PlugX and ShadowPad are the shared backdoors of China-nexus espionage, used by many separate groups, which makes a single detection valuable across dozens of threat actors. This guide profiles both families for defenders: PlugX (also Korplug, Sogu and other names), a modular remote access tool in use for over a decade, and ShadowPad, a modular backdoor first exposed in the 2017 NetSarang software supply chain compromise. It covers who uses them according to MITRE ATT&CK and government sources, the court-authorised PlugX deletion operation led by the FBI with French partners, the behaviours defenders can detect, and hardening that limits their reach. It is aimed at threat intelligence analysts, SOC teams and incident responders in government, defence, telecoms, critical infrastructure and their suppliers. For remote access trojans in general, see the Remote Access Trojans (RATs) Guide.
Key takeaways
- Tools, not actors. ATT&CK lists PlugX (S0013) as used by at least 15 groups and campaigns, including Mustang Panda, APT41, menuPass and Threat Group-3390, and ShadowPad (S0596) by groups including APT41, Mustang Panda, RedEcho, Tonto Team and Earth Lusca. A PlugX hit tells you the family, not the operator.
- ShadowPad was born in a supply chain attack. Kaspersky found it in a signed NetSarang library (nssock2.dll) in July 2017, activated only by a crafted DNS TXT record, which shows that a valid vendor signature does not prove a file is clean.
- Side-loading is the common thread. Both families are associated with DLL hijacking or injection (T1574.001, T1055.001), where a legitimate signed program loads a malicious DLL, so module load telemetry is the core detection.
- Law enforcement deleted PlugX at scale. DOJ announced on 14 January 2025 that the FBI, with French partners and Sekoia.io, used PlugX's own commands to delete a Mustang Panda version from about 4,258 US computers under court authorisation.
- Removable media still matters. ATT&CK lists Replication Through Removable Media (T1091) for PlugX, so USB controls and autorun restrictions remain relevant in espionage defence.
Who they are (names and aliases)
| Name | Type | What the sources say |
|---|---|---|
| PlugX, Korplug, Sogu, Thoper, TVT, DestroyRAT, Kaba | Malware family (ATT&CK S0013) | Remote access tool with modular plugins used by multiple threat groups (ATT&CK). |
| ShadowPad, POISONPLUG.SHADOW | Malware family (ATT&CK S0596) | Modular backdoor first identified in the NetSarang supply chain compromise in mid-July 2017; once thought exclusive to APT41, later observed with various Chinese threat activity groups (ATT&CK). |
| Mustang Panda (TA416, RedDelta, BRONZE PRESIDENT, TWILL TYPHOON, EARTH PRETA and others) | China-based espionage group (G0129) | Uses PlugX and ShadowPad; DOJ describes it as sponsored by the People's Republic of China and active since at least 2014. See the Mustang Panda Threat Actor Profile Guide. |
| APT41 (Wicked Panda, Brass Typhoon, BARIUM) | Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that also runs financially motivated operations (G0096) | Uses both families. See the APT41 Threat Actor Profile. |
| menuPass (APT10) | Group (G0045) | PlugX user; ATT&CK states individual members acted in association with the Ministry of State Security's Tianjin State Security Bureau. See the APT10 Threat Actor Profile Guide. |
| RedEcho | PRC-related actor (G1042) | Long-running intrusions in Indian critical infrastructure, linked to ShadowPad through shared infrastructure (ATT&CK). |
Attribution wording here follows ATT&CK and DOJ. Vendor names overlap and split differently, so record the source of every attribution in your own intelligence notes.
Targeting and motivation
Both families serve long-term espionage: persistent access, collection and exfiltration rather than fast monetisation.
- Government and diplomatic targets: ATT&CK describes Mustang Panda targeting government, diplomatic and non-governmental organisations, including think tanks and religious institutions. Campaign C0047 covers modified PlugX operations against entities in East and Southeast Asia from mid-2023 to the end of 2024.
- Critical infrastructure: campaign C0043 records 2021 to early 2022 intrusions into Indian electric utilities and logistics firms linked to RedEcho and ShadowPad.
