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Amazon GuardDuty Guide: Findings, Protection Plans and Response

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 8 November 2026 14 min read
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Amazon GuardDuty is switched on in most AWS estates, yet many teams run it with gaps in Region coverage, protection plans left off, broad suppression rules and findings that nobody routes to a responder. This guide explains how GuardDuty is organised across accounts, what each protection plan watches, how to read finding names and severities, how to tune without hiding real attacks, and how to turn findings into a response, especially for the many findings that are really about stolen machine credentials. It is written for SOC analysts, cloud detection engineers and the platform teams who own the GuardDuty configuration. For the wider AWS control set, start with the AWS Security Guide; this page goes deep on GuardDuty alone.

This is an independent guide from NHI Mgmt Group, based on AWS's public documentation as of November 2026. It is not sponsored or reviewed by AWS. Product features change, so confirm settings against AWS's current documentation.

Key takeaways

  • GuardDuty is Regional: it must be enabled, with the same delegated administrator account, in every Region you use and every Region you do not, because attackers launch resources where nobody is looking.
  • Protection plans decide what you can see: foundational detection covers CloudTrail management events, VPC flow logs and DNS logs; S3 data events, EKS audit logs, runtime events, RDS logins, Lambda network activity and malware scanning each need their plan enabled.
  • Many high-value findings are identity findings: credential exfiltration, anomalous API behaviour and root credential usage point at a compromised role, user or access key, so the response is usually credential revocation, not host cleanup.
  • Suppression is not free: suppressed findings are archived, are not exported to EventBridge or Security Hub CSPM, and are not used by Extended Threat Detection to build attack sequences.
  • Routing is part of the control: new findings reach EventBridge in near real time, but repeat occurrences are batched (default every 6 hours), so set the update frequency deliberately and send Critical and High findings straight to on-call.

How identity and access work in Amazon GuardDuty

GuardDuty is a managed detection service. Once enabled it reads the foundational data sources directly from AWS (you do not need to turn on CloudTrail trails or VPC flow logs yourself for GuardDuty to analyse them) and produces findings. Two identity questions matter: which account administers GuardDuty for the organisation, and which principals can change its configuration.

Account model

  • Delegated administrator: the organisation management account designates a member account as the delegated GuardDuty administrator. AWS advises against using the management account itself. A dedicated security tooling account is the usual choice. See the AWS Multi-Account Security Reference Architecture Guide.
  • Same account in every Region: GuardDuty is Regional while AWS Organizations is global, so the delegated administrator must be set in each Region, and AWS requires it to be the same account everywhere.
  • Auto-enable: the administrator can auto-enable GuardDuty and individual plans for ALL members (new and existing) or NEW members only. NEW has an ordering trap in opt-in Regions: an account that joined the organisation before opting in to the Region is not "new" there and stays uncovered. ALL avoids that.
  • Scale: one delegated administrator can manage up to 50,000 member accounts.
  • Administrator-only settings: in a multi-account setup only the administrator can create suppression rules and change the EventBridge update frequency, which keeps members from quietly hiding their own findings.

Foundational sources and protection plans

CoverageData analysedTypical findingsEnable when
Foundational threat detectionCloudTrail management events, VPC flow logs (EC2), DNS logsCredential misuse, crypto-mining traffic, calls from known malicious IPs, root usageAlways, every account and Region
Extended Threat DetectionCorrelates signals across sources, resources and time in an accountAttack sequence findings (Critical)On automatically at no extra cost
S3 ProtectionCloudTrail S3 data eventsExfiltration:S3/AnomalousBehavior, Impact:S3/AnomalousBehavior.DeleteAny account holding sensitive buckets
EKS ProtectionEKS audit logsAnonymous access, suspicious Kubernetes API useAny account running EKS
Runtime MonitoringOperating system events on EKS, EC2 and ECS (including Fargate)Process, file and network behaviour such as reverse shells or minersProduction compute; not on by default
Malware Protection for EC2EBS volumes attached to instancesMalware on an instance that raised a finding, or on demandEC2 workloads
Malware Protection for S3Newly uploaded objectsMalicious uploads to buckets that accept external filesUpload buckets; usable without GuardDuty itself
Malware Protection for AWS BackupEBS snapshots, AMIs and recovery pointsMalware in backups before restoreBackup and recovery accounts
RDS ProtectionLogin activity on supported Aurora and RDS databasesAnomalous or brute-force loginsAccounts with RDS or Aurora
Lambda ProtectionLambda network activity, starting with VPC flow logsFunctions mining or talking to malicious hostsServerless workloads
AI ProtectionUse of Amazon Bedrock, Bedrock AgentCore and SageMaker AIAnomalous model invocations, cost harvestingAccounts with AI workloads

