Winter Vivern reads government email by turning the webmail portal against its own users: a single crafted message, opened in a browser, is enough to run its JavaScript inside a Roundcube or Zimbra session. MITRE ATT&CK tracks the group as G1035 and describes it as linked to Russian and Belarusian interests, active since at least 2020 against European government and NGO entities with sporadic targeting in India and the United States. ESET documented its use of a Roundcube zero-day, CVE-2023-5631, in October 2023, and Proofpoint, which tracks the group as TA473, documented exploitation of a Zimbra cross-site scripting flaw against NATO-aligned governments from February 2023. This profile is for email and web platform owners, SOC analysts and threat intelligence teams in government, diplomatic and policy organisations. It covers names, targeting, ATT&CK techniques, how the group steals credentials and sessions, a dated incident list and a detection and hardening plan. The wider Russian state picture is in the Russia State Cyber Operations Guide.
Key takeaways
- Webmail is the primary target. The group has exploited Roundcube (CVE-2020-35730 and the zero-day CVE-2023-5631) and Zimbra (CVE-2022-27926) to run script in victims' mail sessions.
- Opening the message is enough. ESET found the CVE-2023-5631 exploit needed no interaction beyond viewing the email in a browser; there was no attachment to block.
- The goal is mailbox access and credentials. Payloads listed folders and exfiltrated messages, and Proofpoint saw portal-specific JavaScript capture usernames, passwords, CSRF tokens and session tokens.
- Old-fashioned lures still run alongside. Fake antivirus scanners, cloned ministry websites and macro documents lead to PowerShell scripts, scheduled tasks and file theft over HTTP.
- Patch speed and portal exposure decide the outcome. Proofpoint's advice was to patch Zimbra on public webmail portals and restrict their exposure to the open internet; ESET's was to upgrade Roundcube immediately.
Who they are (names and aliases)
| Name | Used by | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Winter Vivern | DomainTools (2021), MITRE ATT&CK (G1035), ESET, SentinelOne | The most widely used name. |
| TA473 | Proofpoint | Tracked by Proofpoint since at least 2021. |
| UAC-0114 | CERT-UA | Ukraine's CERT designation, used in early 2023 reporting. |
Attribution as stated: ATT&CK says the group is linked to Russian and Belarusian interests. SentinelOne describes it as operating with pro-Russian objectives closely aligned with the interests of the Belarusian and Russian governments, and as resource-limited but creative. Proofpoint agrees the targeting broadly supports Russian and Belarusian goals regarding the war in Ukraine. None of these sources names a specific government agency as the operator, so neither should your reporting.
Targeting and motivation
- Government and diplomacy: European government, military and diplomatic organisations, with a particular focus on the public webmail portals of NATO-aligned governments (Proofpoint). SentinelOne names the foreign ministries of Ukraine and Italy and government agencies in Poland.
- Think tanks and NGOs: ESET's 2023 Roundcube victims were governmental entities and a think tank in Europe; ATT&CK lists NGOs.
- People who matter to policy: Proofpoint observed phishing against US elected officials and staff in late 2022, and targets who are experts in European politics or the economics of the Russia and Ukraine conflict.
- Telecoms and India: SentinelOne highlights private telecommunications organisations supporting Ukraine and users of the Indian government email service email.gov.in, phished in mid-2022.
- Motivation: espionage, specifically the content of official mailboxes and the credentials that unlock them.
Tactics and techniques (MITRE ATT&CK)
Mapping from ATT&CK v20 group G1035 procedure descriptions. IDs checked against the v20 dataset.
