Most AWS estates grow accounts faster than they decide where security services, logs and privileged identities should live, and the result is delegated administrators in the wrong place, logs that production administrators can delete and a management account nobody dares to touch. The AWS Security Reference Architecture (AWS SRA), published in AWS Prescriptive Guidance, answers that question with a worked multi-account layout. This guide walks through it account by account: what belongs in each account, which services are delegated where, how human and machine identities cross account boundaries, and how to adopt it in phases. It is written for cloud security architects and platform engineers designing or re-planning an AWS organisation. Organisation policy mechanics are covered in the AWS Organizations and SCPs Guide; this page focuses on the account map.
This is an independent guide from NHI Mgmt Group, based on AWS's public documentation as of November 2026. It is not sponsored or reviewed by AWS. Product features change, so confirm settings against AWS's current documentation.
Key takeaways
- Accounts are the strongest boundary AWS offers: the SRA uses them to separate organisation management, security tooling, log storage, networking, shared services and workloads so that one compromised identity cannot reach everything.
- The Security Tooling account is the hub: it is the delegated administrator for most security services, including GuardDuty, Security Hub CSPM, AWS Config, Macie, IAM Access Analyzer, Detective, Inspector and the CloudTrail organisation trail.
- The Log Archive account is a storage sink, not a workspace: the SRA says users should not have direct access to it, and logs should be protected with Object Lock, versioning and SSE-KMS.
- Keep the management account thin: SCPs and RCPs do not apply to it, so the SRA delegates security services, Identity Center administration and root session management elsewhere.
- Machine identities cross every boundary: deployment pipelines, security automation and cross-account roles are the real paths between accounts, and they need the same scrutiny as the account layout itself.
What the AWS SRA is and how to use it
The AWS SRA is prescriptive guidance, not a product. It describes an organisation with the Org Management account outside any OU, a Security OU (Security Tooling and Log Archive accounts), an Infrastructure OU (Network and Shared Services accounts) and a Workloads OU (Application accounts), illustrated with a three-tier web application on EC2 and Aurora. AWS notes that not every workload needs every service it lists. Use it as a reference to compare your current layout against, and as a source of design considerations per service, rather than as a template to copy wholesale. It is consistent with AWS Control Tower, which calls the Security Tooling account the Audit account by default. See the AWS Control Tower Guide.
The account-by-account map
| Account (OU) | Purpose | Key services and roles | Who should have access |
|---|---|---|---|
| Org Management (root) | Organisation-wide management | AWS Organizations (SCPs, RCPs, declarative policies), AWS Control Tower, billing, IAM Identity Center instance, Artifact agreements, Systems Manager Quick Setup and Explorer | A small platform team and break-glass identities only |
| Security Tooling (Security) | Delegated administrator for security services; security operations | GuardDuty, Security Hub CSPM and Security Hub, AWS Config aggregation, Macie, IAM Access Analyzer, Detective, Inspector, Audit Manager, Firewall Manager, CloudTrail organisation trail management, centralised root access, KMS keys for security services, Private CA root, EventBridge security bus | Security team; read-only or audit roles for wider views, few write roles |
| Log Archive (Security) | Immutable storage of security logs | S3 buckets for CloudTrail, VPC Flow Logs, CloudFront and WAF logs, Route 53 DNS logs, Config snapshots, GuardDuty exports; Security Lake delegated administrator if used | No direct user access; query from Security Tooling |
| Network (Infrastructure) | Gateway between applications, the internet and on-premises | Transit Gateway, inspection VPC with AWS Network Firewall, ingress and egress VPCs, Route 53 Resolver DNS Firewall, CloudFront, WAF, Shield, Verified Access, VPC Lattice, RAM sharing | Network team via pipelines |
| Shared Services (Infrastructure) | Services used by many teams | IAM Identity Center delegated administrator, AWS Managed Microsoft AD, Systems Manager delegated administrator | Identity and platform teams; tightly controlled |
| Application (Workloads) | The workload and its local controls | EC2 with IMDSv2, Aurora, S3, KMS application keys, Secrets Manager, Systems Manager Session Manager and Patch Manager, Cognito, Verified Permissions, local GuardDuty, Config, Security Hub CSPM and Access Analyzer | Workload team through Identity Center permission sets |
Org Management account
The SRA keeps this account focused on organisation-wide functions. The most important design fact is that SCPs and RCPs do not affect users, roles or resources in the management account, so every control here has to come from IAM discipline and monitoring rather than guardrails.
