Product teams routinely spend a year and a large budget on the wrong security certificate, and buyers routinely accept a certificate that does not cover what they think it covers, because the main product certification schemes answer different questions for different markets. Common Criteria under the CCRA, the EU's EUCC scheme, the US and Canadian FIPS 140-3 programme, France's CSPN and GlobalPlatform's SESIP (with PSA Certified built around it) all end in a certificate, but they differ in what is evaluated, how deeply, by whom, for how long the result stays valid and which buyers will accept it. This guide compares them side by side, explains the threat model and failure modes of each, and gives decision guidance for vendors choosing a route and buyers writing procurement requirements. It is for product security leads, PSIRTs, compliance teams and public-sector or regulated buyers. Each scheme has its own deep guide on NHI Mgmt Group; this page is the chooser.
Status checked 14 November 2026: EUCC under Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482, amended by (EU) 2024/3144 and a further amendment adopted on 8 December 2025; FIPS 140-3 with FIPS 140-2 certificates moved to the CMVP Historical list after 21 September 2026; CSPN procedure ANSSI-CSPN-CER-P-01 version 5.0 (January 2023); SESIP as European Standard EN 17927. These summaries are not legal advice.
Key takeaways
- They certify different things. FIPS 140-3 validates a cryptographic module; Common Criteria and EUCC evaluate a product against a Security Target or Protection Profile; CSPN gives a time-boxed first-level robustness verdict; SESIP and PSA Certified target IoT platforms and chips built for reuse in devices.
- The buyer decides the scheme. US and Canadian federal cryptography needs FIPS 140-3; US national security procurement points to NIAP-approved Protection Profiles under Common Criteria; EU-wide recognition now runs through EUCC; French public buyers often ask for CSPN; IoT silicon and device ecosystems ask for PSA Certified or SESIP.
- Depth and cost vary by an order of magnitude. CSPN's reference workload is 25 person-days; high-assurance Common Criteria or EUCC evaluations of smartcards and secure elements run far longer and need site audits.
- Validity is finite and differs. CMVP certificates stay active for five years (two for interim validations), CSPN certificates for three, and EUCC certificates for at most five, with vulnerability handling duties throughout.
- Many products need two. An HSM sold to governments typically carries FIPS 140-3 for its cryptographic boundary and Common Criteria or EUCC for the product as a whole; the schemes are complementary, not substitutes.
The schemes at a glance
| Attribute | Common Criteria (CCRA) | EUCC | FIPS 140-3 (CMVP) | CSPN | SESIP and PSA Certified |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Owner | CCRA participants; criteria maintained by the CC Maintenance Board, also ISO/IEC 15408 and 18045 | European Commission, ENISA, National Cybersecurity Certification Authorities | NIST and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security | ANSSI (France) | GlobalPlatform (SESIP, EN 17927); PSA Certified by GlobalPlatform |
| What is evaluated | Target of Evaluation against a Security Target, often claiming a Protection Profile | ICT product evaluated with Common Criteria under EU rules | Cryptographic module inside a defined boundary | Product security functions against a security target, time-boxed | IoT platform, chip, RTOS or Root of Trust against a profile |
| Assurance scale | EAL1 to EAL7, or Protection Profile assurance | Substantial and high, expressed through AVA_VAN components | Security Levels 1 to 4 | Single first level | SESIP1 to SESIP5; PSA Levels 1 to 4 |
| Testing style | Evaluation of design, guidance, life cycle, tests and vulnerability analysis | As Common Criteria, plus EU vulnerability handling rules | Algorithm validation (CAVP) then module testing by an NVLAP-accredited lab | Conformity analysis and efficacy analysis, described by ANSSI as black-box testing under time constraints | From self-assessment (SESIP1, PSA Level 1 questionnaire) to lab penetration testing and source review |
| Who tests | Licensed evaluation facility under a national scheme | Accredited ITSEF, certified by an accredited certification body | Cryptographic and Security Testing Laboratory (CSTL) | ANSSI-licensed evaluation centre | Licensed laboratory, overseen by a certification body |
| Validity | Set by the issuing scheme | At most five years | Five years on the Active list; two for interim validations | Three years | Set by the scheme rules |
| Recognition | CCRA mutual recognition for collaborative Protection Profiles, or up to EAL2 plus ALC_FLR | EU-wide | US and Canadian federal; widely referenced elsewhere | French national; useful beyond France only where buyers accept it | Ecosystem and market recognition; SESIP maps to several regional requirements |
For each scheme on its own, see the Common Criteria Evaluation Guide, the EU Cybersecurity Certification EUCC Guide, the FIPS 140-3 and Cryptographic Module Validation Guide and the PSA Certified and SESIP Guide. For version changes in FIPS, see FIPS 140-2 vs FIPS 140-3.
