Federation concentrates trust: one signed assertion from an identity provider can open every application that accepts it, so a weak assertion, a stolen signing key or an injected response undoes every authenticator behind it. NIST SP 800-63C-4, Federation and Assertions, published as final on 31 July 2025, sets three federation assurance levels (FALs) that define how assertions are bound to their audience, protected from injection and tied to the subscriber. Revision 4 also adds explicit requirements for trust agreements, RP subscriber accounts, identity APIs, proxies and subscriber-controlled wallets. This guide is for architects and engineers running SAML or OpenID Connect between identity providers (IdPs) and relying parties (RPs), and for assessors checking FAL claims. Federation concepts and trust models are covered in the Federation and Trust Relationships Guide; this page is about meeting the standard.
Key takeaways
- FAL2 is the practical enterprise floor. It requires single-audience assertions, strong injection protection and RP-initiated flows, which rules out unsolicited IdP-initiated SAML.
- FAL3 adds proof of possession. The RP must verify that the subscriber controls an authenticator in addition to presenting the assertion, through a holder-of-key assertion or a bound authenticator.
- Trust agreements are now normative. They must define the subscriber population, expected xALs, data retention and redress, and multilateral federations must re-evaluate them periodically.
- The IdP must declare the assurance it achieved. IdPs shall indicate the IAL, AAL and FAL actually achieved, and an RP cannot assume IAL1 when no IAL is claimed.
- Deprovisioning is part of federation. Termination of an RP account shall remove federated identifiers, and an attribute API alone shall not create a session.
What it is and who it applies to
SP 800-63C-4 supersedes SP 800-63C (revision 3). It is the federation volume of the four-part revision 4 Digital Identity Guidelines and applies to US federal agencies and the IdPs, CSPs and RPs they federate with. In the private sector it is used as a security baseline for workforce single sign-on, and it is referenced by other profiles: the OpenID Foundation's IPSIE work, for example, builds its first session level on the FAL2 technical controls (see the IPSIE Guide).
- Normative sections: 2 (FALs and how xALs are requested and reported), 3 (common federation requirements: models, identifiers, trust agreements, keys, attribute disclosure, RP accounts, sessions, privacy, security controls), 4 (general-purpose IdPs) and 5 (subscriber-controlled wallets).
- Informative sections: security, privacy and customer experience considerations, and worked examples.
- Protocol-neutral: the volume names SAML and OpenID Connect only as examples (for instance XML Encryption and JWE for encrypted assertions). Requirements apply to whatever protocol carries the assertion.
Structure and key requirements
The three FALs
| Requirement | FAL1 | FAL2 | FAL3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Audience | Multiple RPs allowed; single RP recommended | Single RP | Single RP |
| Replay protection | Required | Required | Required |
| Injection protection | Should; RP should initiate | Shall be strong; transaction begins at the RP | Shall; begins at the RP |
| Trust agreement | Subscriber-driven or pre-established | Pre-established | Pre-established |
| Identifier and key establishment | Dynamic or manual | Dynamic or manual | Manual, each identifier tied to its verification keys |
| Presentation | Bearer assertion | Bearer assertion | Holder-of-key assertion or bound authenticator |
| Federated identifier content | Should not contain plaintext personal information | Shall not contain plaintext personal information | Shall not |
At every level the IdP shall sign the assertion and the RP shall validate it. Federal IdPs at FAL2 shall protect assertion signing keys with FIPS 140 Level 1 or higher.
Requesting and reporting xALs
- IdPs shall support RP-specified minimum IAL, AAL and FAL values set in the trust agreement and should support stricter requests at run time.
- IdPs shall always indicate the xAL actually achieved, even when the request was not met, and RPs shall have a mechanism for handling an unmet request.
- An RP cannot assume the account meets IAL1 when no IAL claim is made. In OpenID Connect this is typically conveyed with
acrvalues; in SAML with the AuthnContextClassRef. Agree the exact values in the trust agreement.
Assertion contents and protection
| Element | Requirement | Implementation note |
|---|---|---|
| Assertion identifier | Shall be unique enough for the RP to detect replay | SAML ID; OIDC jti or nonce tracking |
| Signature | Shall cover identifier, issuer, audience, subject and validity window | Reject unsigned or partially signed responses; never accept alg: none |
| Audience | All RPs shall check it contains their identifier; single audience required at FAL2 and above | OIDC aud equal to the client ID |
| Encryption | When contents are encrypted, use the RP's key and approved cryptography | XML Encryption for SAML, JWE for OIDC |
| Holder-of-key | Shall include an authenticator identifier the RP can verify; authenticator shall be phishing-resistant; shall not carry an unencrypted private or symmetric key | Certificate-bound or key-bound assertions |
| Federated identifier | Unique to one subscriber at the RP; pairwise pseudonymous identifiers (PPIs) shall be unguessable and contain no identifying information | Use the issuer plus subject pair, never email address alone |
Injection protection
The volume lists techniques that protect an RP from accepting an assertion it did not ask for:
- back-channel presentation of the assertion (for example the OIDC authorization code flow, where the RP fetches tokens directly);
- an unguessable value tying the RP's unauthenticated session to the request (OIDC
stateandnonce, PKCE); - RP authentication to the IdP when requesting the assertion;
- prohibiting IdP-initiated federation, except where an external party only signals the RP to start an RP-initiated flow;
- for front-channel responses, a signed response containing an RP-provided nonce;
- platform APIs instead of HTTP redirects for front-channel communication.
