Power BI concentrates an organisation's most sensitive numbers in a service where a single tenant setting can publish a report to the open internet and a single service principal can read every workspace it has been added to. Most Power BI exposure comes from tenant settings left at defaults, guests and sharing links nobody reviews, and applications that embed or automate reports with long-lived secrets. This guide covers the CISA SCuBA Power BI baseline policy by policy, then the identity layer underneath it: admin roles, workspace roles, service principals, embedding, gateway credentials and the audit operations that show abuse. It is for Microsoft 365 and Fabric administrators, data platform owners and security engineers. For data protection in general see the Data Security Guide.
This is an independent guide from NHI Mgmt Group, based on Microsoft's public documentation as of November 2026. It is not sponsored or reviewed by Microsoft. Product features change, so confirm settings against Microsoft's current documentation.
Key takeaways
- Tenant settings are the control plane. The SCuBA baseline sets seven policies, all in the Power BI admin portal: publish to web, guest access, guest invitations, two service principal settings, resource keys, R and Python visuals, and sensitivity labels.
- Publish to web means anonymous. It creates a public URL that needs no authentication; disable it, or limit it to a named security group and audit every
PublishToWebReportevent. - Service principals need two grants, so control both. A tenant setting scoped to a security group, and workspace membership as Member or Admin; Microsoft says such apps need no Entra API permissions at all.
- Workspace roles are broader than they look. Members can add people and reshare, Contributors can read data through OneLake and Spark, and nested groups inherit roles.
- Audit lives in Microsoft Purview. Operations such as
ShareReport,ExportReport,GenerateEmbedTokenandTakeOverDatasetare the ones to alert on.
The SCuBA Power BI baseline at a glance
CISA's Power BI secure configuration baseline, in the cisagov/ScubaGear repository, uses SHOULD for every policy, leaving room for mission-justified exceptions. Each one maps to a named tenant setting. Policy IDs and setting names below were checked in the repository on 27 October 2026; Microsoft renames settings as Fabric evolves, so confirm the label in your admin portal.
| Policy ID | Requirement | Tenant setting (section) | Risk addressed |
|---|---|---|---|
| MS.POWERBI.1.1v1 | Publish to web SHOULD be disabled unless the mission requires it | Publish to web (Export and sharing settings) | Anonymous public access to report data |
| MS.POWERBI.2.1v1 | Guest user access SHOULD be disabled unless required, or limited to security groups | Guest users can access Microsoft Fabric (Export and sharing settings); in GCC, GCC High and DoD: Allow Azure Active Directory guest users to access Power BI | External users reaching data and APIs |
| MS.POWERBI.3.1v1 | Inviting external users SHOULD be disabled unless required | Users can invite guest users to collaborate through item sharing and permissions | Guest sprawl created through sharing dialogs |
| MS.POWERBI.4.1v1 | Service principals with API access SHOULD be restricted to specific security groups | Service principals can call Fabric public APIs (Developer settings) | Unrestricted application access to APIs |
| MS.POWERBI.4.2v1 | Service principals' ability to create and use profiles SHOULD be restricted to security groups | Allow service principals to create and use profiles (Developer settings) | Profiles used with more permission than intended |
| MS.POWERBI.5.1v1 | ResourceKey-based authentication SHOULD be blocked unless streaming or push datasets need it | Block ResourceKey authentication set to Enabled (Developer settings) | Data pushed with a secret key in a URL, without an Entra token |
| MS.POWERBI.6.1v1 | Python and R interactions SHOULD be disabled | Interact with and share R and Python visuals | Untrusted script code in reports |
| MS.POWERBI.7.1v1 | Sensitivity labels SHOULD be enabled and used for sensitive data | Allow users to apply sensitivity labels for content (Information protection) | Unclassified data shared or exported without protection |
Two baseline notes matter in practice. Disabling external invitations does not remove existing guests, who keep the access they already had. And sensitivity labels need Microsoft Purview Information Protection Premium P1 or P2 licensing, with a Power BI Pro or Premium Per User licence for people applying labels. See the CISA SCuBA Baselines Guide for the other Microsoft 365 baselines and the Microsoft Purview Information Protection Guide for labelling.
