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ISO/IEC 27099 PKI Practices and Policy Framework Guide: Certificate Policies, Practice Statements and Audit Evidence

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 27 October 2026 15 min read
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Most private PKIs issue millions of machine certificates under a certificate policy nobody has read since the CA was built, if one was ever written at all. ISO/IEC 27099:2022 is the international standard that ties the operation of a public key infrastructure to an information security management approach, through a certificate policy (CP), a certification practice statement (CPS) and, where applicable, an ISMS. This guide explains what the standard covers and who it applies to, how it relates to the RFC 3647 CP/CPS outline that almost every CA document follows, what it means for machine identity, and how to build the evidence an assessor expects. It is written for PKI owners, identity architects, GRC teams and auditors working with internal or contractual PKIs rather than the public WebPKI alone.

Key takeaways

  • It is an ISMS lens on PKI operations. ISO describes ISO/IEC 27099 as setting requirements for managing information security at PKI trust service providers through CPs, CPSs and, where applicable, an ISMS, built on ISO/IEC 27000 family concepts and ISO/IEC 27002 controls.
  • Risk treatment is tied to each certificate policy. The standard expects risk assessment and treatment to reflect the service requirements in each CP, so a CA that issues device, user and code signing certificates needs a risk view per policy, not one generic assessment.
  • Contractual PKIs are its main target. ISO distinguishes closed, open and contractual PKI environments and focuses on contractual ones, which is where most enterprise, partner, IoT and sector PKIs sit.
  • RFC 3647 is still the document skeleton. The nine-part CP/CPS outline from RFC 3647 is what assessors, relying parties and the CA/Browser Forum expect to see; use it as the structure and ISO/IEC 27099 as the management and risk discipline around it.
  • Machine identity is where the CP earns its keep. Workload, device and code signing certificates are non-human credentials; the CP is the only place that states who may request them, how they are validated, how long they live and how fast they are revoked.

What it is and who it applies to

ISO/IEC 27099:2022, "Information technology, Public key infrastructure, Practices and policy framework", is published by ISO and IEC through joint technical committee ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 (Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection). The ISO catalogue lists it as edition 1, published in July 2022, 94 pages, at stage 60.60 (International Standard published), with no amendment or revision in progress when checked on 27 October 2026. The full text is paid; this guide relies on ISO's public abstract and on the openly published documents the standard sits alongside, and does not quote clause numbers from inside the standard.

ItemWhat the ISO catalogue statesWhat it means in practice
SubjectInformation security management of PKI trust service providers through CPs, CPSs and, where applicable, an ISMSYour CA is treated as a service with a management system, not as a server
Certificate uses in scopeLife cycle of public key certificates used for digital signatures, authentication and key establishment for data encryptionTLS server and client, mTLS workload, device, user, S/MIME and code signing certificates all fit
Out of scopeAuthentication methods, non-repudiation requirements, key management protocols and attribute certificatesPair it with authentication standards, key management guidance and protocol specifications
Control baseISO/IEC 27000 family concepts and the ISO/IEC 27002 controlsFits inside an existing ISO/IEC 27001 ISMS
EnvironmentsClosed, open and contractual PKI, with a focus on contractualEnterprise, partner federation, IoT manufacturing and sector schemes
  • Enterprise PKI owners: AD CS, cloud private CA and HashiCorp style internal CAs that issue to workloads and devices. See the Enterprise PKI Design and CA Hierarchy Guide.
  • Commercial trust service providers: CAs already audited against WebTrust or ETSI schemes can use ISO/IEC 27099 to frame the ISMS that sits behind their CPS.
  • Relying parties and procurement: organisations accepting partner or supplier certificates can ask whether the issuing CA runs its PKI under a CP and CPS managed this way.
  • Auditors: ISO/IEC 27001 auditors who find a CA in scope can use it to judge whether PKI operations are actually covered by the ISMS.

Structure and key requirements

ISO/IEC 27099 does not replace the CP/CPS document format that the industry has used for two decades. RFC 3647 (Informational, November 2003, obsoleting RFC 2527) defines the vocabulary and the outline. A certificate policy is a named set of rules, identified by an object identifier (OID), stating which community and class of applications a certificate is suitable for. A CPS describes the practices a specific CA uses to issue, manage, revoke and renew or re-key certificates. One CA can support several CPs, and several CAs can operate under one CP. The CA/Browser Forum TLS Baseline Requirements (version 2.3.1, effective 4 October 2026) go further for public TLS: a CA's CP and/or CPS must be structured in accordance with RFC 3647 and include all material RFC 3647 requires, and must be updated at least once every 366 days with an incremented version and a dated changelog entry.

