New Zealand has no single cyber security law, so banks, insurers, fund managers and infrastructure operators face a patchwork of regulator guidance, licence conditions and a pending critical infrastructure regime with different clocks and different recipients. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) sets cyber resilience expectations and mandatory incident reporting for prudentially regulated entities, the Financial Markets Authority (FMA) imposes a 72-hour notification licence condition, telecommunications operators answer to the GCSB under TICSA, and the Government consulted in 2026 on mandatory cyber rules for about 200 critical infrastructure entities. This guide sets out what each regime requires, who it binds and how to run one programme across them. It is for security, risk and compliance leads in New Zealand financial services and critical infrastructure. Government agency controls are in the NZISM guide and privacy breach rules in the Privacy Act guide.
Status checked 14 November 2026 against RBNZ, FMA, DPMC and legislation.govt.nz sources. The critical infrastructure regime is a proposal, not law, so confirm the position before relying on any date or figure.
Key takeaways
- RBNZ reporting is mandatory: banks, non-bank deposit takers and insurers have reported material cyber incidents within 72 hours since 8 April 2024, and complete a cyber resilience survey against the April 2021 Guidance.
- FMA licensees have their own clock: a standard licence condition in force since 1 July 2024 requires a business continuity plan, resilient critical technology systems and notice within 72 hours of determining a material incident.
- One incident can mean two reports: RBNZ and FMA thresholds differ, but the FMA's form accepts the RBNZ template, so dual-regulated entities should build one process.
- Critical infrastructure rules are coming, not here: DPMC's consultation closed on 19 April 2026; the proposal includes 24-hour initial and 72-hour full incident reports to the NCSC, a risk management programme and director attestations, with no legislation date set.
- Telecommunications already has a security regime: TICSA requires network operators to notify the GCSB before changes in areas of specified security interest, including systems holding aggregated authentication credentials.
The regimes at a glance
For the government sector control baseline see the New Zealand Information Security Manual (NZISM); for notifiable privacy breaches see the New Zealand Privacy Act Guide. This page covers the sector rules those guides do not.
| Regime | Who it binds | Status | Incident clock | Recipient |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RBNZ Guidance on Cyber Resilience | Registered banks, non-bank deposit takers, licensed insurers, designated financial market infrastructures | Issued April 2021, principle based | None in the Guidance itself | RBNZ (supervisory dialogue) |
| RBNZ cyber resilience data collection | Banks, non-bank deposit takers, insurers | Material reporting from 8 April 2024 | As soon as practicable, within 72 hours of detection | RBNZ |
| FMA standard condition on business continuity and technology systems | Managers of registered schemes, discretionary investment management providers, derivatives issuers, peer-to-peer lending and crowdfunding providers | In force 1 July 2024 | As soon as possible, within 72 hours of determining a material incident | FMA (online form) |
| FMA conduct licensing (CoFI) | Licensed financial institutions | Check current FMA licence conditions (Bell Gully summary) | Reported as within 72 hours of determining a material incident affecting service supply | FMA |
| Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Act 2013, Part 3 | Network operators | In force | Notice before procurement or architecture change in specified areas | Director (GCSB) |
| Proposed critical infrastructure cyber regime | About 200 critical infrastructure entities in seven sectors | Consultation closed 19 April 2026; awaiting Cabinet decisions | Proposed 24-hour initial, 72-hour full report | NCSC (proposed) |
RBNZ: Guidance on Cyber Resilience and mandatory reporting
The RBNZ issued its Guidance on Cyber Resilience in April 2021 after a consultation that closed on 29 January 2021. It is high-level and principle based, so entities tailor it to their size and technology. It has four parts:
- Governance: board and senior management roles and an effective cyber resilience strategy.
- Capability building: five focus areas for building and testing cyber capability.
- Information sharing: choosing reliable channels and building a trusted environment for sharing threat information.
- Third-party management: managing cyber risk arising from outsourcing and service providers.
The three data collections
After consulting in 2023, the RBNZ confirmed three reporting duties for banks, non-bank deposit takers and insurers. Large entities are those with total assets of at least NZ$2 billion.
| Collection | What is reported | Frequency | Start |
|---|---|---|---|
| Material cyber incident report | Initial report, incident update and post-incident conclusions, on the RBNZ template | Per incident, as soon as practicable and within 72 hours | 8 April 2024 |
| Periodic report of all incidents | Total incidents, number material, breakdown by type such as phishing and malware, affected clients where possible | Large entities six-monthly, others annually; the RBNZ page shows this collection as currently paused | First reports were due 30 April 2025 (large) and 30 October 2025 (others) |
| Cyber resilience survey | Self-assessment against the Guidance: governance, capability, information sharing, third parties | Large entities yearly, others every two years | First due 1 October 2024 |
An incident is material if it has materially affected, or could have materially affected, the entity or its depositors, policyholders, beneficiaries or other customers, financially or otherwise. Bell Gully notes that this definition is broad, and that it is unclear whether a short outage that is fixed quickly counts. In practice most entities report early and update later rather than argue about materiality inside the 72-hour window.
