Join our Newsletter — 33% off our NHI Course
Home› Guides› ISO/IEC 29147 and 30111 Vulnerability Disclosure and Handling…
Guide Regulations & Frameworks

ISO/IEC 29147 and 30111 Vulnerability Disclosure and Handling Guide: what the standards cover and how to conform

PDF for newsletter subscribers · free to read online

← All guides
By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 27 October 2026 12 min read
On this page

Customers, regulators and procurement teams increasingly ask vendors to show that vulnerability reports are received, handled and disclosed "in line with ISO/IEC 29147 and ISO/IEC 30111", and many vendors cannot show it. The two standards are a pair: 29147 covers the outward-facing side (taking in reports and publishing remediation information) and 30111 covers the internal process of investigating and fixing what is reported. This guide explains what each standard covers, how they relate to the EU Cyber Resilience Act, NIST SP 800-216, ETSI EN 303 645, security.txt and CSAF, and how to build and evidence a programme that an auditor or customer will accept. It is written for PSIRT leads, product security managers, GRC teams and auditors. ISO status was checked on iso.org on 27 October 2026. Both standards are paid documents: this guide summarises their published scope and how official bodies use them, and you should confirm clause-level detail against your licensed copy.

Key takeaways

  • Two standards, one lifecycle: ISO/IEC 29147:2018 is about receiving reports and disclosing remediation information; ISO/IEC 30111:2019 is about processing and remediating reported vulnerabilities in between.
  • Both are being revised: iso.org lists both at stage 90.92 "to be revised", with ISO/IEC AWI 29147 and ISO/IEC WD 30111.2 under development, so write contracts against "the current edition".
  • They are vendor standards: both apply to vendors of products and services, including online services, not to researchers or to organisations only consuming patches.
  • Regulation points at the practice, not always the number: the CRA requires coordinated vulnerability disclosure policies without naming ISO; NIST SP 800-216 and ETSI EN 303 645 reference 29147 (and 800-216 also 30111) directly.
  • Machine credentials are part of the scope: many reports concern leaked API keys, hard-coded secrets and token flaws, and the handling process must include credential revocation, not just code fixes.

What it is and who it applies to

ItemISO/IEC 29147ISO/IEC 30111
Full titleInformation technology, Security techniques, Vulnerability disclosureInformation technology, Security techniques, Vulnerability handling processes
Current editionEdition 2, published 23 October 2018Edition 2, published October 2019
Status on iso.org (27 Oct 2026)Published; stage 90.92, to be revised; ISO/IEC AWI 29147 under development to replace itPublished; stage 90.92, to be revised; ISO/IEC WD 30111.2 under development to replace it
CommitteeISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27
Scope (ISO abstract)Requirements and recommendations for vendors on disclosing vulnerabilities in products and services: receiving reports and disclosing remediation informationRequirements and recommendations for how to process and remediate reported potential vulnerabilities in a product or service
Also containsTerms and definitions, concepts, techniques and policy considerations; example policies (Annex A) and example communications (Annex B)Applies to vendors involved in handling vulnerabilities
Who uses itVendors who choose to practise vulnerability disclosure; buyers and regulators who reference itVendor PSIRTs, product engineering and service operations teams

The ISO abstract for 29147 says the activities between receiving a report and disclosing it are described in 30111. NIST SP 800-216 describes the split the same way: 29147 "provides guidance for coordinating the reporting of vulnerabilities and the creation of advisories", and 30111 "addresses the process of handling a reported vulnerability". For the wider programme design, including bug bounties and safe harbour wording, see the Bug Bounty and Vulnerability Disclosure Guide.

Structure and key requirements

The disclosure side (29147)

  • A published policy: how to report, what is in scope, what reporters can expect and how you will communicate. 29147 gives example policies in Annex A. ETSI EN 303 645 provision 5.2-1 turns this into a requirement for consumer IoT manufacturers: publish a vulnerability disclosure policy with contact information and timelines for acknowledgement and status updates until resolution.
  • A way to receive reports: a stable, monitored channel, with secure transport for sensitive details. RFC 9116 security.txt is the common way to publish it: a file at /.well-known/security.txt with a required Contact field and exactly one Expires field, plus optional Policy, Encryption, Acknowledgments, Canonical, Preferred-Languages and Hiring.
  • Communication with reporters: acknowledgement, status updates and agreement on publication timing. 29147 Annex B gives example communications.
  • Coordination: working with other vendors and coordinators when a vulnerability affects shared components.
  • Advisories: publishing remediation information that lets users act.

