Australia's Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 (SOCI Act) puts legal security duties on owners and operators of critical assets in eleven sectors, and a cyber incident at one of those assets can have to be reported within 12 hours. The Act sets three positive security obligations (the Register of Critical Infrastructure Assets, mandatory cyber incident reporting and the critical infrastructure risk management program, or CIRMP), adds enhanced cyber security obligations for Systems of National Significance (SoNS), and gives government powers to assist or direct in a serious incident. This guide goes through each obligation, the CIRMP Rules hazard by hazard, the reporting clocks, penalties, the findings of the 2026 Independent Review and what all of it means for privileged, remote and machine access to critical systems. It is for security, risk and compliance leads at responsible entities and their managed service and data storage providers. The ransomware payment reporting duty sits in the separate Cyber Security Act 2024 (see the Ransomware Payments and Sanctions Guide), and privacy law in the Australian Privacy and Cyber Rules Guide.
Status checked 27 October 2026: the latest compilation of the Act on the Federal Register of Legislation is C2026C00213 (June 2026). The CIRMP Rules (LIN 23/006) have applied since February 2023, with cyber framework compliance required after the grace periods. The Independent Review of the SOCI Act by Dr Jill Slay AM was delivered on 2 February 2026 and recommends major legislative change; the Cyber and Infrastructure Security Centre (CISC) says it is shifting its regulatory posture from 2026-27. No replacement Act had been passed when this guide was checked.
Key takeaways
- Three duties for most assets: register operational and ownership information (Part 2), report cyber incidents to the Australian Signals Directorate's ACSC (Part 2B) and adopt, maintain and comply with a written CIRMP (Part 2A), depending on asset class.
- Two reporting clocks: 12 hours for a critical cyber security incident with a significant impact on essential goods or services, 72 hours for one with a relevant impact; an oral report must be followed by a written one within 84 or 48 hours.
- The CIRMP is all-hazards: cyber and information security, personnel, supply chain, and physical security and natural hazards, each to be minimised or eliminated as far as reasonably practicable.
- A named cyber framework is required: AS ISO/IEC 27001, Essential Eight Maturity Level One, the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, C2M2 MIL1 or the AESCSF Framework Core SP-1, or an equivalent.
- Enforcement is about to harden: the 2026 review found penalties widely seen as ineffective and recommended a penalty-based model, Essential Eight Maturity Level Two in the CIRMP and personnel security plans with background checks.
Scope: who and what is covered
The Act covers eleven sectors: communications; financial services and markets; data storage or processing; defence industry; higher education and research; energy; food and grocery; healthcare and medical; space technology; transport; and water and sewerage. Each sector has defined critical infrastructure asset classes; section 12L identifies the responsible entity for each class, usually the licensed owner or operator.
| Obligation | Part of the Act | Who | Applies to |
|---|---|---|---|
| Notify data storage or processing providers | s 12F(3) | Responsible entities | All critical infrastructure assets |
| Register of Critical Infrastructure Assets | Part 2 | Responsible entities and direct interest holders (at least 10%, or influence or control) | Listed asset classes |
| CIRMP | Part 2A | Responsible entities | Broadcasting, domain name systems, data storage or processing, electricity, energy market operator, gas, designated hospitals, food and grocery, freight infrastructure and services, liquid fuel, certain financial market infrastructure and water assets |
| Mandatory cyber incident reporting | Part 2B | Responsible entities | Most asset classes, excluding space, defence industry and certain aviation assets; extends to data storage systems used with an asset |
| Enhanced cyber security obligations | Part 2C | Responsible entities for SoNS | Assets declared Systems of National Significance by the Minister |
| Government assistance and directions | Part 3A | Any responsible entity | Only where an incident would seriously prejudice Australia's prosperity, national security or defence |
An asset can include premises, computers and data. Components that work together as one system count as one asset. Telecommunications security obligations were consolidated into the SOCI framework in 2025. See the Critical Infrastructure Regulation Map.
Key obligations
Mandatory cyber incident reporting (Part 2B)
| Type | Test | Deadline from becoming aware | Written follow-up after oral report |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical cyber security incident (s 30BC) | Significant impact: the asset provides essential goods or services and the incident has materially disrupted their availability, for example loss of control of OT, inability to deliver services or shutting down essential services to contain the incident | 12 hours | 84 hours |
| Other cyber security incident (s 30BD) | Relevant impact on the availability, integrity, reliability of the asset or the confidentiality of information about or in it, including imminent incidents; for example corporate systems hit while the asset still delivers core functions | 72 hours | 48 hours |
- What counts: unauthorised access to or modification of computer data or programs, and unauthorised impairment of the availability, reliability, security or operation of a computer, data or program.
- Where: the ACSC online form, or by phone on 1300 292 371 (1300 CYBER1), followed by the written report.
- Overlaps: this report does not replace a Privacy Act notifiable data breach notice or a ransomware payment report under the Cyber Security Act 2024.
