For decades, software makers have been able to ship insecure products and disclaim almost all responsibility for the harm that followed, and that position is now being dismantled. The EU has rewritten its product liability regime to cover software, the Cyber Resilience Act imposes security obligations on products with digital elements, and the 2023 US National Cybersecurity Strategy called for liability to shift onto vendors that fail to take reasonable precautions. This guide covers the liability angle only: what each regime does, how it connects to secure by design practice, and what software producers and their customers should change now. It is written for security leaders, product security teams, procurement and in-house counsel working with them. For the engineering practice itself, see the Security by Design and by Default Guide.
Status checked 27 October 2026 against EUR-Lex, the European Commission, GOV.UK and the archived White House site. Dates and obligations may change through implementing acts, national transposition and new policy; confirm against the primary sources before relying on them.
Key takeaways
- Software is now a product under EU liability law. Directive (EU) 2024/2853 expressly includes software in the definition of product and applies to products placed on the market after 9 December 2026.
- Missing updates can create liability. The new directive says economic operators are not exempted where defectiveness is due to software, including updates, or a lack of updates necessary to maintain safety.
- Contracts cannot remove the exposure. Liability to the injured person under the directive cannot be limited or excluded by a contractual provision.
- The CRA and the PLD work together. The Cyber Resilience Act sets security requirements; its recitals describe the new liability directive as complementary, so failing CRA requirements can feed liability claims.
- The US position is policy, not statute. The 2023 strategy proposed liability legislation and a safe harbour tied to secure development practice; it did not itself create liability.
Why the liability model is changing
Traditional software licences disclaim warranties and cap damages at the licence fee. Combined with the difficulty of proving which defect caused a breach, this left the cost of insecure software with customers and the public. Policymakers in both the EU and US framed this as a market failure: buyers cannot easily judge security quality, so vendors under-invest in it.
The US National Cybersecurity Strategy of 1 March 2023 put it directly in Strategic Objective 3.3, Shift Liability for Insecure Software Products and Services. It said the government should "shift liability onto those entities that fail to take reasonable precautions to secure their software", and proposed legislation that would:
- Limit disclaimers: prevent manufacturers and software publishers with market power from fully disclaiming liability by contract.
- Set higher standards for high-risk uses: establish stronger duties of care for software in specific high-risk scenarios.
- Create a safe harbour: shield companies that securely develop and maintain their software, drawing on practices such as the NIST Secure Software Development Framework.
The strategy is now hosted on the archived Biden White House website. It was a statement of policy and did not change the law. The current Office of the National Cyber Director pages, checked on 27 October 2026, do not set out a position on software liability. Treat the US liability shift as an unrealised proposal that still shapes procurement expectations and federal guidance, such as the CISA Secure Software Attestation Form Guide describes.
The EU Product Liability Directive 2024/2853
The new Product Liability Directive, dated 23 October 2024 and in force since 8 December 2024, repeals the 1985 directive. Member States must transpose it by 9 December 2026, and it applies to products placed on the market or put into service after that date. Its main provisions for software, as stated in the text on EUR-Lex:
| Provision | What it says | Why it matters for software |
|---|---|---|
| Art. 4(1) definition of product | All movables, even if integrated into or inter-connected with another movable or an immovable, expressly including software | Standalone software, firmware, apps and SaaS components can be products for strict liability |
| Art. 2(2) open source exclusion | Does not apply to free and open-source software developed or supplied outside the course of a commercial activity | Hobbyist and community projects are out; commercial supply of open source is not automatically out |
| Art. 6(1)(c) damage | Covers destruction or corruption of data that are not used for professional purposes | Consumer data loss caused by a defect is compensable |
| Art. 7(2)(f) defectiveness | Courts consider relevant product safety requirements, including safety-relevant cybersecurity requirements | Failing cybersecurity requirements, such as those in the CRA, is evidence of defect |
| Art. 8 economic operators | Liability extends to the manufacturer of a defective component integrated under the manufacturer's control | Suppliers of software components can be liable alongside the product maker |
| Art. 10 presumptions | Defectiveness presumed where the defendant fails to disclose relevant evidence, the product does not comply with mandatory safety requirements, or there is an obvious malfunction | Eases the burden of proof that historically protected vendors |
| Art. 11(2) exemptions that do not apply | No exemption where defectiveness is due to software, including updates or upgrades, or a lack of updates necessary to maintain safety | Patch management and support periods become liability issues |
| Art. 15 no contractual limitation | Liability toward the injured person cannot be limited or excluded by contract or national law | End user licence disclaimers do not protect against PLD claims |
| Art. 17 expiry | Rights expire 10 years after the relevant date, or 25 years for latent personal injury | Long tail exposure for products in use for many years |
The directive is strict liability: the claimant must show the defect, the damage and the causal link, not fault. It covers damage to natural persons, including death, personal injury, damage to property and data loss as above. It is not a route for business-to-business claims for commercial losses, which stay in contract and national law. The live EU Product Liability Directive 2024 Guide covers the directive in more detail.
