"Supports SSO and SCIM" tells an enterprise almost nothing about whether a SaaS application will enforce MFA, end sessions when the identity provider says so, or stop local accounts bypassing the directory. IPSIE, the OpenID Foundation's Interoperability Profiling for Secure Identity in the Enterprise working group, is writing profiles of OpenID Connect, SCIM, the Shared Signals Framework and logout specifications (with OAuth requirements inside them) that remove that optionality and give buyers named levels to ask for. The work is still in draft, but its levels already give buyers a useful vocabulary for SaaS security reviews. This guide explains what the IPSIE levels and draft profiles require as of October 2026, how enterprises can use them in procurement, and how SaaS providers can prepare. It is for identity architects, SaaS security reviewers and product security teams at software vendors. Broader SaaS risk is covered in the SaaS Security Guide.
Key takeaways
- IPSIE profiles existing standards, it does not invent new ones. The charter says profiles are created by including or excluding parts of existing specifications (OpenID Connect, Shared Signals, SCIM and logout), with secure defaults.
- Two independent ladders. Session Lifecycle levels SL1 to SL3 cover sign-on, MFA signalling, logout and continuous access; Account Lifecycle levels AL1 to AL3 cover deprovisioning, user and group sync, and role management.
- SL2 puts deadlines on revocation. When the identity service asks, the application must terminate sessions and tokens within 1 hour if they are device-bound or 15 minutes if not; SL3 shortens this to 15 and 5 minutes.
- AL2 bans local account changes. The application shall not independently create, update or delete users that the identity service manages.
- Everything is draft. No IPSIE specification is final or an Implementer's Draft yet, so procurement language should cite the level behaviour, not a version number that will change.
What IPSIE is and where it stands
The IPSIE working group was chartered at the OpenID Foundation to develop interoperability and security profiles of existing specifications, so that independent implementations interoperate, while prioritising secure defaults. Its co-chairs are Aaron Parecki (Okta) and Dick Hardt (Hellō). The charter's initial problem space is single sign-on, user lifecycle management, entitlements, risk signal sharing, logout and token revocation. It may later address feature discovery, onboarding and account recovery, discovering applications used in an enterprise, and monitoring and restricting application usage.
The intended audience is identity providers serving enterprises, SaaS vendors that sell to enterprises (independent software vendors) and developers of supporting libraries. The charter commits the group to profiles of OpenID Connect, the Shared Signals Framework, SCIM and logout specifications.
| Document | Where published | Status as checked on 27 October 2026 |
|---|---|---|
| IPSIE Levels (SL1 to SL3, AL1 to AL3) | openid/ipsie GitHub repository, ipsie-levels.md | Working group draft (no version number) |
| IPSIE v1 Draft (use cases and user stories) | openid/ipsie GitHub repository | Draft, no version number; listed as the only draft on the OpenID specifications page |
| IPSIE SL1 OpenID Connect Profile 1.0 | openid.net/specs | Draft 00, dated 18 April 2025, author Aaron Parecki |
| SCIM 2.0 IPSIE Profile | IETF Internet-Draft draft-schreiber-scim-ipsie-profile-00 | Individual Internet-Draft, version 00, dated 6 July 2026, intended status Informational; not an IETF working group document |
| Final specifications and Implementer's Drafts | OpenID Foundation IPSIE specifications page | None listed |
Because the documents are drafts, details differ between them. The levels document names the session lifetime claim session_expiry, while SL1 Profile draft 00 defines session_lifetime. Expect such details to change before any final version.
The IPSIE levels
Each level includes the requirements of the levels below it, and the SL and AL ladders are independent: an application can be SL2 and AL1.
