Join our Newsletter — 33% off our NHI Course
Home› Guides› Handala and Void Manticore Threat Actor Profile Guide:…
Guide Threat Intelligence & Threat Actors

Handala and Void Manticore Threat Actor Profile Guide: Personas, Tradecraft and Defences

PDF for newsletter subscribers · free to read online

← All guides
By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 27 October 2026 11 min read
On this page

Void Manticore is an Iranian state-linked group that breaks in with stolen or guessed credentials, steals data, destroys systems and then publicises the damage through personas such as Handala Hack and Homeland Justice. MITRE ATT&CK tracks the group as G1055 and, citing Check Point Research, describes it as assessed to operate on behalf of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). Its operations against Albania in 2022, Israeli organisations since 2023 and US companies in 2026 combine wipers, abuse of legitimate management tools and hack and leak messaging on Telegram. This profile covers who the group is, what it targets, its ATT&CK techniques, how it abuses identities, and what defenders should do. It is written for SOC, identity and incident response teams. For destructive malware in general, see the Wiper Malware Guide.

Key takeaways

  • One operator, several faces. Homeland Justice, Karma and Handala Hack are personas that sources link to the same MOIS-aligned operation, which gives the state deniability and lets it tailor messaging to each audience.
  • Credentials are the entry point. Check Point found that compromised VPN accounts are the main way in, supported by brute force, password guessing and credential stuffing against exposed services.
  • Destruction uses your own tools. The group has pushed wipers through Group Policy logon scripts and, in the Stryker attack, legitimate remote wipe commands through a cloud device management console.
  • The leak is part of the attack. Claims on Telegram and leak sites are often exaggerated, but they pressure victims, staff and regulators, so communications planning is a defensive control.
  • Privileged identity is the control point. Phishing-resistant MFA on remote access, no standing Global Administrator rights and multi-admin approval for bulk device actions remove the paths the group relies on most.

Who they are (names and aliases)

NameTypeSource and notes
VOID MANTICORETracking nameCheck Point Research; MITRE ATT&CK G1055 primary name
Red SandstormTracking nameMicrosoft naming, listed as an alias by ATT&CK and Check Point
BANISHED KITTENTracking nameListed as an alias by ATT&CK and Check Point
COBALT MYSTIQUETracking nameSophos threat profile, listed by ATT&CK
Homeland JusticePublic personaUsed against Albania since mid-2022; ATT&CK campaign C0038; Check Point says still used against Albania
Karma, Karmabelow80Public personaUsed against Israeli organisations; Check Point says Karma was likely absorbed into Handala
Handala HackPublic personaUsed since late 2023; ATT&CK calls it the current primary persona

Attribution as stated by sources: ATT&CK says the group is "assessed to operate on behalf of" MOIS. Check Point assesses Void Manticore as affiliated with MOIS and notes that public reporting links it to the MOIS Internal Security Deputy's Counter-Terrorism Division, which Check Point presents as public reporting rather than its own finding. DomainTools assesses Homeland Justice, Karma and Handala as one coordinated MOIS-aligned ecosystem rather than independent hacktivists, without stating a formal confidence level. The FBI and CISA advisory on the 2022 Albania attacks attributed them to "Iranian state cyber actors". ATT&CK also records collaboration with Scarred Manticore, a separate Iranian actor linked to initial access that preceded some Void Manticore operations. Keep these qualifiers when briefing leadership; see the Cyber Threat Attribution Guide for how to read them.

Targeting and motivation

  • Regions: ATT&CK lists government entities, critical infrastructure and private sector organisations in Albania, Israel and the United States, with activity since at least mid-2022.
  • Sectors: government (Albania), Israeli private and public bodies, and more recently US enterprises, including the medical technology company Stryker in March 2026. Check Point also highlights IT and service providers, targeted as a route to customer credentials.
  • Motivation: political pressure and retaliation rather than profit. The FBI and CISA assessed the September 2022 Albania wave as likely retaliation for public attribution of the July attacks and for Albania cutting diplomatic ties with Iran. ATT&CK also records extortion messaging on leak sites (T1657 Financial Theft), but the pattern is influence first.
  • Influence model: DomainTools describes a cycle of claim, media pickup, public debate and institutional response, in which limited access is framed as large-scale compromise. Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 calls these "state-directed hacktivist personas" that operated openly on Telegram from 2023 to 2025.

For the wider Iranian landscape, see the Iran State Cyber Operations Guide, and for the leak side of the playbook, the Hack and Leak Operations Guide.

Tactics and techniques (MITRE ATT&CK)

ATT&CK v20 records 63 technique uses for G1055. The table selects those that matter most for detection and hardening.