The Cyber Resilience Act as the standard of care
Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, the Cyber Resilience Act, entered into force on 10 December 2024. The European Commission states that its main obligations apply from 11 December 2027, with vulnerability and incident reporting obligations applying earlier. The CRA does not create a damages remedy itself. Its liability effect comes through the PLD:
- Complementary by design: CRA recital 31 says Directive (EU) 2024/2853 is complementary to the regulation, that manufacturers are liable for damage caused by a lack of safety irrespective of fault, and that lacking security updates could trigger that liability.
- Support periods: CRA recital 60 says the support period for vulnerability handling should be no less than five years unless the product's expected lifetime is shorter. A product that stops getting security updates inside its support period is a strong candidate for a PLD defect claim.
- Reporting: manufacturers must notify actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents to the designated CSIRT and ENISA through a single reporting platform, with a 24 hour early warning referenced in the recitals.
For obligations, conformity routes and the reporting timetable, see the EU Cyber Resilience Act Guide.
Comparing the main regimes
| Regime | Legal status (checked 27 Oct 2026) | Liability mechanism | Secure by design link |
|---|---|---|---|
| EU Product Liability Directive 2024/2853 | In force; transposition and application from 9 December 2026 | Strict liability for defective products, software included; no contractual exclusion | Cybersecurity requirements and missing updates are factors in defectiveness |
| EU Cyber Resilience Act 2024/2847 | In force; main obligations from 11 December 2027, reporting earlier | Market surveillance and administrative fines; feeds PLD claims | Essential cybersecurity requirements, vulnerability handling, support periods |
| US National Cybersecurity Strategy 2023 | Policy document on the archived White House site; it proposed, but did not itself enact, liability rules | Proposed legislation and safe harbour | Safe harbour tied to practices such as NIST SSDF |
| UK Software Security Code of Practice | Voluntary; published 7 May 2025, updated 15 January 2026 | None directly; may inform contracts and expectations | 14 principles software vendors are expected to implement |
In the UK, the Software Security Code of Practice from the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology and the NCSC is voluntary. It does not create liability, but it gives buyers a reference to write into contracts, and in a negligence claim a recognised code can inform what a reasonable vendor would have done.
How liability connects to secure by design practice
CISA describes secure by design as treating customer security as a core business requirement, applied during design to reduce exploitable flaws before release, and secure by default as products being secure out of the box with little or no configuration and no added cost. It states that every technology provider must take ownership at the executive level. Under the new liability regimes, these principles turn into evidence:
- Documented secure development: an SSDF aligned process (NIST SP 800-218, version 1.1) is the clearest evidence of reasonable precautions, and the US strategy proposed it as a basis for a safe harbour. See the NIST Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF, SP 800-218) Guide.
- Secure defaults: shipping with MFA, logging and least privilege enabled reduces the chance that a foreseeable misconfiguration becomes a defect.
- Vulnerability handling and updates: a published support period, a working update channel and records of fix times are what answers an Article 11(2) argument about missing updates.
- Component governance: because component makers can be liable, and integrators answer for the whole product, an SBOM and supplier assurance records show what was in the product and why it was trusted. See the SBOM Guide.
- Evidence retention: Article 10 presumes defect where a defendant fails to disclose relevant evidence, so design decisions, threat models, test results and release records must be retrievable for the liability period.
The update channel itself carries risk. In the SolarWinds supply chain compromise, attackers inserted a backdoor into Orion builds that were signed and shipped as normal updates. Under Article 11(2), an update is part of the product: a compromised build pipeline is a product defect risk, not only a security incident.
What producers should do now
- Inventory products in scope. List every product with digital elements placed on the EU market, including firmware, apps and software components supplied to others, and the date each version is placed on the market relative to 9 December 2026.
