The NCSC's 10 Steps to Cyber Security and its 14 Cloud Security Principles are the two pieces of UK government guidance most often quoted in contracts, audits and board papers, yet they are often cited without being turned into work anyone can check. The 10 Steps (version 1.0, published 11 May 2021) breaks the job of protecting an organisation into ten components and is written for security professionals in medium and large organisations. The Cloud Security Principles (version 2.1, reviewed 7 June 2023) help you choose a cloud or SaaS provider that meets your security needs. This guide turns both into owners, evidence and measures, shows how the cloud principles plug into Step 10 (supply chain) and Step 6 (identity), and calls out where machine identities need more attention than the source text gives them. It sits between the Cyber Essentials Guide (a baseline for commodity attacks) and the NCSC Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF) Guide (outcome-based assessment for essential services).
Key takeaways
- Two documents, two jobs. The 10 Steps describes how to run your own security; the 14 Cloud Security Principles describe what to expect from a provider and how to evidence it. Configuring your own cloud tenancy securely is a separate task.
- Risk management comes first. Step 1 asks for board-approved policy, a chosen risk method and an understanding of residual risk; the other nine steps are how you act on it.
- Baselines are not enough. The NCSC itself says Cyber Essentials does not cover all cyber risks, so tailored risk analysis is still needed on top of it.
- Service identities count. Cloud Principle 10 expects service identities to be authenticated as robustly as users, with lifecycle processes so no service credential stays valid indefinitely.
- Evidence beats assertion. For each principle, record what the provider claims, how it is backed up (contract, certification, independent test) and what you still own.
Where the 10 Steps and the Cloud Principles sit
UK organisations meet several NCSC products. They are complementary, not competing, and the right starting point depends on size and regulatory position.
| NCSC guidance | Audience the NCSC names | What it gives you | Use it for |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cyber Essentials | All organisations, often small | Five technical controls against commodity attacks, with certification | A minimum bar, and a supplier requirement |
| 10 Steps to Cyber Security | Medium to large organisations with someone dedicated to cyber security (smaller firms are pointed to the Cyber Action Toolkit) | Ten components of a security programme with recommended practice | Programme design, gap analysis, board conversation (alongside the Cyber Security Toolkit for Boards) |
| 14 Cloud Security Principles | Anyone buying cloud platforms or SaaS | Goals, differentiators and implementation approaches per principle | Provider selection and assurance, contract schedules |
| Cyber Assessment Framework | Operators of essential services and others with high-consequence systems | Objectives, principles and indicators of good practice | Regulated assessment and outcome-based maturity |
For government and public sector projects the Secure by Design for UK Government Guide lists the 10 Steps and the Cloud Security Principles among the control sets a service may select.
The 10 Steps as owners, evidence and measures
The NCSC pages describe recommended practice in prose. The table below is our conversion of each step into a named owner, the evidence an assessor would ask for and one measure that shows it is working. The owner suggestions and measures are NHI Mgmt Group recommendations, not NCSC requirements.
