Crypto-asset service providers (CASPs) in the EU now answer to two regulations at once: the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA) for authorisation, custody and conduct, and the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) for ICT risk, incidents, testing and suppliers. MiCA links the two directly, requiring CASPs to run "resilient and secure ICT systems as required by Regulation (EU) 2022/2554", and it makes a custodian liable to clients for crypto-assets lost through incidents attributable to it. For a CASP, that turns private key management and the identities that can sign transactions into regulated controls. This guide explains who is covered, the obligations that matter to security teams, the timeline and current status, penalties, what it means for machine identities and AI agents, and a practical compliance plan. It is for CISOs, compliance leads and security architects at exchanges, custodians, brokers and wallet providers operating in the EU. It complements the DORA Guide, which covers DORA in depth.
Status checked 27 October 2026: MiCA has applied in full since 30 December 2024 and DORA since 17 January 2025. The MiCA transitional period for providers operating under national law before 30 December 2024 could run to 1 July 2026 at the latest, and Member States could shorten it. Check your national competent authority for any decisions that affect you.
Key takeaways
- CASPs are DORA financial entities. DORA Article 2(1)(f) lists crypto-asset service providers authorised under MiCA, together with issuers of asset-referenced tokens, so the full DORA framework applies, scaled by proportionality.
- MiCA points to DORA for ICT. Article 68(7) and (8) require ICT systems, business continuity and data safeguards "as required by" DORA, so one ICT programme must satisfy both.
- Custody means keys. MiCA defines custody to include holding or controlling the means of access to crypto-assets, which can include private cryptographic keys, and requires a custody policy against fraud, cyber threats and negligence.
- Losses are the CASP's problem. Article 75(8) makes the custodian liable for losses from incidents attributable to it, capped at market value at the time of loss.
- The grace period is over. Article 143(3) let existing providers continue until 1 July 2026 at the latest; firms serving EU clients should now be authorised or operating under Article 60.
Scope: who and what is covered
MiCA Article 3(1)(15) defines a crypto-asset service provider as a legal person or other undertaking that provides crypto-asset services and is allowed to do so in accordance with Article 59 (paraphrased). Recital 74 says crypto-asset services should only be provided by legal persons with a registered office in a Member State.
| MiCA crypto-asset service (Article 3(1)(16)) | Security relevance |
|---|---|
| (a) Custody and administration on behalf of clients | Highest: control of keys or other means of access |
| (b) Operation of a trading platform | Matching engine, hot wallets, market integrity |
| (c), (d) Exchange for funds or for other crypto-assets | Treasury wallets and payment rails |
| (e) Execution of orders; (g) reception and transmission of orders | Order integrity, API keys of clients and venues |
| (f) Placing of crypto-assets | Issuer data and client onboarding |
| (h) Advice; (i) portfolio management | Client data, delegated trading authority |
| (j) Transfer services on behalf of clients | Signing of outbound transactions |
- Authorisation: Article 59(1) prohibits providing crypto-asset services in the Union unless the person is a CASP authorised under Article 63 or an entity allowed to provide them under Article 60.
- Article 60 entities: credit institutions, central securities depositories, investment firms, market operators, electronic money institutions, UCITS management companies and alternative investment fund managers can provide crypto-asset services under Article 60 without a separate Article 63 authorisation. These firms are usually already DORA financial entities.
- Passporting: under Article 59(7), authorised CASPs may provide services throughout the Union, through a branch or under the freedom to provide services.
- DORA: Article 2(1)(f) brings MiCA-authorised CASPs and issuers of asset-referenced tokens into DORA's scope. Article 4(1) requires DORA's ICT risk management rules to be applied in line with proportionality, taking into account size, overall risk profile and the nature, scale and complexity of services.