The handling side (30111)

30111 covers processing and remediation. NIST SP 800-216, which was written to align with both standards, describes a handling sequence that matches what most PSIRTs run:

PhaseWhat happensTypical evidence
ReceiptConfirm receipt to the reporterTicket with timestamp, acknowledgement message
Triage and prioritisationRate using a documented scoring method such as CVSS, adjusted for environment; for shared components use the highest severitySeverity record with scoring vector and rationale
Identify affected products and componentsFind every affected product, version and service; route third-party and open source components to their maintainersAffected versions list, SBOM query results
VerifyReproduce and perform root cause analysisReproduction notes, CWE assignment
RemediateInterim mitigations first where needed, then patch, upgrade or configuration changeFix commit, test results, release record
Advisory decision and releaseDecide whether and when to publish; balance risk with disruption to usersAdvisory, CVE record, release notes
Post-releaseMonitor, update remediation as needed, feed lessons into the development lifecycleAdvisory revisions, root cause actions

SP 800-216 does not set fixed timelines: it says policies should specify expected response and remediation timelines and a target schedule for remediation development. Set your own and publish the reporter-facing ones. See the PSIRT Guide for operating models and the FIRST service areas.

What a good advisory contains

SP 800-216 lists the content an advisory should carry, and it lines up with what customers expect from a 29147 programme: product name and version information; a unique, consistent identifier (CVE is suggested); dates in ISO 8601 format; impact with a documented severity system (CVSS is suggested); remediation steps and interim mitigations; contact details; reporter acknowledgement if wanted; terms of use; and detail limited so the advisory does not enable exploitation. Publishing advisories in OASIS CSAF 2.0 (OASIS Standard, 18 November 2022) makes them machine-readable. See the CSAF Security Advisories Guide and the CVE, CWE and CPE Guide.

Where the standards meet regulation

InstrumentWhat it requires or saysReference to 29147 or 30111
EU Cyber Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847Recital 76: manufacturers should put in place coordinated vulnerability disclosure policies specifying a structured process through which vulnerabilities are reported; operative vulnerability handling and reporting duties in Annex I and Article 14Not named in the recitals; harmonised standards are the route to presumption of conformity
NIST SP 800-216 (May 2023)Federal vulnerability disclosure guidelines; roles of a Federal Coordination Body and Vulnerability Disclosure Program OfficesCongress directed alignment "to the maximum extent practicable" with industry best practice and 29147 and 30111; 800-216 augments rather than replaces them
ETSI EN 303 645 V3.1.3 (2024-09)Provision 5.2-1 (shall publish a disclosure policy), 5.2-2 (act on disclosed vulnerabilities in a timely manner), 5.2-3 (monitor, identify and rectify during the support period)States that CVD is standardised in ISO/IEC 29147

For the CRA's operative duties and the reporting deadlines, see the EU Cyber Resilience Act Vulnerability and Incident Reporting Guide and the EU Cyber Resilience Act Guide.

Identity and NHI requirements

A large share of real reports are about credentials rather than code: an API key in a public repository, a hard-coded secret in firmware, a signing key exposed in a build artefact, a token that never expires. A handling process modelled only on "write a patch" fails these reports. Build the following into your 30111 process:

  • Credential reports as a triage category: classify leaked secrets, hard-coded keys and token validation flaws separately, with a faster target, because exploitation needs no development work.
  • Revocation before remediation: for a leaked key or token, revoke and rotate first, then fix how it leaked. Record both in the ticket. See the OWASP NHI Top 10 NHI2 Secret Leakage Guide.
  • Customer-side credentials: if the flaw exposed customers' API keys or tokens, the advisory must tell customers to rotate them, and say which ones.
  • Hard-coded keys are design flaws: identical keys across all installations need a product change and a migration path, not a key swap.
  • Protect the PSIRT itself: the reporting mailbox, bug tracker and advisory publishing pipeline hold unreleased vulnerability details. Restrict access, require phishing-resistant MFA and keep publishing credentials in a vault.

The Gladinet hard-coded keys case shows why: an AES key and IV shared by every CentreStack and Triofox installation (CVE-2025-14611) let attackers forge access tickets on any server, and an earlier hard-coded ASP.NET machineKey (CVE-2025-30406) did the same for ViewState. Patching did not invalidate machine keys attackers had already read, so customers also had to rotate them. An advisory for this kind of flaw has to say so plainly, and the handling process has to treat key rotation guidance as part of the remediation, not an afterthought.