- Set and publish support periods. Decide the vulnerability handling support period per product, at least five years unless expected lifetime is shorter, and resource the update capability to match.
- Align development with a recognised framework. Map the secure development lifecycle to SSDF and to CRA essential requirements, and record conformance per release.
- Review licence terms with counsel. Disclaimers will not hold against PLD claims from natural persons; review where exposure sits and how it is insured.
- Build an evidence pack. Keep threat models, test results, SBOMs, vulnerability records and update history for each release, retained for at least the Article 17 period.
- Harden the build and update pipeline. Signing keys, build service accounts and release tokens are the identities that ship your product; protect them as production secrets.
- Pilot with one product line. Run the evidence pack and support period process on one product, test retrieval as if responding to a disclosure request, then extend.
What buyers and customers should do
- Ask for support periods in writing: require a stated end of security support date for every product purchased.
- Request secure development evidence: SSDF attestations, SBOMs and vulnerability handling policies, and record what was provided.
- Keep update records: customers who fail to apply available updates may weaken their own claims; patch history is evidence both ways.
- Contract for B2B gaps: because the PLD protects natural persons, business losses still depend on contract terms. Negotiate security obligations, notification and remedies directly.
Decision guidance by organisation type
- Small software vendors: focus on a published support period, a reliable update mechanism and basic evidence retention. These answer the most likely liability arguments at low cost.
- Large vendors and platform providers: treat liability as a product risk in enterprise risk management, with product security reporting to the board and legal involvement in release governance.
- Open source maintainers: non-commercial projects are outside the PLD, but companies that commercially supply open source, for example through paid support or as part of a product, should assume they are in scope and take advice.
- Organisations that build software for internal use only: the PLD and CRA focus on products placed on the market; internal tools are mostly out of scope, but the same practices reduce operational risk.
Measuring readiness
- Percentage of in-scope products with a published support period and end of support date.
- Median time from vulnerability confirmation to available fix for supported products.
- Percentage of releases with a complete evidence pack (threat model, test results, SBOM, signing record).
- Percentage of release signing keys and build credentials held in managed, audited stores.
- Time to retrieve the full evidence pack for a given release in a test exercise.
Common failure patterns
- Relying on the EULA. Assuming licence disclaimers will protect against claims, when Article 15 says they do not for PLD liability.
- Silent end of support. Stopping updates without a declared support period, inviting an argument that a lack of updates necessary to maintain safety caused the harm.
- Treating open source as automatically exempt. The exclusion covers software supplied outside commercial activity, not every product that contains open source.
- Losing the evidence. Discarding design and test records after release, which leaves nothing to rebut the Article 10 presumptions.
- Ignoring the update pipeline. Securing the product but not the build and signing infrastructure that ships its updates.
- Waiting for the US. Assuming nothing changes until US legislation passes, when EU market access already depends on these regimes.
Framework mapping
| Framework | Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| NIST CSF 2.0 | GV.SC-01 | Supply chain risk management programme and policies |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | GV.RM-03 | Product liability risk included in enterprise risk management |
| NIST SP 800-218 | SSDF 1.1 practice groups | Evidence of reasonable precautions in development |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | SA-8, SA-11, SA-15 | Security engineering principles, developer testing, development process standards |
Practitioner checklist
- List products placed on the EU market and their market dates relative to 9 December 2026.
- Publish a vulnerability handling support period for every product.
- Map the development lifecycle to SSDF and CRA essential requirements.
- Retain threat models, test results, SBOMs and update history for at least the Article 17 period.
- Protect build, signing and release credentials as production secrets.
- Review licence terms and insurance with counsel in light of Article 15.
- Require support periods and secure development evidence from your own suppliers.
- Track legislative status in the EU, UK and US at least twice a year.
Standards and references
- EUR-Lex: Directive (EU) 2024/2853 on liability for defective products
- EUR-Lex: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 Cyber Resilience Act
- European Commission: Cyber Resilience Act
- The White House (archived): National Cybersecurity Strategy, March 2023
- NIST: SP 800-218 Secure Software Development Framework Version 1.1
- CISA: Secure by Design
- GOV.UK: Software Security Code of Practice
This guide summarises software liability and secure by design policy in the EU, US and UK and is not legal advice. Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Security by Design and by Default Guide · EU Product Liability Directive 2024 Guide · EU Cyber Resilience Act Guide · AI Liability and Product Liability Guide