An adversary with control of an ESXi host or vCenter can run programs inside your virtual machines through the hypervisor's own management channel, without logging in to the guest and, in documented cases, without leaving a logon event in it. MITRE ATT&CK T1675 ESXi Administration Command, added in 2025 under Execution (TA0002) on the ESXi platform, covers abuse of ESXi administration services, chiefly VMware Tools guest operations, to execute commands on guest machines. ATT&CK names the vSphere Web Services SDK operations involved, such as StartProgramInGuest, ListProcessesInGuest, ListFilesInGuest and InitiateFileTransferFromGuest. This guide covers the technique view: how the channel works, the published cases, what ATT&CK v20 tells you to detect, the single listed mitigation and the practical controls around it, and how to test. It is for virtualisation administrators, SOC analysts and detection engineers. For host hardening in depth, see the VMware ESXi Hardening Guide.
Key takeaways
- The hypervisor is an execution path into every guest. The VMware Tools daemon in each VM accepts management requests from the host, which is exactly what T1675 abuses.
- Guest logs may stay silent. Mandiant reported that UNC3886's guest operations on Windows guests produced no 4624 or 4634 events, so detection has to start at the host and vCenter.
- The privilege is specific and grantable. vSphere separates guest operation program execution, modifications and queries; ATT&CK's only mitigation, M1018, is to withhold them where not required.
- vCenter service credentials are the pivot. UNC3886 recovered vpxuser credentials for every connected host from a compromised vCenter, a non-human identity that reaches the whole estate.
- Turning the channel off is a real option. Broadcom documents settings to disable guest operations per VM or in VMware Tools, at the cost of tools that depend on them.
What T1675 covers
ATT&CK describes persistent background services on ESXi-hosted VMs that allow remote management from the ESXi server. The VMware Tools daemon runs as vmtoolsd.exe on Windows guests, vmware-tools-daemon on macOS and vmtoolsd on Linux. Through the vSphere Web Services SDK, an adversary can run programs and scripts in the guest and move files, enabling follow-on techniques inside the VM such as T1083 File and Directory Discovery, T1005 Data from Local System and T1003 OS Credential Dumping. The technique (version 1.0) was created on 28 March 2025.
| Guest operation (API) | What it does |
|---|---|
| StartProgramInGuest | Runs a program or script inside the guest OS |
| InitiateFileTransferToGuest | Uploads a file into the guest |
| InitiateFileTransferFromGuest | Downloads a file from the guest |
| ListFilesInGuest, ListProcessesInGuest | Enumerates files and processes in the guest |
vSphere governs these operations with privileges on the virtual machine object:
| Privilege (vSphere Client) | API name | Broadcom description |
|---|---|---|
| Guest operation program execution | VirtualMachine.GuestOperations.Execute | Guest operations that involve running an application in the VM |
| Guest operation modifications | VirtualMachine.GuestOperations.Modify | Modifications to the guest OS, such as transferring a file to the VM |
| Guest Operation Queries | VirtualMachine.GuestOperations.Query | Queries of the guest OS, such as listing files |
| Guest operation alias modification and alias query | VirtualMachine.GuestOperations.ModifyAliases, QueryAliases | Changing and reading guest operation aliases for the VM |
Each privilege can be set on the VM or inherited from a folder. Under normal operation, guest operations also require credentials for the guest; Mandiant lists name and password, SAML token, SSPI and ticketed session methods.
Two related techniques sit nearby and have their own pages: T1673 Virtual Machine Discovery, which usually comes first, and T1059.012 Hypervisor CLI, which covers commands run on the host itself rather than in guests.
How adversaries use it: cases
- UNC3886 (G1048) and VIRTUALPITA (S1217): ATT&CK v20 records UNC3886 using
vmtoolsd.exeto run commands on guest VMs from a compromised ESXi host, and VIRTUALPITA executing commands on guests from compromised hypervisors. Mandiant's June 2023 report describes the chain: the group recovered cleartext vpxuser passwords for all connected ESXi hosts from a compromised vCenter Server, installed backdoored VIBs, then used CVE-2023-20867 in VMware Tools to run privileged guest operations without guest credentials. Its scripts mapped to StartProgramInGuest, file transfer to and from the guest, ListFilesInGuest and ListProcessesInGuest. See the UNC3886 Threat Actor Profile Guide. - The Gentlemen ransomware (S9051): ATT&CK v20 records it using ESXi administration commands including
vmkfstoolsto modify the compromised system, citing Check Point Research (April 2026). Ransomware operators who reach the hypervisor gain leverage over every VM at once; see the ESXi Ransomware Playbook.
