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Ransomware-as-a-Service Business Model Guide: Affiliates, Revenue Splits and Why Takedowns Rarely End It

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 27 October 2026 13 min read
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Ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) splits one crime into a supply chain of specialists, so the gang named on the leak site is rarely the person who broke in, and removing the brand rarely removes the people. Developers rent encryptors and panels, affiliates run intrusions for a share of the ransom, access brokers sell the way in and negotiators handle the money. Understanding how that market is organised, and how money and trust flow through it, tells defenders where controls bite and why law enforcement disruptions reduce the threat without ending it. This guide covers the roles, revenue models, services, incentives and failure points of RaaS, drawing on US Department of Justice and UK National Crime Agency findings, Microsoft research, MITRE ATT&CK v20 and Coveware incident data. It is for threat intelligence analysts, incident responders, security leaders and risk owners. The wider criminal market around RaaS is covered in the Cybercrime Ecosystem Guide, which this page does not repeat.

Key takeaways

  • The affiliate takes most of the money. The DOJ states LockBit's developer received 20 percent of each ransom and the affiliate 80 percent, which is why skilled affiliates hold the power in the market and move freely between brands.
  • Most affiliates are not getting rich. The NCA found that of 194 LockBit affiliates, up to 114 appear never to have received a ransom payment, and that affiliates paid thousands to join.
  • The payload is the least informative part. Microsoft warns that naming an incident after its ransomware implies one group with common tradecraft, when affiliates using the same payload differ widely. Defend the intrusion stages where the affiliate operates.
  • Promises are part of the product, and they are false. The NCA found LockBit did not routinely delete stolen data after payment and that some decryptors given to paying victims did not work.
  • Disruption works by breaking trust. Takedowns that expose affiliates, leak panel data and recover keys reduce activity, as with the 73 percent fall in UK LockBit attacks the NCA reported, but affiliates and access persist, so plan for the next brand.

The roles in a RaaS operation

Microsoft defines RaaS as a model in which an operator builds and maintains ransomware tools and sells access to affiliates who carry out intrusions and split the profits. In practice there are more roles, some filled by the same people.

RoleWhat it doesDocumented exampleWhere defenders meet it
Developer or operatorWrites the encryptor and builder, runs the affiliate panel, leak site and payment portalDOJ: the LockBit developer designed the code, recruited affiliates and maintained the panel and leak siteEncryptor behaviour, ransom notes, leak site listings
AffiliateGains or buys access, escalates privilege, steals data, deploys the payloadATT&CK: Storm-0501 (G1053) has worked with Sabbath, Hive, BlackCat, Hunters International, LockBit 3.0 and EmbargoEvery intrusion stage before encryption
Initial access brokerCompromises networks and sells access, sometimes with privileged credentialsMicrosoft: listings advertise features such as no EDR coverage or domain admin credentialsStolen credentials, exposed RDP and VPN, commodity malware
Negotiator or "support"Handles victim chat, price and payment instructionsATT&CK: Water Galura (G1050), the Qilin operators, handle payload generation, negotiation and publication for affiliatesRansom portal communication
Data handling and leak servicesExfiltration tools, storage, leak site publicationATT&CK: StealBit (S1200), LockBit's exfiltration toolBulk outbound transfers, leak site
Laundering and cash-outMoves cryptocurrency through exchanges and mixersDOJ: about $1.09 million of a BlackSuit ransom was frozen at an exchange in January 2024Sanctions screening and law enforcement reporting

Not every brand uses the open affiliate model. ATT&CK describes Play (G1040) as presumed to operate as a closed group. Coveware counted "lone wolf" extortionists without a brand as the third largest share of its Q2 2025 cases (9 percent) and noted many likely also work under branded programmes.

Revenue and fee models

ModelHow money flowsDocumented exampleWhy it matters to defenders
Percentage splitVictim pays; affiliate keeps most, operator takes a cutLockBit: 20 percent developer, 80 percent affiliate (DOJ); the developer allegedly received at least $100 million of at least $500 million in paymentsAffiliates have a strong incentive to maximise each victim's pain and to change brands if the cut or trust changes
Joining fee or depositAffiliate pays to be admittedNCA: LockBit affiliates paid thousands to joinOperators profit even when affiliates fail, so volume of attempts stays high
Per-key feeAffiliate pays the administrator for each decryption keyDOJ: Phobos affiliates paid administrators a fee for each key, matched by a unique deployment identifier, with more than $16 million extorted from over 1,000 victimsLow-cost strains suit many small attacks on small organisations
Full serviceOperator handles negotiation and publication; affiliate supplies access and dataWater Galura for Qilin (ATT&CK G1050)Negotiation style is consistent across affiliates of one brand
Data-only extortionNo encryption; payment is for non-publicationCoveware: exfiltration in 74 percent of Q2 2025 cases, with payment rates for exfiltration-only incidents "stubbornly high"Backups alone do not remove leverage. See the Data Extortion Without Encryption Guide

What victims pay: Coveware reported an average payment of $1,130,070 and a median of $400,000 in Q2 2025, with 26 percent of victims paying. Those figures come from one incident response firm's caseload and swing sharply quarter to quarter; use them for orientation, not budgeting. See the Ransomware Statistics Guide for sourced trend data.

