Join our Newsletter — 33% off our NHI Course
Home› Guides› ATT&CK Espionage Backdoors and Implants (M to Z)…
Guide Attack Techniques & Malware

ATT&CK Espionage Backdoors and Implants (M to Z) Software Hub: Every Member, Behaviour and Defence

← All guides
By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 12 November 2026 16 min read
On this page

Espionage backdoors are built to stay quiet for months, and most of the names in this category will never appear in a headline, yet each one is a documented pattern a defender can hunt for. This hub covers the 187 MITRE ATT&CK v20 software entries in the espionage backdoors and implants category whose names run from M to Z, from Machete to ZxxZ. Names from A to L are in the companion ATT&CK Espionage Backdoors and Implants Software Hub. The behaviour counts on this page were computed from the ATT&CK v20 technique relationships for every member, not estimated. It is written for threat hunters, detection engineers and CTI analysts who need to turn a malware name in a report into telemetry and controls.

Key takeaways

  • Windows dominates. 187 entries, all typed as malware in ATT&CK; 180 list Windows as a platform, while Linux, macOS, containers and Android appear only a handful of times.
  • Download, discover, phone home. The three most shared techniques are T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer (105 members), T1082 System Information Discovery (95) and T1071.001 Web Protocols (91): most implants pull more tooling over HTTP or HTTPS after profiling the host.
  • Persistence is ordinary. Registry Run keys (54 members), scheduled tasks (32) and Windows services (31) carry most of the persistence, so autostart auditing still catches a large share of the long tail.
  • Attribution is concentrated. 161 entries have at least one associated group in ATT&CK v20; APT29, OilRig, NIMBUS MANTICORE and MuddyWater account for the most members, and 26 entries have no group recorded.
  • Behaviour beats names. Hash and name indicators age quickly; the shared behaviours below stay stable across families and are the better investment for detection.

What this category covers

NHI Mgmt Group groups the ATT&CK software catalogue into hubs. This category holds custom backdoors, implants and modular espionage platforms whose main purpose is long-term covert access and collection, typically operated by state-linked groups, plus a smaller number of criminal backdoors with similar behaviour such as More_eggs (used by FIN6 and Cobalt Group according to ATT&CK). General-purpose remote access trojans, post-exploitation frameworks and loaders sit in their own hubs: see the ATT&CK Remote Access Trojans Software Hub, the ATT&CK C2 and Post-Exploitation Frameworks Software Hub and the ATT&CK Loaders and Droppers Software Hub.

A few members show why the category matters beyond endpoint hygiene, using ATT&CK's own descriptions:

  • Supply chain implants: SUNSPOT injected the SUNBURST backdoor into the SolarWinds Orion software update framework, and ATT&CK records SUNSPOT as used by APT29 since at least February 2020. ShadowPad was first identified in a supply chain compromise of NetSarang software in 2017 and has since been used by several China-linked groups. See the Software Supply Chain Security Guide.
  • Identity infrastructure implants: Skeleton Key injects false credentials into domain controllers to create a backdoor password, and ATT&CK notes that Mimikatz carries similar functionality as a module.
  • Long-lived platforms: ATT&CK describes Regin as a malware platform with timestamps dating back to 2003, and Uroburos as an espionage tool used by FSB units associated with Turla that has had several variants.
  • Stealthy persistence: Tarrask, used by HAFNIUM according to ATT&CK, was designed to maintain persistence through concealed scheduled tasks.
  • Cloud-adjacent targets: Siloscape targets Kubernetes clusters through Windows containers and was first observed in March 2021.

Common behaviours across members

The table counts how many of the 187 members ATT&CK v20 links to each technique through a "uses" relationship. It shows where shared detection effort pays off most.