TacticTechniqueReported behaviour
Resource developmentT1585.001 Social Media Accounts; T1583.003 Virtual Private Server; T1583.006 Web ServicesTelegram accounts for messaging; VPS for command and control; commercial VPN services to hide origin
Initial accessT1133 External Remote Services; T1078 Valid Accounts; T1199 Trusted Relationship; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationLogins to VPN with compromised accounts; IT and service providers as a route in; SharePoint CVE-2019-0604 in the Albania intrusion
Credential accessT1110 Brute Force; T1110.001 Password Guessing; T1110.004 Credential Stuffing; T1003.001 LSASS Memory; T1552.002 Credentials in RegistryRepeated attempts against VPN; LSASS dumping with a built-in DLL; exporting registry hives
Discovery and lateral movementT1087.002 Domain Account; T1021.001 Remote Desktop ProtocolActive Directory enumeration with ADRecon; manual movement over RDP
Command and controlT1219.002 Remote Desktop Software; T1572 Protocol Tunneling; T1102 Web ServiceNetBird mesh VPN installed on victim hosts; tunnelling tools; Telegram API for control
Execution and privilege abuseT1484.001 Group Policy Modification; T1072 Software Deployment Tools; T1651 Cloud Administration Command; T1078.004 Cloud AccountsWipers pushed by GPO logon scripts; abuse of MDM and RMM; privileged cloud accounts used to reach Intune
Defence impairmentT1686.003 Windows Host FirewallDisabling Windows Defender protections before follow-on activity
Collection and exfiltrationT1213.002 Sharepoint; T1114.002 Remote Email Collection; T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelData taken from SharePoint and mail servers; exfiltration over Telegram bot channels
ImpactT1485 Data Destruction; T1561.001 Disk Content Wipe; T1561.002 Disk Structure Wipe; T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact; T1490 Inhibit System RecoveryCustom wipers including BiBi; VeraCrypt on system drives; deleting virtual machines from the hypervisor

Check Point describes the operations as manual and hands-on, with four wiping methods run in parallel in one intrusion, one of them a PowerShell wiper it suspects was written with AI assistance. ATT&CK also records screen, audio and video capture (T1113, T1123, T1125), including during a Zoom session, which matters for executives and dissidents targeted for surveillance.

How they abuse identities and credentials

  • VPN accounts first: Check Point saw hundreds of logon and brute force attempts against VPN gateways, often from commercial VPN nodes and machines with default hostnames such as DESKTOP-XXXXXX or WIN-XXXXXX. After Iran's internet shutdown in January 2026, connections moved to Starlink address ranges and some came from Iranian IP addresses.
  • Domain Admin as the goal: in one Check Point case, access predated the destructive phase by several months and the operator held Domain Administrator credentials (T1078.002), which made Group Policy distribution of wipers trivial.
  • Cloud admin as a weapon: in the Stryker attack, reporting summarised on the NHI Mgmt Group breach page describes a compromised administrator account used to create a new Global Administrator, then Intune remote wipe against tens of thousands of devices. No endpoint malware was needed. Unit 42 describes the same shift to "compromised privileged identities" issuing legitimate wipe commands.
  • Service providers as credential sources: T1199 entries describe targeting IT and service providers to obtain credentials. Treat supplier remote access accounts as privileged.
  • Non-human identities: Microsoft notes that Intune Multi Admin Approval also applies to app-only calls through Microsoft Graph, which means service principals with device management permissions can issue the same destructive commands as a human admin. Inventory them alongside human admins. See the Microsoft Intune Guide.

Notable incidents

WhenPersonaWhat sources report
May 2021 to September 2022Homeland JusticeFBI and CISA: initial access through SharePoint CVE-2019-0604 about 14 months before ransomware and wiper attacks on the Albanian government in July 2022, periodic email exfiltration, leaks from late July, and a second wave in September 2022
Late 2023 onwardsHandala HackCheck Point: persona in use against Israeli targets; destructive operations paired with data exfiltration and Telegram claims, per Unit 42
March 2026Handala HackStryker: remote wipe through Microsoft Intune on 11 March 2026, claimed on Telegram with unverified figures of over 200,000 systems and 50 TB stolen. See the Stryker Cyberattack 2026 breach page

The Stryker page also records that the US Justice Department described Handala as a persona operated by MOIS and seized four related domains on 19 March 2026. Treat persona claims as unverified until your own forensic evidence confirms them; DomainTools notes that confirmed system-level disruption is the exception and that most claims rest on partial data exposure.