What a RaaS kit includes

  • Builder and encryptor: configurable payloads for Windows, Linux and VMware ESXi, often with partial encryption for speed. The NCA counted more than 7,000 LockBit attacks built through its panel between June 2022 and February 2024.
  • Affiliate panel: victim management, build history, chat and payout records. Panel data is what let investigators measure affiliate earnings, and what exposes affiliates when the panel is seized.
  • Leak site: countdowns and published samples to pressure victims. See the Ransomware Leak Sites and Victim Shaming Guide.
  • Exfiltration tooling: purpose-built tools such as StealBit, or legitimate tools such as Rclone chosen by the affiliate.
  • Payment portal and negotiation: Tor chat with a victim ID, sometimes with operator staff. Microsoft lists negotiation and cryptocurrency handling among RaaS extortion services.
  • Rules and reputation: affiliate rules on targets and conduct, which operators break when it suits them. The NCA found an affiliate LockBit claimed to have banned went on to build 127 attacks and was paid multiple times.

How affiliates choose and switch brands

Affiliates behave like contractors choosing a platform. Microsoft documented DEV-0237 moving from Ryuk and Conti to Hive, then BlackCat and later Nokoyawa; DEV-0506 moving from Conti to Black Basta around April 2022; and DEV-0504 deploying at least six RaaS payloads since 2020, including REvil and BlackCat. Their reasons are commercial:

  • Revenue share and payout reliability: an exit scam, such as the one widely reported when ALPHV shut down after the Change Healthcare Breach 2024, sends affiliates to rivals, in that case with the stolen data, which RansomHub then used for a second demand.
  • Operational security: a brand under law enforcement pressure risks exposing its affiliates through seized panels.
  • Sanctions friction: payments to sanctioned groups are harder to obtain. Mandiant assessed that Evil Corp linked actors moved to LockBit to hinder attribution. See the Ransomware Family Lineage and Rebrands Guide.
  • Features: ESXi lockers, faster encryption and better exfiltration tools win affiliates.

Defender implication: the intrusion tradecraft follows the affiliate. Profiles of brands such as the LockBit Threat Actor Profile or Qilin Threat Actor Profile describe what affiliates of that brand were seen doing, not a fixed playbook.

Why takedowns rarely end the threat

DisruptionWhat it achievedWhat survived
Hive, January 2023 (DOJ)FBI inside the network from late July 2022; more than 300 keys to victims under attack and over 1,000 to earlier victims; more than $130 million in demands avoidedAffiliates; Group-IB assesses with moderate confidence that Hunters International, active from October 2023, is a possible Hive rebrand
LockBit (Operation Cronos), February to May 2024 (NCA, DOJ)Panel and keys seized; affiliate data exposed; active affiliates down from 194 to 69; UK monthly attacks down 73 percentThe brand continued in reduced form; affiliates moved elsewhere
Phobos administrator, November 2024 (DOJ)Extradition and charges against an alleged administratorAffiliate crews and copies of the strain
BlackSuit, July 2025 (DOJ)Four servers, nine domains and about $1.09 million seizedCisco Talos had already assessed a probable successor, Chaos, active from February 2025

The pattern is consistent. Developers are few and replaceable; code is bought, leaked or rewritten; affiliates and access brokers are many and keep their skills, tooling and footholds. Disruption is most effective when it damages trust between roles by exposing affiliates, showing that promises to delete data were false and releasing keys. See the Cybercrime Law Enforcement Takedowns Guide.

Where the model is weakest: defensive pressure points

Dependency of the modelControl that breaks itATT&CK v20
Bought or stolen access and credentialsMFA on all remote access, phishing-resistant MFA for admins, removal of dormant accounts, breached-password screeningT1078 Valid Accounts; T1133 External Remote Services
Fast privilege escalationUnique local admin passwords (LAPS), no domain admin logons on workstations, tiered administrationT1003 OS Credential Dumping
Remote tools the affiliate bringsAllowlist one remote support tool and block the restT1219 Remote Access Tools
Killing security toolsEDR tamper protection, vulnerable driver blocklistT1685 Disable or Modify Tools
Data theft as leverageEgress controls and alerts on bulk uploads and RcloneT1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
Encryption and recovery denialImmutable, offline backups with separate credentials; ESXi hardeningT1486 Data Encrypted for Impact; T1490 Inhibit System Recovery

These mirror Microsoft's recommendations: credential hygiene and LAPS, auditing privilege paths, rapid patching of Active Directory, MFA and conditional access in the cloud, tamper protection, attack surface reduction rules such as blocking credential theft from LSASS, and blocking unneeded remote management tools.