The lesson from the UNC3886 case is about identity as much as vulnerabilities: the exploit needed privileged host access (root or vpxuser), and the group obtained it through a vCenter service account. Mandiant notes the vpxuser credentials are encrypted at rest and rotate every 30 days by default, yet were recoverable with root on vCenter.
What to detect and where
ATT&CK v20 detection strategy DET0232 has one analytic for ESXi. It uses the Application Log Content data component from the ESXi hostd log, looking for guest operations API calls (StartProgramInGuest, ListProcessesInGuest, ListFileInGuest, InitiateFileTransferFromGuest), with emphasis on unusual frequency, calls from unexpected management accounts and activity outside business hours. NHI Mgmt Group recommends extending that to every layer that can see the request:
| Layer | Source | What to look for |
|---|---|---|
| ESXi host | hostd log (DET0232) | Guest operations API calls, the calling user, and the target VM; any guest operation by vpxuser or root that does not match a known automation job |
| Per VM | vmware.log in the VM folder | Guest operations entries showing host-to-guest execution and file transfer; see the ESXi Logs Detection Guide |
| vCenter | vCenter events and task history | Guest operation tasks, the account that requested them, and grants of guest operations privileges to new roles or users |
| Guest OS | EDR process telemetry | Processes spawned by vmtoolsd.exe or vmtoolsd, especially shells, script interpreters and credential tools; do not rely on logon events alone |
| Host configuration | ESXi syslog and configuration audit | Firewall allow-list changes, VIB installs with forced or unsigned acceptance, and logging being disabled, which Mandiant saw before and around guest operations |
Baselining
Legitimate tools use the same channel: backup software, patching, guest customisation and administrators running PowerCLI Invoke-VMScript, which the VMware vSphere blog describes as a guest operations feature. Build an allowlist of the service accounts, source hosts and schedules that use guest operations, and alert on anything else. Expect a small, stable set; if guest operations are rare in your estate, every call is worth a look.
Guest-side signal that holds
Even when authentication events are missing, the program still runs. A child process of the VMware Tools daemon that is a command shell, PowerShell, a scripting engine or a tool that reads credential stores is a high-value EDR rule. Tune it against the allowlist above, since administrative scripts produce the same parent-child relationship.
Mitigations
| Control | Source | How to apply |
|---|---|---|
| M1018 User Account Management | ATT&CK v20, the only listed mitigation | If not required, restrict permission to perform guest operations. Remove the guest operations privileges from custom roles; grant them only to named automation accounts on the VM folders they manage |
| Disable guest commands per VM or host | Broadcom knowledge base | guest.commands.enabled = "FALSE" in a VM's VMX file, or host-wide in /etc/vmware/config; Broadcom notes this also stops backup and update tools that rely on the VIX API |
| Disable guest operations in VMware Tools | VMware vSphere blog | VMwareToolboxCmd.exe config set guestoperations disabled true where other management tooling covers ad hoc commands |
| Patch VMware Tools and ESXi | Mandiant, VMware advisory VMSA-2023-0013 | Keep VMware Tools current on every guest; apply vendor security updates promptly |
| Protect vCenter and host credentials | NHI Mgmt Group recommendation | Treat vCenter, vpxuser and root on ESXi as tier zero; restrict vCenter shell access, isolate management networks and monitor for credential access on vCenter. See the VMware vCenter Server Hardening Guide |
Where identity fits
T1675 is reached through identities, almost all of them non-human: vCenter's vpxuser account on each host, backup and automation service accounts holding guest operations privileges, and the guest credentials those tools store to authenticate guest operations. NHI Mgmt Group recommends an inventory of every account that holds guest operations privileges, with an owner, a purpose and a review date; vaulting any guest credentials that automation uses; and alerts when a privileged human account suddenly performs guest operations it never used before. See the MITRE ATT&CK T1078 Valid Accounts Guide and the Hypervisor and Virtualisation Security Guide.
How to implement, in order
- Find who uses guest operations: export vCenter roles and list every role holding the execute, modify or query guest operations privileges, then ask backup, patching and automation owners which jobs depend on them.