| Tactic | Technique | Observed behaviour |
|---|---|---|
| Reconnaissance | T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning | Remotely hosted Acunetix instances used to find unpatched webmail portals. |
| Resource development | T1583.001 Domains; T1584.006 Web Services | Look-alike domains for government entities; compromised WordPress sites hosting payloads. |
| Initial access | T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application | Roundcube and Zimbra XSS flaws; ATT&CK also records use of the Follina vulnerability (CVE-2022-30190). |
| Initial access | T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment; T1189 Drive-by Compromise | Malicious documents; cloned government websites delivering fake antivirus software. |
| Execution | T1059.007 JavaScript; T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.003 Windows Command Shell; T1204.001 Malicious Link | JavaScript delivered through webmail XSS; macros passing execution to PowerShell; batch scripts disguised as virus scanners. |
| Persistence | T1053.005 Scheduled Task | PowerShell creates scheduled tasks that periodically fetch remote payloads. |
| Stealth | T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | Tools posing as virus scanners; base64-encoded exploit payloads in emails. |
| Credential access | T1056.003 Web Portal Capture | Pages mimicking government email logon sites to collect credentials. |
| Collection | T1114.001 Local Email Collection; T1083 File and Directory Discovery; T1113 Screen Capture; T1119 Automated Collection | JavaScript lists folders and emails on the mail server and exfiltrates messages; scripts take screenshots and recursively collect files. |
| Exfiltration and C2 | T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel; T1020 Automated Exfiltration; T1071.001 Web Protocols | HTTP and HTTPS for command and control and exfiltration. |
How they abuse identities and credentials
For Winter Vivern the mailbox session is the identity. A cross-site scripting payload runs with the same authority as the logged-in user, so MFA at sign-in does not stop it: the session is already authenticated.
- Session and token theft: Proofpoint's analysis of the Zimbra payloads found JavaScript written for each target portal that stole CSRF tokens and active session tokens from cookies or responses, and in some cases Roundcube request tokens. In defender terms this is the behaviour described by ATT&CK T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie. See the Session Hijacking and Cookie Theft Guide.
- Credential capture in the real portal: the same payloads captured usernames and passwords entered on the legitimate login page, then tried to log in with them, and showed fake POP3 or IMAP setup pages. Because the script runs on the genuine domain, URL checks by the user do not help.
- Look-alike logon pages: separately, the group built phishing pages imitating government email sign-in (T1056.003), including against email.gov.in users (SentinelOne).
- Trusted sender abuse: Proofpoint saw emails sent from compromised accounts and spoofed to look like a colleague or a peer government, carrying a legitimate-looking URL hyperlinked to actor infrastructure.
- Mailbox content as the prize: the CVE-2023-5631 payload could list folders and emails and send messages to the attacker's server (ESET), which is collection without ever needing the password.
Defensive consequence: password resets alone are not enough after a webmail XSS compromise. Invalidate all sessions, rotate application-specific passwords and IMAP or POP credentials, and review forwarding rules and connected clients. Phishing-resistant MFA still matters because it defeats the look-alike page route; see the Phishing-Resistant MFA Guide.
Notable incidents
| When | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 2021 | DomainTools reports re-crafted government macro documents and names the group. | DomainTools, cited by ATT&CK |
| Mid-2022 | Credential phishing pages target users of India's email.gov.in. | SentinelOne |
| Late 2022 | Phishing against US elected officials and staff. | Proofpoint |
| Early 2023 | Campaigns against Ukrainian and Italian foreign ministries and Polish government agencies; fake scanner lures and the APERETIF trojan reported by CERT-UA (UAC-0114) and Poland's CBZC. | SentinelOne, March 2023 |
| From February 2023 | Exploitation of Zimbra CVE-2022-27926 against NATO-aligned government webmail. CISA added the CVE to KEV on 3 April 2023. | Proofpoint; CISA KEV |
| August to September 2023 | Exploitation of Roundcube CVE-2020-35730, a flaw also used by Sednit (APT28). CISA added it to KEV on 22 June 2023. | ESET; CISA KEV |
| 11 October 2023 | Zero-day exploitation of Roundcube CVE-2023-5631 against European government entities and a think tank; fixed in Roundcube 1.6.4, 1.5.5 and 1.4.15 on 16 October 2023; KEV listing 26 October 2023. | ESET; CISA KEV |
Detection and defence
Webmail platform
- Patch inside days, not cycles. Subscribe to Roundcube and Zimbra security announcements and track the KEV entries above. ESET notes CVE-2023-5631 affected fully patched servers at discovery, so patching must be paired with exposure reduction. See the Roundcube Webmail Hardening Guide and the Zimbra Collaboration Hardening Guide.