TechniqueMembersTactic focusDefensive angle
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer105Command and controlAlert on unusual processes writing executables after outbound web requests
T1082 System Information Discovery95DiscoveryBaseline which processes call host profiling commands and APIs
T1071.001 Web Protocols91Command and controlProxy logging, TLS inspection where lawful, beacon interval analysis
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell77ExecutionParent and child process analytics on cmd.exe
T1083 File and Directory Discovery71DiscoveryBulk directory enumeration by non-user processes
T1057 Process Discovery64DiscoveryProcess listing from unexpected binaries
T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information62StealthScript block logging; decoded payload written to disk
T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery62Discoveryipconfig, route and ARP queries from services
T1070.004 File Deletion61StealthSelf-deletion shortly after execution; forward logs off-host
T1033 System Owner/User Discovery61Discoverywhoami and similar from non-interactive sessions
T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder54PersistenceAutostart auditing with a known-good baseline
T1005 Data from Local System52CollectionAccess to document stores by unusual processes
T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography46Command and controlNon-standard encrypted payloads inside HTTP bodies
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel45ExfiltrationUpload volume per destination and per process
T1113 Screen Capture39CollectionScreen capture APIs called by background processes
T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location36StealthSystem binary names running from the wrong path
T1053.005 Scheduled Task32PersistenceEvent ID 4698 and task registry changes
T1543.003 Windows Service31PersistenceEvent ID 7045 new service creation
T1059.001 PowerShell31ExecutionScript block logging (Event ID 4104), Constrained Language Mode
T1574.001 DLL23Stealth and executionSigned binaries loading unsigned DLLs from writable folders
T1056.001 Keylogging23CollectionKeyboard hook APIs in non-input processes
T1071.004 DNS17Command and controlLong or high-entropy subdomains, high query volume to one domain

Tactic labels follow ATT&CK v20, where several defence evasion techniques now sit under the Stealth tactic. For the wider picture, see the ATT&CK Command and Control Tactic and the ATT&CK Discovery Tactic (TA0007) Guide.

Detection and hardening themes

Where to look first

SignalData sourceMembers it helps with
New Run key values, scheduled tasks and services outside change windowsSysmon Event IDs 12 and 13; Security Event ID 4698; System Event ID 7045The persistence majority, including Tarrask-style hidden tasks
Office, script hosts or signed applications making first-time outbound HTTPS connectionsEDR network events; Sysmon Event ID 3; proxy logsWeb protocol C2, the most common channel here
Executables or DLLs written by processes that just made a web requestEDR file events; Sysmon Event ID 11Ingress tool transfer and staged second stages
Signed binaries loading DLLs from user-writable pathsSysmon Event ID 7DLL side-loading families
PowerShell with encoded commands or long obfuscated script blocksEvent ID 4104PowerShell backdoors such as POWERSTATS, PowerExchange and POWRUNER
Unusual services or modules on domain controllers; authentication anomaliesDC EDR coverage; Event IDs 4624 and 4769 analyticsSkeleton Key and other identity infrastructure implants
Software build or update servers spawning unexpected processesBuild server EDR; integrity checks on build outputsSUNSPOT-style build tampering

Hardening that removes common footholds

  1. Start with application control: WDAC or AppLocker in audit mode on servers, then enforce. Most members are custom Windows binaries that would not be on an allow list.
  2. Constrain script hosts: enable PowerShell script block logging and Constrained Language Mode for standard users, and restrict wscript and mshta where they are not needed.
  3. Force egress through an inspecting proxy: deny direct outbound internet from servers, log every request with process context where the EDR supports it, and review first-seen domains.
  4. Protect the identity tier: EDR on every domain controller, LSA protection and alerting on any new service or driver on a DC. See the Active Directory and Entra ID Hardening Guide.
  5. Treat build and update infrastructure as tier 0: isolate build systems, sign outputs and compare builds, as the SolarWinds case showed. Roll back any control that breaks a business process by returning to audit mode, not by removing it.

Where identity fits

Backdoors in this category frequently harvest what lets an operator return without the implant: browser-stored credentials (T1555.003, 12 members), keystrokes and, in the Skeleton Key case, the domain authentication path itself. Service accounts and API keys found on a compromised host extend access long after the malware is cleaned. After any confirmed implant, rotate the machine and service credentials that host could read, not only the user passwords. See the Service Account Security Guide.

Metrics

  • Percentage of the 22 behaviours above with a tested detection mapped in the SIEM or EDR.
  • Percentage of servers with application control in enforce mode.
  • Percentage of servers with direct internet egress (target zero).
  • Mean time from a new autostart entry to analyst review.
  • Number of domain controllers without full EDR coverage (target zero).

Framework mapping

Control themeNIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5NIST CSF 2.0CIS Controls v8.1
Application allow listingCM-7, CM-10PR.PS-05Control 2
Egress filtering and proxyingSC-7PR.IR-01Control 13
Endpoint monitoring and loggingSI-4, AU-2, AU-6DE.CM-01, DE.CM-09Controls 8 and 13
Malicious code protectionSI-3DE.CM-09Control 10
Software integrity in build pipelinesSI-7, SR-4GV.SC-07Control 16
Credential rotation after compromiseIA-5, IR-4RS.MI-02Control 5

Common failure patterns

  • Hunting by name only: blocking a hash from a report while the Run key, task or service it created stays in place.
  • Servers with open egress: the most common channel is plain HTTPS, which succeeds wherever servers can browse the internet.
  • Cleaning the host but not the credentials: the operator returns with harvested passwords, tokens or service account secrets.
  • Unmonitored domain controllers and build servers: the highest-value targets for implants such as Skeleton Key and SUNSPOT often carry the least EDR coverage.
  • Logs that live only on the host: with file deletion recorded for 61 members, local evidence disappears quickly.