FMA: licence conditions and conduct rules
The FMA announced its standard condition on business continuity and technology systems on 8 April 2024, and it took effect on 1 July 2024. It applies to managers of registered schemes (other than restricted schemes), discretionary investment management service providers, derivatives issuers, and peer-to-peer lending and crowdfunding providers. Each must:
- Maintain a business continuity plan suited to the scale and scope of the service.
- Ensure critical technology systems are operationally resilient.
- Notify the FMA as soon as possible, and no later than 72 hours after determining it is a material incident, of any event that materially affects the supply of the service.
The FMA runs a secure online notification form built to match the RBNZ cyber incident process, so a dual-regulated entity can reuse one set of facts. Licensed financial institutions under the conduct of financial institutions (CoFI) regime have a parallel 72-hour duty when an incident materially affects supply of their service. Because RBNZ and FMA thresholds are not identical, an incident can trigger one report, both, or neither.
Telecommunications: TICSA network security duties
Part 3 of the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Act 2013 applies to network operators. Section 46 requires them to engage with the Director (the head of the GCSB) as soon as practicable once aware of a network security risk. Section 47 defines areas of specified security interest:
- Network operations centres.
- Lawful interception equipment or operations.
- Aggregated customer information or authentication credentials: any part of a network that manages or stores aggregated customer information or aggregated authentication credentials, including privileged user credentials.
- Large aggregations of customer or end-user data, in transit or at rest.
- Any area added by Order in Council.
Section 48 requires notice of proposed procurement or changes in these areas before going to market, so the Director can assess and, under sections 51 to 57, advise, require mitigations or refer significant risks to the Minister, who can make binding directions. Section 60 requires operators to register within three months of becoming an operator.
The proposed critical infrastructure cyber regime
DPMC ran a first critical infrastructure resilience consultation in mid-2023, then published Enhancing the cyber security of New Zealand's critical infrastructure system in February 2026. Consultation ran from 27 February to 19 April 2026 and is closed; feedback will inform advice to Cabinet, and no bill or timetable had been published when this page was checked. The supporting document scores six candidate measures: government information collection, a voluntary information exchange, required sharing between entities, mandatory incident reporting, a risk management programme aligned to an internationally recognised framework, and a power to direct the management of cyber threats for national security reasons.
Russell McVeagh's summary of the discussion document sets out the proposed detail:
- Scope: about 200 entities in communications and data (including data centres and cloud services), defence, energy, finance (systemically important domestic banks, financial market infrastructure and NZX), health, transport and water. Airlines, insurers and managed funds are proposed to be excluded.
- Incident reporting: significant incidents reported to the NCSC with an initial report within 24 hours and a full report within 72 hours, plus regular reporting of all incidents.
- Risk management: a cyber risk management programme based on a recognised framework such as NIST CSF or ISO/IEC 27001:2022, covering critical components, material risks and treatment.
- Governance: directors responsible for compliance, shown first through formal attestations.
- Nationally significant entities: a small, confidential group with stronger minimum standards and faster reporting.
- Penalties: administrative fines up to $50,000, civil penalties up to $200,000, and criminal fines for serious breaches of up to the greater of $5 million or 2% of turnover for entities and up to $500,000 for directors, with a one-year grace period before enforcement.
The New Zealand Cyber Security Strategy action plan lists mandatory cyber resilience requirements for critical infrastructure among its initiatives, alongside a possible penalty regime under the Privacy Act 2020. Treat every figure above as a proposal that may change at Cabinet or select committee. Organisations in Australia will recognise the shape: see the Australia SOCI Act Guide.
Where identity and machine credentials fit
TICSA is the only New Zealand statute here that names authentication credentials directly: systems that store aggregated credentials, including privileged user credentials, are an area of specified security interest, so moving a privileged access vault or identity provider can be a notifiable change. The RBNZ Guidance's third-party part and the proposed critical infrastructure risk programme both reach the service accounts, API keys and integration tokens that suppliers use to operate your systems. When drafting a 72-hour report, the first question a regulator asks is which identities were used; an inventory of non-human identities with owners and scopes makes that answerable. See the APRA CPS 234 Guide for a comparable prudential standard that sets explicit expectations on third-party information security.
Running one programme across the regimes
- Map obligations: list each legal entity, its RBNZ registration or licence, FMA licences, TICSA operator status and likely critical infrastructure designation.
