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HART, WirelessHART and ISA100 Security Guide: Join Keys, Gateways and HART-IP Hardening

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 27 October 2026 13 min read
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Process plants now run thousands of wireless transmitters, and the security of every one depends on how join keys were set at commissioning and how the gateway is protected afterwards. WirelessHART (IEC 62591) and ISA100 Wireless (IEC 62734) both use IEEE 802.15.4 radios with AES-128, keyed integrity checks and a central security manager, so the cryptography is rarely the weak point. Problems come from default or shared join keys, keys readable from devices, exposed gateways and the HART-IP connections that carry instrument data to asset management and control systems. This guide covers wired HART, WirelessHART, ISA100 and HART-IP security, how keys and joining work, how to harden gateways, what to monitor, and where wireless instrumentation should and should not be used. It goes deeper than the Industrial IoT (IIoT) Security Guide and is for instrument engineers, OT security teams and system integrators.

Key takeaways

  • Security is built in but keys are set by people. WirelessHART security is always on, yet default, documented or shared join keys undo it; use unique join keys per device.
  • The gateway is the crown jewel. It hosts the network and security managers, holds the keys and bridges the wireless field network to plant Ethernet, so protect it like a controller.
  • HART-IP has real security now, if enabled. HART-IP version 2 uses TLS or DTLS with pre-shared keys or SRP, but a version 1 client connecting first locks a server into insecure version 1 operation.
  • Wired HART has no security of its own. The analogue loop and its digital signal rely on physical protection and on the security of multiplexers and asset management systems.
  • Radio cannot be fully protected. Jamming and false advertisements can disrupt any 802.15.4 network, so do not depend on wireless for safety functions without an engineered fallback.

How HART, WirelessHART, ISA100 and HART-IP fit together

These technologies carry measurements and diagnostics from field instruments to control, asset management and analytics systems. Each has a different security model.

TechnologyTransportNative securityMain exposure
Wired HARTDigital signal over 4-20 mA loops; reached through multiplexers and asset management systemsNone in the protocolAnyone with access to the loop, marshalling cabinet or multiplexer can read and change device configuration
WirelessHART (IEC 62591)IEEE 802.15.4 mesh, time-slotted, with channel hoppingAES-128 CCM end to end, link-layer and session-layer MICs, join, network and session keys, always onDefault or shared join keys, gateway compromise, jamming
ISA100 Wireless (IEC 62734, ISA100.11a)IEEE 802.15.4 at 2.4 GHz, IPv6 and 6LoWPAN, UDP, backbone routingAES-128 at data link and end to end, join key, over-the-air provisioning with asymmetric keys, time used against replayWell-known keys used before join, provisioning exposure, backbone and gateway compromise
HART-IPHART over IP (TCP or UDP), used by multiplexers, WirelessHART gateways and Ethernet-APL instrumentsVersion 2: TLS or DTLS 1.2 or later with PSK or SRP, user credential slots, audit log, syslogServers left on version 1 without security, default credentials, flat networks

FieldComm Group describes a WirelessHART network as field devices, one or more gateways and a Network Manager that schedules communication, manages routes and monitors health, and can run in the gateway, a host or a controller. The Security Manager generates, stores and manages keys, and there is one per network. ISA100 networks have equivalent system and security management roles and use backbone routers to connect the 802.15.4 subnets to the plant network.

How keys and joining work

WirelessHART

  • Join key: a 128-bit key that protects the joining process and authenticates the device to the Security Manager. FieldComm Group allows it to be common to the network or unique per device; unique join keys work as an access control list that keeps unknown nodes out.
  • Network key: shared by all devices for broadcast traffic.
  • Session keys: unique to each source and destination pair; end-to-end AES-128 encryption runs from the instrument to the gateway, so routing devices cannot read the data they forward.
  • Integrity: each packet carries a session-layer MIC over the payload and a link-layer MIC protecting routing information, plus a CRC; messages that fail are discarded and failures are reported.
  • Key changes: join and encryption keys can be rotated automatically or on demand. FieldComm Group advises that if a common join key is used it should be changed periodically, with all devices online so none are orphaned, and that unique join keys do not need rotation.

ISA100 Wireless

  • Layered security: the ISA100 Wireless Compliance Institute describes AES-128 at the data link layer as a hop-by-hop layer and end-to-end security above it, with message integrity, authenticity and time used as security material against replay.
  • Provisioning: devices receive a join key and network ID before joining. ISA100 supports over-the-air provisioning using public key cryptography, and the WCI has standardised provisioning and configuration over Bluetooth LE. Provisioning is the moment keys are most exposed, so do it in a controlled area.