Complete member table (M to Z)

Every entry assigned to this hub, alphabetical, from ATT&CK v20. Up to three associated groups are shown; linked names have an NHI Mgmt Group threat actor profile. For names A to L, see the ATT&CK Espionage Backdoors and Implants Software Hub.

IDNameTypePlatformsAssociated groups (ATT&CK v20)
S0409MacheteMalwareWindowsMachete
S1060MafaldaMalwareWindowsMetador
S1169MangoMalwareWindowsOilRig
S1156ManjusakaMalwareLinux, WindowsNone recorded in ATT&CK v20
S1059metaMainMalwareWindowsMetador
S1146MgBotMalwareWindowsDaggerfly
S1015MilanMalwareWindowsHEXANE
S9059MiniBikeMalwareWindowsNIMBUS MANTICORE
S9060MiniBusMalwareWindowsNIMBUS MANTICORE
S9052MiniFastMalwareWindowsNIMBUS MANTICORE
S9053MiniJunkMalwareWindowsNIMBUS MANTICORE
S0084Mis-TypeMalwareWindowsNone recorded in ATT&CK v20
S0083MisdatMalwareWindowsNone recorded in ATT&CK v20
S0080MivastMalwareWindowsDeep Panda
S0079MobileOrderMalwarePlatform not listed in ATT&CKScarlet Mimic
S1026MongallMalwareWindowsAoqin Dragon
S0284More_eggsMalwareWindowsFIN6, Cobalt Group, Evilnum
S1047MoriMalwareWindowsMuddyWater
S9032MuddyViperMalwareWindowsMuddyWater
S0233MURKYTOPMalwareWindowsLeviathan
S0205NaidMalwareWindowsElderwood
S0272NDiskMonitorMalwareWindowsPatchwork
S0630NebulaeMalwareWindowsNaikon
S0691NeoichorMalwareWindowsKe3chang
S0210NerexMalwareWindowsElderwood
S0034NETEAGLEMalwareWindowsAPT30
S0033NetTravelerMalwareWindowsTA459
S1106NGLiteMalwareWindowsNone recorded in ATT&CK v20
S1192NICECURLMalwareWindowsAPT42
S0118NidiranMalwareWindowsSuckfly
S1090NightClubMalwareWindowsMoustachedBouncer
S1147NightdoorMalwareWindowsDaggerfly
S1100NinjaMalwareWindowsToddyCat
S1107NKAbuseMalwareLinux, macOS, WindowsNone recorded in ATT&CK v20
S0340OctopusMalwareWindowsNomadic Octopus
S0439OkrumMalwareWindowsKe3chang
S0138OLDBAITMalwareWindowsAPT28
S0052OnionDukeMalwareWindowsAPT29
S0264OopsIEMalwareWindowsOilRig
S0229OrzMalwareWindowsLeviathan
S0165OSInfoMalwareWindowsAPT3
S0626P8RATMalwareWindowsmenuPass
S1233PAKLOGMalwareWindowsMustang Panda
S0208PasamMalwareWindowsElderwood
S1102PcexterMalwareWindowsToddyCat
S0158PHOREALMalwareWindowsAPT32
S0517PillowmintMalwareWindowsFIN7
S0048PinchDukeMalwareWindowsAPT29
S0501PipeMonMalwareWindowsWinnti Group
S0124PisloaderMalwareWindowsAPT18
S0254PLAINTEEMalwareWindowsRancor
S0067pngdownerMalwareWindowsPutter Panda
S9066POLLBLENDMalwareWindowsNIMBUS MANTICORE
S0216POORAIMMalwareWindowsAPT37
S0150POSHSPYMalwareWindowsAPT29
S0139PowerDukeMalwareWindowsAPT29
S1173PowerExchangeMalwareWindowsOilRig
S1012PowerLessMalwareWindowsMagic Hound
S0441PowerShowerMalwareWindowsInception
S0145POWERSOURCEMalwareWindowsFIN7
S0393PowerStallionMalwareWindowsTurla
S0223POWERSTATSMalwareWindowsMuddyWater
S0371POWERTONMalwareWindowsAPT33
S0184POWRUNERMalwareWindowsOilRig
S0113PrikormkaMalwareWindowsNone recorded in ATT&CK v20
S0238ProxysvcMalwareWindowsLazarus Group
S0078PsyloMalwareWindowsScarlet Mimic
S0147PteranodonMalwareWindowsGamaredon Group
S0196PUNCHBUGGYMalwareWindowsFIN8
S0197PUNCHTRACKMalwareWindowsFIN8
