Whoever controls vCenter Server controls every host, datastore and virtual machine it manages, so it deserves tier 0 protection. Securing it is a shared responsibility: Broadcom ships fixes and the Security Configuration Guide, and the customer controls identity sources, roles, credentials, logging and patch timing. This guide covers the vCenter layer specifically: Single Sign-On and identity sources, roles and the built-in privileged groups, the service accounts and API credentials that automation uses, the events to forward, and the vSphere 8 Security Configuration Guide (SCG) controls that matter most. It is written for virtualisation administrators, security engineers and SOC teams. For host settings such as lockdown mode, execInstalledOnly and ESXi services, see the VMware ESXi Hardening Guide; this page does not repeat them.
This is an independent guide from NHI Mgmt Group, based on Broadcom's public documentation as of November 2026. It is not sponsored or reviewed by Broadcom. Product features change, so confirm settings against Broadcom's current documentation.
Key takeaways
- vCenter is a tier 0 identity system. It stores the password of the root-equivalent vpxuser account on every managed host, so a vCenter compromise is a compromise of the whole estate.
- Separate infrastructure identity from enterprise identity. Broadcom's own guidance is to authorise administrators through local vsphere.local groups and to federate vCenter to a dedicated, MFA-enforcing identity provider, not the corporate directory the help desk can reset.
- Federation does not cover every door. The appliance root account, the VAMI on port 5480, the console and SSH all authenticate outside SSO, so they need their own network restrictions, vaulted credentials and monitoring.
- Patch vCenter as an emergency change. Every vCenter CVE used in the BRICKSTORM campaign already had a patch available; the gap was time to patch, not missing fixes.
- Forward events off the appliance. VM clone, reconfigure, permission and role events are the signals that reveal credential theft by cloning domain controllers, and an attacker with admin rights can tamper with logs kept only on vCenter.
How identity and access work in vCenter Server
vCenter authenticates people and services through vCenter Single Sign-On (SSO). The SSO domain, vsphere.local by default, holds local users, solution users for vCenter services and a set of predefined groups. Administrators can add identity sources such as Active Directory over LDAP, or configure Identity Federation so an external SAML or OIDC identity provider handles sign-in and MFA. Authorisation is separate: a permission is a pairing of a user or group, a role, and an inventory object, and permissions propagate down the inventory tree when the propagate option is set.
| Access path | How it authenticates | Covered by federated MFA? | Hardening priority |
|---|---|---|---|
| vSphere Client and vSphere API (HTTPS 443) | SSO: federated IdP, identity source or vsphere.local account | Yes, when Identity Federation is configured | Enforce phishing-resistant MFA at the IdP; 15 minute idle timeout |
| [email protected] | Local SSO account | No | Vault it under dual control, use only for break-glass, alert on every use |
| VAMI (HTTPS 5480) | Appliance root or SystemConfiguration group members | No | Restrict by appliance firewall to admin workstations |
| Appliance console, SSH and Bash shell | Appliance root and BashShellAdministrators | No | SSH off unless vCenter HA needs it; limit group membership |
| Solution users and plugins | Certificates and tokens issued by SSO | No | Inventory registered plugins; remove unused ones |
| Automation (PowerCLI, Terraform, backup) | Service accounts or API tokens | No (non-interactive) | Per-purpose accounts, narrow roles, source restrictions |
Broadcom's VCF 9.1 identity design guidance makes the point bluntly: MFA and conditional access at the external provider do not automatically protect the appliance root login, the vCenter console or a direct ESX session. Map each path for your build and record who uses it, how it authenticates and where its activity is logged.
Admin roles and privileged access
Built-in roles and SSO groups
vCenter ships with system roles (Administrator, Read-only, No access) and sample roles such as No cryptography administrator. The Administrator role at the root object, or as a global permission, reaches every object in every linked vCenter. The vsphere.local domain also contains 27 predefined groups, several of which grant more power than their names suggest.
