Tokens for collaboration tools such as Notion, Asana, Airtable, Linear and Figma usually act as the person who created them, so a leaked token exposes everything that person can see: roadmaps, designs, customer lists, incident notes and sometimes other credentials pasted into pages. These tools hold some of an organisation's most sensitive working data, yet their tokens are often created by individuals for quick scripts and automations, stored in notebooks or CI variables and forgotten. This page sets out, per platform, what each token type can reach, how to revoke and replace it, what GitHub secret scanning detects, and how to shrink the blast radius next time. It is for SaaS administrators, security operations and engineers who build integrations. For Slack, GitHub and Salesforce tokens see the SaaS API Token Security Guide; for Jira and Confluence see the Atlassian API Tokens Security Guide.
Key takeaways
- Personal tokens inherit the person: Notion and Airtable personal access tokens act as their creator, Asana PATs act on your behalf, so a leak is as wide as that user's access.
- Revocation is immediate but owner-driven: most of these platforms let only the token's creator revoke a personal token from their own settings, so the response depends on reaching that person or an administrator with equivalent power.
- OAuth gives you better levers: Linear OAuth access tokens last 24 hours and can be revoked through
/oauth/revoke; Notion public connections use refreshable OAuth tokens, unlike static internal tokens. - Provider notification is partial: GitHub's partner programme notifies Notion (API tokens), Linear and Figma about public leaks, but not Asana or Airtable, and Asana legacy-format tokens have no push protection.
- Assume data was read: the main harm from these tokens is data access, so leak response is also a data exposure assessment.
How identity and access work in work SaaS platforms
| Platform | Token types (vendor docs) | What a token reaches | Lifetime |
|---|---|---|---|
| Notion | Internal connection token; public connection OAuth access and refresh tokens; personal access tokens | Internal connections see only pages shared with them ("Add connections"); PATs act as the creator with that user's permissions | Internal tokens static; OAuth refresh returns a new access and refresh token |
| Asana | Personal access tokens; OAuth; service account tokens (Enterprise tiers) | Acts on behalf of the user | "Persistent by default" |
| Airtable | Personal access tokens; OAuth; service account PATs (Enterprise); legacy API keys | Only the scopes and bases or workspaces granted, acting as the creating user | No expiry described; legacy API keys stopped working on 1 February 2024 |
| Linear | Personal API keys; OAuth access and refresh tokens; client credentials tokens | Personal key as the user; OAuth limited by scopes such as read, write, issues:create, admin | OAuth access 24 hours; client credentials 30 days |
| Figma | Personal access tokens with scopes; OAuth apps; SCIM API token | Scoped endpoints (for example file_content:read) on behalf of the user | Not stated for PATs in the pages checked |
Airtable's documentation tells developers to treat tokens as opaque, variable-length strings, and Asana says token formats may change without notice. Detection should therefore rely on maintained secret scanning patterns rather than home-made regular expressions.
Admin roles and privileged access
- Notion: only workspace owners can create internal connections, and tokens are found in the connection's Configuration tab in the Developer portal. Keep the list of owners short, because each owner can create a token with access to whatever pages get shared with it.
- Asana: Enterprise+ tiers provide admin controls in the Manage apps panel that affect how PATs are handled. Use them to restrict or review PAT use rather than relying on individuals.
- Airtable: Enterprise admins can create PATs for service accounts from the Admin Panel, which keeps automation off personal accounts.
- Linear: every admin in the workspace that owns an OAuth app gets access to it, so Linear recommends a dedicated workspace for OAuth apps. Client secrets and webhook signing secrets are rotated separately under Settings, API, and the
adminscope should be requested only when truly necessary. - Figma: the SCIM API token provisions and deprovisions users, so treat it as an identity administration credential, not an integration convenience.
Integrations, API tokens and service accounts
- Prefer OAuth or service accounts over personal tokens: Asana advises OAuth when an app acts for other users; Airtable and Asana offer service account tokens on enterprise plans; Linear supports client credentials tokens with
actor=app, so changes are credited to the application rather than a person. - Grant the least data: Airtable PATs can be limited to specific scopes and bases; Notion internal connections only see pages explicitly shared with them; Figma and Linear scopes limit endpoints. Use them, and review sharing on Notion pages connected to integrations.