| Step | Core NCSC expectation | Evidence to hold | Measure (ours) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Risk management | Board-approved policy; a chosen method or framework; mitigate, accept, transfer or avoid each risk; understand residual risk; reassess when threats or technology change | Risk policy with board approval date, method statement, risk register with owners | Share of top risks with a named owner and a review in the last 12 months |
| 2 Engagement and training | Security that supports people, a positive reporting culture, training that fits roles | Training plan by role, reporting channel, phishing exercise results | Time from staff report to triage |
| 3 Asset management | Know what you have, including data, devices, software and services | Asset register, system diagrams, owners | Share of discovered assets matched to a register entry |
| 4 Architecture and configuration | Design and build systems securely, maintain secure configuration | Architecture decisions, configuration baselines | Drift from baseline on high-value systems |
| 5 Vulnerability management | Automatic updates where practical, an update strategy per system, risk-based triage, unmitigated vulnerabilities in the risk register, segregate unsupported systems | Update strategy per system, scan coverage, risk register entries | Median time to patch internet-facing critical flaws |
| 6 Identity and access management | MFA on online services, tiered admin model, separate admin accounts, joiners movers leavers, regular privilege review, traceable actions | MFA coverage report, admin account list, access review records | Share of privileged accounts with MFA and a separate admin identity |
| 7 Data security | Protect data in transit, at rest and at end of life, with backups | Data classification, encryption settings, tested restores | Restore test success rate |
| 8 Logging and monitoring | Logs that answer incident questions, most important logs kept at least 6 months, tamper protection, alert when logs stop arriving, exercise detection | Log source list, retention settings, pipeline health alerts | Share of critical sources with a "no logs received" alert |
| 9 Incident management | A plan, roles, exercises and lessons learned, aligned with monitoring | Incident plan, exercise reports, post-incident reviews | Actions from last exercise closed on time |
| 10 Supply chain security | List and rank suppliers by risk, proportionate minimum requirements, contract terms for incidents and data return or deletion, include key partners in exercises | Supplier register with tiers, contract clauses, assessment records | Share of top-tier suppliers assessed in the last year |
Steps 2, 4, 7 and 9 are summarised here from the collection structure; read the NCSC step page before using the row as an audit criterion. For deeper treatment of individual steps see the Vulnerability Management Guide, the Log Management and Retention Guide and the Asset Inventory and CMDB Security Guide.
Details practitioners miss
- Step 5 sets no fixed patch deadline: the page asks for security updates "as soon as possible", especially for internet-exploitable systems, and a staggered rollout with a rollback plan. If you need a number for a policy, set it yourself and label it as yours (we suggest 14 days for critical internet-facing flaws, in line with the Cyber Essentials requirement).
- Step 5 on legacy: segregate unsupported systems, monitor them proactively and keep patching their other components (browsers, anti-malware) even when the operating system no longer gets updates.
- Step 6 on high-access roles: apply admin-grade protection to people who approve payments and developers who can change software, not only to IT administrators.
- Step 6 on monitoring: watch failed MFA second steps, logins from unexpected locations, password spraying and unexpected lockouts.
- Step 8 on the pipeline itself: alert when logs stop arriving, or when a periodic test event is not captured, and plan storage rollover so full disks do not stop services.
- Step 10 on exit: contracts should set out specific requirements for return and deletion of your information and assets.
The 14 Cloud Security Principles and what you still own
Each principle page sets goals, differentiators to look for and suggested implementation approaches. The NCSC is clear that the suggestions are not exhaustive and that you should analyse both the service and the company running it. The right-hand column is our view of the customer-side work that remains however good the provider is; see the Shared Responsibility Models Guide.
| No. | Principle | Ask the provider | Customer-side work (ours) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Data in transit protection | How data is protected from tampering and eavesdropping across networks | Enforce TLS on your own endpoints and integrations |
| 2 | Asset protection and resilience | Data location, physical protection, sanitisation, resilience | Choose regions, configure backups and key management |
| 3 | Separation between customers | How separation works across compute, storage, data flows and networking, and what is inherited from underlying services | Separate your own environments and tenants |
| 4 | Governance framework | Who directs security of the service through its lifetime | Map provider governance to your risk register |
| 5 | Operational security | Vulnerability, monitoring, change and incident management | Subscribe to provider advisories and status feeds |
| 6 | Personnel security | Staff vetting and technical controls that audit and limit staff actions | Use provider operator access controls where offered |
| 7 | Secure development | Secure design and an automated, audited deployment pipeline | Apply the same to code you deploy on the platform |
| 8 | Supply chain security | How third parties are held to the provider's standards | Record sub-processors in your supplier register |
| 9 | Secure user management | Tools for managing your use, including role-based access control | Design roles, review membership, restrict console access |
| 10 | Identity and authentication | MFA for users, service identities authenticated as robustly as users, service credential lifecycle | Federate users, replace static keys with workload identity, own break-glass |
| 11 | External interface protection | How APIs, web consoles and command line interfaces are defended | Restrict which interfaces you expose and to whom |
| 12 | Secure service administration | Tiered admin, privileged access management with just-in-time and just-enough access, detailed admin audit | Apply the same pattern to your own administrators |
| 13 | Audit information and alerting for customers | What audit data you get, format, retention, deletion protection, and prompt automated security alerts | Ingest logs and alerts into your SOC and test them |
| 14 | Secure use of the service | Help to meet your data protection duties; secure by design and default | Configure the service securely and train users |
For the operator-access side of Principles 6 and 12 see the Cloud Provider Support and Operator Access Controls Guide.
