Sales engagement and revenue tools such as conversation intelligence, website chat and email sequencing platforms hold OAuth tokens into your CRM, mailboxes and calendars, and those tokens live in the vendor's infrastructure, not yours. In August 2025 a single compromise of the Salesloft Drift integration gave an attacker tokens that reached Salesforce tenants at hundreds of organisations, and three months later long-lived tokens for another customer success platform's connected app were used the same way. This guide is about that category of integration: what access tools like Gong, Drift, Outreach and Salesloft typically request, how to scope the integration identity in Salesforce, Microsoft 365 and Google Workspace, what to ask the vendor, how to monitor integration traffic, and how to revoke fast. It is for CRM administrators, identity and SaaS security teams, and third-party risk owners. Token mechanics common to all SaaS platforms are in the SaaS API Token Security Guide; this page applies them to revenue tools.
Key takeaways
- The vendor holds a standing key. When you connect a sales tool by OAuth, the vendor stores a refresh token that works until revoked unless you set a policy, so the vendor's security becomes part of yours.
- Each integration needs its own identity. Gong's own documentation recommends a dedicated Salesforce integration user scoped to the data the tool needs, and Salesforce offers an API-only Integration user licence for exactly this.
- Mail and calendar access is the hidden blast radius. Conversation and engagement tools often read mailboxes and calendars across the sales team; scope app-only access to the people who use the tool, not the whole tenant.
- CRM records are a secret store. In the Drift campaign the attacker searched exported support cases for AWS keys, passwords and Snowflake tokens, so scanning CRM data for secrets is part of integration security.
- Revocation must be rehearsed. You need to know, per vendor, which tokens to revoke in which consoles and which credentials the vendor could have seen, before the vendor's incident notice arrives.
What sales engagement integrations reach
Revenue tools connect to several systems at once, and each connection is a separate non-human identity.
| Tool category | Typical connections | Data reached | Write capability |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conversation intelligence (for example Gong) | CRM, mail and calendar, video conferencing, dialler | Accounts, contacts, opportunities, meeting recordings, transcripts, email metadata or content | Gong's documentation lists write access to Salesforce Task and Event objects and export of calls through its own Conversation objects |
| Website chat and conversational marketing (for example Drift) | CRM, marketing automation, email | Leads, contacts, accounts, chat transcripts | Creates and updates leads and contacts |
| Sales engagement and sequencing (for example Outreach, Salesloft) | CRM, mail sending, calendar | Contacts, activities, mailbox send rights | Sends email as users, logs activities to CRM |
| Customer success and revenue platforms | CRM, support desk, product analytics | Accounts, cases, usage | Updates account fields and tasks |
The pattern behind recent incidents is the same in every row: a vendor stores OAuth refresh tokens for each customer, the tokens are long-lived, and the integration user can read far more than the tool uses. In the Salesloft Drift breach, the attacker reached Salesloft's GitHub account between March and June 2025, moved into Drift's AWS environment and obtained customers' OAuth tokens. Google Threat Intelligence Group, which tracks the actor as UNC6395, reported Salesforce data theft between 8 and 18 August 2025, use of Drift Email tokens against a small number of Google Workspace accounts on 9 August, and revocation of all Drift tokens by Salesloft and Salesforce on 20 August. In the Gainsight Salesforce breach, Gainsight's investigation found the attacker held 285 tokens created between 2017 and 2023, and its root-cause statement was that the "OAuth tokens were allowed to live too long".
Scoping the integration identity in Salesforce
- Dedicated, API-only user: Salesforce's Integration user licence is API only (it cannot log in to the user interface) and uses the Minimum Access - API Only Integrations profile. Gong's documentation also recommends a dedicated integration user rather than a real employee, noting that the integration disconnects if the person who set it up is deactivated.
- Object and field access by permission set: Grant only the objects the tool documents. Gong, for example, lists read access to Account, Contact, Lead and Opportunity (plus Opportunity Team, Split and Product for forecasting) and write access to Task and Event. Do not add View All Data or Modify All Data to make setup easier; Gong notes that "View All Records" on an object overrides role-based visibility, so use it only where the tool genuinely needs every record.