Each scheme in depth: threat model, architecture and failure modes
Common Criteria under the CCRA
Threat model: whatever the Security Target or Protection Profile states. The security problem definition names threats, organisational policies and assumptions, and the evaluation checks that the product counters those threats under those assumptions. The assurance level says how rigorously; the Security Target says what was claimed.
Architecture in words: the vendor writes a Security Target for a Target of Evaluation, a licensed lab evaluates it using the Common Evaluation Methodology, and a national scheme certifies. CC:2022 split the criteria into five parts and introduced exact conformance, which collaborative Protection Profiles use so results are comparable between products. In the US, NIST SP 800-53 control SA-4(7) points agencies to NIAP-approved Protection Profiles.
Failure modes: buyers reading the product name rather than the Target of Evaluation; a high EAL claimed against a thin Security Target; recognition assumed abroad when the evaluation sits above the CCRA's mutual recognition scope; and certified configurations that differ from how the product is actually deployed.
EUCC
Threat model: the same Common Criteria approach, with the assurance level (substantial or high) chosen according to the risk of the product's intended use, and vulnerability analysis depth expressed through the AVA_VAN components. ENISA notes protection profiles certified at AVA_VAN 4 and 5.
Architecture in words: a voluntary EU scheme set by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482, built on the SOG-IS Common Criteria framework already used in 17 Member States. An accredited ITSEF evaluates, an accredited certification body certifies, and the National Cybersecurity Certification Authority supervises; high assurance needs extra authorisation. State-of-the-art documents for smartcards, integrated circuits, site security and cryptography are binding for those product types. The December 2025 amendment added rules on product series certification and assurance continuity, and ENISA's cryptography guidelines (v2) now include post-quantum recommendations.
Failure modes: vendors treating the certificate as the finish line when the regulation requires ongoing vulnerability intake, analysis and remediation reporting to the certification body; scoping a product series without reading the new series rules; and assuming EUCC alone gives Cyber Resilience Act conformity for every product class. See EU CRA Product Classes Guide.
FIPS 140-3 and the CMVP
Threat model: compromise of cryptographic keys and critical security parameters, use of unapproved algorithms, and physical attack on the module, scaled by Security Level from production-grade components (Level 1) to a full tamper-detecting envelope with environmental protection (Level 4).
Architecture in words: FIPS 140-3 adopts ISO/IEC 19790 and ISO/IEC 24759 as modified by the NIST SP 800-140 series. Algorithms are validated by the CAVP first; a CSTL then tests the module and the CMVP validates the submission. The CMVP page states that cryptography required in US federal systems must be validated, and that non-validated cryptography is treated as providing no protection. FIPS 140-2 modules moved to the Historical list after 21 September 2026 and may be used only in existing systems.
Failure modes: "FIPS compliant" or "FIPS ready" claims with no certificate; products that embed a validated module but use other cryptography for some functions; running outside the approved mode defined in the security policy; and missing the five-year sunset, after which a module drops off the Active list.
CSPN
Threat model: the security target defines the attackers (local or remote, software or hardware means) and the scenarios the product addresses. CSPN limits what can be certified: its procedure lists permitted function categories such as secure communication, identification and access control, data protection, cryptography and random number generation, self-protection and logging, and excludes detection functions such as firewalls, intrusion detection and vulnerability scanners from conformity evaluation, as well as biometric authentication.
Architecture in words: created by ANSSI in 2008 as a lower-cost, time-boxed alternative to Common Criteria. A licensed evaluation centre performs a conformity analysis (does the product meet its specification on a test platform) and an efficacy analysis (theoretical resistance of mechanisms, vulnerability identification, misuse risks). The reference workload is 25 person-days over eight calendar weeks, plus ten person-days where essential functions rely on cryptography, within a range of 15 to 60 person-days. Certificates last three years and cover one product version; an assurance continuity process can extend a certificate to a new version.
Failure modes: presenting CSPN as equivalent to Common Criteria in markets that do not recognise it; certifying a version that customers will not run for long; and applying for CSPN while a Common Criteria evaluation of a similar version exists or is in progress, which the procedure generally excludes.
