This cheat sheet template gives incident responders one place to record, per remote execution method, which evidence to look for on the source host and on the destination host, built on the Windows Security events Microsoft documents and extended by your own lab testing. It covers PsExec, WMI, WinRM, RDP, SMB file share access and remotely created scheduled tasks. Each method has a fill-in table so your team can confirm every row against its own estate before relying on it in an investigation.
The template is deliberately evidence first. It does not explain how to perform lateral movement. For the techniques, hardening and detection strategy behind it, see the Lateral Movement Guide. This page is the working sheet you print, copy into your case notes or load into your runbook.
Key takeaways
- Lateral movement leaves evidence on two hosts. Event 4624 is written on the destination, the computer that was accessed, so a source host review alone will miss it.
- The logon type in 4624 is the fastest way to separate methods: 3 for network, 5 for service, 10 for RemoteInteractive (Remote Desktop), and 9 for NewCredentials.
- Event 4648 records a process logging on with explicitly supplied credentials, including the Target Server Name and the Process Name, which makes it a key source host artefact.
- Event 4697 records service installation with the Service File Name and Service Account. Event 4698 records scheduled task creation with the full task XML.
- Event 5145 records network share object access with Share Name, Relative Target Name, Accesses and Source Address, if Audit Detailed File Share is enabled.
- Every row in this template should carry a "validated in lab" date. Evidence that depends on audit policy you have not enabled does not exist on your hosts.
How to use this template
- Copy the tables into your incident response runbook, wiki or case template. Keep the column headings so different responders record evidence the same way.
- Check audit policy first. For each event, the "Audit subcategory" row names the subcategory Microsoft documents. Confirm it is enabled on workstations, servers and domain controllers. Where it is not, mark the row "not collected" rather than deleting it, so the gap stays visible.
- Validate in a lab. Run each method between two test hosts with your normal administrative tooling, then record the events, log names and fields you actually observe. Fill the "Lab observed" column and the date. Repeat after major Windows or tooling upgrades.
- Use it in triage. When you suspect movement from host A to host B, work the method table for both hosts. Record the Logon ID and Logon GUID from each event so you can pivot across events on the same host.
- Record absence as well as presence. "Searched, none found" with the time range and query is evidence too, especially when logs may have been cleared.
- Review quarterly. Update rows when you change audit policy, deploy new remote administration tools or retire old ones.
Queries and field lists on this page are illustrative. Field names come from Microsoft's event documentation; check them against your SIEM's parsed schema, which may rename them.
Core events reference
The five Security log events below anchor every method sheet. The field names are the ones Microsoft lists on each event's documentation page.
4624: An account was successfully logged on
| Item | Detail | Your notes |
|---|---|---|
| Where generated | Destination machine, where the logon session was created | |
| Key fields | Logon Type, Restricted Admin Mode, Elevated Token, New Logon Security ID and Account Name, Logon ID, Linked Logon ID, Logon GUID, Workstation Name, Source Network Address, Source Port, Logon Process, Authentication Package, Package Name (NTLM only) | |
| Logon types most relevant here | 2 Interactive, 3 Network, 4 Batch, 5 Service, 9 NewCredentials, 10 RemoteInteractive | |
| Notes | Restricted Admin Mode is populated only for type 10 logons. Network Account Name and Domain are populated only for NewCredentials. Source Port is 0 for interactive logons. |
4648: A logon was attempted using explicit credentials
| Item | Detail | Your notes |
|---|---|---|
| Audit subcategory | Audit Logon | |
| What it records | A process attempting an account logon by explicitly specifying that account's credentials. Microsoft notes this commonly occurs with scheduled tasks or RUNAS and periodically during normal operating system activity. | |
| Key fields | Subject Security ID and Account Name, Account Whose Credentials Were Used, Target Server Name, Process ID, Process Name, Network Address, Port | |
| Pivot | Process ID can be matched to 4688 New Process ID. Logon GUID correlates with 4624 and 4769. |
4697: A service was installed in the system
| Item | Detail | Your notes |
|---|---|---|
| Audit subcategory | Audit Security System Extension | |
| Key fields | Subject Security ID, Account Name, Logon ID, Service Name, Service File Name, Service Type, Service Start Type, Service Account | |
| Notes | Service File Name is the path at creation time, including logged parameters; later changes are not logged. Service Account is populated only for Win32 own or share process services. | |
| Microsoft's alert ideas | Service File Name outside %windir%, Program Files or Program Files (x86); Service Type 0x1, 0x2 or 0x8; Start Type 0, 1 or 4; Service Account other than localSystem, localService or networkService |
4698: A scheduled task was created
| Item | Detail | Your notes |
|---|---|---|
| Audit subcategory | Audit Other Object Access Events | |
| Key fields | Subject Security ID, Account Name, Logon ID, Task Name, Task Content (the task XML). Windows 10 1903 and later add fields including ClientProcessId, ParentProcessId, RpcCallClientLocality and FQDN. | |
| Microsoft's alert ideas | Tasks created in the root node (\TASK_NAME); Task Content containing <LogonType>Password</LogonType>, because the password is then stored in Credential Manager |
5145: A network share object was checked
| Item | Detail | Your notes |
|---|---|---|
| Audit subcategory | Audit Detailed File Share | |
| What it records | Every access to a network share object (file or folder). Failures are logged only when access is denied at the share level, not at the NTFS level. | |
| Key fields | Subject fields, Share Name (\\*\SHARE_NAME), Share Path, Relative Target Name, Accesses, Access Mask, Access Check Results, Source Address, Source Port | |
| Microsoft's alert ideas | Source Address outside internal ranges; access outside an account's allowed share list; write and permission changing rights such as WriteData, DELETE, WRITE_DAC and WRITE_OWNER |
Method sheet: PsExec
Microsoft's PsExec documentation (v2.44 at the time of writing) describes a -r option that "specifies the name of the remote service to create or interact with", a -c option that copies a specified executable to the remote system, -s to run the remote process in the System account and -u to supply a user name. It states that if no user name is given, the remote process runs in the caller's context but without network resource access, and that the password and command are encrypted in transit.
