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Unauthorised Remote Monitoring and Management Tool Playbook: Triage Rogue Remote Access Tools Fast

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 27 October 2026 10 min read
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An unapproved remote access agent on an endpoint is either shadow IT or an attacker with a signed, trusted back door, and the SOC has to tell which within minutes. Attackers install legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) and remote support software because it is signed, often allowed by security tools and gives them interactive control without custom malware. CISA, NSA and MS-ISAC described in advisory AA23-025A how help desk themed phishing led users to run portable ScreenConnect and AnyDesk executables that needed no administrator rights. This playbook template gives [Organisation] a repeatable response when an RMM or remote access tool is found that is not on the approved list: triage legitimate versus rogue, contain, remove and close the gap. Governance of approved RMM is covered in the RMM Tool Security Guide, and a compromise of your provider's own RMM in the Compromised MSP Playbook.

How to use this template

  • Adopt it as a sub-playbook of [Organisation]'s incident response plan and link it from the SOC alert runbook for remote access tool detections. See the Incident Response Plan Template.
  • Attach the approved RMM register. Triage depends on a current list of approved tools, their publishers, the hosts they belong on, their tenant or account IDs and their owners. Without it every alert becomes a guess.
  • Use the triage outcomes. Section 3 ends in one of three outcomes: T1 shadow IT, T2 suspicious, T3 confirmed malicious. Later sections say which steps apply to each.
  • Fill in every [placeholder] and test the containment steps on a lab endpoint before adopting the playbook.

1. Scope and triggers

1.1 This playbook applies to any remote monitoring and management agent, remote support or screen sharing tool, remote desktop or VNC server, developer tunnel or built-in remote assistance feature that is installed, running or connecting on an [Organisation] device without an approved business record.

1.2 Techniques to record in the case:

BehaviourATT&CKTypical evidence
Interactive control through remote support softwareT1219.002 Remote Desktop SoftwareProcess from an unapproved remote support publisher, outbound session to its relay
Developer tunnels used as a channelT1219.001 IDE TunnelingTunnel processes on hosts with no development role
Lure that gets the user to install or run itT1566.004 Spearphishing Voice, T1204.002 Malicious FileCall or email claiming to be the help desk shortly before first execution
Persistence through the agent's serviceT1543.003 Windows ServiceNew service created by the installer (Windows event 7045)
Abuse of a provider's or partner's legitimate accessT1199 Trusted RelationshipApproved tool, but unknown technician or tenant
RMM pushing scripts to many hostsT1072 Software Deployment ToolsSame command on many endpoints within minutes

1.3 Triggers: EDR or application control alerts for a remote access tool not on the approved list; DNS or proxy hits on remote access relay domains; a new service with a remote access publisher; a user reporting a "help desk" call followed by a screen sharing request; a portable executable from a remote support publisher running from Downloads or a temporary folder; out of hours sessions on an approved tool by an unknown technician account.

1.4 Out of scope: a confirmed compromise of the approved RMM platform or the MSP running it (use the Compromised MSP Playbook), and ransomware already executing (use the ransomware playbook in parallel).

2. Roles and contacts

RoleNamed leadResponsibilities
SOC analyst[Rota]Triage against the approved register, first evidence collection, outcome T1, T2 or T3
Incident lead[Name, phone]Owns T2 and T3 cases, severity and the decision log
Endpoint team[Name]Isolation, removal, application control rules
Identity administrator[Name]Session revocation and password resets for the user and any accounts used on the host
IT service owner for remote support[Name]Confirms whether a session was legitimate; owns the approved register
Network team[Name]DNS and proxy blocks for relay domains and ports
Fraud or finance contact[Name]Engaged when the user was on a banking or payment session during remote control

3. Detection and triage

3.1 Identify the tool exactly: file path, hash, signer, version, parent process, install time, service name, and whether it is an installed agent or a portable executable. Community catalogues such as LOLRMM list known RMM tools with their artefacts, network domains and Sigma detections, which helps name an unfamiliar binary.

3.2 Check the register. Is this product approved? Is this host in its scope? Does the agent connect to [Organisation]'s own tenant or account ID, or to someone else's? A legitimate product connected to a foreign tenant is not legitimate.

3.3 Ask the user and the IT service owner through a known channel, not through the remote session. Did they start this? Was there a call, chat or email from "IT" first?

3.4 Look at the session: start time, duration, connecting party where the tool records it, files transferred, and what ran on the host during the session (processes, browser activity, new accounts, credential access tools).

OutcomeEvidence patternNext step
T1 Shadow ITUser or IT staff installed it for a known purpose, connects to a known account, no suspicious activity in sessionsRemove, record, route through the exception process; no incident
T2 SuspiciousNo owner can explain it, or a portable binary ran after an unsolicited contact, but no malicious action seen yetContain as T3 until disproved
T3 Confirmed maliciousUnknown connecting party, foreign tenant, credential access, discovery commands, data staging or other attacker toolingFull incident: sections 4 to 8

3.5 Hunt for spread. Search all endpoints for the same hash, signer, service name and relay domains. One rogue agent found usually means others not yet found, especially when an attacker has used an RMM tool for redundant access.

