Gamaredon is the most relentless espionage group targeting Ukraine: it relies on volume, constant change and simple scripts rather than sophisticated exploits, and once inside it spreads through documents, shared drives, USB sticks and colleagues' mailboxes. The Ukrainian government attributed the group to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) in November 2021, and vendors have tracked it since at least 2013. Since 2025 ESET has also reported it opening doors for another FSB-linked group, Turla. This profile is for SOC analysts, email and endpoint teams and threat intelligence staff in Ukraine, neighbouring states and organisations that support them. It covers names and attribution as each source states it, targeting, the ATT&CK techniques mapped to the group, how it uses accounts and trust, notable activity and a detection and hardening plan. For context on how Russian services divide the work, see the Russia State Cyber Operations Guide; general group background is in the Threat Actor Groups Guide.
Key takeaways
- Script-driven and noisy by design. Obfuscated VBScript, PowerShell, LNK files and self-extracting archives arrive in waves; ESET counted more than 1,000 unique Ukrainian machines attacked between November 2022 and December 2023.
- It spreads through trust, not exploits. ATT&CK records macros injected into every Word and Excel file on mapped drives, LNK files planted on removable and network drives, and an Outlook VBA module that phishes colleagues from the victim's own mailbox.
- Infrastructure changes several times a day. Fast flux DNS, throwaway .ru domains, Telegram and Telegraph channels and Cloudflare tunnels mean indicator blocking alone will always lag.
- Macro and script controls are the main defence. Blocking internet macros, restricting mshta.exe and wscript.exe, and controlling removable media cut most of the chain.
- A Gamaredon infection can be the first stage of something worse. ESET assesses with high confidence that Gamaredon tools deployed Turla's Kazuar backdoor on Ukrainian machines in 2025.
Who they are (names and aliases)
MITRE ATT&CK tracks the group as Gamaredon Group (G0047), a suspected Russian cyber espionage group targeting Ukrainian military, law enforcement, judiciary, non-profit and non-governmental organisations since at least 2013. ATT&CK notes that the name comes from a misspelling of "Armageddon" found in early campaigns, and that in November 2021 the Ukrainian government publicly attributed the group to FSB Center 18. ESET reports the Security Service of Ukraine's attribution as the FSB 18th Center of Information Security operating from occupied Crimea; Microsoft observed the group operating out of Crimea.
| Name | Tracked by | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Gamaredon Group | ATT&CK, ESET | Most common public name |
| Aqua Blizzard (earlier ACTINIUM, DEV-0157) | Microsoft | Microsoft found no link to the destructive actor DEV-0586 |
| Trident Ursa | Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 | Unit 42 also lists UAC-0010, the CERT-UA identifier |
| Shuckworm | Symantec | Listed as an alias in ATT&CK |
| Primitive Bear, IRON TILDEN, Armageddon, NastyShrew | Various vendors | Aliases listed in ATT&CK |
Do not confuse Gamaredon with Russian groups that run destructive operations against the same victims: see the Sandworm Threat Actor Profile and the Cadet Blizzard Threat Actor Profile Guide.
Targeting and motivation
- Ukrainian state first: ESET reports most attacks hit Ukrainian governmental institutions. Microsoft observed government, military, NGO, judiciary, law enforcement and non-profit victims, and from October 2021 organisations critical to emergency response, territorial security and aid coordination.
- Beyond Ukraine: ESET saw attempts against Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland in April 2022 and February 2023, none successful. Unit 42 reported an unsuccessful attempt in August 2022 against a large petroleum refining company in a NATO member nation and English-language lures on military assistance.
- Motivation: intelligence collection and keeping access. Microsoft describes the aims as exfiltrating sensitive information, maintaining access and moving laterally into related organisations; Unit 42 calls the group a dedicated access creator and intelligence gatherer.
- Collection focus: documents, screenshots, and since 2023 data from browser-based web applications, email clients and messaging applications such as Signal and Telegram (ESET). ESET's PteroBleed stealer targeted a Ukrainian military system and a government webmail service.