RFC 3647 componentKey subsectionsWhat an ISO/IEC 27099 style ISMS adds
1 IntroductionDocument name and OID, PKI participants (CA, RA, subscribers, relying parties), certificate usage, policy administrationNamed policy owner, scope statement, link to ISMS scope
2 Publication and repositoryWhere CP, CPS, certificates and status information are published, and how oftenAvailability objectives for CRL and OCSP as risk treatments
3 Identification and authenticationNaming, initial identity validation, re-key and revocation request authenticationHow machine requesters (pipelines, MDM, service mesh) are authenticated
4 Certificate life-cycleApplication, issuance, acceptance, renewal, re-key, modification, revocation and suspension, status services, key escrow and recoveryLifetime and revocation targets per CP, linked to risk
5 Management, operational and physical controlsPhysical, procedural and personnel controls, audit logging, records archival, key changeover, compromise and disaster recovery, CA or RA terminationMapped to ISO/IEC 27002 organisational, people and physical controls
6 Technical security controlsKey pair generation, private key protection and cryptographic modules, activation data, computer, life cycle and network security, timestampingHSM, separation of duties and change control evidence
7 Certificate, CRL and OCSP profilesExtensions, policy OIDs, key usage, validityProfile change control and linting
8 Compliance auditFrequency, assessor qualifications, topics covered, actions on deficienciesInternal audit and management review of PKI
9 Other business and legal mattersFees, liability, privacy, warranties, amendments, governing lawContractual commitments to relying parties in contractual PKIs

The practical requirement set that follows from the ISO abstract is short but demanding:

  • Policy-driven: every certificate type is issued under a CP with its own OID, and the CPS says how each CP is met.
  • Risk-based: risk assessment and treatment reflect the service requirements of each CP, so a high-assurance code signing CP gets stronger key protection and validation than a short-lived internal TLS CP.
  • Multi-policy: the provider can support multiple CPs without the controls for one leaking into or weakening another.
  • Managed: where an ISMS applies, the PKI is inside its scope, with objectives, internal audit and management review.

Identity and NHI requirements

Most certificates in an enterprise PKI identify a machine: a web service, a Kubernetes pod, a laptop, an IoT device, a domain controller or a build pipeline signing artefacts. A CP written for human smart cards does not cover these, and that gap is where incidents start. The GitHub code signing certificate theft began with a compromised token tied to a machine account and ended with the exposed certificates being revoked weeks later; the Storm-0558 key breach involved a signing key that should have been retired and stayed valid. Both are failures a CP and CPS are meant to prevent: who may hold signing keys, how long they live and how retirement is enforced.

Machine identity questionWhere it belongs in the CP/CPSGood answer looks like
Who or what may request a certificate?3.2 Initial identity validation, 4.1 Certificate applicationNamed RA systems (MDM, service mesh, CI identity) authenticated to the CA with their own credentials, not shared admin accounts
How is a workload's identity proven?3.2, 4.2 Application processingPlatform attestation or authenticated enrolment protocol (ACME, EST, SCEP with challenge) tied to an inventory record
How long do certificates live?6.3 Other aspects of key pair management, 7.1 ProfileLifetimes per CP, short for automated workloads, with renewal automation stated
Who owns each certificate?1.3 Participants, 4.4 AcceptanceA named team or service owner recorded at issuance, not just a hostname
How fast is revocation?4.9 Revocation and suspension, 4.10 Status servicesStated maximum time from request to published status, tested
Where are subscriber private keys kept?6.1 Key pair generation, 6.2 Private key protectionGenerated on the device, in a TPM or HSM, or in a managed key service; non-exportable for signing keys

Treat the RA systems themselves as privileged non-human identities. A pipeline that can request any certificate under a CP is as powerful as the CA for that policy. See the Machine Identity, PKI and Certificate Lifecycle Guide and the MITRE ATT&CK T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates Guide.

Implementation steps

  1. Inventory CAs and issuance paths. List every root, intermediate and issuing CA, every template or profile, and every system that can request certificates. Many organisations find CAs they did not know they ran. See the Cryptographic Inventory and CBOM Guide.
  2. Classify the PKI environment. Decide whether each PKI is closed (internal only), contractual (relying parties bound by agreement) or open. This sets how much of RFC 3647 section 9 you need.
  3. Define certificate policies. Group certificate types into a small number of CPs by assurance need (for example internal workload TLS, device authentication, user authentication, code signing). Register an OID arc and assign one OID per CP.
  4. Run a risk assessment per CP. Use the ISO/IEC 27005 process to rate threats such as RA compromise, key theft, mis-issuance and status service outage for each CP, and record treatments. See the ISO/IEC 27005 Information Security Risk Guide.
  5. Write the CPS in RFC 3647 order. Describe how each CP is met: key ceremonies, HSM use, roles and separation of duties, enrolment protocols, revocation workflow, logging and archival. Use "no stipulation" only where truly none applies.
  6. Bring the PKI into the ISMS scope. Add CA roles, HSMs and RA systems to the ISO/IEC 27001 scope and Statement of Applicability, with controls such as Annex A 8.24 (use of cryptography) mapped to CPS sections.
  7. Pilot on one CP. Apply the new CP OID and profile to one issuing CA or template, lint certificates, and confirm relying applications accept the policy OID before rolling out further. Keep the previous template available until renewal cycles confirm no breakage, which is the rollback path.
  8. Operate the review cycle. Review CP and CPS at least annually (the 366-day rule used by the CA/Browser Forum is a sensible internal benchmark), record changes with version and date, and feed incidents into the next revision.