S1032PyDCryptMalwareWindowsMoses Staff
S0269QUADAGENTMalwareWindowsOilRig
S1076QUIETCANARYMalwareWindowsNone recorded in ATT&CK v20
S0629RainyDayMalwareWindowsNaikon
S0458RamsayMalwareWindowsNone recorded in ATT&CK v20
S0055RARSTONEMalwareWindowsNaikon
S0241RATANKBAMalwareWindowsLazarus Group
S0169RawPOSMalwareWindowsFIN5
S0662RCSessionMalwareWindowsThreat Group-3390, Mustang Panda
S0495RDATMalwareWindowsOilRig
S0416RDFSNIFFERMalwareWindowsFIN7
S0172ReaverMalwareWindowsNone recorded in ATT&CK v20
S0153RedLeavesMalwareWindowsmenuPass
S0511RegDukeMalwareWindowsAPT29
S0019ReginMalwareWindowsNone recorded in ATT&CK v20
S0375RemexiMalwareWindowsAPT39
S0166RemoteCMDMalwareWindowsAPT3
S0125RemsecMalwareWindowsStrider
S0258RGDoorMalwareWindowsOilRig
S0003RIPTIDEMalwareWindowsAPT12
S0448Rising SunMalwareWindowsNone recorded in ATT&CK v20
S0270RogueRobinMalwareWindowsDarkHydrus
S0090RoverMalwareWindowsNone recorded in ATT&CK v20
S0148RTMMalwareWindowsRTM
S9037RustyWaterMalwareWindowsMuddyWater
S0085S-TypeMalwareWindowsNone recorded in ATT&CK v20
S1210SagerunexMalwareWindowsLotus Blossom
S1099SamuraiMalwareWindowsToddyCat
S1085SardonicMalwareWindowsFIN8
S0053SeaDukeMalwareWindowsAPT29
S0345SeasaltMalwareWindowsAPT1
S0382ServHelperMalwareWindowsTA505
S0596ShadowPadMalwareWindowsBRONZE BUTLER, Tropic Trooper, APT41, and 5 more
S1019SharkMalwareWindowsHEXANE
S0546SharpStageMalwareWindowsMolerats
S0450SHARPSTATSMalwareWindowsMuddyWater
S0444ShimRatMalwareWindowsMofang
S0028SHIPSHAPEMalwarePlatform not listed in ATT&CKAPT30
S0063SHOTPUTMalwareWindowsAPT3
S1178ShrinkLockerMalwareWindowsNone recorded in ATT&CK v20
S0217SHUTTERSPEEDMalwarePlatform not listed in ATT&CKAPT37
S0589SibotMalwareWindowsAPT29
S0610SideTwistMalwareWindowsOilRig
S9058SIGHTGRABMalwareWindowsNIMBUS MANTICORE
S0623SiloscapeMalwareWindows, ContainersNone recorded in ATT&CK v20
S0007Skeleton KeyMalwareWindowsAPT5
S0218SLOWDRIFTMalwareWindowsAPT37
S1035Small SieveMalwareWindowsMuddyWater
S0159SNUGRIDEMalwareWindowsmenuPass
S0273SocksbotMalwareWindowsNone recorded in ATT&CK v20
S0627SodaMasterMalwareWindowsmenuPass
S1166SolarMalwareWindowsOilRig
S0157SOUNDBITEMalwareWindowsAPT32
S0035SPACESHIPMalwareWindowsAPT30
S0543SparkMalwareWindowsMolerats
S1140SpicaMalwareWindowsStar Blizzard
S1234SplatCloakMalwareWindowsMustang Panda
S0390SQLRatMalwarePlatform not listed in ATT&CKFIN7
S0058SslMMMalwareWindowsNaikon
S1227StarProxyMalwareWindowsMustang Panda
S1037STARWHALEMalwareWindowsMuddyWater
S0142StreamExMalwareWindowsDeep Panda
S1034StrifeWaterMalwareWindowsMoses Staff
S0491StrongPityMalwareWindows, AndroidPROMETHIUM
S1042SUGARDUMPMalwareWindowsNone recorded in ATT&CK v20
S1049SUGARUSHMalwareWindowsNone recorded in ATT&CK v20
S0559SUNBURSTMalwareWindowsAPT29
S0562SUNSPOTMalwareWindowsAPT29
S0018SykipotMalwareWindowsNone recorded in ATT&CK v20
S0060Sys10MalwareWindowsNaikon
S0663SysUpdateMalwareWindows, LinuxThreat Group-3390
S0098T9000MalwareWindowsNone recorded in ATT&CK v20
S0586TAINTEDSCRIBEMalwareWindowsLazarus Group
S0467TajMahalMalwareWindowsNone recorded in ATT&CK v20