| Host | Evidence to check | Why | Lab observed (log, event, fields) | Validated on |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Source | 4648 with Target Server Name of the destination and the PsExec Process Name, when -u is used | Explicit credentials supplied by a process | ||
| Source | Process creation (4688 or EDR) for the PsExec binary and its command line | Shows the target, account and options used | ||
| Destination | 4624 Logon Type 3 from the source's Workstation Name and Source Network Address | Network logon for the connection | ||
| Destination | 4697 for the remote service, recording Service Name (default or the -r value) and Service File Name | The tool creates or interacts with a remote service | ||
| Destination | 4624 Logon Type 5 and process creation under the service | Service Control Manager started a service | ||
| Destination | 5145 for any copied executable when -c is used, recording Share Name and Relative Target Name | File copied to the remote system |
ATT&CK maps this pattern to T1569.002 Service Execution and T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares. Record in the notes column which service name your administrators use, so an unexpected name stands out.
Method sheet: WMI
Remote WMI execution is tracked in ATT&CK as T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation. Its WMI Activity operational log and provider host behaviour are not covered by the event pages this template is built on, so the destination specific rows below are fields for your lab to complete rather than claims.
| Host | Evidence to check | Why | Lab observed (log, event, fields) | Validated on |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Source | Process creation for the WMI client tool and command line | Shows the target and the command issued | ||
| Source | 4648 if alternate credentials were supplied | Explicit credentials, with Target Server Name | ||
| Destination | 4624 logon from the source, recording Logon Type and Authentication Package | Session created on the accessed host | ||
| Destination | Process creation for the spawned process and its parent | Identify the WMI provider host as parent in your lab | ||
| Destination | WMI operational log entries (record log name and event IDs from your lab) | Method specific trace | ||
| Destination | WMI persistence objects, if any were created | Separates one-off execution from persistence |
Method sheet: WinRM and PowerShell remoting
ATT&CK tracks this as T1021.006 Windows Remote Management. As with WMI, record the WinRM and PowerShell operational log events from your own lab testing.
| Host | Evidence to check | Why | Lab observed (log, event, fields) | Validated on |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Source | Process creation for the PowerShell or WinRM client and command line | Target name and script or command | ||
| Source | 4648 if alternate credentials were supplied | Explicit credentials, with Target Server Name | ||
| Source | WinRM client operational log (record event IDs from your lab) | Outbound session record | ||
| Destination | 4624 logon from the source, recording Logon Type, Logon Process and Authentication Package | Session created on the accessed host | ||
| Destination | Process creation for the remoting host process and its children | What ran in the session | ||
| Destination | PowerShell script block or module logging, if enabled | Content of commands run |
Method sheet: RDP
Microsoft defines Logon Type 10, RemoteInteractive, as a user logging on remotely using Terminal Services or Remote Desktop. ATT&CK tracks the method as T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol.
| Host | Evidence to check | Why | Lab observed (log, event, fields) | Validated on |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Source | Process creation for the RDP client and its command line | Shows which host was targeted | ||
| Source | 4648 where credentials were entered for the target | Explicit credentials, with Target Server Name | ||
| Destination | 4624 Logon Type 10 with Source Network Address and Workstation Name | Remote interactive session | ||
| Destination | Restricted Admin Mode field on the type 10 event | "Yes" means credentials were passed using Restricted Admin mode | ||
| Destination | Elevated Token field | "Yes" means the session has administrator privileges | ||
| Destination | Remote Desktop Services operational logs (record log names and event IDs from your lab) | Session connect, reconnect and disconnect |
Logon Type 7 (Unlock) and Logon Type 12 (CachedRemoteInteractive, which Microsoft describes as the same as RemoteInteractive, used for internal auditing) can appear around RDP activity. Record in your lab notes when they appear on your builds.