Where identity fits: Step 6 and Principle 10 for machine identities
The 10 Steps identity page has no dedicated section on service accounts; it mentions device-to-service authentication and the need to protect credentials at rest and in transit. Cloud Principle 10 goes further, and its expectations are useful well beyond cloud buying:
- Robust service authentication: service identities should be authenticated as robustly as users, through a cryptographic assertion such as a signature from a private key or a secure key exchange, plus risk factors.
- Context: the NCSC says workload service identities used from outside the cloud environment should be rejected and treated as breached. Build detections for cloud workload credentials used from unexpected networks.
- Lifecycle: the provider should rotate and revoke service credentials so none stays valid indefinitely, and user credentials should follow joiner, mover and leaver processes.
- Exposure alerts: a preferred provider alerts customers when credentials appear in public locations such as code repositories or breach data sites, ideally with a remediation option.
- Break-glass: where users are federated to a corporate directory, keep a well-monitored break-glass administrator account.
In practice, extend Step 6 with an explicit inventory of service accounts, API keys, tokens and certificates, each with an owner and an expiry. See the Service Account Security Guide, the Cloud Workload Identity Guide and the Secrets Management Guide.
Assessing a provider against the principles
The NCSC asks you to consider what evidence a provider offers for its claims and whether it has published a response to the principles, which sets out in one place how it believes it meets the goals. A workable assessment record for each principle has four parts.
- Claim: the provider's statement, quoted from its published response or security documentation.
- Evidence type: contract term, independent certification or audit report, penetration test summary, or self-assertion. For Principle 3 the NCSC looks for externally audited evidence of regular penetration testing, including red and blue team exercises.
- Fit: whether the mechanism suits your use. Principle 3 notes that stronger separation matters most where customers can run their own code (normal for IaaS and PaaS, not SaaS), and that containerisation without hardware backing should be limited to functional separation.
- Residual action: what you configure, monitor or accept, entered in your risk register under Step 1.
For Principle 13 test, not just read: the NCSC suggests providers offer a way to simulate alerts so you can check your handling without waiting for a real incident, and that audit information must not be deletable by you or the provider during the retention period. See the Cloud Logging and Audit Trail Guide.
Decision guidance
- Small organisation, no dedicated security role: start with Cyber Essentials and the NCSC's small-business material; read the 10 Steps as a roadmap rather than a checklist.
- Medium or large organisation: use the 10 Steps as the programme structure and report to the board against it; add a tailored risk method under Step 1.
- Buying SaaS: weight Principles 9, 10, 13 and 14 most, since you cannot run code and most risk sits in user management, identity, audit and configuration.
- Buying IaaS or PaaS: weight Principles 3, 11 and 12 as well, because separation and administration interfaces carry more risk where tenants run code.
- Regulated essential service: use the CAF for assessment and keep the 10 Steps as the operating model beneath it.
How to implement
- Baseline (weeks 1 to 4): score each step as not started, partial or in place, with evidence links. Name an owner per step.
- Risk method (weeks 2 to 6): agree the method under Step 1, define risk scores so staff interpret them consistently, and get board approval of the policy.
- Quick wins (months 2 to 3): MFA on all online services and admin accounts, separate admin identities, automatic updates where practical, log pipeline health alerts.
- Cloud register (months 2 to 4): list cloud and SaaS services from finance and identity provider data, tier them by data and business impact, and assess the top tier against all 14 principles.