Key obligations
MiCA obligations with a security dimension
| Article | Obligation (summarised) | What security teams own |
|---|---|---|
| 62(2)(i), (j), (m) | Authorisation file must describe internal control, risk management and the business continuity plan; include technical documentation of ICT systems and security arrangements with a non-technical description; and, for custody, describe the custody and administration policy | Architecture documentation, control descriptions, custody policy |
| 68(7) | Ensure continuity and regularity of services using resilient and secure ICT systems as required by DORA; business continuity policy including ICT business continuity plans and ICT response and recovery plans under DORA Articles 11 and 12 | Resilience engineering, disaster recovery, testing |
| 68(8) | Systems and procedures to safeguard the availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of data pursuant to DORA, alongside AML/CFT mechanisms | Data protection, logging, access control |
| 68(9) | Records of all services, activities, orders and transactions, kept for five years and up to seven where the competent authority asks | Tamper-evident logging and retention |
| 70(1) | Adequate arrangements to safeguard clients' ownership rights in crypto-assets and means of access, especially on insolvency, and prevent their use for the CASP's own account | Wallet segregation, key control |
| 75(1), (2), (3) | Client agreement covering custody policy, communication, authentication and security systems; register of positions per client; custody policy to minimise risk of loss through fraud, cyber threats or negligence | Key management design, client authentication |
| 75(7) | Segregate client holdings from own holdings, legally and on the distributed ledger | Wallet and address structure |
| 75(8) | Liability to clients for loss of crypto-assets or means of access from an incident attributable to the CASP, capped at market value at the time of loss; problems inherent in the distributed ledger are not attributable | Incident prevention, evidence of attribution |
DORA obligations that apply to CASPs
The EIOPA DORA page lists the regulation's areas: ICT risk management, ICT third-party risk management, digital operational resilience testing, ICT-related incidents including reporting of major incidents, information sharing on cyber threats, and oversight of critical ICT third-party providers. Level 2 standards cover the ICT risk management framework, incident classification and reporting, threat-led penetration testing, third-party policy and the register of information. The DORA Guide walks through each pillar, including the identity and access requirements in the ICT risk management standard.
For a CASP, the practical overlap is clear: a hot wallet signing service is an ICT system supporting a critical function, its key custody provider or MPC vendor is an ICT third-party service provider for the register of information, and a key compromise is both a DORA ICT-related incident and a MiCA custody loss.
Timeline and current status
| Date | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| June 2023 | MiCA enters into force | ESMA; Article 149(1) |
| 29 June 2023 | Certain listed MiCA provisions apply early | Article 149(4) |
| 30 June 2024 | MiCA Titles III and IV (asset-referenced and e-money tokens) apply; deadline for Member States to notify use of the transitional regime | Articles 149(3) and 143(3) |
| 30 December 2024 | MiCA applies in full, including CASP rules | Article 149(2) |
| 17 January 2025 | DORA enters into application | EIOPA |
| 1 July 2026 | Latest end of the transitional period for providers operating under national law before 30 December 2024 (earlier where a Member State shortened it) | Article 143(3); ESMA |
Under Article 143(6), Member States could apply a simplified authorisation procedure for firms already authorised under national law on 30 December 2024. Because transitional choices were national, the date that mattered for your firm depends on the Member State. Level 2 and Level 3 measures under both regulations continue to be published and updated; check ESMA, EBA and your national authority for the current set.
Enforcement and penalties
- MiCA fines for CASPs: Article 111(3) requires Member States to give competent authorities power to impose, on legal persons infringing Articles 59, 60, 64 and 65 to 83, maximum administrative fines of at least EUR 5,000,000 or at least 5% of total annual turnover. Under Article 111(2)(c), the maximum must also be at least twice the profits gained or losses avoided, where these can be determined. These are minimum maximums: national law may set higher ones.
- Market abuse: Article 111(5) sets higher minimums for infringements of the market abuse provisions in Articles 89 to 92, at least EUR 15,000,000 or 15% of total annual turnover for legal persons.
- Civil liability: separate from fines, Article 75(8) exposes a custodian to client claims for crypto-assets lost through incidents attributable to it.
- DORA: DORA has its own supervisory and penalty framework, separate from MiCA, so a single ICT failure can be examined under both regulations. See the DORA Guide for how DORA is supervised and enforced.
What it means for AI agents and non-human identities
A CASP's critical functions run on machine identities: signing services, MPC nodes, HSM client credentials, exchange API keys, hot wallet automation and CI/CD pipelines that deploy wallet software. MiCA's custody definition explicitly covers the "means of access", which can include private keys, so whoever or whatever can trigger a signature is inside the custody perimeter.
- Signing identities: the service account that calls an HSM or coordinates MPC can sign as surely as the key itself. Inventory these identities, restrict them to specific transaction policies, and log every use. See the Crypto Exchange Identity and Key Security Guide.
- Supply chain: in the Bybit hack of 2025, keys and multisig were intact, but hijacked developer AWS session tokens let attackers alter the wallet interface that signers trusted. Under DORA this is an ICT third-party risk; under MiCA it is a custody loss.
- Single key risk: the BitMart hot wallet hack of 2021 shows a single stolen private key draining hot wallets. Custody policies under Article 75(3) should explain how no single key or person can move client assets.