Method sheet: SMB file share access
SMB share access is the carrier for many other methods, and also a method in its own right for staging tools and collecting data. ATT&CK tracks the administrative share variant as T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares.
| Host | Evidence to check | Why | Lab observed (log, event, fields) | Validated on |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Source | Process creation for net use, copy or file manager activity with UNC paths | Shows the share and files involved | ||
| Source | Shortcut files and jump lists with network share paths | Shell record of share access, see the jump lists guide | ||
| Destination | 4624 Logon Type 3 with Authentication Package and Package Name | Network logon; NTLM version can matter | ||
| Destination | 5145 with Share Name, Relative Target Name, Accesses and Source Address | Which files were reached and with which rights | ||
| Destination | File system metadata for files written via the share | Creation times of dropped files |
For the source host shell evidence, see the Jump Lists and LNK Files Forensics Guide.
Method sheet: remotely created scheduled tasks
ATT&CK tracks this as T1053.005 Scheduled Task. Microsoft's 4698 page notes that malware often uses scheduled tasks to persist across reboots and that manually created or malicious tasks often land in the root node.
| Host | Evidence to check | Why | Lab observed (log, event, fields) | Validated on |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Source | Process creation for the task scheduling tool with a remote target argument | Shows the destination and task definition | ||
| Source | 4648 if alternate credentials were supplied | Explicit credentials, with Target Server Name | ||
| Destination | 4624 Logon Type 3 from the source | Network logon to register the task | ||
| Destination | 4698 with Task Name and Task Content, noting Command, UserId and LogonType elements | Exact definition of what will run and as whom | ||
| Destination | On Windows 10 1903 and later, the RpcCallClientLocality and FQDN fields in 4698 | Helps separate local and remote creation | ||
| Destination | 4624 Logon Type 4 (Batch) when the task runs, and process creation | Execution of the task |
Pivot record for each suspected hop
Use one row per suspected hop. It keeps the two halves of the evidence together.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Hop ID and case reference | |
| Source host and IP | |
| Destination host and IP | |
| Method (from the sheets above) | |
| Account (New Logon on destination, Account Whose Credentials Were Used on source) | |
| Destination 4624 time, Logon Type, Logon ID, Logon GUID | |
| Source 4648 time, Process Name, Target Server Name | |
| Method specific events (4697, 4698, 5145) and key values | |
| Processes started in the session | |
| Gaps (logs missing, audit policy off, time range not covered) | |
| Confidence and analyst |
Where identity fits
Every hop uses an identity, and in many incidents that identity is a service account, an automation account or a shared administrative account rather than a named person. The 4624 Virtual Account field flags virtual accounts such as managed service accounts. Microsoft's 4648 guidance recommends monitoring high value accounts including service accounts, use of disabled or guest accounts, and use of an account from a network address it should never use. Those recommendations translate directly into non-human identity baselines: record which hosts each service account should log on to, with which logon type, and treat any deviation found while working this template as a credential compromise lead.
When a hop is confirmed, the account involved needs rotation, scope review and a check of every other host it touched. The Lateral Movement Guide covers tiering and credential hygiene that reduce the routes available.
Common failure patterns
- Looking only at the source. 4624 is written on the destination. Without destination logs, most hops are invisible.
- Audit policy assumed, not checked. 4697, 4698 and 5145 depend on specific audit subcategories. If they are off, absence of events proves nothing.
- Treating 4648 as malicious by default. Microsoft notes it occurs periodically during normal operating system activity. Baseline Process Name and Target Server Name first.
- Ignoring Task Content. The XML in 4698 is the most useful part of the event, showing the command and the account.
- Unvalidated rows. Copying a cheat sheet without lab testing on your builds produces confident but wrong triage.
- Losing the Logon ID. Without it you cannot tie processes and object access to the session that created them.
Practitioner checklist
- Confirm Audit Logon, Audit Security System Extension, Audit Other Object Access Events and Audit Detailed File Share settings on each host class.
- Forward Security logs from servers and workstations, not only domain controllers.
- Run each method in a lab and fill the "Lab observed" and "Validated on" columns.
- Record your administrators' normal PsExec service names, task paths and RDP sources as baselines.
- Alert on 4697 and 4698 values that match Microsoft's monitoring recommendations.
- Baseline 4648 Process Name and Target Server Name per account.
- Keep a pivot record per hop and record gaps explicitly.
- Review and revalidate the template each quarter and after major upgrades.
Standards and references
- Microsoft: 4624(S) An account was successfully logged on
- Microsoft: 4648(S) A logon was attempted using explicit credentials
- Microsoft: 4697(S) A service was installed in the system
- Microsoft: 4698(S) A scheduled task was created
- Microsoft: 5145(S, F) A network share object was checked
- Microsoft Sysinternals: PsExec
- MITRE ATT&CK: T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- NIST: SP 800-61 Rev. 3, Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations for Cybersecurity Risk Management
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Lateral Movement Guide · Windows Forensic Artefacts Guide · Forensic Timeline Analysis Guide · Digital Forensics (DFIR) Guide