- Short-lived where possible: Linear OAuth access tokens expire after 24 hours (
expires_in86399) and refresh tokens rotate on each use; Linear asks client credentials callers to request a new token at the start of each run. - Store tokens properly: Asana recommends a secrets manager, loading secrets into memory at runtime and keeping them out of logs and repositories.
- Retire project tokens: tokens made for migrations and one-off syncs outlive the project. In the Schneider Electric Jira breach, credentials from an infostealer-infected laptop, including migration credentials, were linked to the intrusion and the attacker claimed a bulk pull of about 400,000 user records over a REST API.
Logging and detection
| Secret (GitHub name) | Partner alert | Push protection | Validity check |
|---|---|---|---|
| Notion API Token | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Notion Integration Token | No | Yes | Yes |
| Notion OAuth Client Secret | No | Yes | No |
| Asana Personal Access Token | No | Yes | Yes |
| Asana Legacy Format Personal Access Token | No | No | Yes |
| Airtable Personal Access Token | No | Yes | Yes |
| Airtable API Key (legacy) | No | Yes | No |
| Linear API Key and OAuth Access Token | Yes | Yes | No |
| Figma Personal Access Token | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Figma SCIM API Token | Yes | Yes | No |
"Partner alert" means GitHub tells the provider when the secret appears in a public repository. For Asana, Airtable and Notion integration tokens your own scanning is the only automated public-leak signal, and old-format Asana tokens will not be blocked at push time. A found Airtable legacy API key is low risk now that those keys can no longer access the API, but its presence suggests other old secrets nearby.
- Usage signals: bulk reads or exports of bases, projects, pages or files; API activity from new IP ranges or outside working hours; new integrations, connections or OAuth apps; new webhooks pointing to unknown URLs.
- Audit logs: enterprise tiers of these tools generally offer audit logs (Figma's Activity Logs API requires an OAuth app). Export them to your SIEM so API activity can be tied to a token and a person.
- Content scanning: people paste credentials into Notion pages, Asana tasks and Linear issues. A token for one of these tools can therefore expose other secrets, so include the workspace content in secret scanning where your tooling supports it.
| Metric | Target |
|---|---|
| Integrations running on personal tokens rather than OAuth or service accounts | Falling to 0 |
| Tokens with a recorded owner and purpose | 100% |
| Tokens unused for 90 days still active | 0 |
| Time from leak alert to revocation | Under 4 hours |
| Leavers whose personal tokens were revoked on exit | 100% |
Leak response, step by step
- Identify the token and its owner: platform, token type, creating user or service account, and what it was granted (Airtable bases and scopes, Notion pages shared with the connection, Linear scopes).
- Revoke or regenerate:
- Notion: for an internal connection, a workspace owner replaces the token from the connection's Configuration tab, or removes the connection from shared pages if replacement is not immediately possible (the authorisation page checked does not describe rotation steps). For OAuth, revoke the connection and re-authorise.
- Asana: deauthorise the PAT in the developer console (app.asana.com/0/my-apps); enterprise admins can use Manage apps controls.
- Airtable: delete the token or regenerate it at /create/tokens. Regenerating immediately rejects the old token and keeps the name and permissions, which is the fastest safe path for automations.
- Linear: revoke OAuth tokens with
POST /oauth/revoke; delete personal API keys in Security and access settings. Rotating the client secret invalidates client credentials tokens but not user access or refresh tokens, so revoke those separately. - Figma: Settings, Security, Personal access tokens, select the token, Revoke access. Rotate the SCIM token if it leaked and check for unexpected user provisioning.
- If the owner is unreachable or has left: suspend the user account through your IdP and SaaS admin console as a containment step, but confirm the token is actually rejected afterwards, because token behaviour on user suspension is not documented for every platform here.
- Assess data exposure: list what the token could read and, from audit logs where available, what it did read during the exposure window. Look for secrets stored in pages, tasks, records or issues and rotate those too.
- Restore integrations on a narrower credential: an OAuth app or service account with limited scopes and bases.
- Close the cause and record the incident using the Leaked Credential Response Playbook.
