POLONIUM hides its command and control inside OneDrive and Dropbox, using OAuth applications and tokens on accounts it owns, so its traffic looks like ordinary cloud storage use. This profile covers the Lebanon-based group that MITRE ATT&CK tracks as G1005 and Microsoft now calls Plaid Rain. It draws on MITRE ATT&CK v20, Microsoft Threat Intelligence's June 2022 report, ESET's October 2022 research and Microsoft's naming table, and keeps each source's attribution wording. It is written for SOC analysts, Microsoft 365 administrators, and IT service providers with Israeli customers or operations. The focus is on detecting cloud-service C2 and the supplier route in, not on the malware internals.
Key takeaways
- Attacker-owned OAuth apps are the C2 channel. Microsoft found CreepyDrive carrying an OAuth refresh token and client secret for a POLONIUM-owned OneDrive account, and suspended more than 20 malicious OneDrive applications the group had created.
- Your own tenant controls do not see the attacker's tenant. The tokens belong to the attacker, so the defence is egress and endpoint control: which processes may talk to graph.microsoft.com and to which tenants.
- IT providers are a way in. Microsoft saw an Israeli cloud service provider compromised and its access likely used against a law firm and an aviation company.
- Edge VPN credentials matter. About 80% of victims Microsoft saw beaconing to Graph ran Fortinet appliances, suggesting but not proving CVE-2018-13379; ESET suggests leaked Fortinet VPN credentials may have been used.
- Many small, custom backdoors. ESET documented seven custom backdoors using OneDrive, Dropbox, Mega, FTP and raw TCP, so detection must focus on behaviour, not one tool name.
Who they are (names and aliases)
Microsoft assesses with high confidence that POLONIUM is an operational group based in Lebanon, and with moderate confidence that it coordinated its operations with actors affiliated with Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), based mainly on victim overlap and common tools and techniques. MITRE ATT&CK repeats this assessment. Microsoft said in 2022 that it did not see links to the Lebanese group Volatile Cedar. ESET notes that public information about the group is limited.
| Name | Source | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| POLONIUM (G1005) | MITRE ATT&CK; Microsoft (former name); ESET | Microsoft named it in June 2022 |
| Plaid Rain | Microsoft | Current Microsoft name since April 2023; the naming table lists Lebanon as origin |
| INCENDIARY JACKAL | Listed in Microsoft's naming table | Shown as another name for Plaid Rain |
No source used for this page names individuals, and this page names none. For the Iranian side of the picture, see the Iran State Cyber Operations Guide and the MuddyWater Threat Actor Profile.
Custom backdoors
| Backdoor | C2 channel | Source |
|---|---|---|
| CreepyDrive (S1023) | Attacker-owned OneDrive (also Dropbox per ESET) through Microsoft Graph | Microsoft; ESET; ATT&CK |
| CreepySnail (S1024) | The group's own server, using stolen credentials | Microsoft; ESET; ATT&CK |
| DeepCreep | Dropbox | ESET |
| MegaCreep | Mega | ESET |
| FlipCreep | FTP server operated by the group | ESET |
| TechnoCreep; PapaCreep | TCP sockets to a remote server | ESET |
ESET also describes modules for screenshots, webcam capture, reverse shells, exfiltration and tunnelling, and a custom keylogger that records keystrokes and clipboard contents with Hebrew and Arabic keyboard support.
Targeting and motivation
- Geography: Israel. Microsoft counted more than 20 Israeli organisations targeted or compromised over three months from February 2022, plus one intergovernmental organisation with operations in Lebanon. ESET counted more than a dozen Israeli victims from at least September 2021 to September 2022.
- Sectors: Microsoft cites critical manufacturing, IT and Israel's defence industry, with victims in transportation, government, food and agriculture, financial services and healthcare. ESET adds engineering, law, communications, marketing, media, insurance and social services.
- Motivation: espionage; the keylogger, screenshot and webcam modules point to collection rather than disruption. Microsoft's assessment of coordination with MOIS-affiliated actors means a POLONIUM intrusion may be a precursor to activity by other groups.
- Who should care: Israeli organisations, their IT and cloud service providers, and any business that grants suppliers standing access.