When GuardDuty is first enabled, all plans except Runtime Monitoring are turned on and included in the 30-day free trial. After the trial they keep running and charging, which is when teams are tempted to switch plans off. Decide per plan on risk, not on the first bill: S3 Protection on a log archive account with no sensitive data may be low value, while on a data lake account it is essential.

Admin roles and privileged access

An attacker who can change GuardDuty can blind it. The actions below belong to the security team only and should be protected by SCPs in every member account.

ActionRisk if misusedGuardrail
guardduty:DeleteDetector, guardduty:UpdateDetectorTurns detection off or disables plans in an accountSCP deny for all except the security administration role
guardduty:DisassociateFromAdministratorAccount, guardduty:DisassociateMembersRemoves an account from central visibilitySCP deny in member accounts
guardduty:CreateFilter, guardduty:UpdateFilterSuppression rules that archive real findingsAdministrator account only; peer review; tag each rule with a reason
guardduty:CreateIPSet, guardduty:UpdateIPSetA trusted IP list stops findings for traffic from those addressesRestrict; review entries quarterly
guardduty:UpdatePublishingDestination, guardduty:DeletePublishingDestinationBreaks long-term export of findingsRestrict; alert on change
guardduty:ArchiveFindingsHides findings from the active viewAllow analysts, but log and review who archives what

GuardDuty's own changes appear in CloudTrail, so alert on any of these calls made outside the security role. Removing or changing the delegated administrator does not disable GuardDuty in member accounts, but it does break central visibility until the new administrator is associated in every Region.

Integrations, API tokens and service accounts

GuardDuty touches identity in two directions: it uses AWS-managed access to your data sources, and a large share of its findings concern your machine identities.

Findings that are really about credentials

Finding typeWhat it meansFirst response
UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration.OutsideAWSCredentials issued to an EC2 instance role are being used from an IP outside AWSRevoke the role's active sessions, investigate the instance, check IMDSv2 and SSRF exposure
UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration.InsideAWSInstance role credentials used from a different AWS accountAs above; check remoteAccountDetails.affiliated to see if the account is yours
UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/ResourceCredentialExfiltration.OutsideAWS / .InsideAWSCredentials from another AWS resource used from an unexpected locationRevoke sessions for the resource's role; investigate the resource
CredentialAccess:IAMUser/AnomalousBehavior and the other AnomalousBehavior typesA principal calling APIs in a way unusual for it (discovery, persistence, privilege escalation, impact)Confirm with the owner; if unconfirmed, disable keys and contain
CredentialAccess:IAMUser/CompromisedCredentialsCredentials believed compromisedRotate immediately; hunt for new users, keys and roles
Policy:IAMUser/RootCredentialUsageRoot user credentials usedConfirm a break-glass event; otherwise treat as account compromise
Stealth:IAMUser/CloudTrailLoggingDisabledA trail was stopped or deletedRestore logging; treat the actor as hostile until proven otherwise

When GuardDuty flags IAM credentials being used from an unusual network, responding to the first credential finding means hunting for every identity and resource the credential created, such as new IAM users, Lambda function URLs and instances with termination protection set, not only rotating the key. See the Cloud Access Key Leak Playbook and the EC2 Instance Metadata Service Hardening Guide.