Implementation steps

  1. Assign ownership. Name a PSIRT owner and a deputy, and agree which product, engineering and legal roles take part. Small vendors can run this part-time; the roles still need names.
  2. Publish the policy and channel. Write a disclosure policy using the 29147 Annex A examples as a starting point: scope, how to report, what you commit to, safe harbour language, recognition. Publish security.txt on every customer-facing domain and set a calendar reminder before Expires.
  3. Write the handling procedure. Document the phases above with internal timelines per severity, escalation paths and who approves advisories. Add the credential-specific steps.
  4. Connect to engineering. Link PSIRT tickets to the engineering tracker and release process, and agree how fixes for supported versions are back-ported.
  5. Prepare advisories. Create an advisory template with the SP 800-216 fields, decide whether to become a CVE Numbering Authority, and set up CSAF publishing.
  6. Handle supply chain cases. Use SBOMs to find affected products when a third-party component is reported, and agree with suppliers how you will be notified. See the SBOM Guide.
  7. Test the process. Run a tabletop with a mock report, including a leaked credential scenario, and measure each phase against your timelines.
  8. Review and improve. Review closed cases quarterly, feed root causes into secure development, and update the policy when the new editions of 29147 and 30111 are published.

Evidence and assessment

ISO/IEC 29147 and 30111 are not certification standards; conformance is usually shown in customer audits, ISO/IEC 27001 audits, regulatory assessments or third-party attestations. An assessor will typically ask for:

  • Policy evidence: the published disclosure policy, security.txt, and the internal handling procedure with version history.
  • Case records: a sample of reports from receipt to closure with timestamps, severity, affected versions, communications and advisories.
  • Timeliness: acknowledgement and remediation times against your stated targets.
  • Coordination records: cases involving third-party components or other vendors.
  • Advisory archive: published advisories with CVE identifiers and revisions.
  • Improvement evidence: root cause actions fed back to development.

Metrics

  • Median time to acknowledge a report, against the published commitment.
  • Median time from receipt to remediation release, by severity.
  • Percentage of reports closed with a documented root cause.
  • Percentage of advisories published with a CVE and in CSAF format.
  • Time from a leaked credential report to revocation.
  • Number of reports arriving through unofficial channels (a sign the policy is hard to find).

Mapping to other frameworks

FrameworkRelated requirement
NIST CSF 2.0ID.RA-08 Processes for receiving, analyzing, and responding to vulnerability disclosures are established; ID.RA-01 vulnerabilities identified, validated and recorded
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5RA-5(11) Public Disclosure Program; SI-2 Flaw Remediation; SI-5 Security Alerts, Advisories, and Directives; SR-8 Notification Agreements
NIST SSDF (SP 800-218)RV practice group: respond to vulnerabilities, including a vulnerability disclosure and remediation policy. See the NIST Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF, SP 800-218) Guide.
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex AA.8.8 Management of technical vulnerabilities
ETSI EN 303 645Provisions 5.2-1 to 5.2-3
EU CRACoordinated vulnerability disclosure policy and vulnerability handling requirements for manufacturers

Common pitfalls

  • Policy without process: a published disclosure page, but no internal procedure, owner or timelines. Reports sit in a shared mailbox.
  • Treating 29147 as the whole job: receiving and publishing work, but nothing defines how engineering verifies, fixes and back-ports, which is the 30111 half.
  • Expired or missing security.txt: the Expires date passes, or the file exists on the main site but not on product and API domains, which RFC 9116 treats as separate hosts.
  • Advisories that do not help users: no affected versions, no CVE, no mitigations, or so much detail that they serve as an exploit guide.
  • Credentials treated as code bugs: the fix ships but the leaked key is never revoked, or customers are never told to rotate theirs.
  • Citing a superseded edition in contracts: both standards are being revised; fixed edition references create avoidable non-conformities when the new editions arrive.

Practitioner checklist

  • Confirm the current editions on iso.org and reference "the current edition" in contracts and policies.
  • Publish a disclosure policy with scope, contact, acknowledgement and update timelines, and safe harbour terms.
  • Publish RFC 9116 security.txt on every customer-facing domain, with monitoring of the Expires date.
  • Document the handling process from receipt to post-release, with internal timelines per severity.
  • Add a credential report category with revoke-first steps and customer rotation guidance.
  • Use an advisory template with CVE, affected versions, severity, mitigations and dates, and publish in CSAF.
  • Keep case records that show timestamps for each phase, ready for audit sampling.
  • Run an annual tabletop and review closed cases for root cause trends.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Bug Bounty and Vulnerability Disclosure Guide · PSIRT Guide · CSAF Security Advisories Guide · EU Cyber Resilience Act Vulnerability and Incident Reporting Guide

PDF for subscribers

Take this guide with you

Every section, table and checklist in one PDF, with links to the sources and related guides. Subscribe to our weekly NHI & AI Identity Journal and we’ll email you a download link.

Free weekly newsletter

Subscribe to the NHI & AI Identity Journal

The latest on NHI and Agentic AI security – articles, research, breaches, news and events every week.

Bonus 33% off our NHI Course when you subscribe.

NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 27 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

PDF Downloads for Newsletter Subscribers

Get the guide

Enter your details and we’ll email you a download link.

The full guide is free to read online. The PDF is a thank you for subscribing.

Fill in all fields marked * and tick the PDF box to continue.