- What lives here: AWS Organizations and its policies, AWS Control Tower, billing, the IAM Identity Center instance (administration delegated elsewhere, but some tasks such as managing permission sets provisioned here still need it), IAM access advisor data for the organisation, and AWS Artifact Agreements.
- What does not: security tooling, routine Identity Center administration, member account root credentials and workloads. The SRA delegates each of these to another account.
- Account protection: use a business-managed email address, keep security and administrative contacts current including a phone number, require MFA for every user and review access regularly.
- Declarative policies: when enforced from here, non-compliant API calls fail and account administrators cannot override the attribute. Use account status reports to check readiness before enforcing.
- Identity source: the SRA prefers an external identity provider with SCIM provisioning so access follows HR joiner, mover and leaver events. Only one identity source can be connected to Identity Center at a time.
Security Tooling account
This account carries the most delegated administration in the SRA. Delegation means the service's organisation-wide administration happens here instead of in the management account, which reduces how many people need management account access.
| Service | Delegated administrator | SRA design note |
|---|---|---|
| Amazon GuardDuty | Security Tooling | Findings exported to Log Archive. See the Amazon GuardDuty Guide. |
| AWS Security Hub CSPM and Security Hub | Security Tooling | Cannot be the Org Management account; the Security Hub CSPM delegated administrator automatically becomes the Security Hub one |
| AWS CloudTrail organisation trail | Security Tooling | Log bucket lives in Log Archive |
| AWS Config | Security Tooling | Conformance packs and aggregation; snapshots to Log Archive |
| IAM Access Analyzer | Security Tooling | Organisation analyzer with the organisation as zone of trust |
| Amazon Macie | Security Tooling | Sensitive data findings visible only to the account that created the job |
| Amazon Detective | Security Tooling | Keep aligned with Security Hub and GuardDuty administrators so console pivots work |
| Amazon Inspector | Security Tooling | Delegated administrator cannot view member code snippets |
| AWS Audit Manager | Security Tooling | Must share the Security Hub CSPM delegated administrator for evidence collection |
| AWS Firewall Manager | Security Tooling | One administrator with full scope |
| IAM centralised root access | Security Tooling | Privileged root tasks on members via sts:AssumeRoot |
| Amazon CloudWatch centralised observability | Security Tooling, or a dedicated Monitoring account in the Security OU | Restrict configuration changes to pipelines |
| Amazon Security Lake | Log Archive | Security Tooling acts as subscriber |
| AWS IAM Identity Center | Shared Services | Kept with the directory it uses |
Access guidance in the SRA is explicit: grant read-only or audit roles for organisation-wide views, and keep write or modify roles few, tightly controlled, monitored and logged. Because this account can see and often act on every other account, compromise of its administrators or its automation is close to organisation compromise. The KMS keys that encrypt the organisation trail and other security data are also held here. See the AWS KMS Security Guide.
Log Archive account
The SRA defines this account's goals as immutable storage, access only through controlled and monitored automated mechanisms, and durability through replication and archival. It holds the CloudTrail organisation trail, VPC Flow Logs, CloudFront and WAF access logs, Route 53 DNS logs, Config snapshots and GuardDuty exports, and can hold application and database logs too.
- Integrity: S3 object integrity plus CloudTrail log file integrity validation.
- Immutability: S3 Object Lock, versioning and lifecycle rules; Glacier policies for long retention. See the Amazon S3 Security Guide.
- Encryption as a second gate: SSE-KMS with customer managed keys on all security buckets means reading a log needs both S3 read permission and decrypt permission under the key policy.
- Least privilege: limit the AWS managed policy
AWSCloudTrail_FullAccessto as few people as possible, because it can disable or reconfigure auditing. - Collection options: the SRA now recommends CloudWatch's unified data experience in a Monitoring account as the primary option, with Log Archive as the S3 Tables storage sink, and Amazon Security Lake (with Log Archive as delegated administrator) as a secondary option for organisations already using it or needing subscriber access.
- Detection: configure notifications for any direct access to log buckets or log groups, and use Config and Access Analyzer to catch permission changes. See the AWS CloudTrail Guide.