Integrations

  • Amazon EventBridge: every finding is published as an event with source aws.guardduty and detail-type GuardDuty Finding. Rules in the administrator account receive member findings too; filter on detail.accountId or detail.severity to route.
  • AWS Security Hub CSPM: aggregates GuardDuty findings with Macie, Inspector and configuration checks. See the AWS Security Hub Guide.
  • Amazon Detective: builds behaviour graphs from logs to investigate a finding's root cause.
  • Export to S3: GuardDuty keeps findings for 90 days; configure a publishing destination to an S3 bucket in the log archive account for longer retention.
  • SIEM and SOAR: the automation that consumes findings usually runs as a role with power to disable keys and isolate instances. Scope it tightly and protect it as a privileged machine identity, because compromising it is a fast route to sabotaging your own response.

Logging and detection

Reading a finding

Finding types follow the pattern ThreatPurpose:ResourceTypeAffected/ThreatFamilyName.DetectionMechanism!Artifact, for example Backdoor:EC2/C&CActivity.B!DNS. The prefix tells you the stage (Recon, UnauthorizedAccess, CredentialAccess, Exfiltration, Impact, Stealth, Policy and so on) and the resource type tells you which runbook applies.

SeverityRangeMeaning (AWS)Suggested routing
Critical9.0 to 10.0An attack sequence may be in progress or recently occurredPage on-call immediately; major incident process
High7.0 to 8.9A resource is compromised and actively used for unauthorised purposesPage on-call; contain within the hour
Medium4.0 to 6.9Suspicious activity that deviates from normal behaviourSOC queue; confirm with resource owner same day
Low1.0 to 3.9Attempted activity that did not compromise the environmentRecord; review for trends

Update frequency and archiving

New findings are sent to EventBridge in near real time. Later occurrences of the same finding are aggregated and sent at an interval the administrator sets to 15 minutes, 1 hour or the default 6 hours. For a SOC, 15 minutes is usually the right choice, so that an ongoing exfiltration keeps updating the ticket. Manually archived findings still go to EventBridge; findings archived by a suppression rule do not.

Response playbook outline

  1. Triage: identify the resource type, principal and account from the finding; check whether the activity is a known test or tool.
  2. Credential findings: for roles, revoke active sessions (an inline deny on tokens issued before now); for IAM users, deactivate access keys; then search CloudTrail for every action the principal took and every identity it created.
  3. Compute findings: isolate the instance with a restrictive security group, snapshot volumes for forensics (Malware Protection for EC2 can scan them), and replace the instance rather than clean it.
  4. Data findings: check what was read or deleted using S3 data events, and whether versioning or Object Lock allows recovery. See the Amazon S3 Security Guide.
  5. Close out: record root cause, and add or narrow a suppression rule only if the finding was a confirmed, repeated false positive.

Metrics

  • Coverage: percentage of account and Region pairs with GuardDuty enabled and associated with the administrator (target 100%, including unused Regions).
  • Plan coverage: percentage of accounts with S3, EKS, Runtime Monitoring and RDS Protection enabled where those services are used.
  • Response speed: median time from a High or Critical finding to containment.
  • Suppression health: number of suppression rules, the share scoped to a whole finding type with no second criterion (target zero), and the date each was last reviewed.
  • Credential findings: count per month of credential exfiltration and root usage findings, which should fall as IMDSv2 and short-lived credentials roll out.