| Level | Application (relying party) must | Identity service must |
|---|---|---|
| SL1: SSO and session lifetime | Meet the NIST SP 800-63-4 FAL2 technical controls; set its session lifetime from the assertion | Meet FAL2 technical controls; enforce MFA and tell the application the authentication method used |
| SL2: MFA, logout and session termination | Obtain a new assertion when asked; revoke sessions and tokens when asked; not accept unsolicited federation assertions | Enforce authentication method requests from the application |
| SL3: Continuous access | Communicate session state changes (such as IP address change) to the identity service | Communicate user, session and device state changes to the application |
| AL1: Deprovisioning | Support suspend, archive or delete of users by the identity service | Deprovision accounts from the application |
| AL2: User and group management | Support create and update before first sign-in; block local create, update and delete of managed users; map group claims to roles | Synchronise users, profile data and group membership |
| AL3: Role management | Expose application roles to the identity service | Consume application roles, map them to users and synchronise role claims |
SL1 points to the FAL2 controls of SP 800-63C-4 rather than restating them. The FAL2 requirements themselves are explained in the NIST SP 800-63C-4 Federation Assurance Levels Guide.
Session lifecycle in detail
SL1: what the OpenID Connect profile requires
The SL1 OpenID Connect Profile draft 00 is the most concrete IPSIE document so far. Its main requirements:
| Area | Identity provider | Application |
|---|---|---|
| Flow | response_type=code only; PKCE with S256 required; password grant rejected | Authorization code grant with PKCE S256; fresh challenge per request |
| Codes and redirects | Authorization codes live at most 60 seconds and are single use; exact redirect URI matching; no http redirect URIs; no open redirectors | No open redirectors |
| Mix-up defence | Return iss in authorisation responses (RFC 9207) | Check iss; use only metadata from the issuer's discovery document |
| Client registration | Pre-registered clients only; no unauthenticated dynamic client registration | Obtain the issuer URL from an authoritative source |
| Tokens | Sender-constrained access tokens using DPoP (RFC 9449), including authorization code binding to the DPoP key | Support DPoP, the server-provided DPoP nonce, refresh tokens and refresh token rotation |
| ID token | Single audience (the client ID); acr and amr (amr values from the IANA registry); session lifetime claim in seconds | Set session lifetime from the claim |
| Cryptography | PS256, ES256 or EdDSA; never none; RSA keys at least 2048 bits; follow RFC 8725 for JWTs; tokens and codes with at least 128 bits of entropy | Same JWT rules |
| Transport | TLS 1.2 or later per BCP 195; TLS downgrade prevention on browser endpoints (preloaded HSTS given as one method); no CORS on the authorisation endpoint | Same TLS rules |
The levels document adds that the identity service sets the interval at which the application checks back, with a minimum of 5 minutes when a session lifetime is requested, and that the application can re-validate either with a new sign-on or with refresh tokens. See the DPoP Guide and the OAuth Refresh Token Rotation Guide for the underlying mechanisms.
SL2: termination with deadlines
SL2 adds two commands that the identity service may send and the application must support:
- Re-establish session: the application must obtain a new assertion for the user before continuing any action, effectively a forced re-authentication.
- Terminate: the application must end all active sessions and any access and refresh tokens it created for the user.
| Deadline to act on a command | Tokens or cookies device-bound (for example DPoP) | Not device-bound |
|---|---|---|
| SL2 | 1 hour | 15 minutes |
| SL3 | 15 minutes | 5 minutes |
SL2 also requires the application to reject unsolicited federation, which means no IdP-initiated SAML. The charter commits to a profile of logout specifications for this, and the working group README lists OpenID Provider Commands among the relevant specifications; see the OpenID Connect Logout and Session Management Guide.
SL3: continuous access
At SL3 the two sides exchange state changes: the application reports session changes such as a new IP address, and the identity service reports changes in account and device posture. The levels document leaves the policy response to each party. The charter's Shared Signals profile is the expected carrier; see the Shared Signals Framework Guide. The specific events are marked "to be defined" in the current draft.
Account lifecycle and the SCIM profile
The SCIM 2.0 IPSIE Profile Internet-Draft maps SCIM behaviour to the AL levels. Highlights:
- Authentication to the SCIM endpoint: OAuth 2.0 client credentials with JWT client authentication (RFC 7523); the token carries a
scimscope and nothing broader; both sides publish authorisation server metadata (RFC 8414), and the identity service publishes ajwks_uri. This replaces the long-lived static bearer token most SCIM integrations use today. - Deactivation (AL1): PATCH on the
activeattribute; on deactivation the application must disable every access mechanism tied to the user, including web sessions, API tokens, refresh tokens, personal access tokens, SSH keys and device credentials. Reactivation must be possible. The draft is inconsistent on DELETE (optional in Section 5.2, required at AL1 in Section 10), a sign of how early it is. - Users and groups (AL2): POST and PATCH on Users; required attributes userName, displayName, active and externalId; filtering by userName, externalId and emails; groups creatable with zero members and PATCH accepting at least 50 member operations per request.