- Keep sensitive objects out: If the tool does not need Cases, do not grant Case access. Support cases were the richest source of secrets in the Drift campaign.
- API Enabled by permission set: Google's advisory recommends removing the "API Enabled" permission from profiles and granting it only through permission sets to authorised users, so only named integration users can call the API.
- Connected app policies: Set Permitted Users to "Admin approved users are pre-authorized" and assign the app only to the integration user's permission set. Set IP Relaxation to "Enforce IP restrictions" where the vendor publishes stable egress addresses, and replace the default refresh token policy ("valid until revoked") with an expiry or inactivity limit the vendor supports. Salesforce documents that users with "Use Any API Client" can bypass Permitted Users, so restrict that permission. The policy reference is in the Salesforce Security Guide.
- Sandbox versus production: Gong's FAQ says one Salesforce instance can be connected at a time. Test in a sandbox with a separate integration user, then connect production with a fresh one rather than reusing sandbox credentials.
Scoping mail and calendar access
Microsoft 365
- Consent governance: Restrict user consent and turn on the admin consent workflow (Entra ID, Enterprise apps, Consent and permissions, Admin consent settings). Microsoft documents that only Global Administrators can approve requests for apps that ask for Microsoft Graph application permissions, which is the right level of scrutiny for a vendor asking to read every mailbox. See the Entra ID Applications and Consent Guide.
- Scope app-only mailbox access: Exchange Online RBAC for Applications, which Microsoft says replaces Application Access Policies, assigns roles such as
Application Mail.ReadorApplication Calendars.Readover a management scope or administrative unit, for example the sales team. Grants are additive with Entra ID, so remove the unscoped tenant-wide Graph permission first, then verify withTest-ServicePrincipalAuthorization. Changes can take 30 minutes to two hours to apply. - Prefer delegated over application permissions where the tool supports per-user connection, so access ends when a user leaves or disconnects.
Google Workspace
- App access control: In Security, Access and data control, API controls, set each sales tool to "Specific Google data" with only the scopes it needs, or "Limited", rather than "Trusted".
- Restrict services and high-risk scopes: Set Gmail, Drive and Calendar to Restricted so only configured apps reach them; Google documents that restricting a service revokes tokens held by untrusted apps, and that Gmail, Drive and Chat have separately controllable high-risk scopes.
- Unconfigured apps: Change the default ("allow any third-party app") to allow only basic sign-in or to block until configured, and review "Apps pending review". The accessed apps list (Manage App Access, View list) shows client IDs, scopes and user counts and exports to CSV.
Domain-wide delegation, where a vendor's service account impersonates any user, should be avoided for sales tools. See the Google Workspace Domain-Wide Delegation Security Guide.
Vendor due diligence for token custodians
A vendor that stores your refresh tokens is a credential custodian. Ask specific questions before connecting and at renewal.
| Question | Good answer | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| How are customer OAuth tokens stored and who can decrypt them? | Encrypted with per-tenant keys in a managed KMS or HSM, access by service identity only, no human read path | Drift tokens were taken from the vendor's cloud environment |
| How is source control protected and what secrets are in it? | Phishing-resistant MFA, no long-lived secrets in repositories, monitored guest and collaborator changes | The Drift intrusion began in Salesloft's GitHub account |
| What are your egress IP addresses? | A published, stable list you can enforce in connected app and login IP policies | IP enforcement would have blocked use of stolen tokens from Tor exit nodes |
| Do you support refresh token expiry and re-authorisation? | Yes, with documented behaviour when a token expires | Lets you replace "valid until revoked" |
| What is the minimum scope and object list? | A documented list per feature, no full scope | Google's advisory says to avoid broad scopes like full |
| How fast will you notify us, and will you tell us which tokens were exposed? | Contractual notification window and token-level detail | Every hour of delay is an hour of attacker use |
| Can we see per-tenant API activity logs? | Yes, exportable | Needed to scope an incident from both sides |
Record the answers in your third-party risk process. See the Third-Party Risk Management Guide.