- Software vendors and their customers: the NetSarang case put a backdoor into server administration tools used, as Kaspersky notes, on administrator workstations and servers in finance, energy, telecoms, manufacturing and transport.
- Scale: DOJ states Mustang Panda has infiltrated thousands of systems since at least 2014, and that the PRC government reportedly paid the group to develop the PlugX version removed in 2025.
For the wider picture, see the China State Cyber Operations Guide.
Tactics and techniques (MITRE ATT&CK)
ATT&CK v20 maps 49 techniques to PlugX and 21 to ShadowPad. The table shows behaviours useful for detection, marked by family.
| Behaviour | PlugX (S0013) | ShadowPad (S0596) | What defenders see |
|---|---|---|---|
| Initial delivery | T1204.002 Malicious File, T1091 Replication Through Removable Media | Supply chain (NetSarang, per Kaspersky) | Decoy documents in archives; files appearing on USB drives; trojanised software updates. |
| Loading | T1574.001 DLL, T1127.001 MSBuild, T1620 Reflective Code Loading | T1055.001 Dynamic-link Library Injection, T1055 Process Injection | Signed executable in an unusual folder loading a same-folder DLL; MSBuild run by a user. |
| Hiding | T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories, T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File | T1027.011 Fileless Storage, T1112 Modify Registry | Hidden folders on USB drives; encrypted payloads stored in the registry. |
| Persistence | T1543.003 Windows Service, T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, T1053.005 Scheduled Task | Registry-based configuration (T1112) | New services with names copied from real software. |
| Defence impairment | T1686 Disable or Modify System Firewall, T1070.009 Clear Persistence | T1070 Indicator Removal | Firewall rule changes by a non-admin process; cleanup of persistence when tasked. |
| Command and control | T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1071.004 DNS, T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver, T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol, T1571 Non-Standard Port | T1071.004 DNS, T1071.002 File Transfer Protocols, T1568.002 Domain Generation Algorithms, T1132.002 Non-Standard Encoding | DNS TXT queries to rare domains; monthly-changing domains; C2 addresses retrieved from public web pages. |
| Collection | T1056.001 Keylogging, T1113 Screen Capture, T1074.001 Local Data Staging | T1029 Scheduled Transfer | Staged archives and regular outbound transfers. |
How they abuse identities and credentials
- Administrator workstations: the NetSarang compromise targeted tools that administrators use to manage servers, so a backdoor sat where privileged sessions and saved connection credentials live. Use dedicated privileged access workstations without general-purpose software. See the Privileged Access Workstations Guide.
- Keylogging and screen capture: PlugX plugins capture keystrokes and screens (T1056.001, T1113), which exposes passwords typed into consoles and remote sessions even where MFA protects sign-in.
- Code-signing identities: Kaspersky found the malicious ShadowPad library signed with a legitimate NetSarang certificate. Vendors must protect signing keys and build pipelines as high-value non-human identities. See the Code Signing Security Guide.
- Service identities: both families persist as Windows services, often running as SYSTEM. Review new services and the accounts they run under.
Notable incidents
| Date | Event | Source and key facts |
|---|---|---|
| 13 to 17 July 2017 | NetSarang supply chain compromise | Kaspersky: malicious nssock2.dll compiled on 13 July, trojanised installers posted on 17 July for Xmanager, Xshell, Xftp and Xlpd 5; first-tier beacon every 8 hours; activation by DNS TXT record; monthly DGA; activated payload confirmed at a company in Hong Kong. |
| 2021 to early 2022 | Indian critical infrastructure intrusions | ATT&CK C0043: electric utilities and logistics firms, linked to RedEcho and ShadowPad. |
| Mid-2023 to end of 2024 | RedDelta modified PlugX operations | ATT&CK C0047: Mustang Panda phishing in East and Southeast Asia with modified PlugX infection chains. |
| August 2024 to January 2025 | Court-authorised PlugX deletion (announced 14 January 2025) | DOJ: nine warrants, the first in August 2024 and the last expiring 3 January 2025; French partners (Paris Prosecution Office, Gendarmerie cyber unit C3N) and Sekoia.io, which identified the deletion capability; about 4,258 US computers; FBI testing found the commands did not affect legitimate functions or collect content. |
The deletion removed one PlugX version from infected machines; it did not patch the access route, remove other tools or evict the actor. Organisations notified by their national CERT or ISP still need to investigate. See the Cybercrime Law Enforcement Takedowns Guide.
