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MITRE ATT&CK T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Guide

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 27 October 2026 13 min read
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Kerberos trusts any ticket that is encrypted with the right key, so an attacker who steals a ticket or the key behind it can act as any identity the ticket names, without a password and often without tripping MFA. MITRE ATT&CK T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets, in the Credential Access tactic (TA0006), groups five sub-techniques: Golden Ticket, Silver Ticket, Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting and Ccache Files. This guide takes the technique-level view a defender needs: what each sub-technique depends on, which telemetry shows it on Windows, Linux and macOS, the mitigations ATT&CK lists, and a hardening programme that removes the preconditions. It is for AD administrators, detection engineers and identity teams. It contains no attack procedures, and links to the deeper single-topic guides rather than repeating them.

Key takeaways

  • Every sub-technique depends on a key. Golden tickets need the krbtgt key, silver tickets a service account key, roasting attacks a weak service or user password, and ccache theft access to cached tickets on a host. Protect the keys and the technique fails.
  • Service accounts are the common thread. Kerberoasting and silver tickets both target accounts with SPNs, which are usually old, rarely rotated non-human identities.
  • RC4 is the defender's best signal and the attacker's best friend. Removing RC4 hardens offline cracking, and RC4 tickets in an AES estate stand out in events 4768 and 4769.
  • Forgeries are detected by what is missing. A service ticket or logon with no matching TGT request, or a ticket with impossible lifetimes, is the typical forged ticket footprint.
  • Remediation means rotating keys. After a suspected golden ticket, reset krbtgt twice with at least the maximum ticket lifetime (10 hours by default) between resets; after a silver ticket, rotate the service account.

How the technique works

ATT&CK describes T1558 as subverting Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging tickets to enable Pass the Ticket (T1550.003). In a realm there are three participants: the client, the service and the Key Distribution Center (KDC). The client proves its identity to the KDC's Authentication Service and receives a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) encrypted with the krbtgt key; it then presents the TGT to the Ticket Granting Service to obtain service tickets encrypted with the target service account's key. Each sub-technique attacks a different point in that flow:

Sub-techniqueWhat the adversary needsWhat it yieldsDefender's main lever
T1558.001 Golden TicketThe krbtgt account password hash, usually from DCSync or a DC compromiseForged TGTs for any account, including non-existent ones, for as long as the key is validProtect DCs and replication rights; rotate krbtgt
T1558.002 Silver TicketThe password hash of a service account or computer accountForged service tickets for that service only, created without contacting the KDCStrong or managed service account passwords; AES; rotate on suspicion
T1558.003 KerberoastingAny valid domain account able to request service ticketsService tickets that can be cracked offline to recover service account passwordsLong random passwords or gMSA; remove RC4; monitor 4769
T1558.004 AS-REP RoastingAccounts with Kerberos pre-authentication disabledMaterial that can be cracked offline to recover the account passwordRe-enable pre-authentication; audit the flag
T1558.005 Ccache FilesRead access to credential cache files or stores on Linux or macOS hostsValid tickets to reuse as the cached userCache type and permissions; auditd on cache locations; short lifetimes

ATT&CK lists T1558 for Windows, Linux and macOS. On Linux the ccache location is set by /etc/krb5.conf and the KRB5CCNAME variable, with file caches commonly in /tmp named krb5cc_%UID%; on macOS caches default to memory. MIT Kerberos supports FILE, DIR, KEYRING, KCM and MEMORY cache types, and KEYRING keeps credentials in kernel memory where only the owning user should reach them.

Where it shows up

  • Ransomware and intrusion sets: ATT&CK v20 records Kerberoasting use by Wizard Spider, FIN7 and Indrik Spider, and in campaigns including the SolarWinds Compromise and Operation Wocao. Akira is recorded at the parent technique level.
  • Persistence after domain compromise: golden tickets let an attacker return after passwords are reset, which is why incident response must treat krbtgt as compromised whenever a DC or replication rights were. The Cisco Active Directory Credentials Leak, in which hashes reportedly including krbtgt from a 2022 intrusion were republished in 2025, shows how long such key material stays dangerous if it is not rotated.
  • Hybrid and Linux estates: Linux hosts joined to AD through SSSD or with keytabs cache tickets on disk; see the SSSD and Linux Active Directory Integration Guide and the Linux Service Accounts and Keytab Management Guide.

Detection

ATT&CK's detection strategy for T1558 has three analytics: on Windows, correlating malformed logon fields, RC4-encrypted TGTs, service ticket requests without a corresponding TGT request, and processes accessing LSASS memory; on Linux, suspicious access to the SSSD secrets database and Kerberos key material correlated with unusual service ticket requests; on macOS, anomalous kinit and klist activity in the unified logs.

