Prisma Access puts every remote user, branch and private application path behind one cloud-delivered security service, which means an over-broad administrator role, a leaked service account secret or a loose split tunnel rule now affects the whole organisation at once. These are customer-side configuration choices: broad Superuser grants, authentication that bypasses the corporate identity provider, exclusions that send sensitive traffic around inspection, and logs that never reach the SOC. This guide covers how identity and access work in Prisma Access, the predefined administrator roles, service accounts and integrations, logging, a hardening baseline and the misconfigurations to check first. It is written for network and security engineers who run or audit a Prisma Access tenant, and draws on Palo Alto Networks documentation checked in October 2026. It does not compare SASE vendors; for the architecture and selection see the SASE and SSE Guide.
This is an independent guide from NHI Mgmt Group, based on Palo Alto Networks's public documentation as of November 2026. It is not sponsored or reviewed by Palo Alto Networks. Product features change, so confirm settings against Palo Alto Networks's current documentation.
Key takeaways
- Superuser is the role to ration. Palo Alto's own documentation says to assign Superuser and Multitenant Superuser only to users or service accounts that require unrestricted access; use Security, Network, IAM and Auditor roles for day-to-day work.
- Service accounts are tenant-wide non-human identities. They use OAuth 2.0 client credentials, the secret is shown only once, and an account created in a parent tenant is automatically added to all child tenants.
- Identity drives policy, so the identity source must be right. Use the Cloud Identity Engine to sync users and groups from Entra ID, Okta or on-premises directories and write rules on groups rather than IP addresses.
- Split tunnel exclusions are security exceptions. Every excluded application, domain or route bypasses inspection; keep exclusions specific and reviewed, and enable "No direct access to local network" where supported.
- Logs are only useful once they leave the platform. Forward from Strata Logging Service to your SIEM over encrypted syslog or HTTPS with a properly chained certificate, and watch administrator and configuration events as closely as threat logs.
How identity and access work in Prisma Access
Prisma Access has three connection types, and each has its own identity question.
| Connection type | What it connects | Identity used for policy | Key configuration risks |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile users: GlobalProtect | Managed endpoints through an IPsec or SSL tunnel (tunnel mode), or proxy mode, or tunnel and proxy mode | User and group from the authentication profile and Cloud Identity Engine; device posture from Host Information Profile (HIP) reports | Authentication profile without MFA, permissive split tunnel, HIP not used in rules |
| Mobile users: Explicit Proxy | Web traffic forwarded by a PAC file to the Prisma Access proxy | User authentication at the proxy | PAC file bypass lists, unauthenticated traffic |
| Remote networks | Branches and sites over IPsec tunnels; remote networks are fully meshed with each other | Users via User-ID or Cloud Identity Engine; site by tunnel | Older IKE and IPsec profiles, pre-shared keys reused across sites |
| Service connections (Corporate Access Nodes) | Data centres and HQ, giving users access to private apps and resources such as on-premises Active Directory | The service account Prisma Access uses to reach corporate authentication | Over-privileged directory account, no segmentation behind the tunnel |
- Service connections are expected: Palo Alto recommends always creating a service connection, even with placeholder values, because mobile users reach remote networks through it in a hub-and-spoke model. Internet egress is not supported over service connections.
- Cloud Identity Engine: described by Palo Alto as a centralised, cloud-native source of truth for user identity and authentication. On-premises directories connect through the Cloud Identity Agent; cloud identity providers such as Microsoft Entra ID and Okta connect through API connections. Plan the region for data residency before activation, then associate it with Prisma Access. The service itself is free.
- User authentication for GlobalProtect: authentication profiles, certificates and certificate profiles are held in a template added to the template stack. Prefer SAML to the corporate identity provider with phishing-resistant MFA, combined with a machine certificate check for managed devices.
- Device posture: HIP reporting lets you write rules based on device state such as patch level, disk encryption and antivirus definitions. Use it to separate managed from unmanaged devices rather than relying on user identity alone.
- Unmanaged devices: Clientless VPN and Prisma Browser offer access without a full tunnel. Restrict them to the applications that genuinely need unmanaged access.
For the broader shift from VPN to identity-aware access, see the Secure Remote Access Beyond VPN Guide.