- Collect the logs: forward ESXi
hostdand syslog to the SIEM and confirm guest operations entries arrive; confirm EDR coverage on guests showsvmtoolsdchild processes. - Baseline for two to four weeks: record accounts, sources, VMs and times of legitimate guest operations.
- Reduce privileges: remove guest operations privileges from roles that do not need them, starting with test clusters. Roll back by restoring the exported role definition.
- Disable the channel where it is not needed: pilot
guest.commands.enabled = "FALSE"on a set of VMs whose backup method does not use guest operations, check backups and patching, then widen. - Turn on alerts: guest operations from accounts or sources outside the baseline, and suspicious child processes of the tools daemon.
Decision guidance
- Disable or restrict? Disable guest operations on VMs where backup and management do not depend on them, particularly domain controllers, PAM and identity servers. Where tools depend on them, restrict the privilege to named service accounts and monitor.
- Small estates: a single cluster with one backup product can usually remove the privilege from every human role and monitor the one service account.
- Large estates and service providers: scope guest operations privileges to folders per tenant or business unit, so a compromised automation account cannot reach every VM.
How to test your coverage
With change approval in a test cluster, run a harmless command in a test VM through guest operations, first with the approved automation account and then with an account outside the baseline, outside business hours. Confirm the hostd entries reach the SIEM, the anomaly rule fires for the second run, vCenter records the task, and guest EDR shows the child process of the tools daemon. Then confirm that a VM with guest commands disabled refuses the request. Record results with the ATT&CK coverage mapping guide.
Measuring it
- Number of vCenter roles and accounts holding guest operations privileges, trending down.
- Percentage of ESXi hosts forwarding
hostdlogs to the SIEM. - Percentage of tier-zero VMs with guest commands disabled.
- Guest operations calls outside the baseline per month, and time to triage each.
- Percentage of guests with current VMware Tools.
Common failure patterns
- Watching only the guest: Mandiant showed guest operations without Windows logon events, so guest-only monitoring misses the technique.
- Broad custom roles: administrator-cloned roles keep guest operations privileges that nobody uses.
- vCenter treated as an ordinary server: compromise of vCenter gave UNC3886 credentials for every connected host.
- Disabling guest operations without checking backups: Broadcom warns that backup and update tools relying on the VIX API stop working, which leads teams to revert the change rather than scope it.
- No ESXi log forwarding: local logs can be disabled or edited by an adversary with host access, as Mandiant observed.
Framework mapping
| Framework | Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1675 (TA0002 Execution); M1018; related T1673, T1059.012, T1078 | The technique, its mitigation and the discovery, host command and account techniques around it |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | AC-6, AC-2, CM-7, AU-6, SI-4 | Least privilege for guest operations, account management, least functionality, log review and monitoring |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.AA-05, PR.PS-01, DE.CM-01 | Access permissions, configuration management, monitoring |
| CIS Controls v8.1 | Control 5 Account Management; Control 6 Access Control Management; Control 8 Audit Log Management | Service account inventory, privilege scoping and logging |
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A | A.8.2 Privileged access rights; A.8.9 Configuration management; A.8.15 Logging | Privilege control, configuration and logs |
Practitioner checklist
- List every vCenter role and account holding guest operations privileges, with owner and purpose.
- Remove guest operations privileges from roles that do not need them.
- Disable guest commands on tier-zero VMs whose backup method allows it.
- Forward ESXi
hostdand syslog off-host and alert on guest operations outside the baseline. - Alert on shells and script engines spawned by the VMware Tools daemon in guests.
- Treat vCenter, vpxuser and ESXi root as tier zero and monitor access to them.
- Keep VMware Tools and ESXi patched.
- Test the detection end to end in a test cluster at least twice a year.
Standards and references
- MITRE ATT&CK: T1675 ESXi Administration Command
- MITRE ATT&CK: M1018 User Account Management
- Broadcom: Virtual Machine Guest Operations Privileges (vSphere 8.0)
- Broadcom Knowledge Base: How to disable guest operations
- VMware vSphere Blog: Security with VMware Tools
- Mandiant (Google Cloud): VMware ESXi Zero-Day Used by Chinese Espionage Actor to Perform Privileged Guest Operations
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: VMware ESXi Hardening Guide, VMware ESXi Forensics, ATT&CK Execution Tactic Guide, UNC3886 Threat Actor Profile Guide, T1673 Virtual Machine Discovery.