Trust agreements
Trust agreements shall cover the IdP to CSP, IdP to RP and RP to CSP relationships and define the subscriber population, expected xALs, customer experience requirements, proofing details, redress paths and data retention. Their terms shall be available to subscribers in clear language. Bilateral agreements carry no extra requirements; multilateral agreements under a federation authority shall enumerate vetting practices and be periodically re-evaluated. Key exchange and rotation shall follow the agreement over an authenticated protected channel, and symmetric keys shall be unique to each pair of participants. Large multilateral trust is covered in the OpenID Federation and Trust Chains Guide.
RP subscriber accounts, sessions and identity APIs
- Account states: provisioned, disabled and terminated. Termination shall remove federated identifiers, authenticators and attributes; removing a federated identifier shall block access from it.
- Notifications: the RP shall notify subscribers when a federated identifier is added, and when one is removed from an account that is not being terminated.
- Account linking: shall require an authenticated session, and resolution shall never attach information to another person's identifier.
- Sessions: an authenticated session shall be created only after a valid assertion from the expected IdP is verified and tied to a provisioned RP account; at FAL3 the holder-of-key or bound authenticator shall be verified first.
- Identity APIs: attribute APIs should require sender-constrained access, shall be time-limited by the trust agreement, shall return attributes only for the subscriber in the assertion and shall not on their own establish an authenticated session. All API use shall be recorded and disclosed in the trust agreement.
- Proxies: a federation proxy shall be the issuer of its own assertions, and the FAL of the whole path is the lowest FAL of any link.
Subscriber-controlled wallets
Revision 4 adds a second federation model alongside the general-purpose IdP. In the wallet model the CSP issues signed attribute bundles to a wallet the subscriber controls, the wallet presents them, and the RP shall validate the bundle's signature and any container signature. Wallet assertions presented from the subscriber's device can be treated as holder-of-key, and reaching FAL3 with a wallet requires non-exportable key storage (separate hardware or a protected embedded processor or execution environment). See the Digital Identity Wallets Guide and the OpenID for Verifiable Presentations Guide for the protocols most often used.
Identity and NHI requirements
SP 800-63C-4 governs assertions about people, but federation infrastructure is made of non-human identities, and most federation compromises target them:
- Assertion signing keys: the IdP's signing key or certificate is the most valuable credential in the federation. In the SolarWinds compromise attackers with on-premises admin rights obtained a trusted SAML token-signing certificate and signed their own tokens, logging in as any user without password or MFA (ATT&CK T1606.002 SAML Tokens). Keep signing keys in an HSM, restrict who can export them and monitor key and trust configuration changes. See the Golden SAML and Federation Trust Abuse Defence Guide.
- RP client credentials: OIDC client secrets and private keys authenticate the RP to the IdP and are part of injection protection. Prefer asymmetric client authentication; see the JWT Client Authentication Guide.
- Provisioning and identity API tokens: pre-provisioning grants an RP blanket identity API access outside a federation transaction, and the volume requires its privacy implications to be evaluated and recorded in the trust agreement. Treat these tokens as privileged NHI credentials.
- Federation configuration as an attack surface: adding a new trusted IdP or changing federation settings on a domain (ATT&CK T1556 Modify Authentication Process) lets an attacker mint access without touching user credentials.
Implementation steps
- Inventory federation relationships. List every IdP to RP connection, the protocol, flow type, who initiates, signing and encryption keys, attribute release and the trust agreement (or lack of one).
- Set the target FAL per RP. Use the DIRM output from SP 800-63-4. Most workforce SaaS should reach FAL2; consider FAL3 for administrative consoles and high-value data.
- Close injection gaps. Move OIDC clients to authorization code with PKCE and back-channel token retrieval; disable implicit and hybrid flows that return ID tokens in the front channel; turn off unsolicited IdP-initiated SAML or convert it to an RP-initiated start.
- Enforce single audience. Make sure each RP has its own entity ID or client ID and that assertions are not shared across applications.
- Write or update trust agreements. Record xAL minimums, attribute release, retention, key rotation schedule, incident contacts and deprovisioning expectations.
- Signal assurance. Agree
acror AuthnContext values for each AAL, make RPs check them, and test step-up when the achieved level is too low. - Wire deprovisioning. Connect SCIM or another provisioning API so that termination at the IdP disables or terminates RP accounts, and send session revocation where supported. See the SCIM Provisioning Guide.