Revoke now or replace first? Use the token's reach to decide.
| Situation | Decision | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| Token found in a public repository, package or paste site | Revoke immediately, accept the outage | Public leaks are harvested by automated scanners |
| Token with admin scope, SCIM rights or access to all bases or workspaces | Revoke immediately | Can change users, integrations or data at scale |
| Read-only, narrowly scoped token found in an internal log or private repository | Replace first (Airtable regenerate keeps name and permissions), then revoke within hours | Lower exposure; avoids breaking business workflows |
| Token belonging to someone who has left | Revoke and rebuild the integration on a service account | Nobody can vouch for its use |
Whatever the decision, record the exposure window from the earliest time the token could have been seen to the time it was rejected; that window drives the data exposure review.
Hardening baseline
| Control | Platforms (vendor docs) | Framework anchor |
|---|---|---|
| Service accounts or OAuth for automation | Airtable and Asana service accounts; Linear client credentials with actor=app; Notion public connections | NIST SP 800-53 AC-2 Account Management; CSF PR.AA-01 |
| Scope and data minimisation | Airtable scopes and bases; Notion page sharing; Linear and Figma scopes | AC-6 Least Privilege; CSF PR.AA-05 |
| Short-lived tokens | Linear OAuth 24 hours, client credentials 30 days | IA-5 Authenticator Management |
| Admin restrictions on PATs | Asana Manage apps (Enterprise+); Notion owner-only internal connections | AC-6 |
| Secret scanning with push protection | GitHub for all five, plus own scanning for Asana and Airtable | CSF DE.CM-09; ATT&CK T1552.001 Credentials In Files |
| Audit log review for bulk reads | Enterprise audit logs | AU-6; ATT&CK T1213 Data from Information Repositories |
Use of a stolen token maps to ATT&CK T1528 Steal Application Access Token and T1078.004 Cloud Accounts; containment is CSF RS.MI-01.
Small versus large organisations: a small team can keep a shared register of tokens and revoke by hand. A larger organisation should require OAuth apps or service accounts for any integration touching shared workspaces, use admin controls to restrict personal tokens, and add token revocation to the leaver process. See SaaS deprovisioning.
Where identity fits
A personal token turns a human identity into a non-human one that never signs in, never sees MFA and never leaves when the person does. Inventory these tokens as non-human identities with owners and expiry, and prefer platform-native service accounts so automation survives staff changes. AI assistants and agents connected to these workspaces deserve the same treatment: give each its own OAuth app or service account with the narrowest scopes, so its access can be reviewed and revoked without touching a person's account. See the API Keys vs OAuth Tokens Guide.
Common misconfigurations
- Automation on a personal token: the integration breaks, or worse keeps running, when the person leaves.
- "All workspaces and bases" Airtable grants: convenient at creation, and the widest possible leak.
- Notion connections shared at the top of a page tree: sharing a parent page shares its children, widening what an internal token can read.
- Linear OAuth apps in the main workspace: every admin there gains access to the app, against Linear's recommendation.
- Rotating only the client secret: in Linear this leaves user access and refresh tokens valid.
- Secrets pasted into work items: a single SaaS token then unlocks credentials for other systems.
Practitioner checklist
- Inventory personal tokens, OAuth apps and service account tokens across Notion, Asana, Airtable, Linear and Figma.
- Move integrations to OAuth apps or service accounts with minimal scopes and data.
- Restrict who can create personal tokens and internal connections using admin controls.
- Enable GitHub push protection and add your own scanning for Asana and Airtable tokens.
- Export SaaS audit logs and alert on bulk reads, new integrations and new webhooks.
- Revoke a leaver's tokens as part of offboarding, and confirm rejection.
- Write a per-platform revoke runbook, including Linear's separate token revocation.
- Scan workspace content for pasted secrets and rotate any found.
- Remove tokens unused for 90 days.
Standards and references
- GitHub Docs: Supported secret scanning patterns
- Notion: Authorization
- Asana: Personal access token
- Airtable: Personal access tokens
- Linear: OAuth 2.0 authentication
- Figma: Manage personal access tokens
- Figma: REST API authentication
- Airtable: API key deprecation notice
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: SaaS API Token Security Guide · Atlassian API Tokens Security Guide · Leaked Credential Response Playbook · OAuth Token Theft Incident Playbook