SESIP and PSA Certified
Threat model: attacks on IoT platforms and Roots of Trust: scalable software attacks at the lower lab levels, and physical and side-channel attacks at the higher ones. SESIP Profiles set minimum functional and assurance requirements for a product type and map them to threats.
Architecture in words: SESIP is a GlobalPlatform methodology, based on Common Criteria and published by CEN and CENELEC as EN 17927, with five assurance levels and a strong focus on composition: certified components are reused in devices without repeating evaluations. PSA Certified sets levels for chips, system software and devices, from a lab-reviewed questionnaire at Level 1 to lab vulnerability assessment of the PSA Root of Trust at Levels 2, 3 and 4, and recognises SESIP. GlobalPlatform maps SESIP to requirements including RED, the CRA, the US Cyber Trust Mark, Singapore's labelling scheme, IEC 62443 and ISO/SAE 21434.
Failure modes: a chip certificate presented as a device certificate; device makers stepping outside the component certificate's assumptions and guidance, which breaks composition; and treating Level 1 self-declaration as tested assurance.
Decision guidance: which scheme for which market
| If you are | Lead with | Add | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| Selling cryptographic products or anything doing encryption to US or Canadian federal agencies | FIPS 140-3 | Common Criteria against a NIAP-approved Protection Profile for national security customers | Validated cryptography is mandatory for federal use; NIAP profiles drive national security procurement (SA-4(7)) |
| Selling smartcards, secure elements or HSMs to EU public sector and regulated buyers | EUCC (high where the use case demands it) | FIPS 140-3 for global HSM customers | EUCC is the EU-wide Common Criteria route, with binding state-of-the-art documents for these product types |
| Selling a software security product to French public bodies, quickly | CSPN | EUCC substantial when EU-wide recognition matters | Fixed workload and timeline; national recognition |
| Supplying MCUs, secure enclaves or RTOS platforms to device makers | PSA Certified or SESIP at a lab-tested level | EUCC or Common Criteria for high-assurance secure elements | Composition lets each customer reuse your evidence |
| Building consumer IoT devices for EU and US markets | Build on a certified chip; device-level SESIP or PSA Level 1 aligned to ETSI EN 303 645 | US Cyber Trust Mark, CRA conformity work | Regulatory baselines target the device, not just the silicon |
| A buyer writing requirements | Name the scheme, level, Protection Profile and validity you need | Require the certified configuration in deployment | Generic "certified" clauses are unenforceable |
Small versus large vendors: a start-up with one product and one target market should pick the single scheme its first large buyer requires and design the product boundary so later schemes can reuse the evidence (clean cryptographic boundary, documented life cycle, security guidance). Large vendors with product lines should plan a certification roadmap per product family, reuse Protection Profiles across products and budget for maintenance and re-certification, not just the first certificate.
Common Criteria vs FIPS 140-3: these are not alternatives. FIPS 140-3 answers "is this cryptography correctly implemented and protected?"; Common Criteria answers "does this product meet its security claims?". Network devices and HSMs in government markets commonly need both, and Common Criteria Protection Profiles often expect the cryptography to be separately validated.
EUCC vs CSPN: EUCC carries EU-wide recognition and ongoing vulnerability obligations, at Common Criteria depth; CSPN is faster and cheaper but national, black-box and first-level. Use CSPN for speed into French buyers, EUCC when you need recognition across Member States or higher assurance.
Worked scenario: one HSM, three markets
A vendor plans a network HSM for EU banks, US federal agencies and French ministries.
- Boundary first: engineering defines one cryptographic module boundary that will serve FIPS 140-3 (targeting Security Level 3 for tamper response) and the Common Criteria Target of Evaluation, so documentation is written once.
- Algorithms: CAVP testing of every algorithm the module exposes in approved mode, before the CSTL engagement, because module validation depends on it.
- FIPS 140-3 submission: the CSTL tests the module and submits to the CMVP; the team plans for a five-year Active window and for how security patches will be handled against the validated version.
- EUCC: an accredited ITSEF evaluates the HSM against a relevant protection profile at the level EU banking customers require, applying ENISA's state-of-the-art documents; the PSIRT sets up the vulnerability intake and reporting the regulation demands.