What research found

Research presented in 2018 by Paternotte and van Ommeren on industrial wireless sensor networks reported well-known keys used for WirelessHART advertisements and ISA100 pre-join traffic, default join keys documented by vendors and shared across vendors, key material in device memory recoverable through debug interfaces, possible exposure during over-the-air provisioning, and susceptibility to jamming and fake advertisements. The well-known keys are part of the protocol designs and do not protect data after joining, but the default join keys and readable device memory are deployment problems you can fix.

Securing gateways and HART-IP

The gateway connects the field network to plant Ethernet, hosts the managers and keys, and usually exposes web administration, Modbus, OPC or HART-IP interfaces. HART-IP also appears on multiplexers and on Ethernet-APL instruments, so the same rules apply to them.

  • Use HART-IP version 2 security: FieldComm Group's HART-IP security paper (FCG_AG10197, edition 2.0, March 2023) specifies TLS or DTLS 1.2 or later, authentication by pre-shared keys or Secure Remote Password, which servers must support both of, and AES-128 for session traffic. A session whose credentials cannot be authenticated is aborted.
  • Avoid the version 1 lock: according to the same paper, a server first connected by a version 1 client is locked to version 1 with no security and refuses later version 2 connections, so the user must supply protection such as a VPN. Provision servers with a version 2 client before connecting legacy tools.
  • Credential slots: servers must support at least five user credential sets. Slot 0 belongs to the Security Manager and is the only one that can change credentials. Give historians and analytics read-only credentials, which cannot change configuration.
  • Isolated provisioning: provision on an isolated network, then quarantine the device before going live; the paper notes that servers default to 192.168.0.42 on a benchtop network and to port 5094 after factory reset.
  • Firmware: HART-IP version 2 servers must validate firmware through a root and chain of trust and roll back failed updates. Keep the previous version for rollback.
  • Network placement: put gateways and multiplexers in a dedicated zone, allow only the asset management, DCS and historian hosts that need them, and send one-way data through a data diode where it is only read. See the Data Diodes and Unidirectional Gateways Guide.
  • Administration: change default web and service passwords, disable unused services and protocols, and administer only from engineering workstations. See the Engineering Workstation Security Guide.

Protecting wired HART and asset management paths

Wired HART is still the most common way instrument configuration is read and changed. Because the protocol has no authentication, protection comes from the systems around it.

  • Multiplexers and I/O cards: HART multiplexers and HART-enabled I/O give asset management software access to every connected instrument. Treat them as privileged gateways: zone them, restrict which hosts can reach them, and prefer models that support HART-IP version 2 security.
  • Asset management servers: these servers can change ranges, units, damping and alarm settings on thousands of instruments. Restrict write access to named instrument engineers, log every configuration change and compare against the change record.
  • Handheld communicators: field communicators can connect to any loop in a marshalling cabinet or junction box. Control their issue, keep their software updated and lock cabinets in unmanned areas.
  • Write protection: many instruments offer a hardware or software write-protect setting. Use it on critical measurements once commissioning is complete, and record its state in the instrument database.

Where identity fits

Every instrument on a wireless network is a machine identity, and its join key is a credential. Treat them that way:

  • Unique credential per device: unique join keys per device mean one extracted key cannot admit a rogue node or let an attacker impersonate others.
  • Credential storage: keep join keys and HART-IP PSKs in a vault or the security manager, never in commissioning spreadsheets or on device tags. FieldComm Group advises hiding keys from view to reduce accidental exposure.
  • Lifecycle: remove a decommissioned device from the gateway's join list and factory reset HART-IP devices before disposal or redeployment, as the HART-IP paper recommends.
  • Physical access: because key material can sit in device memory, control access to spare and removed instruments, and ask suppliers how debug interfaces are locked.

See the Device and IoT Identity Guide.

Threat to control mapping

Threat (ATT&CK for ICS v20)ExampleControls
Wireless Compromise (T0860)Rogue device joins using a default or shared join keyUnique join keys, gateway join allow-list, alerts on failed joins
Wireless Sniffing (T0887)Capture of provisioning or pre-join trafficProvision in a controlled area, use asymmetric OTA provisioning where supported
Denial of Service (T0814)Jamming or false advertisements disrupt the meshRedundant paths and access points, RF monitoring, engineered fallback for critical loops
Adversary-in-the-Middle (T0830)Interception of HART-IP between gateway and hostHART-IP version 2 with TLS or DTLS, zoning, VPN for legacy version 1 links
Manipulation of View (T0832)False values presented to operators through a compromised gateway or asset systemGateway hardening, read-only credentials, integrity checks and plausibility alarms in the DCS
Physical key extractionKey read from a stolen or discarded transmitterUnique keys, controlled spares store, factory reset and removal from join list