Monitoring integration activity
Integration traffic is predictable, which makes anomalies detectable. Baseline each integration user's normal volume, objects, source addresses and user agents.
- Salesforce Event Monitoring: Google's advisory directs responders to review Event Monitoring logs for the integration's connection user and the connected app's authentication, and to review
UniqueQueryevents, which record executed SOQL queries. Alert on COUNT queries across Account, Opportunity, User and Case followed by bulk reads, the reconnaissance pattern GTIG reported. - Source and client: Alert on integration logins from outside vendor egress ranges or from anonymising networks (the Drift campaign used mostly Tor exit nodes, ATT&CK T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy), and on user agents the vendor does not use, such as the
Salesforce-Multi-Org-Fetcher/1.0andSalesforce-CLI/1.0strings in GTIG's indicators. - Anti-forensics: GTIG reported the actor deleted query jobs, though logs were not affected. Alert on job deletions by integration users and keep logs in your SIEM, not only in the platform.
- Mail and calendar: Watch Entra ID service principal sign-ins and Google Workspace OAuth token events for the vendor's client IDs, including new scopes granted. See the Entra ID Sign-In and Audit Log Detection Guide and the Google Workspace Audit Log Detection Guide.
Metrics
- Dedicated identity coverage: Percentage of sales integrations using a dedicated, API-only integration user (target 100 per cent).
- Token age: Age of the oldest active refresh token per connected app, and the share of apps with an expiry policy.
- Scope fit: Number of integrations with object access beyond the vendor's documented list, or tenant-wide mail permissions.
- IP enforcement: Share of integrations with IP restrictions enforced.
- Secrets in CRM: Count of secrets found per scan in cases, notes and attachments, trending to zero.
- Revocation time: Measured time to revoke every token for one vendor in a rehearsal.
Revocation and response runbook
- Trigger: Vendor incident notice, platform notice (Salesforce removing an app from AppExchange, Google disabling an integration) or your own detection.
- Revoke everywhere the vendor connects: CRM connected app tokens and the integration user's sessions; Entra ID consent and service principal credentials; Google Workspace app access (set to Blocked revokes access); Slack, dialler and conferencing connections. GTIG advised treating all tokens stored in or connected to Drift as compromised, not only the Salesforce one.
- Scope from logs: Pull Event Monitoring, UniqueQuery, API and login history for the integration user from the earliest suspected date, and ask the vendor for its own logs.
- Hunt for secrets in exposed data: Search exported objects for strings such as
AKIA,snowflakecomputing.com,password,secretand internal VPN or SSO URLs, as GTIG recommends, and rotate anything found. Palo Alto Networks' account of its response included disabling the Drift app, revoking tokens and rotating credentials; see the Palo Alto Networks Salesforce data theft page. - Notify: Assess customer and regulatory notification for personal data in exported records with legal counsel.
- Reconnect deliberately: Only after the vendor confirms remediation, with a new integration user, new consent, tighter scopes and IP enforcement. The full procedure is in the OAuth Token Theft Incident Playbook.
Implementation roadmap
- Discover (weeks 1 to 2): Export connected apps and OAuth usage from Salesforce, enterprise applications and consents from Entra ID, and the accessed apps list from Google Workspace. Tag every revenue tool and its business owner.
- Prioritise: Rank by data reached and token age. Tools with tenant-wide mail access or Case access, and tokens older than a year, go first.
- Rebuild one integration as a pilot (weeks 2 to 4): Create an API-only integration user with a minimal permission set, reconnect the tool in a sandbox, test every feature the sales team uses, then cut over production and revoke the old connection.
- Apply policies (weeks 4 to 8): Admin-approved Permitted Users, IP enforcement where vendors publish egress ranges, refresh token expiry, Exchange RBAC for Applications scopes and Google app access settings. Roll out integration by integration so a broken sync is easy to attribute and roll back by restoring the previous policy.
- Clean the data: Scan CRM cases, notes and attachments for secrets, rotate what you find, and add scanning or redaction on case intake.
- Operate: Quarterly access reviews per integration, monitoring rules above, and an annual revocation rehearsal for your highest-risk vendor. Remove integrations nobody uses. See the NHI Offboarding and Decommissioning Guide.