Detection and defence

What to monitor

SignalWhere to lookWhy it matters
Failed VPN logons followed by success; logons from new countries, new ASNs, hosting providers, Starlink rangesVPN gateway and identity provider sign-in logsCheck Point's main initial access pattern
RDP sessions from hosts named DESKTOP-* or WIN-*, especially out of hoursWindows Security event 4624 (logon type 10), VPN client hostnamesOperator machines that were never renamed
New installs of NetBird, RMM tools or OpenSSH for WindowsEDR software inventory, service creation (event 7045)Mesh tunnels used to reach isolated hosts
LSASS access by rundll32 loading comsvcs.dllEDR process telemetry, Sysmon event 10Credential dumping before escalation
Changes to GPO logon scripts or new scheduled tasks across many hostsDirectory Service Changes (event 5136), event 4698Wiper distribution channel
New Global Administrator or Intune Administrator role assignment; bulk wipe, retire or delete actionsEntra ID audit log, Intune audit logThe Stryker pattern

Controls that break the chain

  1. Remote access: enforce phishing-resistant MFA on every VPN and SSO path, restrict VPN access to countries where you do business, and block or tightly condition access from Iran and Starlink ranges where there is no business need, as Check Point recommends.
  2. Tier 0 administration: remove standing Global Administrator and Domain Admin rights, use just-in-time elevation, and alert on every new top-tier role assignment.
  3. Bulk destructive actions: turn on Intune Multi Admin Approval for device wipe, retire and delete, scripts and RBAC changes, so a single compromised admin cannot act alone. Keep Graph app exclusions minimal and reviewed.
  4. Lateral movement: disable RDP where it is not needed, require Network Level Authentication and jump hosts where it is, and block unapproved tunnelling and remote access software through application control.
  5. Recovery: keep offline or immutable backups and hypervisor credentials separate from the domain, since the group deletes virtual machines and encrypts drives. Use the Wiper Attack Response Playbook.
  6. Exposure: patch internet-facing servers against known exploited vulnerabilities first; the Albania intrusion began with a 2019 SharePoint flaw.

Metrics

  • MFA coverage: percentage of VPN and remote access accounts on phishing-resistant MFA (target 100%).
  • Standing privilege: number of permanent Global Administrator and Domain Admin assignments (target: break-glass only).
  • Protected actions: share of Intune destructive actions covered by Multi Admin Approval.
  • Time to detect: median minutes from a new privileged role assignment to analyst review.
  • Restore test: date and duration of the last full restore from offline backup.

Framework mapping

DefenceNIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5NIST CSF 2.0ATT&CK mitigation
MFA on remote accessIA-2, AC-17PR.AA-03M1032 Multi-factor Authentication
Least privilege for adminsAC-2, AC-6PR.AA-05M1026 Privileged Account Management
Sign-in and audit monitoringSI-4, AU-6DE.CM-01, DE.CM-03Not applicable
Offline backups and recoveryCP-9PR.DS-11, RC.RP-01M1053 Data Backup

Practitioner checklist

  • Add G1055 and its personas to your threat profile and brief leadership with the sources' exact attribution wording.
  • Review VPN logs for brute force followed by success and for default Windows hostnames in the last 90 days.
  • Enforce phishing-resistant MFA on all VPN, SSO and supplier remote access accounts.
  • Remove standing Global Administrator, Intune Administrator and Domain Admin assignments outside break-glass accounts.
  • Enable Intune Multi Admin Approval for wipe, retire, delete, scripts and RBAC, and review excluded Graph applications.
  • Inventory service principals with device management or Directory write permissions and remove what is unused.
  • Alert on new NetBird, RMM or SSH server installs and on GPO logon script changes.
  • Test a restore from offline backup, including hypervisor rebuild, and record the time taken.
  • Prepare holding statements for a public leak claim before you need them.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Iran State Cyber Operations Guide · Wiper Malware Guide · Hack and Leak Operations Guide · Microsoft Intune Guide · Stryker Cyberattack 2026

PDF for subscribers

Take this guide with you

Every section, table and checklist in one PDF, with links to the sources and related guides. Subscribe to our weekly NHI & AI Identity Journal and we’ll email you a download link.

Free weekly newsletter

Subscribe to the NHI & AI Identity Journal

The latest on NHI and Agentic AI security – articles, research, breaches, news and events every week.

Bonus 33% off our NHI Course when you subscribe.

NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 27 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

PDF Downloads for Newsletter Subscribers

Get the guide

Enter your details and we’ll email you a download link.

The full guide is free to read online. The PDF is a thank you for subscribing.

Fill in all fields marked * and tick the PDF box to continue.