How identity and access work in Power BI
Power BI is part of Microsoft Fabric and authenticates every user and application through Microsoft Entra ID, so Conditional Access, MFA and guest policies in Entra apply first. Inside the service, access is layered:
- Tenant settings: switch features on or off for the organisation or for named security groups. They decide whether a capability exists at all, such as publish to web, export, guest access or service principal API use.
- Workspace roles: Admin, Member, Contributor and Viewer, assignable to users, security groups, Microsoft 365 groups, distribution lists and service principals.
- Item permissions and sharing: direct sharing of reports, dashboards and semantic models, including Reshare and Build permissions, and published apps for wider audiences.
- Data-level controls: row-level security in semantic models, sensitivity labels, and the credentials stored for data sources and gateways.
| Capability (from Microsoft's workspace roles table) | Admin | Member | Contributor | Viewer |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Update and delete the workspace; add or remove admins | Yes | No | No | No |
| Add members or others with lower permissions | Yes | Yes | No | No |
| Share items and allow others to reshare | Yes | Yes | Only with Reshare | Only with Reshare |
| Create, write and delete items | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
| Read data through OneLake APIs and Spark | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
| View items and read through the SQL endpoint | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Microsoft notes that group members inherit the role, nested group members do too, and a user with several roles gets the highest. Workspace roles also do not govern everything underneath: OneLake shortcut destinations and on-premises gateways need their own permissions. Review group nesting before assuming a workspace is private.
Admin roles and privileged access
Administration happens in the Power BI (Fabric) admin portal, held by the Entra Fabric Administrator role (formerly Power BI Administrator) and by Global Administrator. Either can change every tenant setting in the table above, so a single compromised admin session can re-enable publish to web or open service principal API access to everyone.
- Put the Fabric Administrator role behind PIM, with approval and short activation, and keep Global Administrator for emergencies. See the Privileged Identity Management (PIM) Guide.
- Scope delegated settings: Fabric lets some tenant settings be delegated to capacity, domain or workspace admins, and the audit log records changes such as
UpdateWorkspaceTenantSettingDelegation. Decide which settings may be delegated and alert on delegation changes. - Limit workspace Admins: two named owners per production workspace is a practical target; use Member for people who manage content and Viewer, or an app audience, for consumers.
- Watch take-overs: taking over a semantic model or data source (
TakeOverDataset,TakeOverDatasource) moves its stored credentials and refresh to a new owner. It is a legitimate fix when an owner leaves and a quiet way to gain control of a data connection.
Integrations, API tokens and service principals
Service principals are how applications embed reports, automate deployment, refresh semantic models and call admin APIs. Microsoft's embedding documentation describes two layers of access, and both should be narrow.
- Tenant settings: a Power BI admin enables Embed content in apps and the setting that lets service principals call the APIs, for the whole organisation or for a security group. SCuBA MS.POWERBI.4.1v1 says to use a security group. Microsoft adds that service principals get every tenant setting they are enabled for, so use a dedicated group and exclude it from sensitive settings.
- Workspace membership: the service principal, or its group, is added to each workspace it needs as Member or Admin. Prefer Member; Admin can add and remove other admins.
| Integration pattern | Identity used | Main risk | Control |
|---|---|---|---|
| Embed for customers (app owns data) | Service principal, or a master user account | Embed tokens generated for any report the identity can reach | Dedicated workspace per app; Member role; alert on unusual GenerateEmbedToken volume |
| Deployment and automation pipelines | Service principal | Secret in CI with Admin on many workspaces | Certificate or federated credential; one principal per pipeline; Member on target workspaces only |
| Admin and governance tools (scanner, inventory) | Service principal with read-only admin API access | Tenant-wide metadata read | Separate admin API setting scoped to one group; read-only only |
| Streaming and push datasets | Resource key in a URL | Anyone with the URL can push data | Block ResourceKey authentication (MS.POWERBI.5.1v1); use Entra tokens |
| Data source and gateway connections | Stored database or cloud credentials | Credentials reused by anyone who can refresh or take over | Dedicated read-only accounts; limit gateway data source users |
- Do not add Entra API permissions: Microsoft states that an app used as a Power BI service principal does not need delegated or application permissions in the Azure portal and recommends not adding them, because they are never used. Remove any that were added "to make it work".