- Pilot and roll back safely. Change one RP at a time, keep the previous metadata or client configuration ready to restore, and roll keys with overlapping validity so that both old and new keys verify during the change.
Evidence and assessment
| Check | Where in SP 800-63C-4 | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| FAL claimed per RP | FAL requirements | Federation register with flow type, audience and presentation method |
| Injection protection | Security controls (3.11.1) | Client configuration (code flow, PKCE, state and nonce), IdP-initiated SSO disabled |
| Single audience | FAL2 requirements | Sample assertions showing one aud or Audience value |
| xAL reporting | Requesting and reporting xALs | Sample ID tokens or SAML responses with acr or AuthnContext values; RP rejection test for low values |
| Trust agreements | Trust agreements | Signed or published agreements with required contents |
| Key management | Key establishment and rotation | HSM evidence, rotation records, metadata change logs |
| RP account lifecycle | RP subscriber accounts | Deprovisioning test showing account terminated and federated identifier removed |
| Identity API controls | Identity APIs (3.12.3) | Sender-constrained token configuration, access logs, agreement entry |
What to monitor: changes to federation trust (new IdPs, new signing certificates, modified domain federation settings), assertions with unexpected issuers or audiences, sign-ins whose achieved AAL is below the RP's minimum, and RP sessions that outlive the IdP account. In cloud identity platforms, audit events for adding a federated domain or changing its federation settings deserve a high-priority alert.
Metrics:
- share of federated RPs at FAL2 or above;
- number of RPs still accepting IdP-initiated or implicit-flow assertions;
- share of RPs that check
acror AuthnContext against a minimum; - median time from IdP termination to RP account termination;
- signing keys stored in an HSM, and age of the oldest active signing key;
- federation relationships without a current trust agreement.
Mapping to other frameworks
| SP 800-63C-4 area | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | NIST CSF 2.0 | ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A | ATT&CK threat addressed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assertion protection and verification | IA-8, SC-23 | PR.AA-04 | 8.5 Secure authentication | T1606.002 SAML Tokens |
| Signing and encryption keys | SC-12 | PR.AA-04, PR.DS-02 | 8.24 Use of cryptography | T1606.002 |
| Federation configuration | AC-3, AU-12 | PR.AA-05 | 5.15 Access control | T1556 Modify Authentication Process |
| Trust agreements | IA-8 | PR.AA-04 | 5.19, 5.20 Supplier relationships | T1199 Trusted Relationship |
| RP account lifecycle | AC-2, AC-2(3) | PR.AA-01 | 5.18 Access rights | T1078.004 Cloud Accounts |
| Sessions | AC-12, IA-11 | PR.AA-03 | 8.5 | T1550.004 Web Session Cookie |
Common pitfalls
- IdP-initiated SAML left on for convenience. It fails the FAL2 requirement that the transaction begins at the RP and is a common injection route.
- One assertion, many audiences. Shared entity IDs or wildcard audiences mean a token for one application works at another. Wildcards shall not be used in structured identifiers.
- Matching users on email. Email addresses change and can be reassigned; the federated identifier is the issuer and subject pair.
- No check of achieved assurance. If the RP never reads
acr, a password-only sign-in at the IdP is accepted as if it were phishing-resistant. - Signing keys on ordinary servers. A token-signing certificate exportable from the IdP host enables forged tokens, as the SolarWinds case shows. Rotate twice after suspected compromise so that no forged token signed with the old key remains valid.
- RP sessions that ignore IdP termination. Disabling a user at the IdP does not end long-lived RP sessions or refresh tokens unless logout or revocation is wired up. See the OpenID Connect Logout and Session Management Guide.
Practitioner checklist
- Keep a federation register with protocol, flow, audience, keys and target FAL for every RP.
- Use authorization code with PKCE and back-channel token retrieval for OIDC; disable implicit flows.
- Disable unsolicited IdP-initiated SAML for FAL2 and above.
- Issue single-audience assertions and validate audience, issuer, signature and validity window at every RP.
- Agree and check acr or AuthnContext values against each RP's minimum AAL.
- Put signing keys in an HSM, rotate on a schedule with overlapping validity, and alert on trust changes.
- Write trust agreements with the contents the common requirements section sets out.
- Connect deprovisioning and session revocation from IdP to RP, and test it.
- Use holder-of-key assertions or bound authenticators for FAL3 applications.
Standards and references
- NIST: SP 800-63C-4 Federation and Assertions
- NIST: SP 800-63B-4 Authentication and Authenticator Management
- NIST: SP 800-63A-4 Identity Proofing and Enrollment
- OpenID Foundation: IPSIE SL1 OpenID Connect Profile 1.0 (draft)
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5 Security and Privacy Controls
- NIST: Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
- MITRE ATT&CK: SAML Tokens
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Federation and Trust Relationships Guide · SAML Security Guide · NIST SP 800-63B-4 Authenticator Assurance Levels Guide · Identity Provider and SSO Security Guide