Windows DNS and DHCP servers decide where every client in an Active Directory network sends its traffic, yet they are often run as background infrastructure with Tier 0 privileges nobody reviews. AD-integrated DNS usually runs on domain controllers, the DnsAdmins group can influence a service running as SYSTEM on those controllers, and the DHCP server writes DNS records with a stored credential. A single malicious record, rogue lease or forwarder change can redirect authentication traffic across the estate. This guide covers the identity model behind both roles, privileged groups, the DHCP DNS registration credential, logging and event IDs, a hardening baseline and common misconfigurations. It is for Windows infrastructure engineers, Active Directory administrators and detection engineers. Protocol-level DHCP attacks and network controls are covered in the DHCP Security Guide; DNS concepts in the DNS Security Guide.
This is an independent guide from NHI Mgmt Group, based on Microsoft's public documentation as of November 2026. It is not sponsored or reviewed by Microsoft. Product features change, so confirm settings against Microsoft's current documentation.
Key takeaways
- Treat DNS on domain controllers as Tier 0. DnsAdmins, the DNS server configuration and AD-integrated zone ACLs all affect domain controllers, and DnsAdmins is not protected by AdminSDHolder.
- Allow only secure dynamic updates. AD-integrated zones should accept updates authenticated with Kerberos, and zone ACLs should be reviewed so ordinary accounts cannot create arbitrary names.
- Give DHCP its own DNS registration credential. Set-DhcpServerDnsCredential with a dedicated low-privilege account, name protection on, and DnsUpdateProxy left empty.
- Use the built-in protections. AD authorisation of DHCP servers, cache locking (100 percent by default), the global query block list (WPAD and ISATAP by default), DNS policies and DNSSEC with NSEC3.
- Turn on the logs that matter. The DNS Server Audit channel is on by default and records zone and record changes; DHCP audit logs record leases; both must be collected centrally.
How identity and access work in Windows DNS and DHCP
DNS Server
In an AD-integrated zone, each DNS record is an object in an Active Directory partition (DomainDnsZones, ForestDnsZones or the domain partition) with its own access control list. A client that registers its name through secure dynamic update authenticates with Kerberos and becomes the owner of its record, which stops another account overwriting it. Non-secure updates accept changes from anyone who can reach the server. The DNS service itself runs as Local System, so on a domain controller it runs with the controller's full privilege.
DHCP Server
In a domain, a DHCP server must be authorised in Active Directory: Microsoft documents that unauthorised DHCP servers installed in AD domains "cannot function properly, and do not lease IP addresses to DHCP clients". Local groups DHCP Administrators (full management, including backup and restore of the DHCP database) and DHCP Users (read-only) control management. When the server registers A and PTR records on behalf of clients, it uses the credential set with Set-DhcpServerDnsCredential; if none is set, it uses the server's computer account, which on a domain controller is the DC itself.
| Identity | What it can do | Risk | Control |
|---|---|---|---|
| DnsAdmins (domain group) | Read, write, create and delete child objects on DNS data; manage DNS servers | Configure the DNS service on DCs, which runs as SYSTEM; a well-documented path is loading a plug-in DLL into the service | Empty or Tier 0 only; monitor membership |
| Authenticated users on AD-integrated zones | Create new records (default zone ACL allows creating child objects) | Record injection, including wildcard or WPAD records that capture traffic | Review zone ACLs; pre-create sensitive names; GQBL |
| DnsUpdateProxy members | Register records on behalf of other clients, with no owner security on the records they create | Records any client can later take over | Keep empty; never add a DC |
| DHCP DNS credential | Create and update client A and PTR records | If it is a DC or admin account, compromise of the DHCP host means DNS control | Dedicated, unprivileged domain account |
| DHCP Administrators | Manage scopes, options, failover, backup and restore | Push malicious DNS server, gateway or WPAD options to every client | Named admins via PAM; no service accounts |
| Enterprise Admins | Authorise DHCP servers in AD | Needed rarely | Just-in-time elevation |
Admin roles and privileged access
- DnsAdmins is a Tier 0 group: Microsoft lists it as not protected by AdminSDHolder, so its ACL and membership can drift without reset. Members can change the configuration of a service running as SYSTEM on domain controllers. Keep it empty and administer DNS with Domain Admins from privileged access workstations, or limit it to Tier 0 accounts. See the Active Directory and Entra ID Hardening Guide and the Active Directory ACL and Delegation Hygiene Guide.
- Delegate zones, not servers: if teams need to manage records, delegate permissions on specific zones or organisational DNS objects rather than adding them to DnsAdmins.
- Avoid DHCP on domain controllers: a DHCP server on a DC without a separate DNS credential registers records as the DC, and DHCP Administrators gains a foothold on a Tier 0 host. Run DHCP on member servers where possible.
- Use privileged access tooling: grant DHCP Administrators and DNS rights just in time, record sessions for Tier 0 hosts and remove standing membership. See the JIT Access Guide.