Detection and defence
Behaviour-level detection ideas
- Side-loading: signed executables running from ProgramData, AppData, a USB drive or a recycle-bin path and loading an unsigned DLL from the same folder (Sysmon Event ID 7). Build an allow-list of known good host and DLL pairs.
- USB execution: processes started from removable drives, hidden folders created on USB media, and shortcut files on USB roots pointing at hidden executables.
- Services and Run keys: new services (System Event ID 7045) whose binary path is a user-writable folder or whose name copies real vendor software.
- DNS: TXT queries to rare domains, and domains that change monthly in a pattern (the ShadowPad DGA described by Kaspersky). See the DNS Security Guide.
- Firewall changes: Windows Firewall rule additions by a process other than management tooling.
- Software integrity: hash and behaviour checks on administrator tools after updates, since the NetSarang files were validly signed.
Hardening mapped to frameworks
| Defence | Why it matters for PlugX and ShadowPad | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | NIST CSF 2.0 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Disable autorun, restrict or block USB storage, scan removable media | Blocks the worm-like PlugX route | MP-7, SI-3 | PR.PS-05 |
| Application control with path rules for user-writable folders and removable drives | Stops side-loading chains from dropped folders | CM-7 | PR.PS-05 |
| Software supply chain checks: vendor integrity verification, staged update rollout | Limits trojanised update impact | SR-3, SR-11, SI-7 | GV.SC-07 |
| Protective DNS and DNS logging | Exposes DNS-based C2 and DGA | SC-7, SI-4 | DE.CM-01 |
| Privileged access workstations for administrators | Keeps admin credentials away from general-purpose tools | AC-6, SC-7 | PR.AA-05 |
Response steps
- Treat a confirmed PlugX or ShadowPad infection as a likely espionage intrusion: preserve memory and disk images before cleaning, and limit who knows while scoping.
- Scope with the side-loading pair, service names, DNS domains and USB serial numbers seen on the first host.
- Assume credentials typed on infected hosts are compromised; rotate privileged and service account passwords and keys from a clean device.
- Rebuild infected hosts and reformat implicated USB drives rather than cleaning them in place.
- Report to your national authority; government and critical infrastructure organisations usually have reporting duties. See the Digital Forensics (DFIR) Guide.
Metrics that show it is working
- Percentage of endpoints with USB storage blocked or restricted to approved devices.
- Number of unexplained signed-binary plus unsigned-DLL load events per week, and percentage triaged.
- Percentage of administrators using dedicated privileged access workstations.
- Coverage of DNS query logging across sites, including TXT records.
Practitioner checklist
- Map your detections to the PlugX and ShadowPad technique lists in ATT&CK and prioritise side-loading, services and DNS C2.
- Deploy a Sysmon or EDR rule for signed binaries loading same-folder unsigned DLLs from user-writable or removable paths.
- Block or restrict USB storage, disable autorun and log removable media insertion.
- Log DNS centrally, including TXT queries, and alert on rare and periodically rotating domains.
- Check the integrity of administrator tooling after every vendor update and stage rollouts.
- Move privileged administration to dedicated workstations.
- Prepare an espionage response runbook that preserves evidence and rotates credentials from a clean device.
Standards and references
- MITRE ATT&CK: PlugX (S0013)
- MITRE ATT&CK: ShadowPad (S0596)
- US Department of Justice: Justice Department and FBI Conduct International Operation to Delete Malware Used by China-Backed Hackers
- Kaspersky Securelist: ShadowPad in corporate networks
- MITRE ATT&CK: Mustang Panda (G0129)
- MITRE ATT&CK: RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations (C0047)
- MITRE ATT&CK: Indian Critical Infrastructure Intrusions (C0043)
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Remote Access Trojans (RATs) Guide · Mustang Panda Threat Actor Profile Guide · APT41 Threat Actor Profile · Removable Media and USB Control Guide