- No credentials over SCIM: the application must not support a password attribute, and the identity service must never send credentials.
- Operational floor: rate limits signalled with HTTP 429 (Retry-After given as an example), at least 25 requests per second per tenant, support for /Bulk, audit logging of every create, modify and delete.
- AL3: role management requirements are not yet defined in the draft.
The deactivation rule closes the gap the SCIM Provisioning Guide warns about: SCIM that disables an account but leaves its tokens alive.
Using IPSIE in procurement and SaaS reviews
Until the profiles are final there is no IPSIE certification, so enterprises should ask for the behaviours behind each level. Suggested minimums:
| Application risk | Suggested target | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Low risk, no sensitive data | SL1, AL1 | Central sign-on with MFA and reliable deprovisioning |
| Business systems with customer or employee data | SL2, AL2 | Forced re-authentication and termination on incident; no local account drift |
| Admin consoles, code, CI/CD, data platforms | SL3 where available, AL2 or AL3 | Short revocation deadlines and posture signals; roles governed centrally |
Questions to put to a SaaS vendor:
- Can SSO be enforced for every user, including administrators, with local passwords disabled? Is there a documented break-glass account and how is it protected?
- Does the ID token or assertion's authentication method (
acr,amr) change what the application allows, and can it request step-up? - Is IdP-initiated SSO accepted? Can it be turned off?
- When the IdP terminates a user, how quickly are web sessions, API tokens and personal access tokens revoked, and by what mechanism?
- Does SCIM deactivation revoke all access mechanisms, and can local user changes be blocked for managed users?
- How is the SCIM endpoint authenticated: static token, or OAuth with JWT client authentication?
- Can identity events (sign-in, token creation, admin changes) be streamed to the customer's SIEM?
Small organisations can use the level table as a checklist without formal assessment. Large enterprises should write the level behaviours into security schedules and track vendor roadmaps, since many applications will reach SL1 and AL1 well before SL3. The SaaS Security Buyer's Guide covers the wider evaluation.
Implementing IPSIE as a SaaS provider
- Close the SL1 gaps first. Move to authorization code with PKCE, validate
iss, pin the issuer from configuration, drop implicit flows and IdP-initiated SAML, and honour a session lifetime from the IdP. - Bind the tenant to the IdP. The v1 Draft user stories call for binding the customer's identifiers and IdP entity to an internal identifier, so that a user from one customer's IdP cannot be confused with another's when several IdPs are configured.
- Build a revocation path. Index every session, access token, refresh token and personal access token by user, so that a single call can end them all. Measure how long it takes in practice and compare with the SL2 deadlines.
- Bind tokens to devices. DPoP-bound tokens give a longer SL2 deadline and resist replay of stolen tokens.
- Harden SCIM. Replace static SCIM bearer tokens with OAuth client credentials and JWT client authentication, scope tokens to
scim, and make deactivation revoke all access mechanisms. - Lock managed users. Block local edits to users and profile data owned by the customer's identity service, while keeping a governed break-glass account.
- Test with a pilot customer. Run the new behaviours behind a tenant-level flag, verify with the customer's IdP, then make them default for new tenants. Keep the flag as the rollback.
Where identity fits: the NHIs inside IPSIE
- SCIM clients are privileged NHIs. The identity service's SCIM credential can create and change every account in the tenant. The draft's move from static bearer tokens to short-lived OAuth tokens with JWT client authentication treats it as such; see the JWT Client Authentication Guide.
- Personal access tokens and API keys: the SCIM profile explicitly lists them among the mechanisms deactivation must revoke. In many SaaS products they survive SSO deprovisioning and become orphaned NHI credentials.
- Non-person entities: the v1 Draft includes a user story for non-person entity authentication, but no level covers service or agent identities yet.
