fleet-level identity operations see the Identity for IoT Fleets Guide.
Key takeaways
- Hardware keys stop cloning. If the private key is generated in a TPM or derived by DICE hardware and never exported, copying the firmware or the flash does not copy the identity.
- TPM and DICE solve the same problem at different cost. TPM 2.0 gives a full command set, sealed storage and standard attestation; DICE gives a unique, firmware-bound identity on parts with almost no security hardware.
- DICE identities change when firmware changes. That is the security property, and it means your PKI and enrolment design must expect new keys after updates.
- Separate manufacturer and operator identity. IEEE 802.1AR defines an Initial Device Identifier installed by the manufacturer and Local Device Identifiers issued by the operator; use the first to bootstrap the second.
- Attestation is a protocol, not a chip feature. The IETF RATS architecture (RFC 9334) defines who produces evidence, who verifies it and who acts on the result; design those roles explicitly.
Why device identity needs a hardware root of trust
Without hardware protection, an IoT device's identity is typically a certificate and private key, or a shared symmetric key, written to flash during manufacturing or onboarding. Anyone with physical access, a debug port or a firmware vulnerability can read it. The consequences are cloned devices that impersonate genuine ones, attackers registering counterfeit hardware to a cloud platform, and no reliable way to tell a genuine device running tampered firmware from a healthy one.
NIST IR 8259A, the IoT Device Cybersecurity Capability Core Baseline (May 2020), lists device identification as a core capability. A hardware root of trust is how that identifier becomes something a remote party can verify cryptographically rather than a serial number anyone can claim. In NIST SP 800-53 terms this is IA-3 (Device Identification and Authentication) backed by SC-51 (Hardware-based Protection). See the NIST IR 8259 IoT Device Cybersecurity Baseline Guide.
TPM 2.0 for device identity
- Endorsement Key (EK): a key unique to each TPM, usually with an EK certificate from the TPM manufacturer. Microsoft's Azure IoT Hub Device Provisioning Service (DPS) documentation describes the EK as the TPM's secure root of trust: the vendor records EK_pub at manufacture and the service enrols the device by it. Clearing the TPM erases owner data but keeps the EK, so the device remains recognisable.
- Storage Root Key (SRK): created when the owner takes ownership; it protects the owner's keys and changes if ownership is taken again.
- Proof of possession: in DPS TPM attestation the service encrypts a nonce first with the SRK and then with EK_pub; only the TPM holding both private keys can recover it and use it to sign a token. The EK private key never leaves the TPM.
- Identity and attestation keys: the TCG specification "TPM 2.0 Keys for Device Identity and Attestation" (v1.10 r9, April 2025) applies IEEE 802.1AR device identity formatting to TPM-protected keys, so a TPM can hold a manufacturer-certified device identity key and an attestation key alongside operator-issued ones.
- Measured boot and quotes: boot components are measured into Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs), and the TPM signs a quote over selected PCRs with an attestation key so a verifier can check what booted. D3FEND models this as TPM Boot Integrity (D3-TBI).
- Form factors: discrete TPM chips, firmware TPMs in the main processor's secure environment and integrated TPMs. Microsoft notes that software-emulated TPMs suit prototyping only, not production.
DICE for constrained devices
DICE is TCG's answer for microcontrollers that cannot carry a TPM. TCG describes it as establishing a unique cryptographic identity for resource-constrained devices and IoT systems with minimal hardware.
- Unique Device Secret (UDS): a per-device secret provisioned in hardware and readable only by the DICE engine at reset.
- Measure and derive: the engine measures the first mutable code (Layer 0) and derives a Compound Device Identifier (CDI) from the UDS and that measurement. The hardware requirements specification notes that updates to the DICE engine itself are not measured into the CDI, so the engine must be inherently trusted.
- Lock the UDS: access to the UDS is closed before Layer 0 runs, so firmware never sees it.
- DeviceID key: Layer 0 derives the DeviceID key pair from its CDI. The DICE Layering Architecture (v1.0 r0.19, July 2020) defines it as an asymmetric key that authenticates a combination of device and firmware; it is long-lived and typically certified during manufacturing.
- Layering: Layer 0 measures Layer 1, derives the next CDI and certifies Layer 1's key, and so on up the chain.
- Alias key: derived from the last CDI in the chain, it reflects the top-level firmware and signs attestation evidence.