- Machine identity extension (months 3 to 6): inventory service credentials, set owners and expiry, and move cloud workloads to short-lived federated credentials where the platform supports it.
- Exercise and review (ongoing): run an incident exercise including key suppliers, feed lessons back into monitoring, and reassess when threats, technology or use change. Roll back any control that breaks a business process through change management, record the exception and its residual risk, and set a date to revisit it.
Detection and measurement
- MFA coverage: percentage of human accounts, and separately admin accounts, with MFA enforced.
- Service credential age: share of service credentials older than your rotation target (we suggest 90 days for long-lived secrets where they cannot yet be removed).
- Log health: critical log sources with a working "no data" alert, and retention of at least 6 months for the most important logs.
- Patch latency: median days to deploy critical updates on internet-facing systems.
- Supplier assurance: top-tier suppliers and cloud services with a current assessment against the relevant principles.
- Exercise follow-through: actions from the last incident exercise closed by their due date.
Framework mapping
| NCSC element | NIST CSF 2.0 | NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 |
|---|---|---|
| Step 1 Risk management | GV.RM, ID.RA | RA-3 |
| Step 2 Engagement and training | PR.AT | AT-2 |
| Step 3 Asset management | ID.AM | CM-8 |
| Step 4 Architecture and configuration | PR.PS, PR.IR | CM-2, CM-7 |
| Step 5 Vulnerability management | ID.RA, PR.PS | RA-5, SI-2 |
| Step 6 and Principles 9, 10, 12 | PR.AA | AC-2, AC-6, IA-2 |
| Step 7 and Principle 1 | PR.DS | SC-8 |
| Step 8 and Principle 13 | DE.CM | AU-6, AU-9, AU-11 |
| Step 9 Incident management | RS.MA | IR-4 |
| Step 10 and Principle 8 | GV.SC | SR-3, SR-6 |
This mapping is NHI Mgmt Group's own alignment by subject; the NCSC does not publish an official crosswalk on these pages.
Common failure patterns
- Quoting the 10 Steps as a certification: there is no 10 Steps certificate. Claims of "10 Steps compliance" in tenders need evidence per step.
- Treating a provider's principles response as your assurance: the response is a claim. Record the evidence behind it and the customer-side work that remains.
- Ignoring service identities: MFA on people while static API keys and service account passwords never expire leaves the gap Principle 10 warns about.
- Short or silent logs: default retention shorter than 6 months, no alert when a source goes quiet, and admins able to delete audit data.
- Admin from everyday devices: using the same account and device for email and administration, against the Step 6 advice on separate accounts and restricted web and email on admin devices.
- Supplier lists without tiers: assessing every supplier the same way, so the highest-risk providers get no deeper review.
Practitioner checklist
- Name an owner and evidence location for each of the 10 Steps.
- Get board approval of the risk management policy and define your risk scores.
- Enforce MFA on all online services, and separate admin accounts with restricted web and email access.
- Inventory service accounts, API keys, tokens and certificates with owners and expiry dates.
- Keep the most important logs for at least 6 months, protect them from tampering and alert when they stop.
- Write a software update strategy per system and record unmitigated vulnerabilities in the risk register.
- Tier suppliers and assess top-tier cloud and SaaS services against all 14 principles, with evidence types recorded.
- Add incident reporting and data return or deletion terms to supplier contracts.
- Exercise incident response with key suppliers and track the actions to closure.
Standards and references
- NCSC: 10 Steps to Cyber Security
- NCSC: The Cloud Security Principles
- NCSC: 10 Steps, Identity and access management
- NCSC: 10 Steps, Logging and monitoring
- NCSC: 10 Steps, Vulnerability management
- NCSC: 10 Steps, Supply chain security
- NCSC: Cloud Security Principle 10, Identity and authentication
- NCSC: Cloud Security Principle 13, Audit information and alerting for customers
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Cyber Essentials Guide · NCSC Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF) Guide · Cloud Security Guide · Privileged Access Workstations Guide · Non-Human Identity (NHI) Guide