Detection and measurement
- Log: SSO sign-ins with
acrandamr, local password sign-ins (which should be zero for managed users), SCIM operations and failures, termination commands received and the time each revocation completed, and new personal access tokens or API keys. - Alert on: local account creation in a managed tenant, sign-ins without SSO, sessions still active after a terminate command, and SCIM errors that leave a leaver active.
Metrics:
- share of SaaS applications (weighted by data sensitivity) meeting SL1, SL2 and AL1, AL2;
- median and 95th percentile time from IdP termination to full revocation in each application;
- number of active local (non-SSO) accounts in managed tenants;
- personal access tokens and API keys owned by deprovisioned users;
- share of SCIM integrations using OAuth rather than static tokens.
Framework mapping
| IPSIE area | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | NIST CSF 2.0 | CIS Controls v8.1 | ATT&CK threat addressed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SL1 federated SSO with MFA | IA-2(1), IA-2(2), IA-8 | PR.AA-03, PR.AA-04 | 6.3, 6.7 | T1078.004 Cloud Accounts |
| SL2 termination and re-authentication | AC-12, IA-11 | PR.AA-03 | 6.2 | T1550.004 Web Session Cookie |
| SL3 continuous access signals | SI-4 | DE.CM-03 | 8 | T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie |
| AL1 deprovisioning | AC-2, AC-2(3) | PR.AA-01 | 5.3, 6.2 | T1078 Valid Accounts |
| AL2 and AL3 users, groups and roles | AC-2, AC-3 | PR.AA-05 | 6.1, 6.8 | T1136 Create Account |
Common failure patterns
- SSO configured, local passwords still on. Users or admins keep a direct login that skips MFA and survives deprovisioning. AL2's ban on local changes and SL1's MFA requirement both target this.
- Deprovisioned in the IdP, alive in the app. Long application sessions and refresh tokens outlast the account; without an SL2-style terminate command the leaver keeps access.
- Static SCIM tokens with tenant-wide power. One leaked token can create administrator accounts.
- Accepting IdP-initiated SSO. Unsolicited assertions are an injection route that SL2 forbids.
- Ignoring the authentication method. If the application never reads
amroracr, it cannot tell a password-only sign-in from a passkey. - Citing a draft version in contracts. Draft numbers and claim names will change; contract for behaviour and deadlines.
Lessons from incidents
- The Snowflake breach involved customer accounts protected only by passwords stolen by infostealers, with no MFA and no network allow lists. Enforced SSO with MFA at SL1, and no local credentials for managed users at AL2, address exactly this gap.
- In the CircleCI breach malware stole an engineer's SSO session cookie that had already passed 2FA, and the attacker replayed it. Device-bound tokens, short revocation deadlines and SL3 session signals (such as an IP change) are the controls that shrink that window.
Practitioner checklist
- Record the target SL and AL level for each SaaS application by data sensitivity.
- Require SSO with MFA for all users, including administrators, and disable local passwords for managed users.
- Turn off IdP-initiated SSO and require authorization code with PKCE for OIDC integrations.
- Check that applications read
acroramrand can request step-up. - Test termination: disable a test user at the IdP and time how long sessions, refresh tokens and personal access tokens stay valid.
- Replace static SCIM bearer tokens with OAuth client credentials where the vendor supports it.
- Confirm SCIM deactivation revokes API keys and personal access tokens.
- Stream SaaS identity events to the SIEM and alert on local account creation.
- Track IPSIE draft changes quarterly and update procurement wording.
Standards and references
- OpenID Foundation: IPSIE Working Group
- OpenID Foundation: IPSIE Levels (working draft)
- OpenID Foundation: IPSIE SL1 OpenID Connect Profile 1.0, draft 00
- IETF: SCIM 2.0 IPSIE Profile (Internet-Draft)
- OpenID Foundation: IPSIE Working Group Charter
- OpenID Foundation: IPSIE v1 Draft
- NIST: SP 800-63C-4 Federation and Assertions
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: SaaS Security Guide · SCIM Provisioning Guide · Shared Signals Framework Guide · Identity Provider and SSO Security Guide