The Layering Architecture states that any change to a component must produce a different measurement, and any change to Layer 0 must produce a different DeviceID key. A change confined to a higher layer changes the keys at and above that layer, including the alias key, but not the DeviceID. Persisted keys must be revoked after an update to the trusted code and new keys generated from the new layer. This is what makes DICE identities firmware-bound: malware that changes the boot code cannot produce the genuine key.
TPM, DICE and the alternatives compared
| Option | Key protection | Firmware binding | Cost and footprint | Best fit |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Key in flash | None | None | Lowest | Not acceptable for production identity |
| Secure element | Strong, tamper-resistant chip | Only if firmware measurement is added separately | Low to medium per unit | Constrained devices needing tamper resistance |
| DICE | UDS in hardware, keys derived at boot | Built in: keys depend on measured firmware | Lowest hardware cost of the hardware options | Microcontrollers, components and peripherals |
| TPM 2.0 (discrete) | Strong, keys never exported | Measured boot into PCRs plus quotes | Highest per unit; needs more host resources | Gateways, industrial PCs, edge servers |
| Firmware TPM | Depends on the processor's trusted execution environment | As TPM | No extra chip | Application-class processors |
- Choose DICE when: the device is a microcontroller, cost per unit matters and you control the boot ROM or silicon choice.
- Choose TPM when: the device runs a full operating system, needs sealed storage for several keys, or must interoperate with existing TPM attestation services.
- Combine: the TCG DICE work group explicitly covers systems with or without a TPM; a gateway can use a TPM while its sensors use DICE.
Manufacturer and operator identities
IEEE 802.1AR-2018 (Secure Device Identity, active standard) defines a Secure Device Identifier (DevID) bound to a device's keys. A manufacturer installs an Initial Device Identifier (IDevID); the network operator then enrols the device with Local Device Identifiers (LDevIDs). An amendment, 802.1AReg-2026, adds ML-DSA (post-quantum signature) support.
| Identity | Issued by | Lifetime | Used for |
|---|---|---|---|
| TPM EK or DICE DeviceID certificate | Silicon or device manufacturer | Life of the hardware (DICE: until Layer 0 changes) | Proving the hardware is genuine |
| IDevID | Device manufacturer | Long, often the device lifetime | Bootstrapping enrolment with the operator, zero-touch onboarding |
| LDevID | Operator's CA | Shorter, renewable | Day-to-day authentication to networks and cloud services |
| DICE alias certificate | Issued on-device by the layer below | Until the firmware layer changes | Signing attestation evidence about current firmware |
Do not use the manufacturer identity for production authentication: you cannot revoke it on your own terms, and it identifies the device to every service it talks to. Use it once to prove the device is genuine, then issue an operator LDevID from your own CA. See the IoT and Device Certificate Provisioning Guide and the IoT Device Onboarding Guide.
Attestation: proving what the device is running
RFC 9334, the IETF Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) architecture (Informational, January 2023), gives a vocabulary that keeps designs clear:
- Attester: the device, producing Evidence (for example a TPM quote or DICE alias-signed claims).
- Verifier: appraises Evidence against Reference Values (known-good firmware hashes) and Endorsements (manufacturer statements about the hardware) under an appraisal policy, and issues signed Attestation Results.
- Relying Party: the cloud service, network access controller or broker that decides whether to trust the device.
- Endorser and Reference Value Provider: typically the manufacturer, supplying endorsement certificates and golden measurements.
- Passport model: the device obtains an Attestation Result and presents it to several relying parties. Background-check model: the relying party forwards the device's Evidence to the verifier itself.
The practical consequence: someone must maintain reference values for every firmware version in the field. If that list is not updated on release, healthy devices fail attestation after every update. See the Workload Attestation Guide for the same pattern in cloud workloads.
Where identity fits in the PKI
- Manufacturing CA: signs DeviceID or IDevID certificates on the line. Its key is as sensitive as any code signing key: the MSI Signing Keys Leak showed how leaked firmware and Boot Guard signing keys let anyone sign modified firmware that passes verification on devices already sold.
- Operator CA: issues LDevIDs with your naming, short lifetimes and revocation. See the Enterprise PKI Design and CA Hierarchy Guide.
- Cloud enrolment groups: Azure DPS, for example, can enrol a whole branch of devices by an intermediate CA certificate, and disabling that entry blocks every device beneath it while individual entries can block a single device. Group devices by factory or production line so a compromised branch can be cut off.
- Post-update keys: with DICE, an update to measured layers produces new alias keys and, for Layer 0, a new DeviceID. Plan certificate re-issue as part of the firmware release process.
Implementation approach
- Decide the root of trust per device class: TPM for gateways and Linux devices, DICE or a secure element for microcontrollers. Record it in the device security requirements.