- France: instead of a separate CSPN, the vendor checks whether French ministries will accept the EUCC certificate; CSPN would only be considered for a different, lighter product, since the procedure excludes products with a Common Criteria evaluation of a similar version.
- Buyer view: each customer verifies the certificate number, module or TOE version and approved configuration against what is delivered. See the Cryptographic Key Management Guide for key handling once the HSM is in service.
Implementation: running a certification programme
- Map buyers to schemes: list target customers and the exact scheme, level and Protection Profile or profile each requires. Confirm with procurement documents, not sales assumptions.
- Design for evaluation: fix the boundary, minimise the attack surface inside it, and keep design, life-cycle and guidance documentation current from the start.
- Pre-assess: run a gap assessment with a lab before contracting the formal evaluation; for FIPS 140-3, complete CAVP testing early.
- Freeze a version: evaluate a version you will ship long enough to recover the cost; plan assurance continuity or maintenance for updates.
- Set up vulnerability handling: EUCC makes it a certification obligation, and every scheme loses value if a known flaw sits unpatched; align PSIRT processes with each scheme's rules on patches to certified versions.
- Track validity: keep a register of every certificate, its version, expiry, and the product releases it covers; start renewals early.
- Fallback: if an evaluation stalls, keep selling under existing certificates where valid, publish the in-process status only where the scheme allows it (the CMVP lists Modules In Process), and never claim certification in advance.
Detection and measurement
- Certificate coverage: percentage of revenue or deployed units covered by a current certificate for the version actually shipped.
- Version drift: number of supported releases that differ from the certified version without an assurance continuity decision.
- Days to expiry: certificates within 12 months of expiry or sunset without a renewal plan.
- Vulnerability response: median time from vulnerability report to analysis and notification for certified products, against scheme deadlines.
- Buyer verification rate (for buyers): share of procured security products whose certificate, version and configuration were checked against the official list at purchase and at renewal.
Common failure patterns
- Certificate scope misread: a buyer accepts a certificate for a different version, configuration or component than the one deployed.
- Wrong scheme for the buyer: a vendor gains CSPN or PSA Level 1 and then learns the target customer requires FIPS 140-3 or a NIAP Protection Profile.
- Patching frozen by certification: teams delay security fixes to stay on a certified version instead of using the scheme's maintenance or continuity routes.
- Chip certificate passed off as device assurance: composition assumptions ignored, so the device inherits nothing.
- Sunset missed: FIPS 140-2 modules still being specified in new systems after they moved to the Historical list.
- Keys outside the boundary: service credentials and signing keys handled by uncertified software around a certified module; see the Cryptographic Inventory and CBOM Guide.
Framework mapping
| Framework | Reference | Relevance to product certification |
|---|---|---|
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | SA-4, SA-4(7) | Acquisition requirements, including NIAP-approved Protection Profiles |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | SC-13 | Cryptographic protection, the control under which validated modules are specified |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | SR-5 | Acquisition strategies, tools and methods for supply chain risk |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | ID.RA-10, GV.SC-07 | Critical suppliers assessed before acquisition; supplier and product risk understood and managed |
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A | A.5.21, A.8.24 | ICT supply chain security; use of cryptography |
Practitioner checklist
- Identify every target buyer's required scheme, level and profile in writing before starting.
- Define one boundary that serves FIPS 140-3 and Common Criteria or EUCC if you need both.
- Complete algorithm validation before module testing.
- Read the Security Target, security policy or certification report, not just the certificate.
- Check certificates on the official lists: CMVP, Common Criteria Portal, ENISA, ANSSI, GlobalPlatform or PSA Certified.
- Record certificate expiry and sunset dates and plan renewals a year ahead.
- Run vulnerability handling that meets EUCC obligations even where not required.
- Require certified configurations in deployment and verify them at acceptance.
- For IoT, confirm the device stays within the chip or platform certificate's assumptions.
Standards and references
- ENISA: EUCC certification scheme
- NIST: Cryptographic Module Validation Program
- Common Criteria Portal
- ANSSI: CSPN certification procedure (ANSSI-CSPN-CER-P-01 v5.0)
- ANSSI: Presentation of the CSPN
- GlobalPlatform: SESIP
- PSA Certified: Getting certified
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: EU Cybersecurity Act and EUCS Guide, EU Cyber Resilience Act Guide, FedRAMP Guide, US Cyber Trust Mark Guide, ETSI EN 303 645 Consumer IoT Guide. This guide summarises certification scheme rules and is not legal advice.