- Certificates over secrets: Microsoft recommends certificates for back-end services. A client secret is shown once and tends to be copied into configuration files. See the Azure Entra Client Secrets Security Guide.
- Know the limits: service principals cannot use My workspace, cannot sign in to the portal, and cannot be used for "embed for your organisation" apps.
- Replace master user accounts: embedding with a real user account means a password, often exempted from MFA. Replace it with a service principal.
- Gateway credentials: on-premises data gateways store data source credentials encrypted (the audit log records
EncryptCredentialsandChangeGatewayDatasourceUsers). Limit who can use each gateway data source and give the stored account read-only rights.
See the Service Account Security Guide and the Entra ID Applications and Consent Guide for lifecycle and ownership practice.
Sharing, guests and data exfiltration paths
Power BI offers several ways for data to leave its intended audience, and the controls differ for each.
- Publish to web: anonymous, viewable by anyone with the link. The baseline's fallback, if it must stay on, is to restrict it to specific security groups. Embed codes can be reviewed and deleted by admins; the audit log records
PublishToWebReportandDeleteEmbedCode. - Guests: B2B guests appear in user pickers once invited. Limit guest access to a security group, and review guests with access to sensitive workspaces. See the Entra ID Cross-Tenant Access and B2B Guest Governance Guide.
- Export and download: exports to files, report downloads and Analyze in Excel move data outside the service (
ExportReport,ExportArtifactDownload,DownloadReport,AnalyzeInExcel). Restrict export tenant settings to groups that need them and rely on sensitivity labels to carry protection into exported files. - Resharing: anyone with Reshare can extend access. Grant Reshare sparingly and prefer apps with defined audiences.
These map to ATT&CK collection and exfiltration techniques such as Data from Information Repositories (T1213) and Exfiltration Over Web Service (T1567). See the Data Loss Prevention (DLP) Guide.
Logging and detection
Fabric and Power BI activities are recorded in the Microsoft Purview audit log. Searching it needs the Audit Logs role in Exchange Online, which the Compliance Management and Organization Management role groups hold by default, and retention is governed by Purview audit retention policies. Forward the events to your SIEM; see the Microsoft 365 Unified Audit Log Guide for Detection.
| Operation (Microsoft operation list) | What it means | Alert or review |
|---|---|---|
PublishToWebReport | A report was published to the web | Alert on every occurrence; confirm approval |
ShareReport, ShareDashboard, ShareArtifact | Direct sharing | Review shares to guests or external domains |
ExportReport, ExportArtifactDownload, DownloadReport, AnalyzeInExcel | Data leaving the service | Alert on volume spikes per user or principal |
GenerateEmbedToken, GenerateMultiResourceEmbedToken | Embed tokens issued | Baseline per application; alert on new reports or volume |
AddGroupMembers, DeleteGroupMembers, UpdateFolderAccess | Workspace membership and access changes | Alert on Admin grants in production workspaces |
TakeOverDataset, TakeOverDatasource | Ownership and credentials moved | Confirm it matches a leaver or change record |
CreateServicePrincipalProfile | New service principal profile | Check against the approved group (MS.POWERBI.4.2v1) |
AddDatasourceToGateway, ChangeGatewayDatasourceUsers, EncryptCredentials | Gateway data sources and stored credentials changed | Review who gained use of a data source |
Pair Power BI audit data with Entra sign-in logs for service principals: a principal signing in from a new location or outside its pipeline schedule is the earliest sign of a stolen secret (ATT&CK T1528, T1078.004). See the Entra ID Sign-In and Audit Log Detection Guide.
Metrics:
- ScubaGear results for the Power BI baseline, per run.
- Number of active publish-to-web embed codes (target zero, or only approved ones).
- Guests with access to workspaces holding labelled confidential data.