Decision guidance

  • Small organisation, one internal CA: a single combined CP/CPS document in RFC 3647 order, two or three CPs, and PKI controls folded into the existing ISMS is usually enough.
  • Large or regulated organisation: separate CP and CPS documents, a policy authority that approves changes, per-CP risk registers and an independent annual PKI audit.
  • Managed or cloud private CA: the provider covers the CA infrastructure controls, but the CP, enrolment authentication, templates and revocation decisions stay yours. See the AWS Certificate Manager and Private CA Guide.
  • Public TLS: do not run your own public CA to meet ISO/IEC 27099; public CAs must meet the CA/Browser Forum requirements and root programme rules regardless.

Evidence and assessment

ISO/IEC 27099 is not, on its own, a certification scheme with a published accreditation programme that this guide could confirm. In practice evidence is assessed through an ISO/IEC 27001 audit with the PKI in scope, an internal audit against the CPS, or a CA audit scheme such as WebTrust for CAs or ETSI EN 319 411-1 (ETSI's deliver directory showed V1.5.1 as the latest published version when checked).

Evidence itemShowsMeasure
Approved CP and CPS with version historyPolicy administration worksDays since last review (target under 366)
Per-CP risk register and treatment planRisk-based operationPercentage of CPs with a current risk assessment
Key ceremony records and HSM logsCA key protection (CPS 6.1, 6.2)Ceremonies with full witness and script evidence
Issuance logs matched to inventoryOnly authorised requesters receive certificatesCertificates issued without a known owner
Revocation test recordsRevocation and status services meet stated targetsMedian time from revocation request to published CRL or OCSP status
Certificate lint resultsProfiles match CPS section 7Non-conforming certificates per month

Monitor CA audit logs for template changes, new enrolment agents and issuance spikes, and alert on certificates issued outside approved profiles. Misuse of certificate templates maps to ATT&CK T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates. See the AD CS Security Guide and the Certificate Revocation Guide.

Mapping to other frameworks

FrameworkReferenceLink to CP/CPS practice
ISO/IEC 27001:2022Annex A 8.24 Use of cryptographyRules for cryptography and key management, evidenced by CP/CPS
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5SC-17 Public Key Infrastructure CertificatesIssue certificates under an organisationally defined certificate policy
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and ManagementCA and subscriber key life cycle (CPS section 6)
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5IA-5(2) Public Key-based AuthenticationPath validation and status checking by relying parties
NIST CSF 2.0PR.AA-01, ID.AM-08Credentials for services and hardware managed; assets managed through their life cycle
CA/Browser Forum TLS BRSections 2.2, 2.3, 6.3.2RFC 3647 structure, annual update, maximum validity (200 days from 15 March 2026, 100 days from 15 March 2027, 47 days from 15 March 2029)
ETSI EN 319 411-1Policy and security requirements for TSPs issuing certificatesEuropean audit route for CAs
MITRE ATT&CKT1649, T1588.004, T1553.002Threats the CP must treat: forged or stolen certificates, acquired certificates, abused code signing

NIST SP 1800-16 (TLS Server Certificate Management) is a useful companion for the operational side: inventory, ownership and automation of TLS certificates at scale. See the Certificate Expiry Outages and 47-Day TLS Certificates Guide.

Common pitfalls

  • A CPS copied from a public CA: it describes ceremonies, audits and liability limits the organisation does not actually perform, so the document is false on day one and any assessor will find it.
  • One policy for everything: code signing, domain controller and IoT certificates issued under one CP means the strongest controls are either applied everywhere (costly) or nowhere (risky).
  • Unowned machine certificates: certificates issued to hostnames with no owning team cannot be renewed, revoked or retired reliably, which is how expired certificates cause outages.
  • Signing keys that never retire: the Storm-0558 case shows a signing key meant to be retired staying valid; the CPS key changeover section must be enforced by tooling, not memory.
  • Revocation that has never been tested: GitHub's precautionary revocation broke older signed releases, a reminder that revocation affects relying software and needs a rehearsed plan.
  • PKI outside the ISMS scope: the CA is treated as an infrastructure server, so its roles, HSMs and RA accounts are never in internal audit or management review.

Practitioner checklist

  • Confirm the edition you reference (ISO/IEC 27099:2022, edition 1) and buy the text for the policy authority.
  • Inventory every CA, profile or template and every system able to request certificates.
  • Define a small set of CPs by assurance level, each with its own OID.
  • Complete and record a risk assessment and treatment plan per CP.
  • Write or rewrite the CPS in RFC 3647 order, describing only what you really do.
  • Record an owner for every issued machine certificate and reject issuance without one.
  • Protect CA keys and high-assurance subscriber signing keys in HSMs with documented ceremonies.
  • Test revocation end to end and measure time to published status.
  • Place CA roles, HSMs and RA systems inside the ISO/IEC 27001 scope and Statement of Applicability.
  • Review and version CP and CPS at least every 366 days, and after any PKI incident.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Cryptographic Key Management Guide · Enterprise PKI Design and CA Hierarchy Guide · PKI Basics Guide · ISO 27001 Certification Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 27 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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