Infrastructure OU: Network and Shared Services accounts
Network account
The Network account is the gateway between applications and the internet, isolated from workloads for separation of duties. Transit Gateway gives hub-and-spoke connectivity; an inspection VPC with AWS Network Firewall inspects east-west and north-south traffic; separate ingress and egress VPCs carry inbound and outbound connections, with their flow logs sent to Log Archive. Two SRA details that are often missed: Network Firewall cannot inspect traffic from sources or destinations within its own firewall subnet, so nothing else should be deployed there; and Network Firewall cannot see Route 53 Resolver queries, so Resolver DNS Firewall is needed alongside it to filter DNS exfiltration. Network Access Analyzer can confirm that inspection sits on every path to an internet gateway. Edge services (CloudFront, WAF, Shield Advanced) can be centralised here or deployed per Application account and managed through Firewall Manager. See the Amazon VPC Security Guide.
Shared Services account
The Shared Services account is the delegated administrator for IAM Identity Center and Systems Manager and hosts AWS Managed Microsoft AD. Identity Center sits here because, when Active Directory is the identity source, the directory must be in the delegated administrator account. Only one delegated administrator is allowed at a time, and it can perform most management tasks, so access to this account must be tightly controlled. Organisations that want stricter separation can use a dedicated identity account instead. See the AWS IAM Identity Center Guide and the AWS Systems Manager Security Guide.
Workloads OU: Application accounts
Each Application account runs local members of the central security services (GuardDuty, Config, Security Hub CSPM, Access Analyzer, EventBridge) monitored by the security team, plus the workload's own controls. The SRA's example workload recommends IMDSv2 on EC2, default EBS encryption, Session Manager instead of SSH, application-specific KMS keys in the same account as the resources they encrypt, Secrets Manager in the account closest to where secrets are used, Block Public Access on S3 (which the SRA calls the most important S3 control), and private certificates from a Private CA root held in Security Tooling and shared through RAM. Workloads OUs can be organised by environment or by application; the SRA notes that controls that differ by environment are easiest to enforce as SCPs on environment OUs.
Identity across the SRA
| Identity | Where it is administered | Control |
|---|---|---|
| Workforce users | Identity Center (delegated to Shared Services), federated from an external IdP with SCIM | Permission sets per OU and job function; MFA; no IAM users in member accounts |
| Member account root users | Centralised root access from Security Tooling | Remove root passwords, access keys and MFA from members; use sts:AssumeRoot only for privileged root tasks |
| Management account root | Management account | Hardware MFA, business-owned email, break-glass procedure |
| Deployment pipelines | CI/CD platform, assuming roles in target accounts | OIDC federation, per-OU roles, no pipeline role able to change Security OU accounts |
| Security automation | Security Tooling | Few write roles, monitored; remediation roles scoped to the actions they automate |
| Workload roles | Each Application account | Instance profiles and task roles with IMDSv2; no long-term access keys |
The cross-account roles between these accounts are the real attack paths in a multi-account estate. List every role whose trust policy names another account, with its owner, and review it quarterly. See the AWS STS and AssumeRole Guide and the AWS Resource Control Policies and Data Perimeter Guide.
Implementing the SRA in phases
- Map current state: list every account, its OU, and which account is the delegated administrator for each security service. Note any services administered from the management account.
- Create the Security OU: stand up Security Tooling and Log Archive (or adopt Control Tower's Audit and Log Archive accounts). Move the organisation trail's bucket to Log Archive with Object Lock and SSE-KMS.
- Move delegated administrators: register Security Tooling as delegated administrator service by service, starting with GuardDuty and Security Hub CSPM. Changing a delegated administrator can break aggregated views temporarily, so plan each move in a change window and confirm member association in every Region afterwards.
- Thin the management account: delegate Identity Center to Shared Services, enable centralised root access, then remove IAM users and workloads from the management account.
- Build the Infrastructure OU: centralise connectivity and inspection in the Network account; route ingress and egress through inspection and DNS Firewall.
- Apply guardrails by OU: SCPs and RCPs for Region restriction, logging protection and data perimeter, tested on a sandbox OU first. Rollback is detaching the policy.
- Restrict access to the Security OU: read-only roles for analysts; changes only through pipelines; alerts on any direct access to Log Archive.
