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SS7 and Diameter Signalling Security Guide: Stopping Tracking, Interception and SMS OTP Theft

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 27 October 2026 13 min read
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SS7 and Diameter, the signalling protocols that route calls, texts and roaming between mobile operators, were built for a closed club of trusted carriers, so a party with signalling access can often ask a network where a subscriber is or where their messages should go. The US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) described them in March 2024 as remaining the foundation of mobile networks, and the GSMA lists customer traffic interception, location tracking and fraud as the main concerns when signalling access is leased to third parties. For enterprises the most direct consequence is that SMS one-time passcodes and voice calls are only as safe as the global signalling network. This guide explains how signalling attacks work at a conceptual level, what operators should deploy (filtering, signalling firewalls, IPX controls, 5G SEPP), and what enterprises and identity teams should change in their authentication and executive protection. It is for telecom security engineers, identity architects and risk owners who rely on mobile networks.

Key takeaways

  • Signalling trust is transitive. Any operator, transit carrier or Global Title lessee connected to the interconnect can send messages that a home network may process unless it filters them.
  • Operators need layered filtering. FCC advisory committee work (CSRIC V and VI) recommended firewalls, monitoring and message filtering, evaluation of Diameter peer relationships and security gateways at network boundaries; GSMA FS.11 and FS.19 set out the controls.
  • Global Title leasing hides the true sender. GSMA's FS.52 code of conduct required GT lessors and transit carriers to stop "routing via lessee only" by 31 December 2023 and to accept liability for traffic sent with their GTs.
  • SMS is a restricted authenticator. NIST SP 800-63B-4 restricts out-of-band authentication over the public switched telephone network, says it is not phishing-resistant, and requires an alternative authenticator for every subscriber.
  • Enterprises cannot fix signalling, but can stop depending on it. Move privileged and high-value users to phishing-resistant authentication and protect executives' numbers as identity assets.

How signalling networks work

When a subscriber roams, receives a text or is called, the networks involved exchange signalling messages with the subscriber's home network. In 2G and 3G these use SS7, with the Mobile Application Part (MAP) carrying subscriber operations and Global Titles (SCCP addresses) routing messages between networks. 4G uses Diameter between network elements such as the MME and the HSS, with Diameter edge agents at the network border. 5G standalone networks use HTTP-based service interfaces, and interconnect through a Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP) defined by 3GPP. ENISA assessed the risk in this area as medium to high in its 2018 study, and the DHS 2017 Study on Mobile Device Security noted that SS7 and Diameter weaknesses cannot be solved by changes to end-user devices. Real networks run all of these at once, and 4G and 5G subscribers are still reachable through SS7 for SMS, voice fallback and roaming in many places.

GenerationSignalling protocolInter-operator borderMain security weakness
2G, 3GSS7 (MTP, SCCP, TCAP, MAP)STPs and SS7 interconnect, often through carriers and hubsNo origin authentication of messages; trust based on being connected
4GDiameter (S6a, S6d and other interfaces)Diameter Edge Agent, IPXHop-by-hop trust; the FCC notes Diameter does not encrypt originating IP addresses in transit, enabling spoofing of roaming partners
5G SAHTTP/2 service-based interfacesSEPP over the N32 interfaceStronger by design, but only once both operators run SA interconnect; fallback paths remain
Cross-generationSMS over SS7 or IMS, GTP for data roamingInterworking functionsAttacks shift to whichever path is least filtered

What signalling abuse enables

This section describes attack outcomes so that defenders can prioritise controls. It deliberately does not describe message sequences or tooling.

OutcomeWhat the attacker learns or changesWho is harmedMain control
Location trackingThe subscriber's serving cell ID or serving switch address. CSRIC VI found this typically reveals a city or general area rather than GPS coordinates, which can still be harmful for VIPs and officialsExecutives, officials, journalists, abuse victimsCategory filtering of location queries from outside the home network; SMS home routing
SMS and call interception or redirectionMessages or calls routed through attacker-controlled infrastructure by manipulating the subscriber's registered location or routing dataAnyone relying on SMS or voice OTP; banking customersLocation update plausibility checks, velocity checks, signalling firewall
Subscriber data disclosureIdentifiers such as IMSI, subscription profile detailsSubscribers; enables follow-on attacksFiltering of subscriber information requests from external peers
FraudManipulated profiles or routing that bypass chargingOperatorsFraud management, filtering, IPX controls
Denial of serviceSubscribers detached or unreachableSubscribers, critical servicesRate limiting and filtering at the border

MITRE ATT&CK for Mobile records the device-side view as T1430 Location Tracking and T1636.004 SMS Messages. ATT&CK's older SS7-specific mobile techniques are deprecated or revoked in v20, so map signalling attacks to these current techniques and to enterprise T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception where an SMS code is the target.