Implementation approach

  1. Inventory: list gateways, access points, backbone routers, multiplexers and every wireless and HART-IP device with firmware, join key type (unique or common) and network ID.
  2. Replace default and shared keys: move to unique join keys, starting with new installations and devices due for maintenance. Where a common key must stay for now, rotate it with all devices online and confirm every device rejoined before closing the work.
  3. Harden gateways: change passwords, close unused services, update firmware after testing on a spare, and back up configuration so you can restore it if an update fails.
  4. Enable HART-IP version 2 security: provision credentials on an isolated network, assign read-only credentials to historians, and keep legacy version 1 clients off secured servers or behind a VPN.
  5. Zone and monitor: place gateways in their own zone and forward gateway logs and HART-IP syslog to the OT SIEM.
  6. Test and roll out: pilot changes on one network or unit during a planned window, check that all devices rejoin and data reaches the DCS, then extend unit by unit. Keep the previous configuration and firmware to roll back.

Decision guidance

  • Monitoring versus control: wireless instrumentation suits monitoring, asset health and non-critical control. For safety instrumented functions or fast control loops, use wired instruments, or engineer a fail-safe response to communication loss. See the Safety Instrumented Systems Security Guide.
  • Unique versus common join keys: unique keys cost more effort at commissioning but remove rotation work and limit the impact of one leaked key. Common keys may suit small temporary networks if rotated and recorded.
  • WirelessHART versus ISA100: both offer comparable cryptography; choose on host system support, vendor ecosystem and provisioning model rather than on security alone.

Detection and measurement

  • Gateway reports: failed join attempts, integrity and authentication failures, unexpected new devices and devices dropping off. FieldComm Group notes that failed access attempts and anomalies such as retransmissions are reported.
  • HART-IP syslog: server start and stop, credential and configuration changes, session open and close, and failed connection attempts, which may indicate probing. The audit log keeps at least 128 session records in volatile memory and is cleared by a power cycle, so forward it.
  • Radio health: trends in path stability, retries and channel blacklisting can reveal jamming or interference.
  • Configuration integrity: capture configuration snapshots at installation, before returning from maintenance and after replacement, and compare them.

Metrics:

  1. Percentage of wireless devices with unique join keys.
  2. Percentage of HART-IP servers running version 2 security with no version 1 lock.
  3. Number of failed join or authentication events per month, each investigated.
  4. Percentage of gateways with current tested firmware and logs forwarded off-device.
  5. Time to remove a decommissioned device from the join list.

Framework mapping

FrameworkReferenceApplies to
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5AC-18, SC-40Wireless access control and wireless link protection
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5IA-3, SC-12Device authentication with join keys; key establishment and management
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5CM-8, SI-4Inventory of wireless devices; monitoring of gateways and RF
NIST CSF 2.0ID.AM-01, PR.AA-03, DE.CM-01, PR.PS-02Hardware inventory, authentication of hardware, network monitoring, firmware maintenance
IEC 62443Zones and conduitsGateways and HART-IP hosts in their own zone; see the IEC 62443 Guide
MITRE ATT&CK for ICS v20T0860, T0887, T0814, T0830, T0832Techniques the controls address

Common failure patterns

  • Vendor default join keys: networks commissioned with documented default keys, sometimes shared across vendors.
  • Keys in commissioning sheets: join keys stored in spreadsheets on shared drives or emailed to contractors.
  • Gateway on the business network: web administration and HART-IP reachable from office systems or vendor VPNs.
  • HART-IP stuck on version 1: a legacy tool connected first and locked the server into unsecured operation.
  • Wireless in a safety role: a safety-relevant measurement depends on a wireless path with no engineered response to jamming or loss.
  • Old devices left in the join list: removed or spare transmitters still have valid keys and can rejoin.

Practitioner checklist

  • Inventory gateways, access points, multiplexers and devices with key type and firmware.
  • Replace default and shared join keys with unique per-device keys.
  • Store join keys and HART-IP credentials in a vault or the security manager only.
  • Harden gateways: passwords, unused services, firmware, configuration backups.
  • Enable HART-IP version 2 with TLS or DTLS and read-only credentials for historians.
  • Zone gateways and HART-IP servers and allow only required hosts.
  • Forward gateway logs and HART-IP syslog to the OT SIEM and investigate failed joins.
  • Remove decommissioned devices from join lists and factory reset before disposal.
  • Keep wireless out of safety functions unless a fail-safe response is engineered.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Industrial IoT (IIoT) Security Guide · Zigbee and Thread Security Guide · Physical Layer and Wireless Jamming Guide · Industrial Protocol Security Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 27 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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