The CIRMP Rules hazard by hazard (LIN 23/006)
| Rule | Hazard | What the program must do |
|---|---|---|
| s 6, s 7 | All hazards (general) | Identify the operational context and material risks (examples include remote access to operational control systems, offshore storage of sensitive operational information and manipulation of critical components); minimise or eliminate risks as far as reasonably practicable; describe interdependencies and the risk methodology; name the positions responsible for the program and its review |
| s 8 | Cyber and information security | Minimise material cyber risks and comply with a listed or equivalent framework within 12 months after the grace period ends |
| s 9 | Personnel | Identify critical workers; grant access to critical components only after a suitability assessment (an AusCheck background check is optional); manage malicious or negligent insiders and off-boarding |
| s 10 | Supply chain | Address unauthorised access to the supply chain, misuse of privileged access by suppliers, disruption, and risks from major suppliers; list major suppliers |
| s 11 | Physical security and natural | Identify physical critical components; restrict access to critical workers and accompanied visitors; respond to unauthorised access; test arrangements |
- Grace periods: Part 2A did not apply until six months after the Rules commenced or the asset became a critical infrastructure asset, whichever was later; the cyber framework had to be met 12 months after that, roughly 18 months in total.
- Annual report: responsible entities must submit an annual report on the CIRMP within 90 days of the end of each Australian financial year, in practice by 28 September. Section 30AG of the Act sets the duty.
Choosing the cyber framework (CIRMP Rules s 8(4))
| Framework | Minimum level | Fits best when |
|---|---|---|
| AS ISO/IEC 27001:2015 | Compliance | You already run or plan a certified ISMS across corporate and operational systems |
| Essential Eight Maturity Model | Maturity Level One | Windows-heavy corporate IT; quick baseline, but thin on OT. See the Essential Eight Guide |
| NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity | Not specified | Multinational groups already reporting against NIST |
| C2M2 | Maturity Indicator Level 1 | Energy and utilities with OT-heavy estates |
| AESCSF 2020-21 Framework Core | Security Profile 1 | Australian energy market participants |
Small responsible entities usually reach a defensible position fastest with Essential Eight Maturity Level One plus OT-specific controls; large, OT-heavy operators tend to choose C2M2 or AESCSF because they cover operational technology directly. Given the review's recommendation, plan for Maturity Level Two either way.
Systems of National Significance (Part 2C)
For assets the Minister declares SoNS, the Secretary may require: a cyber security incident response plan, cyber security exercises, vulnerability assessments, and access to system information to support a near real-time threat picture shared with ASD. These obligations are applied by notice, not automatically.
Protected information
Information obtained under the Act, including the fact that an asset is a SoNS, is protected information. Disclosing it is an offence unless the disclosure is authorised by the Act. This is separate from the PROTECTED security classification under the Protective Security Policy Framework.
Timeline and current status
- 2018: SOCI Act enacted (Act No. 29 of 2018).
- 2021 and 2022: amendments expand the Act to eleven sectors and add the positive security obligations, SoNS and government assistance.
- 8 July 2022: mandatory cyber incident reporting starts for most asset classes.
- 17 February 2023: CIRMP Rules (LIN 23/006) commence, registered 16 February 2023.
- August 2024: cyber framework deadline passes for assets in scope at commencement; first annual reports due by 28 September 2024.
- November 2024: the Enhanced Response and Prevention amendments pass with the Cyber Security Legislative Package, extending the Act to data storage systems used with critical assets and strengthening response powers.
- 2025: telecommunications security consolidated into the SOCI framework.
- 2 February 2026: Independent Review final report delivered to the Minister.
- 2026-27: CISC changes its regulatory posture in response to the review.
Proposed CIRMP rule changes and a simpler principles-based Act may follow. Check the Federal Register of Legislation and CISC before relying on this list.
Enforcement and penalties
- Regulator: CISC in the Department of Home Affairs, with sector regulators for some assets (the Reserve Bank of Australia for certain financial market infrastructure).
- Civil penalties: expressed in penalty units. For example, law firm commentary (Clayton Utz) puts the penalty for failing to submit the CIRMP annual report at 150 penalty units; at the Commonwealth penalty unit of $364 from 1 July 2026 that would be $54,600, and higher maximums may apply to a body corporate under the general Commonwealth penalty rules.
- Criminal offences: apply to serious conduct such as unauthorised disclosure of protected information.
- Regulatory posture: CISC guidance on incident reporting focuses enforcement on egregious breaches such as failing to report critical incidents. The review recommends a move from light touch to penalty-based enforcement, so expect more compliance activity from 2026-27.
- Directions: in serious incidents the government can issue information gathering directions, action directions or intervention requests under Part 3A, which override normal commercial control.
What it means for AI agents and non-human identities
- Remote and privileged access is a named material risk: the CIRMP Rules list remote access to operational control systems as an example of a material risk, and supply chain rules call out misuse of privileged access by suppliers. Vendor service accounts, jump host credentials and integration keys must be inventoried, owned and monitored. See the OT Remote Access Guide.
- Critical workers include who holds the keys: personnel hazard rules focus on people, but the access they control often runs through shared or machine accounts. Map each critical component to the human and non-human identities that can reach it. See the OT and ICS Identity and Access Guide.