Hardening baseline

AreaBaseline
AdministrationDelegated administrator in a security tooling account, the same account in every Region; never the management account
CoverageAuto-enable set to ALL in every Region, including Regions you do not use (deny those Regions with an SCP as well)
PlansS3, EKS, RDS, Lambda and Malware Protection where the services run; Runtime Monitoring on production compute with the agent managed automatically where possible
Tamper protectionSCP denying detector deletion, disassociation and filter or IP set changes outside the security role
RoutingEventBridge rules for severity 7 and above to paging; all findings to SIEM; update frequency 15 minutes
RetentionPublishing destination to an S3 bucket in the log archive account, encrypted with a KMS key that GuardDuty is allowed to use
TuningSuppression rules only for repeated, confirmed false positives, always pairing the finding type with a second criterion

Rollout in phases

  1. Centralise: designate the delegated administrator in every Region and associate all existing accounts.
  2. Baseline for two weeks: enable foundational detection and the relevant plans with no suppression; let anomaly models learn and collect the false positive profile.
  3. Route: connect EventBridge to SIEM and paging; agree runbooks per resource type with named owners.
  4. Tune narrowly: add suppression rules for known scanners, bastions and on-premises egress addresses, each with a second criterion such as an AMI ID, tag or source IP.
  5. Lock: apply the tamper-protection SCP in a pilot OU, then across the organisation. Rollback is detaching the SCP.
  6. Exercise: generate sample findings in a test account and confirm each reaches the right queue and runbook.

Choosing coverage by organisation size

  • Small estate: a single account can enable GuardDuty in every Region, send High and Critical findings by email or chat through EventBridge and SNS, and still get value from foundational detection and S3 Protection.
  • Large estate: the cost of S3 Protection and Runtime Monitoring scales with data events and compute, so decide by account class (production data, production compute, sandbox) and record exceptions. Sandbox accounts still need foundational detection: they are often where stolen keys are first tested.

Framework mapping

ActivityNIST CSF 2.0NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5ATT&CK examples
Continuous monitoring of cloud activityDE.CM-01, DE.CM-09SI-4T1078.004 Cloud Accounts, T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery
Correlation and analysisDE.AE-02, DE.AE-03AU-6, IR-5T1552.005 Cloud Instance Metadata API
Malware scanningDE.CM-09SI-3T1496.001 Compute Hijacking
Triage and responseRS.MA-02, RS.AN-03IR-4T1530 Data from Cloud Storage, T1485 Data Destruction

In CIS Controls v8.1 GuardDuty supports Control 13 (Network Monitoring and Defense) and Control 8 (Audit Log Management); in ISO/IEC 27001:2022 it supports A.8.16 Monitoring activities.

Common misconfigurations

  • Only enabling home Regions: attackers with stolen keys often launch miners in Regions the victim never uses, where no detector is running.
  • Using NEW auto-enable with opt-in Regions: accounts that joined before the Region was opted in remain uncovered without anyone noticing.
  • Whole-type suppression: a rule that archives every Recon:EC2/Portscan or every EKS finding hides real attacks and removes those signals from attack sequence correlation.
  • Findings with no destination: findings sit in the console while nobody is paged; the 90-day retention then quietly discards the evidence.
  • Treating credential findings as host problems: rebuilding the instance while the exfiltrated role session stays valid leaves the attacker in place.
  • Disabling plans after the trial without a risk decision, leaving S3 data access and runtime behaviour invisible in the accounts that need them most.

Practitioner checklist

  • Designate one delegated administrator account, not the management account, in every Region.
  • Set auto-enable to ALL and verify with ListMembers that every account is associated in every Region.
  • Enable the protection plans that match the services each account runs, including Runtime Monitoring on production compute.
  • Deploy an SCP that denies detector deletion, disassociation and filter or IP set changes outside the security role.
  • Route severity 7 and above to paging and all findings to the SIEM; set the update frequency to 15 minutes.
  • Export findings to an encrypted S3 bucket in the log archive account for retention beyond 90 days.
  • Write runbooks for credential exfiltration, anomalous IAM behaviour, root usage and S3 impact findings.
  • Allow suppression rules only for confirmed, repeated false positives with a second criterion and a review date.
  • Test the pipeline quarterly with sample findings and record time to containment.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: AWS Security Guide · Cloud Detection Engineering Guide · AWS CloudTrail Guide · Detection Engineering for Non-Human Identities Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 8 November 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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