- AI agents: agents that trade, rebalance or execute transfers for clients act under the CASP's authorisation. Give each agent its own identity with transaction limits and allow-listed destinations, keep humans in the approval path for transfers above thresholds, and record agent actions to meet the Article 68(9) record-keeping duty. See the AI Agents with Crypto Wallets Security Guide.
- Client API keys: client-issued trading keys are part of the client authentication and security systems that Article 75(1) agreements must describe; scope them by IP, permission and withdrawal rights.
Compliance steps
- Confirm your status: record whether you are an Article 63 CASP, an Article 60 entity, or still awaiting a decision, and which Member State supervises you.
- Map services to systems: list each MiCA service you provide (Article 3(1)(16)) and the ICT systems, wallets and identities that support it; mark critical or important functions for DORA.
- Write one ICT risk framework: build the DORA framework once and reference it from the MiCA authorisation documentation required by Article 62(2)(j), rather than maintaining two.
- Document the custody policy: cover key generation, storage (HSM, MPC or multisig), quorum rules, signer verification, segregation of client and own wallets, recovery and key ceremonies. The Cryptographic Key Ceremony Template helps.
- Register third parties: include custody technology vendors, MPC providers, node and RPC providers, cloud and wallet software suppliers in the DORA register of information.
- Prepare incident handling: classify a key compromise or unauthorised transfer under DORA's major incident criteria and link it to client notification and the Article 75(8) liability assessment.
- Test: include signing infrastructure in resilience testing and, where required, threat-led penetration testing. Run recovery exercises for loss of a key share or signer.
- Evidence and records: keep tamper-evident logs of signing requests, approvals and agent actions for at least five years.
Decision guidance
- Smaller CASPs: DORA's proportionality principle (Article 4(1)) lets you scale the framework, but custody obligations and liability do not shrink. Consider a qualified custody provider, then manage it as a critical ICT third party.
- Large exchanges and banks offering crypto: integrate wallet infrastructure into the existing DORA programme, including testing and register of information, and align key management with enterprise HSM governance.
- Standards to borrow: the CryptoCurrency Security Standard Guide describes industry key management practice that maps well onto a MiCA custody policy.
Detection and measurement
- Signing coverage: percentage of client asset value held in wallets requiring multi-party approval.
- Identity hygiene: number of signing-capable machine identities, with owner, scope and last review date (target: 100% owned and reviewed quarterly).
- Policy blocks: number of outbound transfers blocked by transaction policy (destination, amount, contract call) per month, reviewed for false positives.
- Recovery time: measured time to restore signing after loss of a key share or signing node in tests.
- Register completeness: share of wallet and custody suppliers recorded in the DORA register of information.
Framework mapping
| Requirement | MiCA / DORA | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | NIST CSF 2.0 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Key management for custody | MiCA Art 70, 75(3) | SC-12, SC-13 | PR.DS-01 |
| Access control for signing identities | MiCA Art 68(8); DORA ICT risk framework | AC-2, AC-6, IA-5 | PR.AA-05 |
| Continuity and recovery | MiCA Art 68(7); DORA Arts 11, 12 | CP-2, CP-10 | RC.RP-01 |
| Records and logging | MiCA Art 68(9) | AU-2, AU-11 | DE.CM-09 |
| Supplier risk | DORA third-party pillar | SR-3, SA-9 | GV.SC-07 |
Practitioner checklist
- Confirm authorisation route (Article 63 or 60) and supervising authority, and record the date checked.
- Map every MiCA service to supporting ICT systems, wallets and identities.
- Maintain one DORA ICT risk framework referenced by the MiCA authorisation file.
- Publish a custody policy covering keys, quorum, segregation and recovery, with a client summary.
- Inventory signing-capable service accounts, HSM credentials, MPC nodes and agent identities.
- Add custody, MPC, node and wallet software providers to the register of information.
- Treat a key compromise as both a DORA incident and a MiCA custody loss in the playbook.
- Keep signing and approval records for at least five years.
Standards and references
- EUR-Lex: Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 on Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA)
- EUR-Lex: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 on Digital Operational Resilience (DORA)
- ESMA Interactive Single Rulebook: MiCA Article 75, Custody and Administration
- ESMA Interactive Single Rulebook: MiCA Article 68, Governance Arrangements
- ESMA Interactive Single Rulebook: MiCA Article 143, Transitional Measures
- ESMA Interactive Single Rulebook: MiCA Article 111, Administrative Penalties
- ESMA: Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA)
- EIOPA: Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA)
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: DORA Guide · Crypto Exchange Identity and Key Security Guide · Crypto Travel Rule Compliance Guide. This guide summarises the MiCA and DORA obligations for crypto-asset service providers as of 27 October 2026 and is not legal advice.