Tactics and techniques (MITRE ATT&CK)
All IDs below are ATT&CK v20 techniques recorded against G1005, except the row marked as an NHI Mgmt Group mapping of vendor reporting.
| Tactic | Technique | What sources describe | Primary defence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Initial access | T1199 Trusted Relationship | Credentials from a compromised IT company used against a law firm and an aviation company | Scoped, time-bound supplier access with MFA |
| Initial access, persistence | T1078 Valid Accounts | Compromised credentials used to access victims | MFA on all remote access; sign-in anomaly alerts |
| Initial access (NHIMG mapping) | T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application | Possible exploitation of Fortinet appliances (CVE-2018-13379), not confirmed by Microsoft | Patch VPN appliances; rotate VPN credentials after any exposure |
| Resource development | T1583.006 Web Services; T1588.002 Tool | Legitimate OneDrive accounts created for operations; AirVPN and plink obtained | Egress controls on unsanctioned services |
| Command and control | T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication | OneDrive and Dropbox used for C2 | Restrict which processes and tenants may reach cloud storage APIs |
| Command and control | T1090 Proxy | AirVPN used for operational activity; plink for redundant tunnels | Block consumer VPN and SSH egress from servers |
| Exfiltration | T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | Stolen data sent to group-owned OneDrive and Dropbox accounts | Data loss prevention and tenant restrictions |
Technique deep dives: T1102 Web Service Defensive Guide, MITRE ATT&CK T1199 Trusted Relationship Guide, T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service and T1583 Acquire Infrastructure.
How they abuse identities and credentials
POLONIUM is a clear case of non-human identities used against defenders: the C2 runs on OAuth applications, client secrets and refresh tokens that the attacker registers and controls.
- Refresh token and client secret in the implant: Microsoft describes CreepyDrive sending its embedded refresh token and client secret to a legitimate Microsoft endpoint to obtain an access token, then using Graph API calls to read a tasking file, upload, download and execute. Because the attacker sets the account's protections, the sign-in looks like normal customer activity. See How to detect use of a stolen OAuth refresh token for token mechanics.
- The tokens are outside your tenant: conditional access, consent policies and app governance in your tenant do not apply to an app registered in the attacker's tenant. Control the egress instead: Microsoft Entra tenant restrictions can limit which external tenants users and devices may sign in to, and endpoint rules can flag non-browser processes calling graph.microsoft.com. See Microsoft Graph Exfiltration Detection.
- Supplier credentials: the IT provider route works because supplier accounts carry standing access into customers. Give providers named, MFA-protected, time-limited access and review it. See the Compromised MSP Playbook.
- VPN credentials: ESET's suggestion that leaked Fortinet VPN credentials were used makes VPN accounts a priority: Microsoft's own advice is to review single-factor VPN accounts and enforce MFA on all remote access.
- Stolen credentials in CreepySnail: Microsoft says CreepySnail authenticates to the group's C2 with stolen credentials, so a password reset alone does not remove the implant; rebuild the host and rotate the credentials it held.
Notable activity
| Date | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| September 2021 | Earliest activity observed by ESET | ESET |
| February 2022 onward | More than 20 Israeli organisations targeted or compromised over three months | Microsoft |
| June 2022 | Microsoft names POLONIUM, suspends more than 20 malicious OneDrive applications and disables actor accounts | Microsoft |
| October 2022 | ESET publishes seven custom backdoors, most recent activity September 2022 | ESET |
| April 2023 | Microsoft renames the group Plaid Rain | Microsoft |
Detection and defence
What to monitor
| Signal | Data source | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Non-browser, non-Office processes (PowerShell, unknown .exe) connecting to graph.microsoft.com, login.microsoftonline.com, Dropbox or Mega APIs | EDR network events; proxy logs | CreepyDrive and similar cloud C2 |
| Token requests from endpoints to tenants other than your own | Proxy or TLS inspection logs; tenant restriction logs | Attacker-owned app tokens being redeemed |
| Repeated, predictable file paths read and written through Graph from one host | Proxy logs; Microsoft-supplied hunting queries | Tasking file polling pattern Microsoft describes |
| Base64-encoded usernames or IP addresses in web request parameters | Web proxy logs | CreepySnail pattern Microsoft lists for hunting |
| plink or AirVPN processes and outbound SSH from workstations or servers | EDR process and network events | Tunnelling and operational proxying |
| Supplier accounts signing in at unusual times or to unusual systems | Identity provider and VPN logs | Trusted relationship abuse |
Microsoft published Microsoft Sentinel hunting queries for these patterns, including CreepyDrive re-authentication sequences and predictable OneDrive file paths.