- Off-boarding covers credentials: rule 9 requires managing off-boarding risk; revoke or rotate service account passwords, API keys and certificates a departing worker or supplier knew.
- Incident clocks depend on identity telemetry: deciding within 12 hours whether OT control was lost, or whether data was accessed without authority, needs authentication logs for service accounts and automation. The Colonial Pipeline attack, where an unused VPN account without MFA led to a six-day fuel pipeline shutdown, is the kind of significant impact incident Part 2B targets.
- AI in operations is a gap the review named: the review lists AI among coverage gaps. If agents or automation can change OT setpoints or cloud configurations, treat them as critical access paths in the CIRMP now. See the Critical Infrastructure Identity Security Guide.
Framework mapping
| SOCI obligation | NIST CSF 2.0 | NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 | ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A |
|---|---|---|---|
| Register of assets (Part 2) | ID.AM-01, ID.AM-02 | CM-8 System Component Inventory | A.5.9 Inventory of information and other associated assets |
| Incident reporting (Part 2B) | RS.CO-02 | IR-6 Incident Reporting | A.5.24, A.6.8 Information security event reporting |
| CIRMP all hazards (s 7) | GV.RM-01, ID.RA-04 | RA-3 Risk Assessment, PM-9 Risk Management Strategy | Clause 6.1, A.5.1 |
| Personnel hazards (s 9) | GV.RR-04 | PS-3 Personnel Screening, PS-4 Personnel Termination | A.6.1 Screening, A.6.5 |
| Supply chain hazards (s 10) | GV.SC-07 | SR-3 Supply Chain Controls, SR-6 | A.5.19, A.5.21 |
| Remote and privileged access (s 6) | PR.AA-05 | AC-17 Remote Access, AC-6 Least Privilege | A.8.2 Privileged access rights |
| SoNS incident response plans and exercises | ID.IM-02 | IR-3 Incident Response Testing, IR-8 | A.5.26 |
Compliance steps
- Confirm asset class and responsible entity: use the asset class definitions and section 12L; record direct interest holders. Recheck after acquisitions.
- Keep the register current: assign an owner for operational and ownership information changes, and notify data storage or processing providers under s 12F(3).
- Build the reporting runbook: a decision tree for significant versus relevant impact, the ACSC phone number and form, and timers for 12 and 72 hours and the written follow-up.
- Write the CIRMP per hazard: one section per rule 7 to 11, with material risks, controls, owners and the chosen cyber framework. Get board or governing body sign-off for the annual report.
- Inventory privileged, remote and machine access: every path to critical components, including supplier and automation accounts, with an owner and MFA or certificate-based authentication.
- Test: run an OT incident exercise each year that ends with a timed ACSC report, and test physical access arrangements as rule 11 requires.
- Prepare for SoNS notices: if your asset could be declared, draft the incident response plan and exercise schedule in advance.
- Plan for the review's changes: gap-assess against Essential Eight Maturity Level Two and personnel security plans now.
Detection and measurement
- Awareness to ACSC report: time measured in exercises and real incidents, against 12 and 72 hours.
- Framework conformance: percentage of controls in the chosen framework assessed as met.
- Access path coverage: percentage of remote, supplier and machine access paths to critical components with a named owner and strong authentication.
- Critical worker assessments: percentage of critical workers with a current suitability assessment.
- Annual report on time: submitted and board-approved within 90 days of financial year end.
Common failure patterns
- Corporate-only CIRMP: a program written around IT that ignores OT, physical and supplier access.
- Misjudging impact: classifying an OT-adjacent incident as relevant impact and missing the 12-hour clock.
- Forgotten supplier accounts: integrator remote access left enabled after projects end.
- Stale register data: ownership changes not notified after restructures.
- Paper compliance: the review warns of artefact-driven compliance; controls documented but not tested.
Practitioner checklist
- Confirm the asset class, responsible entity and direct interest holders.
- Keep register information current and notify data service providers.
- Embed the 12-hour and 72-hour reporting decision in the incident runbook.
- Cover all four hazard domains in the CIRMP with named owners.
- Choose and evidence a listed cyber framework; plan for Maturity Level Two.
- Inventory and own every privileged, supplier and machine access path to critical components.
- Assess critical workers and revoke credentials at off-boarding.
- Submit the board-approved annual report by 28 September.
- Track the government response to the 2026 review.
Standards and references
- Federal Register of Legislation: Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018
- Federal Register of Legislation: Security of Critical Infrastructure (Critical infrastructure risk management program) Rules (LIN 23/006) 2023
- Cyber and Infrastructure Security Centre: Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018
- Cyber and Infrastructure Security Centre: Regulatory obligations
- Cyber and Infrastructure Security Centre: Mandatory Cyber Incident Reporting Guidance
- Department of Home Affairs: Independent Review of the SOCI Act, Final Report
- Clayton Utz: Inaugural critical infrastructure annual risk reviews due
This guide summarises the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 (Cth) and its CIRMP Rules as of 27 October 2026 and is not legal advice. Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Ransomware Payments and Sanctions Guide · Australian Privacy and Cyber Rules Guide · Critical Infrastructure Identity Security Guide · OT Security Guide