| SSO group or role | What membership grants | Recommended handling |
|---|---|---|
| Administrators (vsphere.local) | Administration of the VMware Directory Service and full vCenter administration | Named admin accounts only, reviewed quarterly; no service accounts |
| SystemConfiguration.BashShellAdministrators | Full access to the Appliance Management APIs and the Bash shell | Empty by default in routine operation; add for a support task and remove afterwards |
| SystemConfiguration.Administrators | View and manage appliance system configuration | Infrastructure admins only |
| CAAdmins | Administrator privileges for the VMware Certificate Authority | Very small group; certificate changes are a trust change |
| DCAdmins | Domain controller actions on VMware Directory Service | Treat like Domain Admins |
| ActAsUsers | Can obtain Act-As tokens from SSO (act on behalf of other users) | Alert on any membership change |
| TrustedAdmins | vSphere Trust Authority configuration | Only where Trust Authority is deployed |
| Administrator role, global or root permission | Every privilege on every object | Replace with scoped custom roles at datacenter or cluster level |
Separating authentication from authorisation
SCG control vcenter-8.administration-sso-groups (priority P0) asks you to separate authentication and authorisation for administrators. In practice: let the identity provider prove who someone is, but grant vCenter rights through local vsphere.local groups that only the virtualisation team can change. If an attacker adds an account to an Active Directory group, that alone should not make them a vCenter administrator. Broadcom's BRICKSTORM guidance goes further and recommends a dedicated infrastructure identity provider tenant, separate from the corporate IdP, with phishing-resistant MFA, so that a compromised help desk, HR feed or provisioning system cannot reset or grant infrastructure credentials. Help desk social engineering is the route Scattered Spider is known for; see the Scattered Spider Threat Actor Profile.
- Separate admin accounts: administrators use a dedicated vCenter identity, not their email account, from a Privileged Access Workstations Guide style hardened device.
- Break-glass: [email protected] and appliance root are separate emergency paths with different reach (vSphere Client and API versus VAMI and the operating system). Test both while the IdP is unavailable. See the Break-Glass Account Guide.
- Account recovery: no one outside the virtualisation team, including the service desk, should be able to reset an infrastructure administrator's password or MFA.
- Encryption keys: the No cryptography administrator role exists so operators can manage VMs without reaching encrypted VM keys; use it for operations staff where VM Encryption or a Native Key Provider is in use, and back up the Native Key Provider securely.
Integrations, API tokens and service accounts
vCenter accumulates non-human identities quickly: backup products, monitoring collectors, configuration management, Terraform or PowerCLI pipelines, NSX, vSAN and third-party plugins. Each holds a credential that can usually do far more than its job requires, and none of them can complete human MFA.
- vpxuser: vCenter creates
vpxuseron every ESXi host with full administrative rights and rotates its password on the interval set byVirtualCenter.VimPasswordExpirationInDays(default 30 days, SCG controlvcenter-8.vpxuser-rotation). BRICKSTORM operators extracted it from vCenter to reach hosts over SSH. Under active investigation, shorten the interval or force rotation. - One account per purpose: a backup account needs snapshot and disk read privileges, not permission to change identity sources or delete datastores. Build custom roles and assign them at the narrowest object.
- Backup exceptions: backup products clone and snapshot VMs, which is exactly what credential-theft cloning looks like. Broadcom advises allowlisting backup activity by service account name, not by target VM, so a stolen admin account cloning a domain controller still alerts.
- Tokens over passwords: where the platform supports it, prefer short-lived tokens. In VCF 9.1, the VCF SSO API client exchanges an API token (default 30 days, configurable to 180) for a bearer token (default 30 minutes, configurable to 480). The API token is still the long-lived secret: vault it and monitor its use.
- Plugins are trust relationships: each registered plugin extends what vCenter trusts and exposes, including plugins enabled by default. Inventory registered plugins and solution users, and remove those you do not use.
- Do not connect change engines: Broadcom recommends not connecting systems that can alter accounts, passwords or authentication configuration (HR feeds, password reset tools, configuration management) to the infrastructure IdP or vCenter.
Record every vCenter service account with owner, role, scope, credential location and last use. See the Service Account Security Guide and the Service Account Inventory Template.
Logging and detection
vCenter 8.0.3 generates 633 documented event types. They are visible in the vSphere Client and the vSphere API (EventManager) and can be forwarded with remote logging. The detailed service log is /var/log/vmware/vpxd/vpxd.log on the appliance. Configure the VAMI syslog target (vcenter-8.vami-syslog, P0) and keep vpxd.event.syslog.enabled set to true (vcenter-8.events-remote-logging). Local task and event retention defaults to 30 days, which is far shorter than the 393-day average dwell time Mandiant reported for BRICKSTORM, so long-term retention must live in the SIEM.