3.6 Decision (incident lead): set the outcome and severity. Critical: T3 on a server, an administrator's workstation or more than [5] hosts. High: any other T3. A T2 that stays unexplained after [4] hours is treated as T3.

4. Containment

4.1 T2 and T3: isolate the host through EDR network containment, which keeps the EDR channel open for investigation while cutting the remote session. Do not just kill the process: many agents run as services and restart.

4.2 Block the tool's relay domains and the specific binary hash or signer at DNS, proxy and application control, organisation-wide, in [audit for 1 hour, then enforce] mode for publishers that are also approved elsewhere.

4.3 Revoke sessions and reset passwords for the logged-on user and any account used on the host during the session. Treat browser-stored passwords and session cookies on that host as exposed.

4.4 If the user was in online banking or a payment system during the session, contact the bank and finance team at once. The AA23-025A campaign used remote control to alter a victim's view of their bank account and push a "refund" to the scammer.

4.5 Decision (incident lead and IT service owner): if the rogue tool is the same product as the approved RMM, block by tenant or account ID rather than by publisher, so legitimate support continues.

5. Eradication

5.1 Uninstall the agent and remove its service, scheduled tasks, startup entries, configuration files and any portable copies. For a T3 on a high-value host, reimage rather than clean.

5.2 Remove anything the attacker added during sessions: local or domain accounts, other remote access tools, persistence items and tooling. The Remote Access Trojans (RATs) Guide covers the custom malware that often follows.

5.3 Remove built-in tools you do not use. If [Organisation] supports users with another tool, Microsoft documents uninstalling Quick Assist with Remove-AppxPackage for the MicrosoftCorporationII.QuickAssist package, or blocking remoteassistance.support.services.microsoft.com; note that the block also disrupts Intune Remote Help. The Black Basta Threat Actor Profile shows why: affiliates talked users into opening Quick Assist.

5.4 Rotate any credential, API key or token used or visible on the host during remote sessions.

6. Recovery

6.1 Return the host to service only after the scan for the same tool across the estate (3.5) is clean and application control blocks the tool.

6.2 Give the user their device back with a short explanation of the lure and how to verify a genuine help desk contact.

6.3 Monitor the host and user for [14] days for new remote access tools, new services and sign-ins from new locations.

7. Communication and notification

AudienceOwnerWhen
Affected user and line managerSOC analystAt containment
All staffSecurity awarenessWhere a help desk impersonation campaign is active, the same day
Managed service providerIT service ownerIf the tool is one they use or they may be impersonated
Executive sponsorIncident leadFor Critical T3 cases at declaration
Privacy, regulators and individualsPrivacy leadIf personal data was accessed during sessions and the breach is notifiable
Bank and law enforcementFinance and incident leadWhere money moved or fraud was attempted

8. Post-incident review

8.1 Record the timeline: first execution, first session, detection, containment and removal.

8.2 Root cause questions: Could a standard user run a portable remote access executable? Was the tool blocked at the network edge? Did the user know how to verify the help desk? Was the approved register current?

8.3 Metrics: time from first execution to detection; percentage of endpoints under application control that blocks unapproved remote access tools, including portable ones; number of distinct unapproved remote access tools seen per month; percentage of T2 cases resolved within [4] hours; repeat findings on the same host or team.

Implementation guidance

  • Approve one tool, block the rest. AA23-025A recommends auditing remote access tools, using application control to prevent installation and execution of unauthorised RMM including portable versions, enforcing signed software execution, and allowing approved RMM only from inside the network or through approved remote access methods such as VPN or VDI.
  • Block at the edge too. The advisory also recommends blocking inbound and outbound connections on common RMM ports and protocols at the perimeter; use relay domain lists for tools that run over HTTPS.
  • Detect what runs only in memory. The advisory notes that portable RMM can be loaded in memory; rely on EDR process and network telemetry, not file inventory alone.
  • Size by organisation. A small organisation can rely on its EDR's application control and a short approved list maintained by its MSP. A large organisation needs a register tied to CMDB, tenant ID allow lists per approved product, and automated SOAR enrichment of every remote access alert.
  • Treat RMM agents as non-human identities. Each agent holds a credential to a console that can run code as SYSTEM. Inventory them and own them. See the Remote Access Identity Guide.
Playbook sectionNIST CSF 2.0NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A
Approved registerID.AM-02CM-8, CM-11A.5.9, A.8.19
3. Detection and triageDE.CM-09, RS.AN-03SI-4, IR-4A.8.16, A.5.25
4. and 5. Containment and eradicationRS.MI-01, RS.MI-02IR-4, CM-7, SC-7A.5.26
Remote access controlPR.AA-05AC-17A.8.20
7. CommunicationRS.CO-02IR-6A.5.26

References: CISA, NSA and MS-ISAC: AA23-025A Protecting Against Malicious Use of Remote Monitoring and Management Software · NIST: SP 800-61 Rev. 3 Incident Response Recommendations · MITRE ATT&CK: T1219.002 Remote Desktop Software · Microsoft: Use Quick Assist to help users · LOLRMM: Living Off The Land RMM catalogue

This template is provided for guidance and must be adapted to your organisation. Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: RMM Tool Security Guide · Compromised MSP Playbook · ConnectWise ScreenConnect Hardening Guide · Remote Access Policy Template

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 27 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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