Decision guidance
- Small organisation: fewer than a dozen accounts can still follow the SRA's core split (management, Security Tooling, Log Archive, workloads by environment) and skip a separate Network or Monitoring account until traffic inspection or log volume justifies it.
- Large or regulated organisation: consider a dedicated identity account, a dedicated Monitoring account, separate Security Tooling accounts for monitoring and network security, and a separate audit account for Artifact if auditors must be isolated from security operations. AWS Control Tower restricts creating additional accounts under the Security OU, so check your landing zone before planning extras.
- Centralised or distributed edge: centralise CloudFront and WAF in the Network account for one place to manage certificates and logs; distribute them to Application accounts when teams need their own quotas or release cadence, managed with Firewall Manager.
Measuring adoption
- Delegation: number of security services administered from the management account (target zero).
- Log protection: percentage of security log buckets in Log Archive with Object Lock and SSE-KMS (target 100%).
- Direct access: human sign-ins to Log Archive and the management account per month outside break-glass.
- Root exposure: member accounts that still have root credentials after centralised root access is enabled.
- Cross-account trust: count of roles trusting another account with no recorded owner.
Framework mapping
| SRA principle | NIST CSF 2.0 | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A |
|---|---|---|---|
| Account separation and OU design | PR.IR-01 | SC-7, SC-32, PL-8 | A.8.22 |
| Separation of duties between management, security and workloads | GV.RR-02, PR.AA-05 | AC-5, AC-6 | A.5.3 |
| Central, immutable logging | PR.PS-04 | AU-9, AU-12 | A.8.15 |
| Delegated security monitoring | DE.CM-09, DE.AE-03 | SI-4, AU-6 | A.8.16 |
Common failure patterns
- Security services administered from the management account, forcing many people into the one account that SCPs cannot protect.
- Log Archive as a workspace: analysts with write access to log buckets, or the same role able to stop trails and delete logs, which defeats the account's purpose.
- Mismatched delegated administrators: GuardDuty, Security Hub and Detective in different accounts, so investigations cannot pivot between them.
- Shared Services treated as low risk: it holds Identity Center administration and the directory, so its administrators can grant access to every account.
- Pipelines with organisation-wide reach: one CI/CD role trusted by every account, including Security OU accounts, which becomes the single key to the estate.
- Inspection with gaps: workloads in the firewall subnet, or DNS left unfiltered, so traffic bypasses Network Firewall.
Lessons from incidents
A multi-account layout limits how far a stolen credential with administrator-like rights reaches, and SCPs on workload OUs (deny IAM user creation, deny unused Regions) block common persistence steps even with valid administrator credentials, because SCPs bind member account administrators. The SRA's separation of network services into their own account, with workload data and keys elsewhere, is designed to stop a network appliance's role from reaching customer-data buckets.
Practitioner checklist
- Compare your OU and account layout against the SRA map and record every deviation with a reason.
- Make Security Tooling the delegated administrator for GuardDuty, Security Hub CSPM, Config, Access Analyzer, Macie, Detective and Inspector, in every Region.
- Store the organisation trail and other security logs in Log Archive with Object Lock, versioning and SSE-KMS.
- Remove direct user access to Log Archive and alert on any access to log buckets outside automation.
- Delegate Identity Center to Shared Services (or a dedicated identity account) and enable centralised root access.
- Remove workloads and IAM users from the management account and protect its root user with hardware MFA.
- Restrict write roles in the Security OU to pipelines and a small, monitored set of administrators.
- Inventory cross-account roles and pipeline identities with owners and review them quarterly.
- Apply SCPs and RCPs by OU for Region restriction, logging protection and the data perimeter.
Standards and references
- AWS Prescriptive Guidance: AWS SRA architecture
- AWS Prescriptive Guidance: AWS SRA Org Management account
- AWS Prescriptive Guidance: AWS SRA Security Tooling account
- AWS Prescriptive Guidance: AWS SRA Log Archive account
- AWS Prescriptive Guidance: AWS SRA Network account
- AWS Prescriptive Guidance: AWS SRA Shared Services account
- AWS Prescriptive Guidance: AWS SRA Application account
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: AWS Organizations and SCPs Guide · AWS Control Tower Guide · Cloud Landing Zone Security Guide · AWS Security Guide