SignalSourceSub-techniqueNotes
4769 with Ticket Encryption Type 0x17 (RC4) for an AES-capable accountDC Security log, Kerberos Service Ticket Operations.003Microsoft advises alerting on any type other than 0x11 or 0x12 on modern systems
One account requesting tickets for many distinct SPNs in minutes4769 aggregated.003Baseline service and monitoring accounts first
Any 4769 for a honey account with an SPN4769.003High fidelity; the account has no legitimate use
4768 with Pre-Authentication Type 0Kerberos Authentication Service.004Means "Do not require Kerberos preauthentication" is set
5136 changing userAccountControl to disable pre-authentication, or adding servicePrincipalName to a userDirectory Service Changes with SACL.003, .004Attackers may create the weakness they then exploit
4769 or 4624 with no preceding 4768 for the account and hostCorrelation across DCs.001Requires collection from every DC
Kerberos logons for accounts that do not exist or are disabled4624, 4769.001Golden tickets can name any account
Service logons with no matching 4769 on any DCServer 4624 versus DC 4769.002Silver tickets are created without contacting the KDC
Processes opening LSASS memoryEDR, Sysmon process access.001, .002Ticket and hash extraction from memory
Unexpected reads of ccache files, keytabs or the SSSD secrets databaseauditd, EDR on Linux.005ATT&CK suggests auditd on hashes, machine tickets and /tmp files

Since the January 2025 cumulative updates, 4768 and 4769 on Windows Server 2016 and later carry extra fields (msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes, available keys, advertised etypes), which make RC4 analysis precise. The Active Directory Security Monitoring and Event IDs Guide covers audit policy, SACLs and collection.

Mitigations ATT&CK lists, and what they mean in practice

ATT&CK mitigationApplies toPractical control
M1015 Active Directory Configuration.001Reset krbtgt twice to invalidate forged TGTs; Microsoft's forest recovery guidance says wait 10 hours between resets (the default maximum user and service ticket lifetime), because krbtgt keeps a password history of 2. Rotate RODC krbtgt_number accounts separately.
M1026 Privileged Account Management.001, .002, .003Restrict domain admins to tier 0 hosts; remove service accounts from privileged groups; limit who holds replication rights. See the Tiered Administration and Enterprise Access Model Guide.
M1027 Password Policies.002, .003, .004ATT&CK suggests 25 or more characters for service account passwords, or Group Managed Service Accounts, which use long random passwords rotated automatically.
M1041 Encrypt Sensitive Information.002, .003, .004Use AES rather than RC4 for Kerberos. Set msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes on service accounts and the "Network security: Configure encryption types allowed for Kerberos" policy.
M1047 Audit.004, .005Find accounts without pre-authentication and audit changes to the flag; use auditd on ticket caches and key files.
M1043 Credential Access Protection.005Confine access to Kerberos material on Linux with SELinux policy; on Windows, protect LSASS with Credential Guard and LSA protection.

Hardening programme: removing the preconditions

  1. Inventory accounts with SPNs and accounts without pre-authentication: both lists should be short and owned. Treat every user account with an SPN as a non-human identity and record its owner.
  2. Move service accounts to gMSA or dMSA: where the application supports it, managed service accounts remove human-chosen passwords from the Kerberoasting equation. See the Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA) Guide.
  3. Rotate the rest with long random passwords: for accounts that cannot move, vault the credential and rotate it; resetting an old password also generates AES keys for accounts created before AES support.
  4. Remove RC4 in stages: find RC4 use from 4768 and 4769 fields, fix accounts and devices, then restrict allowed encryption types. Microsoft changed the default for accounts without an explicit setting to AES in November 2022, Windows Server 2025 DCs no longer issue RC4 TGTs, and Microsoft announced plans to stop assuming RC4 by default on DCs from the second quarter of 2026 (CVE-2026-20833). Check the current state of that change for your builds. Expect SMB and WinRM failures from systems that only support RC4, and test in a pilot OU first; roll back by re-adding RC4 to the allowed types for that scope.
  5. Use Protected Users for privileged humans: members cannot use NTLM, DES or RC4 in pre-authentication, or delegation, and their TGTs last four hours. Microsoft warns never to add service or computer accounts, and to test before adding domain admins.
  6. Protect DCs and replication rights: golden tickets start with krbtgt theft, so remove unneeded holders of DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All and monitor its use. See the Golden Ticket, Silver Ticket and DCSync Guide.
  7. Rotate krbtgt routinely: a planned rotation, using the two-reset sequence, limits how long a stolen key works and proves the process before you need it in an incident.
  8. Harden Linux caches: prefer KEYRING or KCM caches to files in shared /tmp, restrict keytab permissions, and keep ticket lifetimes short.