| Event | What it can reveal | Suggested alert logic |
|---|---|---|
VmClonedEvent, VmSnapshotCreatedEvent | Cloning a domain controller, CA or vault VM for offline credential extraction | Any clone or snapshot of a tier 0 VM by an account other than the named backup service account |
VmReconfiguredEvent | Disk from a critical VM attached to another VM | Critical VM disk path attached to a non-owner VM |
VmCreatedEvent then VmRemovedEvent | Short-lived staging VMs | Create, power on, power off and delete of the same VM within 24 hours |
VmMigratedEvent, VmRelocatedEvent | Moving a critical VM to a less monitored host or datastore | Migration of tier 0 VMs outside the approved cluster |
PermissionAddedEvent, PermissionUpdatedEvent, RoleAddedEvent, RoleUpdatedEvent | Privilege escalation or persistence | Any change outside an approved change window |
UserLoginSessionEvent, BadUsernameSessionEvent | Logins by break-glass or service accounts, guessing | Any interactive login by [email protected] or a service account; new source IP for an admin |
com.vmware.vc.guestOperations.GuestOperation | File or process actions inside guests through VMware Tools | Guest operations against tier 0 VMs |
ad.event.JoinDomainEvent, ad.event.LeaveDomainEvent | Changes to the identity integration | Any occurrence |
Watch the appliance too: SSH enablement, BashShellAdministrators membership changes and changes to the vCenter web application configuration. BRICKSTEAL, a Java servlet filter that captured administrator credentials at login, persisted by modifying vCenter's web.xml. See the BRICKSTORM Backdoor Guide and, for host-side events, the ESXi Logs Detection Guide.
Metrics that show it is working
- Time to patch: hours or days from VMSA publication to vCenter update for critical advisories.
- Standing admins: number of identities holding Administrator at root or global level (target: a handful of named people plus break-glass).
- Federated coverage: percentage of interactive vCenter logins through the MFA-enforcing IdP.
- SCG drift: P0 and P1 controls failing in the SCG audit script each month.
- Log completeness: days of vCenter events retained in the SIEM, and gaps in daily event volume.
- Service account hygiene: service accounts with owner, scoped role and use in the last 90 days, as a share of the total.
Hardening baseline
Broadcom's vSphere 8 SCG (developed with vSphere 8 Update 3) is the primary baseline. The CIS Benchmark for ESX 8.0 does not cover vCenter, and Broadcom says to use its own guidance where the two conflict. The table lists the vCenter controls with the highest security value; IDs are from the SCG controls file.
| SCG control | Default | Baseline value | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|
vcenter-8.vami-updates, vcenter-8.supported | N/A | All updates applied; version within General Support | P0 / P2 |
vcenter-8.vami-firewall-restrict-access | Connections from any IP | Only authorised infrastructure and admin workstations | P0 |
vcenter-8.administration-client-session-timeout | 120 minutes | 15 minutes | P0 |
vcenter-8.administration-sso-lockout-policy-unlock-time | 300 seconds | 0 (admin must unlock) | P0 |
vcenter-8.administration-failed-login-interval | 180 seconds | 900 seconds | P1 |
vcenter-8.administration-sso-password-policy | Length 8 to 20 | Length 15 to 64 | P1 |
vcenter-8.administration-sso-password-lifetime | 90 days | 9999 (no forced expiry, per NIST SP 800-63B) | P1 |
vcenter-8.tls-profile | COMPATIBLE | NIST_2024 (8.0.3 and later) | P0 |
vcenter-8.vami-access-ssh | Deactivated | Deactivated (vCenter HA is the exception) | P2 |
vcenter-8.vami-syslog, vcenter-8.vami-time | Not configured | Site log server; at least four NTP sources | P0 |
vcenter-8.vami-backup | Not configured | File-based backup to a secured location | P0 |
vcenter-8.fips-enable | false | true (causes a reboot) | Advanced |
Distributed switch controls (reject forged transmits, MAC changes and promiscuous mode; restrict CDP/LLDP, NetFlow, port mirroring and VLAN 4095 guest tagging) are also in the SCG and apply once the feature is in use. Network placement matters as much as settings: keep vCenter on a management network that web servers and VPN pools cannot reach directly, because the BRICKSTORM path ran from an edge device or public site to vCenter. See the Ivanti Connect Secure Hardening and Integrity Checking Guide for that first hop.
Rolling out the baseline
- Audit first: run the SCG PowerCLI audit script (
audit-vcenter-8.ps1) read-only and record the gap list. Take a file-based backup before any change. - Patch and restrict: bring vCenter to the latest supported build, then apply the VAMI firewall allowlist from a jump host, keeping a console path for recovery if you lock yourself out.
- Identity changes in a pilot: configure Identity Federation or the dedicated IdP, move two administrators across, and test break-glass logins with the IdP disabled before migrating everyone.
- Roles: export current permissions, create scoped custom roles for automation and operations, and remove root-level Administrator grants in small batches, watching for failed tasks.