Operator defences

Filtering and signalling firewalls

  • Category-based filtering: classify incoming messages by whether they should ever come from another network. Messages that are only legitimate inside the home network should be blocked at the border; messages legitimate only from a network where the subscriber is actually roaming should be checked against the subscriber's current location.
  • Stateful checks: a signalling firewall correlates messages over time: a location update from a network far from the last known location, or a request from a peer with no roaming relationship, is suspicious. GSMA's FS.52 summary recommends operators implement the controls in FS.11, such as a signalling firewall, and the FCC notice records US carriers describing signalling firewall deployments.
  • SMS home routing: routing mobile-terminated SMS through a home network function so that routing queries do not reveal the subscriber's real identifiers and serving node to external parties.
  • Diameter security: GSMA FS.19 covers Diameter interconnect security; the FCC asked carriers in 2024 whether they had implemented it. Key elements are validating that the Diameter origin realm and host match the peer connection, and evaluating each roaming partner relationship, which CSRIC VI recommended.

Interconnect and Global Title hygiene

  • Refuse unmanaged traffic: GSMA recommends refusing signalling traffic from external parties unless an agreement governs it.
  • Global Title leasing: under FS.52, GT lessors accept legal liability for signalling sent with their GTs, carry out due diligence on lessees, publish leased GT information to GSMA members through RAEX, limit sub-leasing and share incident information. Transit carriers implement IPX security from GSMA IR.77 and, on request, block lessee traffic to a target operator. Operators not involved in leasing are advised not to start and to update agreements to require code compliance.
  • Investigate and share: trace illegitimate signalling to its true source and share incidents with GSMA members.

5G interconnect

5G standalone interconnect uses the SEPP to protect messages between operators over N32, with mutual TLS and application-layer protection. It reduces exposure only when both sides use it and when legacy SS7 and Diameter paths for the same subscribers are also filtered. See the 5G Security Guide.

Phased programme for operators

  1. Baseline: monitor all external SS7, Diameter and GTP traffic in passive mode, classify message types by peer and build a picture of normal roaming patterns.
  2. Block the obvious first: enable filtering for message types that should never arrive from outside the home network. These rarely have legitimate external use, so the risk of breaking roaming is low.
  3. Add stateful rules in alert mode: location plausibility and velocity checks, peer relationship checks and Diameter origin validation, logged but not blocked, so false positives against real roaming partners can be tuned.
  4. Enforce by peer group: switch stateful rules to blocking for peers with clean baselines, keeping a fast rollback per rule and per peer.
  5. Close the interconnect: review GT leasing arrangements against FS.52, require code compliance in agreements, and remove peers without agreements.
  6. Extend to 5G: deploy SEPP for SA roaming and keep legacy filtering in place for fallback paths.
  7. Assure: commission independent signalling security assessments; CSRIC V and VI both recommended security assessments and threat information sharing.

What enterprises and identity teams should do

Most organisations do not run a mobile network, but almost all depend on one for authentication and for executives' communications.

  • Retire SMS for high-value access: NIST SP 800-63B-4 section 3.1.3.3 says use of the PSTN for out-of-band verification is restricted, verifiers should consider risk indicators such as device swap, SIM change and number porting before sending a code, and alternatives must be available to all subscribers. Move administrators, finance approvers and executives to passkeys or hardware security keys. See the Passkey Rollout Guide.
  • Keep SMS only as a fallback, with checks: where SMS stays for customers, query SIM change and porting signals where your provider offers them, rate-limit code requests and alert on codes requested from unusual locations. See the Authenticator Apps and OTP Guide.
  • Protect executive numbers: treat the phone numbers of senior staff as identity assets: carrier account PINs and port-out locks, minimal public exposure, and end-to-end encrypted apps for sensitive calls rather than plain voice and SMS. See the Executive Protection and Digital Footprint Guide.
  • Machine numbers are identities too: SIMs in IoT devices, alarm panels and SMS gateways that send or receive codes and commands are non-human identities. Inventory them, know which operator carries them and avoid using SMS for commands that change device state without a second check.
  • Supplier assurance: ask mobile operators and CPaaS providers which GSMA signalling controls they run, whether they have signalling firewalls and SMS home routing, and whether they are FS.52 signatories or supporters.
Use caseSignalling exposureRecommended approach
Workforce MFA for administratorsHigh if SMS or voice codesPhishing-resistant authenticators only
Workforce MFA for general staffMediumAuthenticator app or passkey; SMS only as monitored fallback
Customer login and paymentsMedium to high, depending on valueOffer passkeys; risk-check SIM change and porting before SMS; step-up for high-value actions
Executive voice and messagingHigh for location and interceptionE2EE apps, carrier account protection, travel guidance
IoT and machine SMSMediumAuthenticated application-layer commands, not SMS content alone

Questions to ask operators and messaging providers

Enterprises buying mobile, SMS or CPaaS services can use these questions in supplier due diligence. The answers will not be fully public, but the way a supplier answers is itself informative.