- Adopt one framework: align controls to NIST CSF 2.0 or ISO/IEC 27001:2022 now, since the critical infrastructure proposal names both and the RBNZ survey asks about the same areas.
- Build a single incident pipeline: one triage step that decides materiality for RBNZ, FMA, Privacy Act and, later, NCSC, with a 24-hour internal target so the proposed shortest clock is already met.
- Reuse the RBNZ template: complete it once and submit it through the FMA form where both regulators are engaged.
- Prepare board evidence: brief directors on the survey results and on the attestation model proposed for critical infrastructure.
- Govern suppliers: add incident notice, cooperation and credential handling terms to contracts for providers with operational control of critical systems.
- Test and rehearse: run an exercise that walks one incident through every report, then fix the gaps. Recheck DPMC and regulator pages each quarter.
Decision guidance
- Smaller non-bank deposit taker or insurer: survey every two years and simpler periodic reporting, but the 72-hour material incident duty is the same as for large banks.
- Dual RBNZ and FMA entity: one process, one template, two decisions on materiality.
- Likely critical infrastructure entity: start the risk management programme and director briefings now; a one-year grace period is proposed, but programmes take longer than that to mature.
- Insurer or fund manager: proposed exclusion from the critical infrastructure regime does not remove RBNZ or FMA duties.
Measuring readiness
- Reporting timeliness: hours from detection to regulator notice, tracked against 24 and 72 hours.
- Materiality decision time: hours from detection to a recorded materiality decision.
- Survey trend: movement in self-assessed maturity across RBNZ survey cycles.
- Supplier coverage: percentage of critical suppliers with incident notice and cooperation clauses.
- Credential ownership: percentage of privileged and machine credentials on critical systems with a named owner and rotation date.
Framework mapping
| Obligation | NIST CSF 2.0 | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A |
|---|---|---|---|
| Board oversight and strategy (RBNZ Part 1, director attestation) | GV.RR-01, GV.OC-03 | PM-9 | A.5.1, A.5.4 |
| 72-hour incident notice | RS.CO-02 | IR-6 | A.5.24, A.5.26 |
| Business continuity and resilient technology (FMA condition) | RC.RP-01 | CP-2 | A.5.29, A.5.30 |
| Third-party cyber risk (RBNZ Part 4) | GV.SC-05 | SR-6 | A.5.19, A.5.21 |
| Information sharing (RBNZ Part 3) | ID.RA-02 | PM-16 | A.5.6, A.5.7 |
| Credential stores (TICSA s 47) | PR.AA-05 | AC-6 | A.8.2, A.5.17 |
Common failure patterns
- Waiting for certainty on materiality: debating the broad RBNZ definition burns the 72-hour window; report and update.
- Reporting to one regulator only: RBNZ and FMA thresholds differ, so a dual-regulated entity that files once can miss the other duty.
- Treating the critical infrastructure regime as law: plans that quote proposed penalties or deadlines as fixed will need rework after Cabinet decisions.
- Ignoring TICSA on platform moves: migrating an identity provider or privileged access vault without notice to the GCSB can breach section 48.
- Supplier blind spots: managed service providers hold standing credentials to critical systems, but contracts lack incident notice or cooperation terms.
Practitioner checklist
- Record which RBNZ, FMA, TICSA and proposed critical infrastructure duties apply to each entity.
- Keep the RBNZ material incident template and FMA form access ready, with named submitters.
- Set a 24-hour internal reporting target to cover the proposed shortest clock.
- Calendar RBNZ survey dates by entity size and monitor the paused periodic collection.
- Maintain a tested business continuity plan for each FMA-licensed service.
- Screen procurement and architecture changes for TICSA areas of specified security interest.
- Inventory privileged and machine credentials on critical systems, with owners.
- Brief the board on the director attestation model and track DPMC announcements quarterly.
Standards and references
- Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Cyber resilience
- DPMC: Cyber security of critical infrastructure consultation
- DPMC: Enhancing the cyber security of New Zealand's critical infrastructure system, Supplementary document 1
- DPMC: Critical infrastructure resilience
- New Zealand Legislation: Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Act 2013
- FMA: New standard condition on business continuity and technology systems (media release)
- Bell Gully: Cybersecurity update, new reporting obligations for financial sector
- Russell McVeagh: Consultation open on cyber security regime for critical infrastructure
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: New Zealand Information Security Manual (NZISM) · New Zealand Privacy Act Guide · Cyber Incident Reporting Requirements Map · APAC Cybersecurity Laws Compared. This guide summarises New Zealand financial sector cyber requirements, TICSA and the proposed critical infrastructure regime as at November 2026 and is not legal advice.