- Session, lockout and TLS: apply in a maintenance window. Changing the TLS profile can break older clients and integrations, so test backup and monitoring tools first; the profile can be set back to COMPATIBLE if something fails.
- Logging: enable forwarding, then build the detections above and run a tabletop that clones a test VM to prove the alert fires.
- Measure: schedule the audit script monthly and track drift.
Small versus large estates
A small team with one vCenter may not justify a separate IdP tenant; at minimum it should use local SSO groups for authorisation, a separate admin account per person, MFA through federation, and a vaulted [email protected]. Large or regulated estates, and any organisation in the sectors BRICKSTORM targets (government, legal, technology, SaaS and outsourcing providers), should isolate the management domain, use hardware-bound MFA for infrastructure administrators and put PAM approval in front of destructive actions. See the Hypervisor and Virtualisation Security Guide for architecture options.
Common misconfigurations
- vCenter rights granted to an AD group: anyone who can change that group, including a compromised help desk or provisioning tool, becomes a vCenter administrator. Use local vsphere.local groups for authorisation.
- Slow patching: vCenter fixes left unapplied for months keep old flaws usable. Apply Broadcom security updates promptly, tracking the Broadcom security advisories (VMSAs). See the UNC3886 Threat Actor Profile Guide.
- VAMI and SSH reachable from the user network: the default appliance firewall allows any source. Restrict 443, 5480 and 22 to management sources.
- Backup account with Administrator: a single stolen backup credential then allows cloning, deleting and reconfiguring every VM. Scope it and alert on use outside the backup window.
- Logs only on the appliance: 30 days of local events and no forwarding leave no evidence when a long intrusion is discovered.
- Break-glass never tested: teams discover during an IdP outage that [email protected] was never vaulted, or that its password is unknown.
Framework mapping
| vCenter control area | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | NIST CSF 2.0 | ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A | ATT&CK techniques addressed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Federation, MFA, separate admin accounts | IA-2, AC-2 | PR.AA-05 | A.5.17, A.8.5 | T1078 Valid Accounts |
| Scoped roles, small privileged groups | AC-6 | PR.AA-05 | A.8.2 | T1098 Account Manipulation |
| SCG baseline, TLS profile, firewall | CM-6, AC-17 | PR.PS-01 | A.8.9 | T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application |
| Patching within General Support | SI-2 | PR.PS-01 | A.8.8 | T1190, T1505.003 Web Shell |
| Event forwarding and retention | AU-6, AU-9 | PR.PS-04, DE.CM-09 | A.8.15, A.8.16 | T1003.003 NTDS, T1564.006 Run Virtual Instance |
| vpxuser rotation, SSH off | AC-2, CM-6 | PR.AA-05 | A.8.2 | T1021.004 SSH |
In CIS Controls v8.1 terms this work sits mainly in Control 4 (Secure Configuration), Control 5 (Account Management), Control 6 (Access Control Management), Control 7 (Continuous Vulnerability Management) and Control 8 (Audit Log Management).
Practitioner checklist
- Patch vCenter to the latest supported build and treat critical VMSAs as emergency changes.
- Restrict the appliance firewall so 443, 5480 and 22 accept only management sources.
- Authorise administrators through local vsphere.local groups and federate sign-in to an MFA-enforcing IdP that the help desk cannot reset.
- Review membership of Administrators, BashShellAdministrators, CAAdmins, DCAdmins and ActAsUsers, and remove root-level Administrator grants that are not needed.
- Vault [email protected] and appliance root separately, and test both with the IdP offline.
- Give every integration its own service account with a scoped custom role, an owner and a monitored credential.
- Forward vCenter events and appliance syslog to the SIEM, keep them well beyond 30 days, and alert on clones, snapshots and disk attaches of tier 0 VMs.
- Apply the SCG P0 controls (session timeout, unlock time 0, TLS profile NIST_2024, NTP, backup) and run the SCG audit script monthly.
- Remove plugins and solution users you do not use.
Standards and references
- Broadcom: VMware vSphere Security Configuration and Hardening Guide
- Broadcom: BRICKSTORM Defense Guide
- Broadcom: BRICKSTORM Detection Audit Events Reference
- Broadcom: VCF Identity and Access Management Best Practices
- Broadcom: Groups in the vsphere.local Domain
- Broadcom: VMware vCenter 8.0.3 Event Reference
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: VMware ESXi Hardening Guide · BRICKSTORM Backdoor Guide · ESXi Ransomware Playbook · Privileged Access Management Guide · Backup Identity Isolation Guide