  1. Do you run a signalling firewall covering SS7, Diameter and GTP at every interconnect, and is it in blocking mode for external traffic?
  2. Which GSMA signalling security guidelines (FS.11 for SS7, FS.19 for Diameter) have you implemented, and when were they last assessed by a third party?
  3. Do you use SMS home routing for mobile-terminated messages?
  4. Do you lease Global Titles to third parties, or carry traffic for lessees, and are you a signatory or supporter of the GSMA FS.52 code of conduct?
  5. Can you give us SIM change, SIM swap and number porting signals through an API so we can risk-check SMS codes before sending them?
  6. How do you protect subscriber accounts against unauthorised port-out and SIM replacement, and can we set account-level PINs for named staff?
  7. How and how quickly will you notify us of a signalling incident affecting our numbers?

Detection and measurement

Operators

  • Signalling firewall alerts by category and peer, trended over time, with investigation of peers that repeatedly send blocked categories.
  • Location update anomalies (impossible travel between serving networks) and bursts of routing queries for the same subscribers.
  • Diameter messages whose origin realm or host does not match the connected peer.

Enterprises

  • Authentication logs showing an SMS code requested and used from a new device shortly after a SIM change or port event.
  • Failed and successful logins for executives after travel, correlated with any carrier notifications.
MetricOwnerDirection
External signalling message categories covered by blocking rulesOperatorRising to full coverage
Roaming peers covered by stateful checks in enforce modeOperatorRising
Leased GT arrangements compliant with FS.52OperatorAll
Privileged users still able to use SMS or voice OTPEnterprise IAMZero
Customer logins protected by passkeys rather than SMSEnterprise IAMRising
Executives with carrier PIN and port-out protection confirmedSecurity or executive protection100%

Common failure patterns

  • Filtering only one generation: Diameter is filtered but SS7 is not, or SEPP is deployed while SS7 and Diameter fallbacks remain open, so attackers use the oldest path.
  • Static allow-lists of peers: trusting every message from a roaming partner, even though partners, hubs and GT lessees can carry hostile traffic.
  • Alert mode forever: firewalls installed in monitoring mode and never moved to blocking because of fear of breaking roaming.
  • SMS for administrator MFA: enterprises that would never accept unencrypted passwords accept codes that cross the signalling network in clear.
  • Ignoring the interception boundary inside the core: signalling is not the only path to subscriber data. Intrusions into operator cores, such as the Salt Typhoon telecom intrusions, show how stolen credentials and network device secrets gave attackers long-term access to operator core infrastructure, where signalling filters offer no protection.

Framework mapping

FrameworkReferenceRelevance
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5SC-7 Boundary Protection; SI-4 System MonitoringSignalling firewalls and border monitoring
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality and IntegritySEPP and protected interconnect
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5IA-2(1), IA-5; SR-6 Supplier Assessments and ReviewsPhishing-resistant MFA for privileged users; carrier and CPaaS assurance
NIST SP 800-63B-4Section 3.1.3.3 PSTN restricted authenticatorLimits on SMS and voice OTP
NIST CSF 2.0PR.IR-01, DE.CM-01Protecting and monitoring networks and services
MITRE ATT&CK v20Mobile T1430, T1636.004; enterprise T1111, T1557Location tracking, SMS collection, MFA interception

Practitioner checklist

  • Operators: deploy signalling firewalls covering SS7, Diameter and GTP, starting with category filtering and moving stateful rules to enforcement.
  • Operators: enable SMS home routing and validate Diameter origin information against the connected peer.
  • Operators: review Global Title leasing against GSMA FS.52 and require code compliance from lessors and transit carriers.
  • Operators: keep legacy filtering in place when deploying 5G SEPP, and commission independent signalling assessments.
  • Enterprises: remove SMS and voice OTP for administrators, finance approvers and executives.
  • Enterprises: check SIM change and porting signals before sending SMS codes to customers, and rate-limit code requests.
  • Enterprises: protect executive numbers with carrier PINs and port-out locks, and use E2EE apps for sensitive calls.
  • Enterprises: inventory machine SIMs and SMS gateways as non-human identities with owners.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Telecom Network Security Guide · SIM Swap Fraud Guide · 5G Security Guide · Telecoms Identity Security Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 27 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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