- Service principals in the API security group, and those with Admin rather than Member on workspaces.
- Share of production semantic models with a sensitivity label.
- Exports per week from labelled content, against a baseline.
Hardening baseline
- Assess: run ScubaGear against the Power BI baseline and export tenant settings, workspace role assignments, guests, service principals and active embed codes.
- Close anonymous paths first: disable publish to web after reviewing existing embed codes with owners; block ResourceKey authentication after checking streaming and push datasets. Roll back by re-enabling for a named security group, never the whole organisation.
- Constrain external access: limit guest access and invitations to security groups (or disable them) and review existing guests, who are not removed by the setting.
- Restructure service principals: create a dedicated security group for API access, a separate one for profiles and one for read-only admin APIs; move each principal to Member on only its workspaces; switch to certificates; remove unused Entra API permissions.
- Disable R and Python visuals unless a reviewed use exists.
- Turn on sensitivity labels, apply them to production semantic models and reports, and restrict export settings to groups that need them.
- Reduce admins: move Fabric Administrator to PIM, cut workspace Admins to named owners, and decide which tenant settings can be delegated.
- Monitor: forward audit operations to the SIEM with the alerts above, and schedule ScubaGear runs to catch drift.
Small versus large organisations: a small tenant can usually disable publish to web, guest invitations, resource keys and R and Python visuals outright, and needs only one or two service principals. Large organisations typically need exceptions, so the security-group form of each setting matters more than the on or off choice, together with workspace ownership reviews and labelling at scale.
Common misconfigurations
- Publish to web enabled for the entire organisation: any report author can create an anonymous public link to production data.
- Service principal API access for everyone: the API setting enabled tenant-wide, so any app registration added to a workspace can call the APIs, against MS.POWERBI.4.1v1.
- One service principal as Admin on every workspace: a deployment secret in CI that can read, change and reshare everything.
- Master user embedding: a licensed user account with a password stored in an application, excluded from MFA.
- Guests never reviewed: external invitations disabled after the fact, but existing guests keep their access.
- Nested groups granting workspace roles: a broad group nested inside a workspace Member group, giving hundreds of people the ability to add others and reshare.
Framework mapping
| Area | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (SCuBA mapping where given) | NIST CSF 2.0 |
|---|---|---|
| Publish to web, guests, invitations | CM-7, SC-7, AC-6 | PR.AA-05 |
| Service principals and profiles | AC-4, AC-6 | PR.AA-01, PR.AA-05 |
| Resource keys | CM-7, IA-5 | PR.AA-01 |
| R and Python visuals | CM-7, SI-3 | PR.PS-01 |
| Sensitivity labels | AC-21, SC-7 | PR.DS-01 |
| Audit and monitoring | AU-12 | PR.PS-04, DE.CM-09 |
Practitioner checklist
- Run ScubaGear for Power BI and document a pass or exception for each MS.POWERBI policy.
- Disable publish to web, or limit it to one security group, and review every existing embed code.
- Limit guest access and guest invitations to security groups and review existing guests on sensitive workspaces.
- Restrict service principal API access and profile creation to dedicated security groups.
- Give each service principal Member, not Admin, on only the workspaces it needs, with a certificate credential and no Entra API permissions.
- Block ResourceKey authentication and disable R and Python visuals unless a reviewed exception exists.
- Enable sensitivity labels and restrict export settings to the groups that need them.
- Move the Fabric Administrator role to PIM and keep workspace Admins to named owners.
- Alert on
PublishToWebReport, external shares, export spikes, embed token anomalies, take-overs and workspace Admin grants.
Standards and references
- CISA: M365 Secure Configuration Baseline for Power BI
- CISA: Secure Cloud Business Applications (SCuBA) Project
- Microsoft Learn: Embed Power BI content with service principal and an application secret
- Microsoft Learn: Roles in workspaces in Microsoft Fabric
- Microsoft Learn: Track user activities in Microsoft Fabric
- Microsoft Learn: Operation list
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Data Security Guide · Microsoft 365 Security Guide · Exchange Online Security Guide · Service Account Security Guide