Phased response plan
- Close the edge: patch VPN appliances, retire single-factor VPN accounts and rotate VPN credentials after any suspected exposure.
- Review suppliers: list every IT and cloud provider with access, remove unfamiliar or unused partner access, and move the rest to named, MFA-protected, time-bound accounts, as Microsoft advises.
- Control cloud egress: in audit mode first, log which processes and tenants reach Microsoft Graph, Dropbox and Mega; then enforce tenant restrictions and block unsanctioned storage. Keep the audit-only policy ready as rollback.
- Hunt: run Microsoft's published POLONIUM hunting queries or equivalent proxy searches, and investigate any match as a possible compromise.
- Respond to a hit: isolate the host, preserve memory and proxy logs, rebuild, and rotate every credential the host used, including VPN and supplier credentials. Report the attacker's app or account to the cloud provider so it can be disabled.
Decision guidance
- Block or monitor cloud storage: organisations that use OneDrive themselves cannot block the domain; restrict by tenant and by process instead. Organisations with no Dropbox or Mega use should block them outright.
- Small organisations: the most effective steps are MFA on VPN and email, a short supplier access list and a managed EDR that alerts on scripting tools making cloud API calls.
- IT and cloud service providers: assume you are a target for downstream access. Separate customer administration credentials per customer and protect them with PAM. See Cybersecurity for MSPs and MSSPs Guide.
Metrics
- Number of VPN accounts without MFA (target zero).
- Percentage of supplier accounts that are named, MFA-protected and time-bound.
- Number of distinct processes per host calling Microsoft Graph outside the approved list, trending down.
- Percentage of endpoints covered by tenant restrictions.
- Time from supplier offboarding to access removal.
Framework mapping
| Control area | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | NIST CSF 2.0 |
|---|---|---|
| MFA on remote access | IA-2, AC-17 | PR.AA-03 |
| Supplier access and oversight | SA-9, SR-6 | GV.SC-07 |
| Egress and boundary control | SC-7 | PR.IR-01 |
| Patch edge appliances | SI-2, RA-5 | ID.RA-01, PR.PS-02 |
| Network and endpoint monitoring | SI-4 | DE.CM-01, DE.CM-09 |
Common failure patterns
- Allow-listing cloud storage by domain: trusting all of graph.microsoft.com lets attacker-tenant traffic through with your own.
- Looking for consent grants in your tenant: the malicious apps live in the attacker's tenant, so app governance in yours shows nothing.
- Standing supplier access: always-on provider accounts become the route into every customer.
- Single-factor VPN accounts: leaked VPN credentials are enough on their own.
- Resetting passwords without rebuilding: implants that carry their own tokens keep working after user password resets.
Practitioner checklist
- Enforce MFA on every VPN and remote access account.
- Patch edge appliances and rotate VPN credentials after exposure.
- Inventory supplier access and make it named, MFA-protected and time-bound.
- Log which processes and tenants reach Microsoft Graph, Dropbox and Mega.
- Enforce tenant restrictions for Microsoft cloud sign-ins.
- Block unsanctioned cloud storage and consumer VPN services from endpoints and servers.
- Run Microsoft's POLONIUM hunting queries or proxy equivalents.
- Rebuild compromised hosts and rotate all credentials they held.
Standards and references
- MITRE ATT&CK: POLONIUM (G1005)
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence: Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations
- ESET: POLONIUM targets Israel with Creepy malware
- Microsoft: How Microsoft names threat actors
- MITRE ATT&CK: T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication
- MITRE ATT&CK: T1199 Trusted Relationship
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Iran State Cyber Operations Guide · MuddyWater Threat Actor Profile · Agrius Threat Actor Profile Guide · T1102 Web Service Defensive Guide · Microsoft Graph Exfiltration Detection