Responding to suspected ticket theft or forgery

Containment differs by sub-technique because the key that must change differs:

  • Kerberoasting or AS-REP roasting observed: assume the targeted account passwords will be cracked. Rotate them immediately with long random values, enable pre-authentication, and review what those accounts can reach, since that is the attacker's next step.
  • Silver ticket suspected: rotate the password of the service or computer account behind the targeted service; for a computer account, reset the machine account password. Review logons to that host during the suspected window.
  • Golden ticket suspected: the domain is compromised. Find and close the route to the krbtgt key (DCSync rights, DC access, backups), then perform the two-reset krbtgt rotation in every affected domain, spaced by the maximum ticket lifetime. Follow the Active Directory Domain Compromise Response Playbook for the wider recovery.
  • Ccache theft on Linux: destroy the affected caches, rotate any keytabs on the host, and treat the cached users' sessions as compromised until their tickets expire.
  • Preserve evidence first: export DC Security logs and EDR telemetry for the window before rotating, because resets change the events you would use to scope the intrusion.

Where identity fits

T1558 is mostly a non-human identity problem. The accounts attackers roast and forge for are service accounts with SPNs, computer accounts and the krbtgt account itself; all of them authenticate without a person present, many were created years ago, and few have an owner who would notice misuse. Treat them as NHIs: inventory, owner, purpose, credential type and rotation date. The Service Account Security Guide and the Kerberos Security Guide cover the wider controls.

Decision guidance

  • Cannot move to gMSA: if an application needs a conventional account, use a vaulted random password of at least 25 characters with AES only, and an SPN on that account alone.
  • Cannot remove RC4 yet: scope RC4 to the specific legacy accounts and devices that need it, and alert on RC4 tickets for every other account.
  • Small estates: start with three actions: fix accounts without pre-authentication, rotate or convert every SPN account, and alert on 4769 RC4 tickets and honey accounts.
  • Large or multi-forest estates: run krbtgt rotation per domain on a schedule, rely on central correlation across all DCs for forgery detection, and consider ITDR sensors for Kerberos protocol anomalies.

Measuring progress

  • Number of user accounts with SPNs not managed by gMSA or a vault, trending down.
  • Accounts with pre-authentication disabled (target zero, or each documented).
  • Share of 4769 tickets issued with RC4, trending to zero outside documented exceptions.
  • Days since last krbtgt rotation in each domain.
  • DCs forwarding Kerberos events (target 100 percent) and time to triage a honey account alert.

Framework mapping

Control areaNIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5MITRE
Service account passwords and keysIA-5, IA-5(1)M1027, M1041
Least privilege for service and admin accountsAC-6M1026
Kerberos key management and rotationSC-12M1015
Monitoring Kerberos activityAU-6, SI-4D3FEND D3-DAM Domain Account Monitoring

Common failure patterns

  • Rotating krbtgt once: the previous key stays in history, so forged tickets made with it can still validate. Two resets are needed, spaced by the maximum ticket lifetime.
  • Resetting user passwords but not krbtgt after DC compromise: the attacker returns with a golden ticket.
  • Legacy SPN accounts with old passwords: a service account set up years ago with a short password and RC4 keys remains the easiest Kerberoasting target.
  • Detecting only at the DC: silver tickets never reach the KDC, so server-side logon telemetry is needed.
  • Ignoring Linux: ccache files in /tmp on AD-joined Linux hosts are readable by anyone who gains root, and no Windows event records their theft.
  • Adding service accounts to Protected Users: it gives no protection for those accounts and can break them.

Practitioner checklist

  • List every account with an SPN and every account without pre-authentication, and assign owners.
  • Convert SPN accounts to gMSA or dMSA, or vault and rotate long random passwords.
  • Measure RC4 use from 4768 and 4769, fix dependencies, then restrict encryption types to AES.
  • Collect Kerberos events from every DC and correlate TGT and service ticket requests.
  • Deploy honey SPN accounts and alert on any ticket request for them.
  • Restrict and monitor replication rights; alert on DCSync from non-DC accounts.
  • Rotate krbtgt on a schedule using two resets spaced by the maximum ticket lifetime.
  • Add privileged human accounts to Protected Users after testing; never add service accounts.
  • Audit ccache, keytab and SSSD files on Linux hosts and keep caches out of shared directories.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Golden Ticket, Silver Ticket and DCSync Guide · Kerberoasting and AS-REP Roasting Defence Guide · Kerberos Delegation Security Guide · Active Directory Domain Compromise Response Playbook

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 27 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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