Admin roles and privileged access
Prisma Access administration runs through Common Services Identity and Access, shared with Strata Cloud Manager. Roles are either multitenant (scoped to a level of the tenant hierarchy) or enterprise (scoped to one selected app). Roles combine as a union, and the system checks the specific app before "All Apps & Services". Every user also has a base role for essential interface features that cannot be removed.
| Predefined role | Scope | What it allows (per Palo Alto documentation) | Who should hold it |
|---|---|---|---|
| Multitenant Superuser | Tenant hierarchy | Read and write to all apps, logs and services at the assigned level | Two or three break-glass and platform owners |
| Superuser | Selected app | Read and write to all system-wide functions, including all other roles' permissions | Platform owners only |
| Security Administrator | Selected app | Read and write to logs and security policy; read-only alerts, devices and quotas | Security policy engineers |
| Network Administrator | Selected app | Read and write to logs and network policy | Network engineers managing tunnels and routing |
| IAM Administrator / Multitenant IAM Administrator | App or hierarchy | Read and write to identity and authentication; read-only logs | Identity team; separate from policy writers |
| Auditor | Selected app | Read-only access to all configuration, subscriptions and licences, plus logs | Internal audit and assurance |
| View Only Administrator | Selected app | Read-only access to functions and logs except DNS logs | Wider operations staff |
| SOC Analyst | Selected app | Logs, reports, events, alerts and configurations | SOC analysts |
| Tier 1 / Tier 2 Support | Selected app | Remediation workflows with read-only alerts, policies and devices | Service desk and support engineers |
| Business Administrator | Tenant or TSG only | Subscription and licence management | Procurement and licence owners |
- Federate administrator login: configure SAML identity federation (including the documented Entra ID integration) so administrator accounts follow joiner, mover and leaver processes and inherit conditional access and MFA. Use identity role mapping and SCIM where your identity provider supports it, so role assignment is driven by groups rather than manual grants.
- Separate duties: keep identity (IAM Administrator), security policy (Security Administrator) and network (Network Administrator) with different people, and give auditors the Auditor role rather than Superuser.
- Use custom roles for the rest: clone a predefined role and remove what a team does not need.
- Break-glass: keep at least one Superuser that does not depend on the federated identity provider, protected by a hardware key, monitored and tested quarterly.
See the Privileged Access Management Guide.
Integrations, API tokens and service accounts
Automation, SIEM pipelines, infrastructure-as-code and third-party tools reach Prisma Access through service accounts. These are among the most powerful non-human identities in a network estate.
- How they authenticate: a service account is not tied to a specific user. It uses a client ID, client secret and tenant service group (TSG) ID to obtain an OAuth 2.0 access token through the client credentials grant. Its identity takes the form
<name>@<tsg_id>.iam.panserviceaccount, which is what appears in audit trails. - Secret handling: the client secret is shown only once and can be downloaded as a CSV. Never leave that CSV in a downloads folder or ticket: move it straight into a secrets manager and delete the file. See the Secrets Management Guide.
- Roles are optional, so set them deliberately: Palo Alto states roles are optional for service accounts. Assign the narrowest role the integration needs (for example SOC Analyst or View Only for read-only SIEM enrichment), never Superuser by default.
- Inheritance: a service account added to a parent tenant is automatically added to every child tenant. For managed service providers and multi-business-unit tenants, create service accounts at the lowest TSG that needs them to limit blast radius.
- Rotation and ownership: give every service account a named human owner, a purpose, a rotation date and a removal date. Remove service accounts when the integration is retired.
- Service connection directory accounts: the account Prisma Access uses to reach on-premises Active Directory over a service connection should be read-only, restricted to the attributes needed and monitored. See the Service Account Security Guide.
Logging and detection
Prisma Access logs go to Strata Logging Service (formerly Cortex Data Lake), which also holds logs from Palo Alto NGFWs and integrates with Panorama and Strata Cloud Manager. Forwarding options include syslog using RFC 5425 encrypted syslog, HTTPS POST (for collectors such as Splunk HEC), email for high-priority alerts, a recommended Microsoft Sentinel integration and cloud storage targets such as Amazon Security Lake, S3, Snowflake and OCI buckets. Formats include CSV, LEEF, CEF, JSON and Parquet. Communication uses TLS 1.2, the receiver's certificate must be signed by a trusted root or private CA and the full chain must be presented; Palo Alto advises connecting directly to a supported endpoint rather than through intermediaries.
| Signal | What to alert on | Threat addressed |
|---|---|---|
| Administrator and role changes | New Superuser assignments, role changes outside change windows, new identity federation or SAML configuration | T1098 Account Manipulation |
| Service account activity | New service accounts, use from unexpected IP ranges, read-only accounts making configuration changes | T1078 Valid Accounts |
| Configuration pushes | Security rule changes allowing any-any, new split tunnel exclusions, decryption exclusions added | Policy loosening |
| GlobalProtect authentication | Impossible travel, repeated failures, logins from devices failing HIP checks | T1133 External Remote Services |
| Threat and URL logs | Command-and-control categories, malware verdicts, newly registered domains | Post-compromise activity |
| Tunnel status | Remote network or service connection tunnels flapping or down | Availability and possible tampering |
Metrics:
- Superuser count: number of human and service accounts with Superuser or Multitenant Superuser (target: a handful, reviewed quarterly).