Tactics and techniques (MITRE ATT&CK)
All techniques below are mapped to G0047 in ATT&CK v20, which records about 70 technique uses for the group. Software in ATT&CK includes Pteranodon (Pterodo), PowerPunch, QuietSieve and Remcos.
| Tactic | Technique | How it shows up |
|---|---|---|
| Initial access | T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment; T1204.002 Malicious File | Documents, archives and LNK files; Unit 42 saw HTML files smuggling RAR archives |
| Stealth, execution | T1221 Template Injection | DOCX and RTF files that fetch a macro-laden remote template only when opened |
| Stealth | T1027.012 LNK Icon Smuggling; T1218.005 Mshta | LNK files hiding scripts; mshta.exe fetching payloads |
| Execution | T1059.005 Visual Basic; T1059.001 PowerShell | Heavily obfuscated VBScript and PowerShell, often in hidden windows |
| Persistence | T1053.005 Scheduled Task; T1547.001 Registry Run Keys | Tasks running randomly named scripts through wscript; Run keys for VBS files |
| Persistence | T1137 Office Application Startup | Macros inserted into existing documents so they run when reopened |
| Defence impairment | T1112 Modify Registry; T1685 Disable or Modify Tools | Changing VBAWarnings under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office to enable macros |
| Lateral movement | T1080 Taint Shared Content | Macros injected into all Word and Excel files on mapped network drives |
| Lateral movement, initial access | T1091 Replication Through Removable Media | LNKs created on every removable and network drive |
| Lateral movement | T1534 Internal Spearphishing; T1021.005 VNC | Outlook VBA module mailing colleagues; UltraVNC for interactive control |
| Command and control | T1568.001 Fast Flux DNS; T1102.002 and T1102.003 Web Service | Rotating IPs; C2 addresses read from Telegram and Telegraph content |
| Command and control | T1090 Proxy | Cloudflare Tunnel client proxying C2 traffic |
| Stealth | T1480 Execution Guardrails | Geoblocking so payloads only download in target countries |
| Collection, exfiltration | T1039, T1025, T1119, T1113, T1020 | Office files from shares and USB drives, screenshots every minute, automatic upload |
| Impact | T1561.001 Disk Content Wipe; T1491.001 Internal Defacement | Deleting desktop and profile files; taunting messages on victim desktops |
How they abuse identities and credentials
Gamaredon rarely needs to steal a domain admin password. It abuses the trust attached to an ordinary user's identity: their mailbox, their mapped drives and their sessions in web applications. That changes which controls matter.
| Trust abused | What the actor does | Control that limits it |
|---|---|---|
| The user's mailbox | Outlook VBA module sends infected attachments to colleagues, who trust the sender (T1534) | Block Outlook VBA macros by policy; scan internal mail as strictly as inbound; alert on bursts of internal mail with attachments |
| The user's write access to shares | Infects every Office file on mapped drives (T1080) | Least privilege on file shares; remove broad write access; file integrity alerts on mass document modification |
| Removable media and the user's session | LNKs on USB drives run as the next user who opens them (T1091) | Removable media control, autorun disabled, LNK execution from removable media blocked |
| Web application sessions | 2023 PowerShell tools and PteroBleed take data from webmail, browser apps, Signal and Telegram (ESET) | Phishing-resistant MFA, short session lifetimes, device-bound sessions for webmail and government systems |
| Hand-off to a second actor | Gamaredon access reused to deploy Turla's Kazuar (ESET, 2025) | Treat any Gamaredon infection as full compromise: reimage, revoke sessions and reset the user's credentials |
- Office trust settings are an identity decision: the VBAWarnings change silently turns the user into a macro-running account. Enforce macro settings through Group Policy or Intune so user-writable registry values are ignored.
- Remote access tools: UltraVNC is legitimate software; inventory approved remote access tools and block the rest by application control.
- For user-level session theft defences, see the AiTM Phishing Guide; for the delivery mechanics, the Malicious LNK Files Guide.