Integrations, API tokens and service accounts
- DHCP DNS registration account: create a dedicated domain user with no other rights, set it with
Set-DhcpServerDnsCredentialon every DHCP server (failover partners must use the same account so either can update records), and rotate its password on a schedule. Store the password in your vault. See the Windows Services and Service Account Security Guide. - Name protection:
Set-DhcpServerv4DnsSetting -NameProtection $truemakes the DNS update fail rather than overwrite an existing record with the same name, tracked with DHCID records. Combine it with-DynamicUpdates OnClientRequestorAlwaysand-DeleteDnsRROnLeaseExpiry $trueto keep stale records down. - IPAM and automation: IP address management servers, CMDB sync jobs and infrastructure-as-code pipelines often hold DNS and DHCP rights. Scope them to the zones and scopes they manage and inventory them as non-human identities.
- Remote management: the DNS and DHCP consoles and PowerShell cmdlets use RPC and WinRM to the server; restrict these management ports to admin networks. See the Windows Remote Management and WinRM/PowerShell Remoting Security Guide.
Logging and detection
DNS Server event channels
| Event ID | Channel | Meaning | Detection use |
|---|---|---|---|
| 513 | DNS-Server/Audit | Zone deleted | Destructive change or sabotage |
| 514 | DNS-Server/Audit | Zone setting changed | Zone transfer or dynamic update setting weakened |
| 515 / 516 | DNS-Server/Audit | Record created / deleted | Manual record injection (for example wpad, wildcard) |
| 519 / 520 | DNS-Server/Audit | Record created / deleted by dynamic update, with source IP | Unexpected clients registering sensitive names |
| 541 | DNS-Server/Audit | Server setting changed | Forwarders, recursion, plug-in or block list changed |
| 548 | DNS-Server/Audit | Restart of the DNS service requested | Often follows a configuration change that needs a restart |
| 525 to 527 | DNS-Server/Audit | Zone signed, unsigned or re-signed | DNSSEC changes |
| 257 to 262 | DNS-Server/Analytical | Responses, ignored queries, recursive queries and timeouts | Query-level hunting, DNS tunnelling (T1071.004) |
Audit events are enabled by default with negligible performance impact. Analytic events are disabled by default; Microsoft reports about 5 percent degradation at 100,000 queries per second and no apparent impact at 50,000 or below. The legacy debug log (dns.log) is resource-intensive and should only be used temporarily.
DHCP and directory signals
- DHCP audit logs: enable with
Set-DhcpServerAuditLog -Enable $true; files are written per weekday to the configured path (by default under %windir%\System32\dhcp). Logging stops if free disk space falls below MinMBDiskSpace (20 MB by default), so alert on gaps. - Group membership: security events 4728, 4732 and 4756 for additions to DnsAdmins, DnsUpdateProxy and DHCP Administrators. See the Active Directory Security Monitoring and Event IDs Guide.
- Directory changes: directory service change auditing (event 5136, 5137) on the MicrosoftDNS containers catches record and ACL edits made through LDAP rather than the DNS service.
- Rogue DHCP: unauthorised Windows DHCP servers stop themselves, but non-Windows rogue servers do not; use DHCP snooping on switches (T1557.003 DHCP Spoofing).
Metrics
- DnsAdmins membership: number of members outside Tier 0 (target zero).
- Zones without secure updates: AD-integrated zones allowing non-secure dynamic updates (target zero).
- Zone transfer exposure: zones allowing transfer to any server (target zero).
- DHCP credential coverage: percentage of DHCP servers with a dedicated DNS credential and name protection on.
- Log coverage: percentage of DNS and DHCP servers whose Audit channel and audit logs reach the SIEM daily.
- Patch latency: days to apply Microsoft security updates to DNS and DHCP servers, tracked against the Microsoft Security Update Guide.
Hardening baseline
| Area | Setting or action | Command or location | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dynamic updates | Secure only on AD-integrated zones | Set-DnsServerPrimaryZone -Name corp.example -DynamicUpdate Secure | Kerberos-authenticated record ownership |
| Zone transfers | Disabled, or only to listed servers | Zone properties, Zone Transfers tab; zone transfer policies | Stops zone enumeration (T1590.002) |
| Recursion | Off on authoritative-only servers; limited to internal clients elsewhere | Recursion scopes and recursion policy | No open resolvers |
| Cache locking | Keep at 100 | Set-DnsServerCache -LockingPercent 100 | Cached entries cannot be overwritten for the TTL |
| Cache pollution protection | Enabled | Set-DnsServerCache -PollutionProtection $true | Ignores out-of-zone NS data |
| Global query block list | Enabled with WPAD and ISATAP | Get-DnsServerGlobalQueryBlockList | Blocks commonly hijacked names (T1557.001) |
| DNS policies | Blackhole known-bad domains and subnets | Add-DnsServerQueryResolutionPolicy -Action IGNORE | Local protective DNS |
| DNSSEC | Sign zones with NSEC3 where clients validate | DNS Manager, Get-DnsServerTrustAnchor | Integrity; NSEC3 prevents zone walking |
| Forwarders | Point to a protective DNS resolver | Server properties | Filtering and logging upstream |
| DHCP authorisation | Every server authorised; review list | Get-DhcpServerInDC | Stops rogue Windows DHCP |
| DHCP DNS settings | Dedicated credential, name protection, delete on expiry | Set-DhcpServerDnsCredential, Set-DhcpServerv4DnsSetting | Safe record registration |
| DHCP failover | Hot standby or load balance with a shared secret | Add-DhcpServerv4Failover | Availability; authenticated partner messages |
| Backups | DHCP database backup and DNS zone export | Backup-DhcpServer, AD backups | Recovery after tampering or ransomware |
See the Protective DNS Guide for upstream filtering and the NIST SP 800-81 Rev. 3 Secure DNS Deployment Guide for the wider deployment model.