- Federated admin share: percentage of administrator logins through SAML federation.
- Service account hygiene: percentage with an owner, a role narrower than Superuser and a rotation in the last 12 months.
- Inspection coverage: share of user traffic that passes through Prisma Access rather than split tunnel exclusions.
- Log delivery: forwarding lag and failed deliveries to the SIEM.
Hardening baseline
- Identity first: connect the Cloud Identity Engine to the authoritative directory, federate admin access with SAML and MFA, and define role mapping from groups.
- Roles: reduce Superuser holders, assign scoped predefined or custom roles and separate IAM, security and network duties.
- Mobile users: authenticate GlobalProtect with SAML plus device certificates; use HIP-based rules for managed devices; restrict Clientless VPN and browser access to named apps.
- Split tunnelling: start from full tunnel (0.0.0.0/0 and ::/0 included), add only specific, documented exclusions, and enable "No direct access to local network" to reduce risk on untrusted networks such as rogue Wi-Fi.
- Security policy: apply security profiles (antivirus, anti-spyware, vulnerability protection, URL filtering, file blocking and WildFire analysis) to allow rules, and decrypt outbound TLS except for documented privacy and pinning exceptions.
- Remote networks and service connections: strong IKE and IPsec crypto profiles, unique pre-shared keys or certificates per site, and segmentation behind service connections so users only reach the private apps they need.
- Service accounts: least privilege roles, secrets in a vault, lowest TSG possible, owner and rotation recorded.
- Logging: forward to the SIEM with full certificate chain validation; alert on the events in the table above.
- Test and roll back: push policy changes to a pilot group of mobile users or one remote network first, keep the previous configuration version for rollback, and record every push in change management.
Common misconfigurations
- Superuser for everyone: the whole network team holds Superuser because it was the simplest way to grant access during deployment.
- Service accounts with no role review: automation accounts created in the parent tenant silently inherit access to every child tenant.
- Client secrets left in CSV downloads: the one-time secret ends up on a laptop or in a ticket.
- Broad split tunnel exclusions: whole SaaS domains, or route exclusions broader than the inclusions, bypass inspection and DLP.
- Local authentication instead of SAML: GlobalProtect or admin accounts that are not deprovisioned when people leave.
- Logs stay in the platform: threat and configuration logs never reach the SIEM, so administrative abuse goes unseen.
- Flat access behind service connections: users who reach the data centre can reach everything there.
Framework mapping
| Area | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | NIST CSF 2.0 |
|---|---|---|
| Admin roles and separation of duties | AC-2 Account Management, AC-6 Least Privilege | PR.AA-05 |
| User and device authentication for remote access | IA-2, AC-17 Remote Access | PR.AA-03 |
| Service account credentials | IA-5 Authenticator Management | PR.AA-01 |
| Tunnel encryption and inspection | SC-7 Boundary Protection, SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity | PR.DS-02 |
| Configuration baseline and changes | CM-6 Configuration Settings, CM-3 Configuration Change Control | PR.PS-01 |
| Logging and monitoring | AU-2 Event Logging, AU-6, SI-4 | DE.CM-01, DE.CM-09 |
Practitioner checklist
- List every Superuser and Multitenant Superuser and reduce to named platform owners plus break-glass.
- Federate admin access through SAML with MFA and map roles from identity provider groups.
- Connect the Cloud Identity Engine and write policy on groups, not IP addresses.
- Require SAML plus device certificates for GlobalProtect and use HIP in rules.
- Review every split tunnel exclusion and enable "No direct access to local network".
- Give every service account an owner, a narrow role, a vault-stored secret and a rotation date; create it at the lowest TSG.
- Use a read-only, monitored directory account for service connection authentication.
- Forward logs to the SIEM over encrypted syslog or HTTPS with full chain validation.
- Alert on role changes, new service accounts, new exclusions and any-any rules.
- Pilot policy pushes and keep a rollback configuration version.
Standards and references
- Palo Alto Networks: About Roles and Permissions
- Palo Alto Networks: Add Service Accounts
- Palo Alto Networks: Prisma Access Mobile Users
- Palo Alto Networks: Prisma Access Service Connections
- Palo Alto Networks: GlobalProtect Tunnel Settings
- Palo Alto Networks: Cloud Identity Engine Getting Started
- Palo Alto Networks: Strata Logging Service, Forward Logs
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: SASE and SSE Guide · Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS Hardening Guide · Secure Web Gateway and Web Filtering Guide · Service Account Security Guide