Notable incidents
| Date | Activity | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 2013 onward | Espionage against Ukrainian military, law enforcement, judiciary and NGOs | MITRE ATT&CK G0047 |
| November 2021 | Ukrainian government publicly attributes the group to FSB Center 18 | MITRE ATT&CK; ESET |
| October 2021 to February 2022 | Campaigns against emergency response, territorial security and aid organisations; lures impersonating the World Health Organization | Microsoft, 4 February 2022 |
| 2022 | Sustained operations after the full-scale invasion; failed attempt on a NATO-country petroleum refiner | Unit 42, 20 December 2022 |
| 2022 to 2023 | More than 1,000 Ukrainian machines attacked; attempts in Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland; PteroBleed stealer | ESET, 26 September 2024 |
| February to June 2025 | Gamaredon tools restart and deploy Turla's Kazuar backdoor in Ukraine | ESET, 19 September 2025 |
Detection and defence
Detection signals
| Signal | Where to look | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Word or Excel loading a template from a remote URL | EDR network events from WINWORD.EXE; proxy logs | Template injection; legitimate remote templates are rare outside SharePoint |
| mshta.exe or wscript.exe launched by Office, Explorer from a USB path, or a scheduled task | Process creation (4688, Sysmon 1) | Microsoft's hunting queries look for MSHTA loading DLLs from the Roaming path and schtasks with wscript |
| Changes to VBAWarnings or other Office Security keys under HKCU | Sysmon Event ID 13 | Defence impairment before macros run |
| Mass modification of .doc, .docx, .xls files on shares by one account | File server audit (Event ID 4663), file integrity monitoring | Taint Shared Content |
| New LNK files written to the root of removable or network drives | EDR file events | USB and share propagation |
| Outlook sending many internal messages with attachments in a short window | Mail flow logs | Internal spearphishing |
| Endpoints querying Telegram, Telegraph, ip-api.com, ngrok or TryCloudflare without business need | DNS and proxy logs | Unit 42 recommends blocking these where unused |
| Newly registered .ru domains and dynamic DNS resolving to many IPs in a day | Protective DNS, passive DNS | Fast flux pattern |
Hardening plan
- Week 1: enforce blocking of macros in files from the internet through Group Policy or Intune; pull current indicators from the vendor repositories ESET and Unit 42 publish and load them into protective DNS. See the Protective DNS Guide.
- Weeks 2 to 4: turn on attack surface reduction rules that block Office from creating child processes and block obfuscated scripts, in audit mode for two weeks, then enforce; review exceptions with business owners.
- Weeks 4 to 8: restrict mshta.exe, wscript.exe and cscript.exe with application control for standard users; disable Outlook VBA; block LNK and script execution from removable drives. Pilot on one department and keep the previous policy for rollback.
- Quarter 1: enforce removable media control (see the Removable Media and USB Control Guide), tighten file share write permissions, and block Telegram and similar services on endpoints with no business need.
- Response: isolate the host, collect scheduled tasks, Run keys and modified documents, clean infected documents on shares, then reimage, revoke the user's sessions and reset credentials. Check for Kazuar or other second-stage tools before closing the case.
Metrics
- Endpoints with internet macros blocked by policy: 100%.
- ASR rules in block mode across the estate: trending to 100% of the agreed set.
- Script host executions by standard users per week: trending to zero outside approved use.
- Removable media write and execute exceptions: documented and reviewed quarterly.
- Time from first Gamaredon alert to host isolation: under one hour.
Framework mapping
| Framework | Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | CM-6 Configuration Settings, SC-18 Mobile Code | Macro and script host settings |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | SI-3 Malicious Code Protection, SI-8 Spam Protection | Email and endpoint scanning, including internal mail |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | MP-7 Media Use, AT-2 Literacy Training and Awareness | USB control and phishing awareness |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.AT-01, DE.CM-09, DE.AE-02 | Awareness, endpoint monitoring, alert analysis |
| MITRE D3FEND | D3-DNSDL DNS Denylisting, D3-EAL Executable Allowlisting | Blocking C2 domains and unwanted script hosts |
Practitioner checklist
- Confirm internet macros are blocked by policy, not by user choice, on every Office installation.
- Alert on Office applications fetching remote templates and spawning mshta.exe or wscript.exe.
- Monitor Office security registry keys under HKCU for changes.
- Detect mass document changes on file shares and LNK creation on removable and network drives.
- Disable Outlook VBA and watch for bursts of internal mail with attachments.
- Block Telegram, Telegraph, ngrok and TryCloudflare on endpoints that do not need them.
- Feed published Gamaredon indicators into protective DNS and refresh them weekly.
- Treat every confirmed infection as a possible hand-off to another actor and investigate for second-stage backdoors.
Standards and references
- MITRE ATT&CK: Gamaredon Group (G0047)
- MITRE ATT&CK: Taint Shared Content
- MITRE ATT&CK: Template Injection
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence: ACTINIUM targets Ukrainian organizations
- ESET Research: Cyberespionage the Gamaredon way
- ESET Research: Gamaredon X Turla collab
- Palo Alto Networks Unit 42: Russia's Trident Ursa (aka Gamaredon APT) Cyber Conflict Operations Unwavering Since Invasion of Ukraine
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Threat Actor Groups Guide · Russia State Cyber Operations Guide · Malicious LNK Files Guide · Phishing Guide · Cyber Warfare Guide