S1193TAMECATMalwareWindowsAPT42
S1011TarraskMalwareWindowsHAFNIUM
S0164TDTESSMalwareWindowsCopyKittens
S0146TEXTMATEMalwareWindowsFIN7
S0665ThreatNeedleMalwareWindowsLazarus Group
S0668TinyTurlaMalwareWindowsTurla
S0004TinyZBotMalwareWindowsCleaver
S0671TomirisMalwarePlatform not listed in ATT&CKNone recorded in ATT&CK v20
S1239TONESHELLMalwareWindowsMustang Panda
S0678TorismaMalwareWindowsNone recorded in ATT&CK v20
S0682TrailBlazerMalwareWindowsAPT29
S1201TRANSLATEXTMalwareWindowsKimsuky
S0001Trojan.MebromiMalwareWindowsNone recorded in ATT&CK v20
S9064TRUSTTRAPMalwareWindowsNIMBUS MANTICORE
S0178TruvasysMalwareWindowsPROMETHIUM
S0647TurianMalwareWindows, LinuxBackdoorDiplomacy
S0199TURNEDUPMalwareWindowsAPT33
S9067TWOSTROKEMalwareWindowsNIMBUS MANTICORE
S0130Unknown LoggerMalwareWindowsPatchwork
S0275UPPERCUTMalwareWindowsmenuPass, MirrorFace
S0022UroburosMalwareLinux, Windows, macOSTurla
S0452USBferryMalwareWindowsTropic Trooper
S0136USBStealerMalwareWindowsAPT28
S0207VasportMalwareWindowsElderwood
S0180VolgmerMalwareWindowsLazarus Group
S0579WaterbearMalwareWindowsBlackTech
S0109WEBC2MalwareWindowsAPT1
S0515WellMailMalwareWindowsAPT29
S0514WellMessMalwareWindowsAPT29
S0206WiarpMalwareWindowsElderwood
S0155WINDSHIELDMalwarePlatform not listed in ATT&CKAPT32
S0219WINERACKMalwarePlatform not listed in ATT&CKAPT37
S0176WingbirdMalwareWindowsNEODYMIUM
S0059WinMMMalwareWindowsNaikon
S0653xCaonMalwareWindowsIndigoZebra
S0117XTunnelMalwareWindowsAPT28
S0388YAHOYAHMalwareWindowsTropic Trooper
S0248ytyMalwareWindowsNone recorded in ATT&CK v20
S0251ZebrocyMalwareWindowsAPT28
S0230ZeroTMalwareWindowsTA459
S0086ZLibMalwareWindowsNone recorded in ATT&CK v20
S0412ZxShellMalwareWindowsAxiom, Threat Group-3390, APT41
S1013ZxxZMalwareWindowsBITTER

Practitioner checklist

  • Map your detections against the 22 shared behaviours above and close the gaps first.
  • Baseline and alert on new Run keys, scheduled tasks and services.
  • Remove direct internet egress from servers and log proxy traffic with process context.
  • Enable PowerShell script block logging and Sysmon image load monitoring for side-loading.
  • Put full EDR coverage and tamper protection on every domain controller and build server.
  • Move servers to application control in enforce mode, after an audit period.
  • After any implant finding, rotate credentials, tokens and keys the host could reach.
  • When a report names a member here, pull its ATT&CK page and hunt its techniques, not just its hashes.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: ATT&CK Espionage Backdoors and Implants Software Hub · ATT&CK Remote Access Trojans Software Hub · Threat Hunting Guide · BRICKSTORM Backdoor Guide · ATT&CK Mitigations

Free weekly newsletter

Subscribe to the NHI & AI Identity Journal

The latest on NHI and Agentic AI security – articles, research, breaches, news and events every week.

Bonus 33% off our NHI Course when you subscribe.

NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 12 November 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org