Choosing an architecture
- Small organisations: AD-integrated DNS on two domain controllers is normal and acceptable. Keep DnsAdmins empty, run DHCP on a member server or the firewall rather than a DC, and forward to a protective resolver.
- Large organisations: separate internal authoritative DNS on DCs from recursive resolution (dedicated caching resolvers or a protective DNS service), run DHCP failover pairs per site on member servers and manage records through IPAM with scoped delegation.
- DNSSEC: signing internal zones adds key management on DCs and only helps where clients or resolvers validate; prioritise validation on recursive resolvers for external names first.
Rollout and rollback
- Baseline: export zone settings (
Get-DnsServerZone), server settings (Get-DnsServer), DnsAdmins and DnsUpdateProxy membership, zone ACLs, DHCP credentials and failover state. - Fix identity first: empty DnsAdmins and DnsUpdateProxy, set dedicated DHCP credentials, enable name protection.
- Switch zones to secure updates in a pilot: review Audit events 519 and 520 for clients that fail to register (often non-domain devices, which DHCP should then register on their behalf).
- Tighten transfers and recursion: confirm secondary servers and forwarders first, then restrict.
- Enable logging and alerts for the Audit channel, DHCP logs and group changes.
- Roll back: zone settings revert with Set-DnsServerPrimaryZone; keep exports of every setting changed and test restores of the DHCP database with Restore-DhcpServer.
Framework mapping
| Framework | Reference | Application |
|---|---|---|
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | SC-20, SC-21, SC-22, AC-6(5), CM-7, SI-4, CP-9 | Authoritative and recursive integrity, resilient architecture, privileged groups, logging, backups |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.AA-05, PR.PS-04, DE.CM-01 | Reviewed privileges, log generation, network service monitoring |
| CIS Controls v8.1 | 4.9 Configure trusted DNS servers, 5.4 Restrict administrator privileges, 8.6 Collect DNS query audit logs, 9.2 Use DNS filtering services | Resolver design, privileged groups, logging, filtering |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1557.001, T1557.003, T1590.002, T1071.004, T1078.002 | Poisoning, rogue DHCP, zone enumeration, DNS tunnelling, abused domain accounts |
Common misconfigurations
- Helpdesk or server teams in DnsAdmins: granted for convenience, it gives a path to code running as SYSTEM on domain controllers. Membership changes are rarely alerted because the group is not protected.
- Non-secure or "secure and non-secure" updates: left from migrations or for printers and Linux hosts, they let any device on the network overwrite records of servers.
- DHCP on a DC without a DNS credential: records are registered as the DC computer account, and adding the DHCP server or DC to DnsUpdateProxy to fix stale records leaves records with no owner security.
- Removing WPAD from the block list: done to support proxy auto-discovery, it lets anyone who can create a wpad record capture web traffic and credentials. Publish proxy settings by policy instead.
- Zone transfers to any server: exposes the full internal naming map for reconnaissance.
- No DNS logs in the SIEM: the Audit channel is on by default but stays on the server, so record injection and forwarder changes are discovered only during incident response. See the DNS Hijack Playbook.
Practitioner checklist
- Empty DnsAdmins and DnsUpdateProxy, or restrict DnsAdmins to Tier 0 accounts, and alert on membership changes.
- Set every AD-integrated zone to secure dynamic updates and review zone ACLs for broad create rights.
- Restrict zone transfers to named secondaries and recursion to internal clients.
- Confirm cache locking at 100, pollution protection on and the global query block list enabled with WPAD and ISATAP.
- Configure a dedicated DHCP DNS credential, name protection and delete-on-expiry on every DHCP server.
- Run DHCP on member servers in failover pairs and review authorised servers with Get-DhcpServerInDC.
- Forward the DNS Audit channel, DHCP audit logs and directory change events to the SIEM.
- Patch DNS and DHCP servers within the Tier 0 patch window and back up DHCP databases and zones.
Standards and references
- Microsoft Learn: DNS logging and diagnostics
- Microsoft Learn: DNS policies overview
- Microsoft Learn: Active Directory security groups
- Microsoft Learn: Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)
- Microsoft Learn: Set-DhcpServerv4DnsSetting
- Microsoft Learn: Set-DnsServerCache
- Microsoft Learn: Set-DnsServerGlobalQueryBlockList
- Microsoft: Security Update Guide
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: DHCP Security Guide · DNS Security Guide · Windows Server Hardening Guide · Active Directory and Entra ID Hardening Guide