- Reduce exposure. Proofpoint recommends restricting public webmail portals from the open internet: put them behind a VPN, zero trust access proxy or at minimum geographic and IP restrictions for sensitive mailboxes.
- Contain script. A strict Content Security Policy that blocks inline script and limits script sources to the webmail origin makes XSS payloads that fetch second stages from attacker domains much harder to run. Test in report-only mode first. See the Content Security Policy Guide.
- Harden cookies. HttpOnly, Secure and SameSite on session cookies limit what script can read and send. See the Cookie Security Guide.
What to log and hunt
| Signal | Source | Linked behaviour |
|---|---|---|
| Inbound HTML mail with SVG elements, onerror handlers or nested base64 content | Mail gateway, server message store | CVE-2023-5631 trigger (ESET); nested base64 (Proofpoint) |
| Browser requests from the webmail origin to newly registered or unknown domains | Proxy, DNS logs, CSP violation reports | Second-stage loader fetch |
| Bulk folder listing or message retrieval in a short window by one session | Webmail application and IMAP logs | T1114.001 email collection |
| The same session token used from two IP addresses or user agents | Webmail access logs | Session token theft |
| Login with correct credentials from new infrastructure shortly after a user opened a suspicious mail | Authentication logs | Captured credential replay |
| Scheduled tasks created by PowerShell that download from remote URLs | Windows Event ID 4698, EDR | T1053.005, T1105 |
| Vulnerability scanner fingerprints (for example Acunetix) against webmail hosts | WAF and web server logs | T1595.002 reconnaissance |
Response
- Scope the mail store: search all mailboxes for the malicious message, because every recipient who opened it in a browser may be affected.
- Kill sessions and rotate: invalidate all webmail sessions, reset passwords and application passwords, and review forwarding rules, filters and identities added to the account.
- Treat it as a data loss event: assume opened mailboxes were read and exfiltrated; follow the Phishing Incident Response Playbook and preserve server logs for the Email Forensics and Header Analysis Guide workflow.
Framework mapping: patching maps to NIST SP 800-53 SI-2 (Flaw Remediation); exposure reduction to SC-7 (Boundary Protection); script controls to SC-18 (Mobile Code); monitoring to SI-4 and CSF 2.0 DE.CM-09.
Metrics: days from a Roundcube or Zimbra security release to production patch (target under 7 for internet-facing portals); percentage of webmail portals reachable only through an access gateway; CSP violation reports from the webmail origin investigated within 24 hours; time from detection to global session revocation for affected users.
Practitioner checklist
- List every Roundcube and Zimbra instance, with version, plugins and whether it is reachable from the internet.
- Patch CVE-2023-5631, CVE-2020-35730 and CVE-2022-27926 and set a 7-day target for future webmail security releases.
- Move sensitive webmail behind VPN or an identity-aware access proxy.
- Deploy a strict Content Security Policy on webmail, starting in report-only mode, and collect violation reports.
- Set HttpOnly, Secure and SameSite on session cookies and bind sessions to client context where the platform allows.
- Alert on bulk folder and message access per session and on session reuse from new IPs.
- Enrol diplomatic and policy staff in phishing-resistant MFA and brief them on look-alike ministry pages and fake antivirus lures.
- Pre-write the response: mailbox-wide search, global session revocation, credential and application password rotation.
Standards and references
- MITRE ATT&CK: Winter Vivern (G1035)
- CISA: Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog
- ESET: Winter Vivern exploits zero-day vulnerability in Roundcube Webmail servers
- Proofpoint: Exploitation Is a Dish Best Served Cold: Winter Vivern Uses Known Zimbra Vulnerability
- SentinelOne: Winter Vivern, Uncovering a Wave of Global Espionage
- MITRE ATT&CK: Steal Web Session Cookie
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Threat Actor Groups Guide · Roundcube Webmail Hardening Guide · Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Prevention Guide · Email Security Guide