Decision guidance
- Delegated per-user or app-wide access: Per-user delegated connections limit each token to one person's data and end when they leave, but are harder to manage; app-wide access is simpler but must be scoped with RBAC for Applications or Google app access settings.
- Small organisations: With one CRM and two or three tools, the essentials are a dedicated integration user per tool, admin-approved apps, no Case access unless needed, and a written revocation list per vendor.
- Large organisations: Add an SSPM or OAuth governance tool to inventory grants across SaaS platforms, contractual token-handling requirements, and SIEM detections per integration. See the SaaS and OAuth App Governance Guide.
Common failure patterns
- Connected as an admin: The integration was authorised by a Salesforce administrator during a trial, so the vendor's token carries admin-level data access for years.
- Tokens that never expire: The default "valid until revoked" refresh token policy left in place, as in the Gainsight tokens dating back to 2017.
- Secrets in support cases: Customers and staff pasting passwords and keys into cases, which integrations with Case access can read and attackers search for.
- Revoking one connection only: Revoking the CRM token but leaving the same vendor's mail, calendar or chat connection live, when GTIG found Drift Email tokens used against Google Workspace.
- Tenant-wide mail permissions: An app-only Mail.Read grant across every mailbox for a tool used by fifty sellers.
- No owner: The person who connected the tool has left, nobody reviews it, and nobody knows to act on the vendor's incident email.
Framework mapping
| Control | ATT&CK technique addressed | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | NIST CSF 2.0 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dedicated, minimal integration users | T1213.004 Customer Relationship Management Software | AC-6, IA-4 | PR.AA-01, PR.AA-05 |
| Refresh token expiry, IP enforcement, fast revocation | T1528 Steal Application Access Token; T1550.001 Application Access Token | AC-20 | PR.AA-05 |
| Vendor due diligence and contracts | T1199 Trusted Relationship | SA-9, SR-6 | GV.SC-04, GV.SC-07 |
| Integration activity monitoring | T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy | AU-6 | DE.CM-06 |
| Secret scanning of CRM data | T1552 Unsecured Credentials | IA-5 | PR.AA-01 |
In ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A the relevant controls are 5.19 and 5.20 (supplier relationships and agreements), 5.23 (use of cloud services), 8.2 (privileged access rights) and 8.16 (monitoring activities).
Practitioner checklist
- Inventory every sales and revenue tool connected to CRM, mail, calendar and chat, with a business owner and the scopes each holds.
- Reconnect each tool through a dedicated, API-only integration user with only the vendor's documented objects, and no Case access unless required.
- Set connected apps to admin-approved users, enforce IP restrictions where vendors publish egress ranges, and replace "valid until revoked" refresh tokens.
- Restrict user consent, use the admin consent workflow, and scope app-only mail and calendar roles with Exchange RBAC for Applications.
- Set Google Workspace sales tools to "Specific Google data" or "Limited", restrict Gmail, Drive and Calendar, and block unconfigured apps.
- Ask each vendor how it stores tokens, protects source control and notifies customers, and record the answers.
- Alert on integration logins from unexpected networks or user agents, COUNT-then-bulk query patterns and query job deletions.
- Scan CRM cases, notes and attachments for secrets and rotate what you find.
- Write and rehearse a per-vendor revocation list covering every system the vendor connects to.
Standards and references
- Google Threat Intelligence Group: Widespread Data Theft Targets Salesforce Instances via Salesloft Drift
- Salesforce: Manage OAuth Access Policies for a Connected App
- Salesforce: Salesforce Integration User Licence
- Microsoft Learn: Role Based Access Control for Applications in Exchange Online
- Microsoft Learn: Configure the admin consent workflow
- Google Workspace Admin Help: Control which third-party and internal apps access Google Workspace data
- Gong: Salesforce fields the integration user needs access to
- MITRE ATT&CK: Steal Application Access Token (T1528)
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: SaaS API Token Security Guide · Salesforce Security Guide · OAuth Token Theft Incident Playbook · SaaS and OAuth App Governance Guide · Salesloft Drift Breach 2025