- Agree manufacturing provisioning: who injects the UDS or reads the EK, where the manufacturing CA lives (HSM, dual control), and how device public keys and certificates are exported to you.
- Build the operator PKI and enrolment: an issuing CA for LDevIDs, an enrolment service (EST or a cloud provisioning service) that accepts IDevID or EK proof of possession.
- Publish reference values: integrate firmware build output (hashes) into the verifier as part of the release pipeline.
- Pilot: run a pilot batch through manufacturing, enrolment, a firmware update and a deliberate failed attestation. Confirm that a cloned flash image does not authenticate.
- Roll out by production line: new identities for new production first; for existing fleets without hardware roots, plan replacement or a compensating control rather than a retrofit.
- Rollback: keep the ability to re-enable the previous enrolment path for a defined batch while you fix provisioning faults, and never by disabling attestation fleet-wide.
Detection and measurement
- Log and alert on: enrolment attempts with unknown EKs or DeviceIDs, the same identity connecting from two places at once (cloning), attestation failures by firmware version, and certificates issued outside manufacturing windows.
- Threats to watch: firmware-level persistence (ATT&CK T1542.001 System Firmware) and hardware supply chain compromise (T1195.003).
| Metric | Target |
|---|---|
| Devices with hardware-protected identity keys | 100% of new production |
| Devices authenticating with operator LDevID rather than manufacturer identity | 100% |
| Attestation pass rate per firmware version | Above 99% within a day of release |
| Time to publish reference values after a firmware build | Before release, never after |
| Concurrent-use (clone) alerts per month | Investigated within 24 hours |
Framework mapping
| Framework | Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | IA-3, SC-51, SI-7, SR-11 | Device authentication, hardware-based protection, firmware integrity, component authenticity |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | ID.AM-01, PR.AA-01, PR.AA-03, PR.PS-02 | Hardware inventory, identity management, authentication, software maintenance |
| NIST IR 8259A | Device identification capability | Unique, verifiable device identity |
| IEEE 802.1AR-2018 | IDevID and LDevID | Manufacturer and operator identities |
| MITRE D3FEND | D3-TBI TPM Boot Integrity, D3-BA Bootloader Authentication | Measured and verified boot |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1542.001, T1195.003 | Firmware persistence, hardware supply chain |
Common failure patterns
- Hardware root present but unused: devices ship with a TPM, but the cloud credential is a symmetric key in a file.
- Shared fleet key: one key or certificate for every device, so one extraction compromises all.
- Manufacturer identity as the only identity: no operator-controlled credential, so revocation depends on the vendor.
- Updates that break identity: DICE keys change after a firmware update and the back end rejects the device, so teams disable checks instead of planning re-certification.
- Stale reference values: attestation enabled but never enforced because golden measurements lag releases.
- Software TPM in production: an emulated TPM used during development ships in the final image, giving the appearance of hardware protection with none of the substance.
- Unprotected manufacturing CA: the CA signing device certificates sits on a factory PC rather than an HSM.
Practitioner checklist
- Require a hardware root of trust (TPM 2.0, DICE or secure element) in device procurement and design requirements.
- Confirm identity private keys are generated or derived in hardware and are non-exportable.
- Obtain EK or DeviceID public keys and certificates from manufacturing through an authenticated channel.
- Issue operator LDevIDs from your own CA and use the manufacturer identity only for bootstrap.
- Protect manufacturing and operator CA keys in HSMs with dual control.
- Integrate reference values into the firmware release pipeline before enforcing attestation.
- Plan certificate re-issue for DICE key changes after updates.
- Group enrolments by production line so a compromised branch can be disabled.
- Alert on concurrent use of one device identity and on unknown enrolment keys.
Standards and references
- Trusted Computing Group: DICE Layering Architecture
- Trusted Computing Group: Hardware Requirements for a Device Identifier Composition Engine
- Trusted Computing Group: TPM 2.0 Keys for Device Identity and Attestation
- IEEE: 802.1AR-2018 Secure Device Identity
- IETF: RFC 9334 Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture
- NIST: IR 8259A IoT Device Cybersecurity Capability Core Baseline
- Microsoft Learn: TPM attestation in Azure IoT Hub Device Provisioning Service
- Microsoft Learn: X.509 certificate attestation in Device Provisioning Service
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Identity for IoT Fleets Guide · Device and IoT Identity Guide · IoT and Device Certificate Provisioning Guide · Matter Device Attestation and Security Guide · IoT Security Guide