Where identity fits

The RaaS market runs on identities it did not create. Access brokers sell VPN, RDP and cloud logins; affiliates escalate through service accounts and cached domain admin credentials; remote management accounts give them a trusted channel. Because affiliates outlive brands, a credential stolen under one programme is a live risk under the next. Treat every ransomware incident, and every disruption of a brand you were exposed to, as a trigger to rotate credentials the intruder could have reached, including service accounts, API keys and RMM credentials. See the Initial Access Brokers Guide and the Service Account Security Guide.

Using RaaS intelligence in your programme

  1. Track affiliates as well as brands: record the intrusion tradecraft observed in each incident against an affiliate cluster where vendors name one (for example Storm-0501), not only the payload.
  2. Prioritise controls by pressure point: start with access (MFA, exposed services), then privilege (LAPS, tiering), then remote tools and EDR tamper protection, then exfiltration and backups.
  3. Prepare the money decisions: agree in advance who decides on engagement and payment, the sanctions screening process under the OFAC advisory, and the law enforcement reporting route. See the Ransomware Payments and Sanctions Guide.
  4. Assume promises are false: plan notification and data breach response on the basis that stolen data will not be deleted, as the NCA's LockBit findings show.
  5. Exercise it: run a tabletop in which the brand disappears mid-negotiation and a second group contacts you with the same data.

Small versus large organisations: small organisations are the main market for low-cost strains such as Phobos, so MFA on remote access, a managed EDR with tamper protection and offline backups give most of the benefit. Large organisations face the most capable affiliates and need identity threat detection, tiered administration, egress monitoring and a rehearsed payment decision process.

Metrics

  • Percentage of remote access entry points (VPN, RDP gateways, VDI, cloud consoles) behind MFA.
  • Percentage of workstations and servers with unique local administrator passwords.
  • Unapproved remote management tools detected per month, and time to remove.
  • Mean time from first affiliate-stage alert (credential dumping, new RMM, bulk upload) to containment.
  • Percentage of critical systems with tested, immutable backup restores in the last quarter.

Framework mapping

ActivityNIST CSF 2.0NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5
Threat intelligence on RaaS brands and affiliatesID.RA-02, ID.RA-03PM-16, RA-3
Access and credential controlsPR.AA-01, PR.AA-05IA-2, AC-2, AC-6
Monitoring for affiliate tradecraftDE.CM-01SI-4
Backups and recoveryPR.DS-11, RC.RP-01CP-9, CP-10
Incident reporting and coordinationRS.CO-02IR-6

Common failure patterns

  • Defending against the brand: detections tuned only to one gang's published indicators miss a new affiliate with different access and tooling.
  • Believing deletion promises: paying for non-publication on the assumption data will be destroyed, when the NCA found LockBit kept it.
  • Treating a takedown as closure: standing down monitoring or leaving compromised credentials in place after news that "the gang is gone".
  • Ignoring the broker stage: stolen credentials or a remote access alert are dismissed because no ransomware is present, although that is the stage where an affiliate is cheapest to stop.
  • No prepared money decision: sanctions screening, legal advice and insurer notification start after the demand arrives, under time pressure set by the leak site countdown.
  • Assuming small targets are not worth it: per-key models like Phobos make small organisations profitable at volume.

Lessons from incidents

The Change Healthcare Breach 2024 shows the RaaS model's internal frictions reaching the victim. It began with a Citrix login without MFA, the kind of access affiliates and brokers trade. UnitedHealth paid a $22 million ransom, ALPHV then shut down in what was widely reported as an exit scam, and the affiliate took the stolen data to RansomHub, which demanded a further payment. The payment bought nothing durable from the person holding the data. The two controls that would have changed the outcome sit at either end of the model: MFA on the remote access route, and a decision process that assumes promises from a RaaS brand cannot be relied on.

Practitioner checklist

  • Put MFA on every remote access route and phishing-resistant MFA on administrator accounts.
  • Deploy unique local administrator passwords and keep domain admin credentials off workstations.
  • Allow one remote support tool and block the rest.
  • Enable EDR tamper protection and the vulnerable driver blocklist.
  • Alert on bulk uploads and data transfer tools leaving servers.
  • Keep immutable, offline backups with separate credentials and test restores.
  • Record affiliate tradecraft from each incident, not only the payload brand.
  • Pre-agree payment decision owners, OFAC sanctions screening and law enforcement reporting.
  • Rotate all reachable credentials after any ransomware incident or relevant takedown.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Cybercrime Ecosystem Guide · Ransomware Groups Guide · Ransomware Family Lineage and Rebrands Guide · Initial Access Brokers Guide · Ransomware Prevention Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 27 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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